I shall never forget how the current South African electoral system emerged. There had been a difficult tense period when we were told that the Codesa negotiators were desperately bolting together what turned out to be the provisional constitution. Then finally, on a single day its terms were released altogether to the press. Many of the clauses has been public knowledge for a while as the Codesa negotiators had battled in public over what sort of constitutional clashes required a two thirds and which a three quarters majority for amendment. But there, tucked in at the end, was the provision for the electoral system. I remember gulping as I read it.
I had, as criminal lawyers put it, previous form for I had spent 26 years teaching political science at Oxford and the Sorbonne and had become something of an expert on electoral systems. Reading what I did that day utterly shocked me for I knew enough to realise that the electoral system there laid out would negate many of the high-flown objectives of the Constitution. There had never been a more extreme PR system in history nor such a party bosses' charter.
The bosses would draw up the lists and anyone who gave them cheek could be immediately "retired" from Parliament or their provincial legislature. In effect voters would be invited to vote for an amorphous notion of party and there would be no personal responsibility to constituency anywhere in the system. All responsibility would be to the party bosses.
The interesting thing was that there had been no publicity at all about the negotiations over this, the most important provision of all. It had clearly been agreed in absolute secrecy and it's authors, obviously realizing the bombshell nature of this provision, had held it back and then only released it amidst the general flood of constitutional provisions. Clearly, they had banked upon the fact that journalistic and political attention would be drawn to many other provisions and, I fear, to the general naïveté of South African journalists about such matters as electoral systems. Their bet, if that is what it was, was wholly vindicated for no one said a word of criticism and when I tried to raise the monstrous nature of the system, even among friends I was met with bored tolerance at best.
I have often wondered why it is that in all the long and tedious accounts of the democratic transition - I cannot understand the fascination with this subject - no one seems to have any ideas as to who exactly is responsible for negotiating this monstrosity of a system. Looking at it with the practiced eye of someone used to studying the politics of the French third and fourth republics and post-war Italy, several things seemed obvious to me.
First, the extreme proportionalism was clearly an attempt by the NP to rescue the furniture from the burning building. For two years and more the polls had shown the ANC around 65 per cent and the Nats around 20 per cent. For the Nats the big prize was to emerge as the leader of an Opposition bloc of around 35 per cent, and thus able to bloc constitutional amendments.