REFLECTION ON THE END OF APARTHEID: A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

“FW de Klerk’s announcement in South Africa’s Parliament on 2 February 1990 radically changed the entire strategic political landscape of South Africa. It ended the revolutionary war in an instant and transformed it into a legitimate political struggle. The security forces were no longer the driving force, and the way was paved for politicians to take the lead towards direct negotiations and CODESA.”

On 2 February 1990, President FW de Klerk announced a change of course. Apartheid was abolished and the liberation movements were unbanned. Why such a radical step? many asked. After all, South Africa had the strongest military and economy in Africa. Why not hold out longer? The short answer is that time was running out.

This article focuses on the security situation in South Africa at the time of De Klerk's announcement. It examines the scope, nature, and intensity of the pressure for change, at that time. The government's handling of the security situation, efforts to address it in non-security ways, as well as the planning and preparation for negotiations, fall outside the scope of this overview.

Note: The term "onslaught", although not entirely accurate, is used as a generic term for the entire spectrum of demands for change.

At the end of the 1980s, South Africa was heading inexorably towards self-destruction. The intelligence community (IC) warned the government that the situation "could escalate into a major crisis on a short timescale". The government was cornered. Because political change was inevitable and unavoidable, a way out had to be found.

The permanent members of the IC were the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Security Branch of the SA Police (SB), and the Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI) of the SA Defence Force. The Department of Foreign Affairs was permanently co-opted to the IC.

Misunderstanding

Many did not understand the urgency and necessity for fundamental political change. The reason is probably due to the secrecy of those years. Information was selectively provided by the authorities and reporting by the media was constrained by emergency measures. The public was never fully informed about the full extent and intensity of the onslaught. They were therefore unaware of the underlying revolutionary situation in the country, and the pressure on the government from non- radical institutions, both domestic and foreign.

Another reason for the misunderstanding was the relative political and economic stability that prevailed at that time. On the surface, the security situation appeared to be calm. What is forgotten is that when De Klerk gave his speech, the national state of emergency was still in place, and strict security measures kept unrest and turmoil under control. There was no chance of lifting the state of emergency without the danger that chaos, worse than the June riots in KwaZulu-Natal in 2021, could break out across the country. Driving forces under the surface were building momentum for change.

White and Black community were so divided during those years, that Whites were generally unaware of developments, feelings, and attitudes in Black communities. They were misled by the assurance of well-meaning Black community, ostensibly that Black community were not as dissatisfied with apartheid policy as some pretended. Most white people's contact with intellectual Black community was extremely limited. (The impression exists that some South Africans, more than thirty years after De Klerk's speech, still have a limited realisation of the intensity of the disgust for apartheid that prevailed both internationally and domestically).

Security Situation

By the end of 1980, South Africa was facing a revolutionary situation that could only be controlled through a state of emergency. At the same time, the government's domestic power base began to erode. The workability and ethical justification of apartheid were increasingly questioned by traditional supporters of the National Party (NP), while Black community who were previously sympathetic to the government tried to distance themselves from it. `

Internationally, South Africa was politically isolated on a large scale. Economic and arms boycotts, and campaigns to strengthen them, increased. The then Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis, saw it this way: "At very high unit costs, but with astonishing innovation, we could produce our own petroleum, weapons, enriched uranium, and more in the midst of boycotts and sanctions. However, when international measures completely isolated us financially in 1985 and forced us to become a capital-exporting country until we were politically rehabilitated internationally, our econometric model immediately showed how severely we would be affected by a lack of currency. Unfortunately, we could not print our own US dollars at the time. As a final condemnation of apartheid, our economy could indeed grow at a maximum rate of only about 2% per year, less than the population growth."

From some of the friendliest countries, such as the United Kingdom and the USA, greater diplomatic pressure began to be exerted to end apartheid. No influential decision-makers in the West saw fit to openly defend South Africa. Even some sympathetic organizations, such as the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, seriously urged the government to abandon apartheid.

Domestically and internationally, the South African government was quickly losing its legitimacy. This gave greater impetus and justification to efforts to persuade or force the government, even violently, to change its policies. At the same time, the ANC's image as a legitimate player increased significantly internationally, especially after the introduction of the Harare Declaration of 1989. The declaration contained the ANC's core proposals for a constitutional settlement in South Africa and was received with acclamation by the OAU, the Commonwealth, and the UN.

The IC's projection was that things could only get worse in the future. The situation the government was facing was presented by the IC to the State Security Council (SSC) as a three-legged pot boiling over. Attempts to press down the lid with force to prevent the pot from boiling over no longer worked. It would continue to boil over until the fire was reduced or extinguished. The message was clear.

In the mid-1980s, the strategic pattern of the struggle began to change. After 1987, the scale gradually began to swing towards negotiations instead of violent change. In 1989, there was a significant strengthening of this trend, as the preponderant weight of conflict resolution shifted towards negotiation and a negotiated settlement. Although the ANC/SACP boasted about a violent revolutionary war ("people's war"), they were secretly planning for negotiations that resulted in the Harare Declaration. Throughout this delicate process, the IC kept the government informed of developments.

The core of the problem

The IC, who has the task of continually assessing South Africa’s overall security situation, informed De Klerk shortly after he took office that "despite perceptions in some public media and in parts of the academic community, the root cause of the RSA's problems is not attributed to a single actor, communism.

The core of the threat undoubtedly lies in the complex social, political, and socio- economic framework of the South African state, with its diversity of peoples, and the added tension arising from domestic and international resistance against the dominant position held by the White minority group. The result was a country and community that constantly grapples with a stability problem, which can escalate into a major crisis on a short timescale, and therefore extremely vulnerable to exploitation by external powers and authorities.

Concern about the security situation

To assess the government decision of the time, it is necessary to look back at the situation in which South Africa found itself in the 1980s. As someone aptly remarked: ‘While we bask in the warm rays of the sun today, we forget how cold the winter was.’

On the eve of De Klerk's announcement, the apartheid system was under massive pressure, both nationally and internationally. The IC warned the government unequivocally that the potential for violent change was so high, that it could lead to large-scale violent eruptions. Even in the short term, that would be difficult to handle. Year after year, the government was informed in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), that the country was caught in an escalating spiral of violence. In 1989, red lights were dangerously flashing.

Like the IC, the heads of the military and police were seriously concerned about the deteriorating security situation. They urged politicians to do something to alleviate the onslaught. The problem is primarily a political problem, it was said.

The role of the security forces is merely to create a safe and stable environment in which legitimate politics can be practiced. The Commissioner of Police informed the government unequivocally that the police's abilities were strained to the limit. The tension under which the police had to work placed them under tremendous pressure. The military also experienced increasing opposition from both white and black over its presence in the townships.

Amongst economists, there was a serious concern. Barend Du Plessis describes it as follows: "Our limited resources could not accommodate the extensive conflict-preventing expenses for essential infrastructure, such as schools, houses, hospitals, roads, municipal services, food aid, and so on, especially in Black, Coloured, and Indian areas, along with drastically rising conflict management expenses, such as a war on the border and action against increasing violence domestically. Additionally, MOSGAS, which was a poor financial investment with a -9% "return" on capital, was launched in 1987. It would have to be indefinitely subsidised as a "strategic necessity." Moreover, it could only begin production five years later.

The Treasury warned the Cabinet that proceeding with MOSGAS would send an unambiguous message that the government was not anticipating a political solution for SA in the foreseeable future, which could end the oil boycott. It was an unwelcome statement, and without further discussion, they summarily moved to the next agenda item. Ministers of "non-security" portfolios then swallowed harder at the inevitable future underfunding of their departments. They could only hope that "things would soon get better," but it would certainly not happen without major political moves, which were not properly understood by everyone and certainly would not be an easy choice."

Thus, South Africa experienced an all-encompassing onslaught, with a violent revolutionary assault as one leg, and attempts to change or destroy apartheid through peaceful pressure as the other leg. However, there was no mastermind controlling and coordinating the onslaught.

A vast infrastructure of anti-apartheid organizations existed within South Africa domestically, which could be activated spontaneously in a short period of time. Given the tension in the South African community, it could lead to widespread violence (full-scale revolution) that would be very difficult for the security forces to contain. An analogy is the street vendor who set himself on fire in Tunisia, thereby ushering in the so-called Arab Spring. The unrest of 2021 in KwaZulu/Natal also serves as an example.

There was also a widespread infrastructure of anti-apartheid organizations abroad, in support of unrest and uprisings in South Africa.

Handling violent situations and provocations would put great pressure on the security forces, which already could not contain all the manifestations of unrest and turmoil in 1989. Mass gatherings where ANC and SACP colours were displayed, intimidation in townships, and various passive resistance actions raised concerns about the revolutionary climate.

Role Players

Who were the people and institutions that played an active role in the process of dismantling or destroying apartheid policies? Was it simply the communists and agitators who many in white circles believed to be the instigators? The reality was certainly more convoluted and complex.

The role players who insisted on changing the political system were diverse. The IC saw it this way: "The differences between the political actors involved both the ultimate goal to be achieved in the RSA, as well as the strategy or method by which it should be achieved. It is often observed that institutions with widely divergent goals work together at a given time to effect change, while each party is convinced that it can achieve its specific goals after "apartheid" has been removed. Similarly, groups that agree on an ultimate goal, can sharply differ with regard to the method to be employed. This state of affairs increased the complexity of the South African situation and raises problems with regard to an accurate prediction of the situation's progress."

As mentioned, the onslaught had a widely varied character that was pursued by diverse institutions for their own interests. The nature of the onslaught ranged from revolutionary violence by the ANC- SACP, to efforts by people and institutions with great empathy for white South Africans who advocated change through peaceful coercion. There were those who advocated change through constitutional means, and those who wanted to follow the unconstitutional path.

The ideological spectrum of institutions that advocated and promoted change ranged from Marxist- Leninist to conservative countries and organizations in the international community, including the United States and the United Kingdom, amongst others.

However, the ultimate goals of the various institutions sharply differed. There were countless models at play. On the one hand, there were those who wanted to establish a fully socialist (read communist) system, while on the other hand, there were those who simply wanted to rid South Africa of racial discrimination. The net result was that the different approaches promoted one theme: South Africa must change, and apartheid must go.

This led to efforts to effect change becoming intertwined. It often happened that communists and non-communists abroad worked together in campaigns to isolate South Africa. Something similar happened domestically. Often churches and communists worked together to launch protest marches and campaigns against apartheid. One of the peculiar situations that arose was that many ANC sympathizers with strong religious convictions joined the atheist South African Communist Party (SACP), simply because they sought a vehicle to fight apartheid.

The onslaught on South Africa during the 1980s can therefore not be attributed to a single actor.

Deployment of the onslaught

Efforts to persuade or force South Africa to abandon apartheid, basically as outlined here, manifested in two broad streams: peaceful change on the one hand and violent or revolutionary change on the other. Below is a brief overview of the deployment of the onslaught.

Revolutionary change

The revolutionary goal was the violent overthrow of the status quo and the establishment of a socialist (Marxist) order in South Africa. The main player was the ANC-SACP, supported by the USSR, its satellites, and sympathizers, as well as international pressure groups. The role, influence and impact of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was limited.

The ANC-SACP followed a two-track strategy. On the one hand, it wanted to overthrow the government by force, and on the other hand, through passive resistance, make the country ungovernable. Its so-called "people's war" strategy, according to which the ANC wanted to isolate the government from its power base, was based on four pillars:

• Mass mobilization
• The establishment of a domestic underground network
• The international isolation of the "apartheid regime"
• Armed struggle.

It was mass mobilization and the international isolation of South Africa, that had the greatest impact. Mass mobilization was particularly focused on the following areas of society:

• The working class and trade unions
• The mobilization of women
• The mobilization of the rural "masses"
• The mobilization of youth
• The religious "front"
• Civil (civic) organizations
• The mobilization of the white community.

Passive resistance actions, "rolling mass action," included: strikes, illegal mass gatherings at funerals, mass marches, boycotts, sit-ins, occupations, demonstrations, refusal to pay rent and taxes, creation of alternative and parallel local government structures, and other forms of civil disobedience such as disrupting schools under the banner of "liberation before education." In the townships, so-called "liberated" areas were created that made it impassable for security forces without armed protection.

Although manifestations of violence such as terrorism, violent riots, sabotage, murder of government officials, and other forms of violence played a role, it was not as important a factor as passive resistance in creating a revolutionary domestic situation. Passive resistance was the spearhead of the revolutionary attack.

Peaceful change

Locally. Regarding peaceful change, the proponents were widely diverse. It ranged from (a) a moderate push for political change mainly from white sectors, and the pressure and influence exerted by Western powers and organizations, to (b) militant statements and actions from activists within the Black community.

As indicated earlier, it was civil or mass resistance primarily from Black community that ultimately played a decisive role in creating the revolutionary situation. Civil unrest continued, and rolling mass action gained momentum.

After 1983, the UDF played a significant role. Despite the close ties between the UDF and the ANC, the UDF cannot simply be regarded as an extension of the ANC. The UDF as an organization was not homogeneous and accommodated varying opinions. However, the net result was that in practice the UDF promoted the ANC's goals.

Importantly, although the ANC was a main instigator of the internal radical opposition, resistance against apartheid gained a singular momentum that was not entirely controlled by the ANC. It was this general resistance against apartheid that led to passive resistance, and it was passive resistance, with the violence that accompanied it, that substantially intensified the revolutionary climate nationwide.

Abroad. It is a myth that South Africa could rely on the support of the West to maintain the apartheid system, even with modifications. The opposite is true. Sharp attacks on apartheid were launched from the West, and Western leaders were rapidly losing patience with South Africa's refusal to budge. The Reagan administration's program of "constructive engagement" aimed unequivocally at the dismantling of apartheid.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had opposed attempts to establish a mandatory total boycott against South Africa; making it clear that apartheid had to be done away with as soon as possible. From the German and French governments, there was no official sympathy for a softer approach. By the late eighties, there were disturbing indications that Western governments were intending to take stronger covert action against apartheid through their intelligence services. Throughout the West, the ANC's image as a reasonable negotiator began to grow.

Changing Zeitgeist

In the late 1980s, the situation gradually began to change. Despite its public advocacy for violent struggle, the ANC had quietly prepared for a constitutional change since 1985. It is known that the Soviet Union, and specifically Gorbachev, had become less enthusiastic about supporting the ANC in the late 1980s.

Shortly before De Klerk was elected president, the ANC announced the Harare Declaration, which contained its constitutional proposals. This document was accepted by acclamation by the international community and was adopted without dissent the following year at the United Nations. Had De Klerk's announcement on 2 February 1990 not occurred, it could be anticipated that this document would have given momentum to campaigns from various quarters to end apartheid.

1989 was a year in which the international zeitgeist decisively swung towards negotiations, rather than violent confrontation. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan during that year, and communist Eastern Europe was crumbling. The end of the Cold War seemed increasingly possible. Worldwide, there was a spirit of greater tolerance. This was reinforced by the summit in Malta between American President George HW Bush and his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, after which Gorbachev said: "The world is leaving one epoch and entering another. We are at the beginning of a long road to a lasting, peaceful era. The threat of force, mistrust, the psychological and ideological struggle should all be things of the past." The Soviet Union lost its appetite for supporting an armed solution in South Africa. The peaceful progress made with the independence of Southwest Africa further contributed to the spirit of rapprochement and negotiation.

There was a growing belief that negotiations, rather than violence, should be the way to settle international disputes. This wave also hit South Africa. Greater pressure was placed on South Africa by many Western countries to engage in talks with the ANC. Glasnost and perestroika became fashionable words in the international community.

Pressure was also put on the ANC by the Soviet Union to plan for negotiations. In this regard, as already mentioned, the ANC had already begun preparations in the mid-1980s. A task force to develop constitutional principles was established, and well-considered academic papers were produced. This led to sharp disagreement within the ANC. There was still a faction around MK that strongly resisted. Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC’s military wing, believed that the struggle should continue until the "Boers" were defeated.

The moderate faction led by OR Tambo and Thabo Mbeki won. This faction had already had unofficial contact with the government under the radar since the second half of the 1980s. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) and its Director-General, Dr Niël Barnard, played a central role in this process. The moderates (pro-negotiation) in the ANC also increasingly engaged in dialogue with politically moderate South Africans.

States of Emergencies

The net result of all the resistance actions was that the country became increasingly ungovernable, so much so that a partial state of emergency had to be declared in 1985, followed by a national state of emergency in 1986. Without it, the country would have been uncontrollable. This state of emergency was still in effect when De Klerk made his announcement on February 2, 1990.

Although the ANC/SACP did not have complete control over the unrest and turmoil in South Africa, its influence and almost mythical symbolic status among the domestic population had increased to such an extent that it could no longer be ignored as a critical power factor.

The government's attempt to maintain sovereignty was further hampered by international isolation and its paralyzing effect on the economy. In the absence of drastic adjustments on South Africa's part, the negative ripple effect of the Harare Declaration after 1990 would have significantly strengthened the momentum of boycotts and isolation.

The above is a simplification of the scope and intensity of the problems. For the sake of brevity, this will suffice.

Growing tension

In 1989, from various local and international sources, the phrase "Give FW a chance" was heard. While he was acting president, he visited various European leaders and that was also the message he heard there: "We give you a last chance." At that time, South Africa was completely isolated.

There was not a single influential decision-maker in the world, locally or internationally, who defended apartheid. Many Western institutions said that they understood South Africa's dilemma, but that the apartheid policy had to be abandoned. Even one of the most sympathetic organizations in the world, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, urgently requested that South Africa abandon apartheid.

It was against this background of increasing peaceful pressure and revolutionary violence that De Klerk made his announcement on February 2, 1990. Everything indicated that the onslaught as a whole, in other words, the peaceful pressure for change as well as the revolutionary attack, was on the verge of escalating significantly.

Therefore, South Africa did not face only a communist-inspired revolutionary onslaught, but rather a combination of revolutionary change and peaceful pressure to change. It was indeed a total onslaught on South Africa to change, to distance itself completely from apartheid.

If only the pressure for peaceful change, which included total boycotts, were considered, South Africa could probably have lasted even longer. More urgent was the domestic revolutionary situation. Unlike in 1960 (Sharpeville), 1976 (the Soweto uprisings), and even the states of emergency of 1985 and 1986, the infrastructure was favourable for revolutionary uprisings and violence spread widely over large parts of the country.

The implementation of the Tricameral Parliament in 1983 was the spark that ignited radical resistance in the country. The Black community felt excluded. As a direct result, the UDF was established. Not only did the UDF unite existing resistance organizations, but it was also the inspiration for the establishment of numerous community organizations that created serious security problems.

It can be rightly said that if it were not for the UDF, the ANC-SACP's onslaught would have been completely different and probably not as successful. The ANC-SACP and the UDF became increasingly intertwined. After the 1986 state of emergency, there was a temporary lull in organized resistance due to the emergency measures, but by the end of the 1980s, political and civil organisations increasingly challenged the state of emergency. When the UDF's effectiveness was curtailed by the national state of emergency, a Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was established in 1988, which played a significant role in stimulating resistance, particularly through its "Defiance Campaign." The campaign to challenge apartheid legislation was essentially twofold: to highlight the segregation of facilities and services, especially in education, transportation, and health, and to emphasize the ongoing restrictions on organizations and individuals that make normal political activities impossible. Due to its amorphous nature, it was difficult to take action against the MDM.

The local resistance committees in the townships were a source of revolutionary ideas. Many of them were young and anarchist in nature, using violence to intimidate the residents of the townships. "Necklacing" was one of the spectacular ways of intimidation. In 1985, the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, made an unsuccessful appeal to them to stop. However, they were out of control and made a huge contribution to making the townships ungovernable.

The security situation in the townships, together with the actions of various other resistance organizations, had become increasingly complex. The struggle had been played out on almost all terrains of society - a total struggle. It involved not only politics and the economy, but culture, the labour force, women and churches, health, education, etc. Terror was part of the ANC-SACP's strategy, which over time also targeted the civilian population. It was the ANC-SACP's outspoken intention to radicalize and mobilize the entire community in all its facets (especially black) against the existing order.

The spirit of militant resistance was gaining significant momentum in 1989. The handling of protest action had become more difficult, and the heavy-handed handling of illegal and other gatherings where the police were openly defied further fuelled resistance.

The struggle was interpreted by some in South Africa as a total attack, orchestrated by the Kremlin. There is no evidence that the USSR orchestrated domestic resistance. Communism and black nationalism were the driving force behind the revolutionary struggle, but were not the only players in terms of the totality of the struggle.

Some commentators believed that the government only had to get rid of communist agitators, both inside and outside the country, to stabilize the country. However, this was a misconception. The intrinsic aversion to apartheid transcended ideological boundaries, both inside and outside the country.

The radical organizations, however, succeeded in creating awareness in the Black community that they were being oppressed, and it was this spirit of the times that particularly encouraged youth to resist without wanting to promote communism or having any communist ties. It was particularly the Black Power movement that was instrumental in this from the beginning of the seventies and was carried forward by the ANC in the eighties.

Elucidation

In the domestic arena, relative stability prevailed because of strong security force operations. However, this had exhausted the security forces and would not be sustainable in the long run. Broad trends that were considered in 1989/1990, included the following: (This is by no means exhaustive and does not capture the complexity as a whole. A more comprehensive analysis is required).

Among the Black communities

• The Black population was becoming increasingly radicalized despite strict security measures. Politicization occurred, especially under the broad umbrella of the UDF with its strong ANC/SACP ties, exceeding traditional tribal affiliations.

• There were no alternative leaders who supported the government that could mobilize black communities, nor any alternative policy frameworks that were acceptable to them. Of all the homeland leaders, only President Lucas Mangope supported the policy of separate development. However, the government's case, under whatever name, did not find buyers in the black market. Radicalization was clearly gaining momentum.

• The image of the ANC and Mandela as "saviors" of the "yoke of apartheid" was being built up with increasing success. This "cause" did attract eager buyers.

• The government did not have a black support base ("constituency"). With the exception Chief Buthelezi, all the so-called homeland leaders had been discredited among Black community, and, moreover, Buthelezi's ultimate goal was exactly the same as that of the ANC: one person, one vote.

• Although Black Power had been strongly curtailed by security measures, there were signs that it was beginning to revive (the Sowetan with its Nation Building Program is an example).

• The government's exercise of authority was sharply curtailed by the creation of inaccessible areas ("no-go areas") in townships that could only be entered with the help of heavy security protection;

• So-called "rolling mass action" escalated. The police were faced with severe difficulties dealing with mass protests, stay-aways, trade boycotts, extensive strikes by trade unions, school disruptions, forced relocations, etc. Reckless heavy-handed action by government, especially during mass protests, led to further isolation steps from abroad and further radicalization of the local population.

• Terrorist acts continued, despite strong security measures. Although the ANC/SACP (MK) violence was militarily insignificant, periodic bomb explosions as well as landmines in rural areas created the image in the Black community that the ANC was still alive and capable of operating domestically. Thus the “power” of the ANC/SACP was promoted. It also led to a sense of insecurity among white people.

• In the South Africa of 1989, there was widespread euphoria among the Black community that the end of apartheid was in sight. This was strongly stimulated, among other things, by the international spirit of glasnost and perestroika. Anti-apartheid organizations internationally eagerly helped to fan these thoughts.

Among White communities

• The push for political change of any kind began to feature more prominently in political debates in the 1980s. Change was in the air.

• Various diverse people and institutions called for change. This ranged from the radical end, which advocated a socialist black majority state along with black organizations, through the moderate middle ground, to the conservative insistence that separateness be strengthened.

• The government was losing its potential/traditional power base:

o  Within the ranks of a loud vocal portion of Afrikaner youth, apartheid was openly rejected, and the government challenged. The Voëlvry Tour made no small contribution to giving momentum to this. The lyrics of Johannes Kerkorrel ("Sit dit af, sit dit af") are but one example.

o  Apartheid was increasingly attacked in public in Afrikaans across a wider front. Vrye Weekblad serves as an example.

o  Criticism of apartheid from academic circles and the Afrikaans press began to increase.

o  Curiosity about who and what the ANC is began to grow. (The SACP was not necessarily considered.) Excursions to talk with the ANC increased. Compare, among others, the Dakar talks, and the trips of Afrikaans students to talk with the ANC;

o  Within the ranks of the National Party, inside and outside Parliament, there was a greater urgency for change;

o  Afrikaans protest literature began to appear more frequently. Compare, for example, the works of André Brink and others.

o  The impact of economic sanctions was increasingly felt, and academics, scientists, technicians, and other personnel became more concerned by the day about their isolation from foreign counterparts;

o  A sense of insecurity and uncertainty was evident among the general white public due to the terror in the countryside and bombs in the cities.

• The Business community tried with greater urgency to convince the government that apartheid was not going to work and of the necessity to talk with the ANC. Of particular importance was Anglo- American's contact with the ANC in the mid-1980s. This resulted in other organizations also seeing their way open to talk with the ANC. The flood of visits to the ANC increased especially after the so- called Dakar meeting between prominent Afrikaners and the ANC. This was an encouragement for greater contact between the ANC and local organizations. It contributed to the image of greater legitimacy of the ANC as a decision-making factor or even alternative government in a future South Africa.

General

• Racial tension increased. Several observers believed that racial tension was heightened by the actions of resistance movements and the ANC's campaign of terror, as well as the government's heavy-handedness in dealing with opponents of apartheid.

•   There were varying views on how close the then South African economy was to collapse. The expectation was that it would happen in the short to medium term.

o  The immediate threat to the economy was the decision in 1985 by the five largest American banks not to roll over South Africa's debt. According to Barend du Plessis, "the banks insisted that interest on the debt be paid promptly but agreed, through negotiations with the Treasury, to staggered repayment of capital.

Two notable cases of confiscation by creditors abroad were the seizure of an aircraft shipment of South African Reserve Bank gold in Switzerland and a significant payment in New York to an RSA exporter. Although both incidents could be attributed to negligence, such situations indicated bigger problems in the short-term future. How does one manage a business without bridge financing? What about a country like SA? It simply was not possible. Persist and collapse or think immediately, plan, and survive."

o  The head of research at the NIS outlined the consequences as follows: "Such financial actions sank Rhodesia, and if we couldn't pay our foreign debt, we would have gone bankrupt. It was no longer just about boycotts; nobody wanted to do business with South Africa. From an economic point of view, we could no longer endure. The fact is that we could no longer afford the cost of the military and police services to keep a lid on things.

In fact, along with increasing economic pressures such as boycotts, sanctions, and disinvestment, i.e., the withdrawal of companies and flight of capital, and the possibility that we could not pay our foreign debt, our economy was on the brink of collapse. It would have been senseless to continue on the existing path, and fortunately, all parties in the IC recognized this. The strongest economy in Africa would have been forced to its knees overnight. Even if the security forces managed to keep a lid on things for a while, our economy would have suffocated. We had an open economy that relied on continued interaction with the outside world."

o  A study by Prof. Anton Lowenberg, representing a relatively common opinion, reached the following conclusion:

"South Africa's apartheid system was enormously costly and ultimately collapsed because the inefficiencies created by apartheid policies escalated as the economy's structure changed. Labour market regulation and industrial decentralization policy inhibited efficient resource utilization, especially as the manufacturing sector became dominant. Apartheid educational policies generated skill shortages.

A mercantile development strategy distorted trade patterns, exacerbated dependence on foreign capital inflows, and created chronic balance of payments difficulties. The administrative and defence costs of implementing apartheid were onerous and rising. These internal weaknesses enhanced South Africa's vulnerability to capital flight, changes in world prices and business cycle conditions, and political changes abroad.

Ultimately, apartheid was abandoned because its costs came to exceed its benefits to white South Africans. The internal dynamics of the system dictated the retrenchment of apartheid, which in all probability would have occurred even without foreign sanctions."

(1)  An international observer, Prof. Schwartzman, stated: "Our analysis suggests that constraints on the domestic labour market and international financial boycotts were the primary factors in the collapse of apartheid."

(2)  Militarily speaking, South Africa remained strong. Despite the build-up of forces in neighbouring countries, there was no immediate military threat posed by the so-called Frontline States. MK was not a real military threat. Its terrorist activities had a political-psychological effect, but very little military impact.

However, strong military action could not defeat an idea. Despite the "hearts and minds" approach, forceful action (kragdadigheid) could not prevent the experience of oppression from inciting people to rebellion. Despite the government's best efforts, it was unable to stem the rising opposition to apartheid, even within its broad base of voter support and even within the structures of the NP.

Conclusion

Apart from ethical considerations, the most important strategic factors underlying FW de Klerk's announcement of February 2, 1990, were, on the one hand, (a) the erosion of the National Party and the government's power base among whites and blacks in South Africa and among sympathetic international players. On the other hand, (b) it was the extent and intensity of active resistance to apartheid. The ANC was already such a significant influential factor that it could not be ignored in the consideration of a new political dispensation.

Together, the totality of the onslaught created an unsustainable security situation. Apartheid was on the brink of collapse if circumstances did not change. The broad analysis of the security threat as outlined in this essay was primarily developed by the NIS, whose approach was decisive in the IC. However, there were still individuals within the IC and commanders in the military and police who saw the threat solely as a revolutionary attack.

The NIS and its head, Dr. Niël Barnard, continued to bring, not only the nature and extent of the threat to the government's attention, but also brought the root cause of the threat, namely the policy of apartheid, to the government's attention despite opposition. In doing so, the NIS contributed significantly to creating a climate in government circles in which it was possible to make drastic policy adjustments and to play an important facilitating role through its contact with the ANC and with President Mandela in promoting the settlement between the government and the ANC for the creation of a new political dispensation.