South Africa’s ICJ Case Brushes Over Gaza’s Violence Economy
An extremely disturbing socio-economic trend appears to exist within Gaza strip. A tremendous financial inequality currently exists between active militants and passive civilians. This wealth gap starts with the Hamas elite living lavishly in Qatar and ends with the helpless civilians who fled from Operation Swords Of Iron and are squeezing the remaining resources in the South of Gaza. In October 2023, the unemployment rate in Gaza was 47% and more than 80% of its population was living in poverty, according to the United Nations.
I therefore asked ChatGPT the following question “What do you call an economic system where the most violent people get the most money?”
Chat GPT replied:
“There isn't a specific term for an economic system where the most violent individuals or entities receive the most money. However, if you're describing a situation where coercion, force, or violence play a significant role in economic transactions, it may be associated with a corrupt or lawless environment rather than a formal economic system.
In conventional economic terms, a system where violence is a primary means of accumulating wealth would likely be considered dysfunctional, and such conditions would likely hinder sustainable economic development. In well-functioning economic systems, the rule of law, property rights, and a fair legal framework are typically considered essential for fostering economic growth and prosperity.”
The economic turmoil facing civilians in Gaza is in fact noted by South Africa’s 84 page ICJ document however this is framed against an alleged economic normality as there is no further reference to the ongoing practice of a violence economy.
“By 16 November 2023, the food infrastructure in Gaza was already considered “no longer functional”, given shop and market closures, the lack of essential food items, and the inflated price of the scarce food available. Bread is scarce or non-existent, with food scarcity leading to significant price hikes, and the price of flour increasing by 65 per cent at one stage. Livestock that has not been killed is facing starvation, and crops are damaged or destroyed. Many Palestinians are resorting to foraging due to hunger, collecting spilled flour from aid distributions from the road, or other unsafe food practices.”
Imminent mass starvation is furthermore argued to be a compelling circumstance for provisional measures.
IDF military missions have so far exposed this controversy of a violence economy in Gaza by finding lavish jewellery receipts worth 25 thousand $, suitcases filled to the brim with money totalling over one million dollars and upturning more and more of the mega underground concrete tunnel system known as the Gaza Metro.
Over and above these financial discoveries it has also been exposed that martyrdom funds are also being utilised. These finances are said to be entrenched in the Palestinian society as an important source of welfare. Critics of these payouts however argue that violent actions against Israeli civilians are being incentivised on a “pay for slay” basis.
The most chilling price tags in the violence economy are the actual bounties placed on the capture of Israeli hostages and soldiers - warm or cold - alive or dead. According to interrogation information shared with the media, the October 7 participants were offered 10 000$ and apartment housing in exchange for kidnapping Israeli civilains.
Furthermore the head of a murdered Israeli soldier was reported to have been offered around at a market price tag of 10 000$. The head was ultimately located by IDF forces in a duffel bag alongside tennis balls and documents in an ice cream store freezer and repatriated for burial.
These practices constitute war crimes. It is a customary international law norm that taking hostages is not allowed. Furthermore putting a price on the head of an enemy (both figuratively and literally) is also not allowed and this practice is expressly banned by many Western States’ military manuals including Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
In conclusion, the economic background leading to the downfall of day-to-day life in Gaza as detailed in South Africa’s ICJ application is both factually and legally incomplete. A far greater economic ill has befallen the civilian population of Gaza and this shattering socio-economic phenomenon of a violence economy goes far deeper than Hamas militants commandeering aid trucks for military purposes.
South Africa might therefore not be able to rely on this argument as a compelling circumstance for provisional measures at the ICJ. While a violence economy is the end result of what was promised to voters in Gaza in 2006, many would not have foreseen it backfire so tremendously on themselves in 2024. This violent system of social and economic distress will inevitably be studied by students in global economics, history, politics and philosophy textbooks in years to come even if the South African government does not acknowledge it today.
