Over the weekend the Sunday Times ran a story which placed President Thabo Mbeki on the horns of a rather pointy dilemma. As the Presidency noted in a statement the headline of the report was "Mbeki took R30-million and gave some to Zuma". The newspaper, it complained, had placed "a spurious allegation in the public domain, i.e. President Thabo Mbeki received a bribe of R30 million from MAN Ferrostaal."

On Wednesday morning Anton Harber noted, that faced with such a bald-faced allegation, Mbeki could respond in two possible ways. He could take no further action, but this could be construed as an admission of guilt. Or, alternatively, he could "issue a forceful pledge to force the newspaper to retract and apologise" and sue if they refused to comply.

That afternoon Minister of Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin, told journalists that the President was indeed "taking legal advice on what action he should take on behalf of himself and government." The problem is that - whatever the merits of the Sunday Times story - The Presidency is desperate not to have any formal inquiry reopened into the arms deal. Erwin told the press briefing, "as government we can see no basis for the appointment of a judicial inquiry."

If Mbeki chooses to sue for defamation that court case would effectively turn into a de-facto judicial inquiry into the merits of the arms deal. Former officials and investigators, who are otherwise constrained from speaking publicly on the matter, would be able to testify about what they know. It is unlikely that the government would want to have the submarine procurement process, among others, subjected to detailed scrutiny.

I

Still, however much has come out, the real truth about the arms deal remains hidden - the actual motives behind it, how it was fixed, who knew about it. It will only be fully exposed when some or other investigation traces the money paid out on "commissions" and "necessary expenses" all the way from source to destination. There is a chance of this happening now that both the Serious Fraud Office in Britain and the Directorate of Special Operations in South Africa are onto the case.

Another possibility is that an insider will rat. Earlier, this week The Witness reported that Jacob Zuma had told supporters outside the Pietermaritzburg High Court that "the ‘whole truth' about the arms deal might be revealed if he were put on trial."

In the interim, the truth about the matter is, in a sense, like the Dark Star of South African politics. It is invisible to the naked eye but one can detect its existence, through the gravitational pull that it exerts on the objects (and people) around it. In its immediate vicinity one can trace the strange decision making which led to the selection of certain preferred bidders [see here, here and here]. One can perhaps even detect its influence over matters further afield - in foreign policy for instance.

We do know the deal was not adopted for the jobs it was supposed to create. Erwin said on Wednesday that "our estimate" was that "probably around" 20 000 direct jobs, and 30 000 indirect jobs, had been created through the arms deal. Even if these figures are true an honest accounting would still have to subtract the jobs that would have been created anyway - as well as those lost in the defence industry due to the poor defence industrial participation offers of most of the winning bidders.

Nor was it adopted because government felt that we particularly needed the weapons. The four corvettes bought from the German Frigate Consortium seem to spend much of their time lurking around Simonstown harbour. The navy itself admits that it only uses two out of the three submarines. Business Day reported the other day that we are effectively without fighter airplanes as the last of the Cheetahs have been decommissioned, while the Gripens we purchased have yet to be delivered. Training the pilots to fly the aircraft purchased, and keeping the technicians to maintain them, does not seem to be a particular priority of government.

II

The original motive, many commentators have suggested, was to secure a funding stream for the ANC after the end of apartheid. The Treasurer General's report to the ANC's 50th National Conference in December 1997, noting that the organisation had been in and out of the red since 1994, sketched out its difficulty as follows:

"The ANC had largely depended on friendly countries and institutions for its funds. Most of these donors were in foreign lands. The 1994 elections created the perception or expectation that a ruling Party had access to the country's resources. Also, the purpose for which we were funded, to defeat apartheid, had been accomplished. So our erstwhile donors were reluctant or unable to continue funding us. Our members' contributions were and are negligible."

The report stated that "It does not matter how noble an organization's ideals and policies are, these remain meaningless for as long as they cannot be implemented. Implementation largely depends on funds. A number of initiatives" it continued, "have been started but failed to yield dividends. We are pleased to report that at last a firm foundation has been laid for long term self sufficiency."

It is unclear what this is in reference to, but the ANC government did push through the arms deal, with almost indecent haste, the following year. In mid-1999 the ANC was able to splurge massively on its election campaign - spending over R100m ($16m). However, much of this would have come from President Nelson Mandela's foreign fundraising on behalf of the organisation. He disclosed in May 1999 that he had managed to solicit a $10m donation from Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, and another $10m from Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nahayan of the United Arab Emirates [see article].

The other point worth remembering is that while sweeteners and success fees could well have been paid out by mid-1999, the final contract was only signed in December of that year. The serious money started being paid back in "commissions" from April 2000 onwards, once the South African taxpayer began paying out for the weapons.

Mandela stopped raising money for the ANC after his relationship with Mbeki soured, and by early 2004 the organisation was some R150m in the red. So if, as is often speculated, the arms deal was originally conceptualised as a means of funding the ANC - where did all the money end up going?

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