DOCUMENTS

SA's dodgy arms sales to dictatorships - David Maynier

The crisis in South Africa's arms control regime, and the implications

How South Africa is doing dodgy arms deals with dictators

The Democratic Alliance (DA) called this press conference to expose the crisis in our arms control regime and explain its implications.

There is a crisis at the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) which has resulted in a massive backlog of permits awaiting assessment with contracts worth billions of Rands in the arms industry now on hold, and several dodgy deals appear to have slipped through the cracks after the last meeting of the NCACC in May/June 2008

We are concerned here with six countries and three types of deals - namely:

  • deals that have been "authorised" by the NCACC;
  • deals that are "pending" authorisation by the NCACC; and
  • a case of authorisation to exhibit military support equipment in a country of concern.

The dodgy deals that have been "authorized" by the NCACC include:

  • selling glide bombs that could be used to deliver nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to Libya;
  • selling multiple grenade launchers to Libya;
  • selling multiple grenade launchers to Syria; and
  • selling thousands of multiple grenade launchers and upgraded assault rifles to Venezuela.

The dodgy deals that are "pending" authorization by the NCACC include:

  • attempting to sell thousands of aviator G-suits to Iran;
  • attempting to sell thousands of sniper rifles to Syria; and
  • attempting to sell millions of rounds of ammunition to Zimbabwe.

The dodgy deals also include authorization by the NCACC to:

  • exhibit and demonstrate radar warning receivers for submarines in North Korea.

The DA calls on NCACC chairperson Jeff Radebe to urgently convene a meeting of the new committee in order to:

  • investigate the arms deals that have been authorised by the committee in respect of Libya, Syria and Venezuela, and stop the export of weapons systems or military support equipment if it has not already been delivered;
  • investigate the arms deals that are pending authorisation by the committee in respect of Iran, Syria, and Zimbabwe, and stop the export of the weapons systems or military support equipment; and
  • investigate the issuing of permits to the company that exhibited military support equipment in North Korea

The DA will also call for NCACC chairperson Jeff Radebe, NCACC deputy-chairperson Naledi Pandor and members of the secretariat to appear before the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans to explain what corrective action will be taken at the NCACC.

ARMING DICTATORS ALL OVER THE WORLD

National Conventional Arms Control Committee in crisis

1. Introduction

The Democratic Alliance (DA) produced this document to expose the crisis in our arms control regime and explain its implications. We will share information about arms deals that have been authorised and arms deals that still have to be authorised. We do this because we think it is the right thing to do, and it is in the public interest to disclose this information. What is going on is wrong.

The National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) was recently appointed and includes:

  • Jeff Radebe - Chairperson (Minister of Justice);
  • Naledi Pandor - Deputy Chairperson (Minister of Science and Technology);
  • Lindiwe Sisulu (Minister of Defence and Military Veterans);
  • Nathi Mthethwa (Minister of Police);
  • Siyabonga Cwele (Minister of State Security);
  • Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (Minister of International Relations);
  • Rob Davies (Minister of Trade and Industry);
  • Barbara Hogan (Minister of Public Enterprises);
  • Thabang Makwetla (Deputy-Minister of Defence and Military Veterans);
  • Ismael Ebrahim (Deputy-Minister of International Relations); and
  • Nhlanhla Nene (Deputy-Minister of Finance).

The NCACC is an inter-ministerial committee appointed to ensure that we have a legitimate, effective and transparent process for controlling trade in conventional arms. The committee must ensure that arms transfers conform to international law and guiding principles set out in legislation. We should not export conventional arms, according to legislation regulating the NCACC, if there is a chance the arms could:

  • contribute to internal repression;
  • contribute to the violation of human rights;
  • contribute to the violation of fundamental freedoms;
  • contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts; or
  • contribute to terrorism and/or crime.

We will expose arms deals that have been authorized as well as arms deals that are pending authorisation by the NCACC. We do this because we are concerned that the new NCACC may not step up to the plate and do the right thing. We hope that, by disclosing this information, the new committee will be forced to stop the arms deals pending authorization by the NCACC.

2. NCACC Crisis

2.1. Permit Authorisation

The NCACC last met in May /June 2008 under the chairpersonship of Sydney Mufamadi.

However, since then, permits have been issued and arms deals authorised without proper meetings of the NCACC.

The legislation is clear:

  • the NCACC must review each application on a case-by-case basis and authorise or refuse permits; and
  • four members of the committee - which must include either the chairperson or the deputy chairperson of the committee - constitute a quorum of the NCACC.

The information at my disposal is that permits have been issued authorising arms deals at meetings of the NCACC without a full quorum. Some arms deals have been authorised by one or two members of the committee, neither of whom were the chairperson or deputy-chairperson of the NCACC. Decisions were effectively being taken and permits issued authorising arms deals by officials.

However, many new permits have not been issued to authorise arms deals because of the long delay in appointing the new NCACC. This has resulted in a massive backlog of applications for permits. The value locked up in the backlog is worth billions of rands. And the arms manufacturing industry is severely prejudiced by this, but companies are too scared to complain for fear of being victimised. Dissenting voices in the arms manufacturing industry are too often accused of trying to "discredit government institutions", in this case the NCACC.

2.2 Secrecy

The NCACC is required, in terms of legislation, to provide reports to Cabinet, Parliament and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

But the NCACC is a serial defaulter when it comes to producing reports required in terms of the legislation. The committee does not produce quarterly reports and sometimes produces annual reports.

The last NCACC annual report was released in 2005 dealing with arms transfers in 2003 and 2004. Parliament received annual reports from the NCACC for 2005 and 2006 but these were marked "Confidential" and "Secret", completely defeating one of the key aims of the NCACC, which is to promote transparency in respect of the trade in conventional arms.

No reports have been received by parliament for 2007 or 2008 despite a promise in a letter dated 05 March 2008 from Sydney Mufamadi to the then speaker of the National Assembly Baleka Mbete that "the NCACC will henceforth submit all its required reports to all relevant institutions in good time. Further to this, the reports to be submitted in good time will be classified in a manner that promotes access to such reports."

2.3 Undercapacity

Much of the problem is blamed on the high vacancy rate within the secretariat and in the inspectorate, which causes severe capacity constraints within the NCACC. Sydney Mufamadi referred to this is the abovementioned letter when he said that "the recent years have seen a sharp increase of the defence industry's business. The volume of permit applications that are lodged with the Secretariat for processing have far exceeded expectations thus placing an administrative strain on the Secretariat."

2.4 Moral Failure

But of course, the real failure is a moral one.

We do not have a principled approach to foreign policy and the early promise that "human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs" has been forgotten.

The danger is that even if the NCACC met regularly, was fully staffed and produced regular reports, dodgy arms deals might still be authorised.

Who can forget the response to the recent incident involving the "An Ye Jiang" - the Chinese ship laden with military equipment destined for Zimbabwe - when the then secretary of defence January Masilela dismissed the human rights violations in Zimbabwe as mere "allegations" and commented, "The position on arms to Zimbabwe is that we trade normally with Zimbabwe; there is no embargo"?

The crisis at the NCACC is a major problem:-

  • there is a serious question about whether the arms deals that were authorised after the last meeting of the NCACC in May/June 2008 complied with provisions in the legislation and were properly authorised and therefore legal;
  • because the NCACC has not yet met, there is a massive backlog of permits to be considered with contracts worth billions of Rands in the arms industry now on hold; and
  • several dodgy deals appear to have slipped through the cracks since the last meeting of the NCACC in May/June 2008.

3. Dodgy Deals

We would like to deal at length here with the issue of dodgy deals, which is the most important consequence of the crisis at the NCACC.

We are concerned here with six countries and three types of deals - namely:

  • deals that have been "authorised" by the NCACC;
  • deals that are "pending" authorisation by the NCACC; and
  • a case of an authorisation to exhibit military support equipment in a country of concern.

The deals that have been "authorised" have received contracting permits and export permits from the NCACC.

The deals that are "pending" are awaiting authorisation of contracting permits and export permits from the NCACC.

The deal involving an arms manufacturer exhibiting military support equipment in a country of concern received a marketing permit from the NCACC.

3.1 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

Deal Status

System

Description

Pending

Aviator G-suits

An Aviator G-suit is worn by pilots who are subject to high levels of acceleration to prevent blackouts and loss of consciousness.

There is a deal pending authorisation by the NCACC to export thousands of aviator G-suits to Iran.

The aviator G-suits are worn by pilots who are subject to high levels of acceleration to prevent blackouts and loss of consciousness.

The suits were not produced in our country, but a company based in our country is attempting to export the aviator G-suits to Iran.

The information at my disposal is that the company in question may be assisting in "busting sanctions". A company based in our country may be being used as a vehicle to export military support equipment for a company based in another country.

We should not be exporting weapons systems or military support equipment to Iran.

The United Nations has placed a partial arms embargo on Iran, while the European Union has placed a total arms embargo on that country.

Moreover, Iran is rated as 6.0 ("Not Free") by Freedom House and its last report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was in 1998.

Iran is also considered by the United States to be a "state sponsor of terrorism", meaning that it allegedly "repeatedly provides support for acts of international terrorism".

3.2 Libya (Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

Deal Status

System

Description

Authorised

Multiple grenade launchers (40mm)

A multiple grenade launcher is capable of firing lethal or anti-riot ammunition and can be used in combat and policing missions.

 

Authorised

 

Glide bombs

 

A glide bomb is a long-range precision guided weapon powered by a booster rocket motor. It can be used to deliver penetration or fragmentation bombs at ranges of over 120 kilometres. There is a concern that these glide bomb can be converted to deliver nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

The NCACC has authorised the export of a number of 40 mm multiple grenade launchers to Libya.

The NCACC has also authorised the export of an unknown number of glide bombs to Libya.

The multiple grenade launchers are capable of firing lethal or anti-riot ammunition and can be used in combat and policing missions.

The glide bombs are long-range precision guided weapons powered by a booster rocket and capable of delivering penetration or fragmentation bombs at ranges of over 100 kilometres.

There is a concern that these guide bombs could be converted to deliver a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon.

For this reason, these glide bombs are normally fitted with certain "safeguards" to prevent and warn of tampering.

However, according to information at my disposal, these "safeguards" were not fitted to the glide bombs exported to Libya.

We should not be exporting weapons systems and military support equipment to Libya.

Libya is rated as 7.0 ("Not Free") by Freedom House and its last report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was in 1997. Libya was rated as one of the most repressive societies in the world and one of the "Worst of the Worst 2009" by Freedom House.

3.3 Syria (Syrian Arab Republic)

Deal Status

System

Description

Authorised

Multiple grenade launchers (40mm)

A multiple grenade launcher is capable of firing lethal or anti-riot ammunition and can be used in combat and policing missions.

Pending

7.62 mm sniper rifles

A sniper rifle is used to ensure accurate placement of bullets at longer ranges than other small arms. A typical sniper rifle is built for optimal levels of accuracy, fitted with a telescopic sight and employed against human targets.

The NCACC has authorised the export of a number of 40mm multiple grenade launchers to Syria.

There is a deal pending authorisation by the NCACC to export thousands of 7.62 mm sniper rifles to Syria.

The multiple grenade launchers are capable of firing lethal or anti-riot ammunition and can be used in combat, policing or peacekeeping missions.

The sniper rifles are used to ensure the accurate placement of bullets at longer ranges than small arms and are normally used against human targets.

We should not be exporting weapons systems or military support equipment to Syria.

Syria was rated as 6.5 ("Not Free") and does not report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Syria was also rated as one of the world's most repressive regimes and one of the "Worst of the Worst 2009" by Freedom House.

Syria is also considered by the United States to be a "state sponsor of terrorism" meaning that it allegedly "repeatedly provides support for acts of international terrorism".

3.4 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)

Deal Status

System

Description

Authorised

Multiple grenade launchers (40mm)

A multiple grenade launcher is capable of firing lethal or anti-riot ammunition and can be use in combat, policing and peacekeeping missions.

Authorised

Upgraded assault rifles

An assault rifle is designed for combat situations with selective fire modes including semi-automatic or fully automatic modes, and is used as a standard weapon for the infantry in most militaries.

The NCACC has authorised the export of more than a thousand 40mm multiple grenade launchers to Venezuela.

The NCACC has also authorised the export of thousands of upgraded assault rifles to Venezuela.

We should not be exporting weapons systems and military support equipment to Venezuela.

Venezuela was rated as 4.0 ("Partly Free") by Freedom House and its last report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was in 2002.

There is also a concern that arms exported to Venezuela are finding their way to Farc guerillas in Columbia.

3.5 Zimbabwe (Republic of Zimbabwe)

Deal Status

System

Description

Pending

7.62 mm ammunition

Ammunition used in various assault rifles.

Pending

9 mm ammunition

Ammunition used in various hand guns.

There is a deal pending authorisation by the NCACC to export more than a million rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition to Zimbabwe.

There is also a deal pending authorisation by the NCACC to export more than a million rounds of 9 mm ammunition to Zimbabwe.

We should not be exporting weapons systems and military support equipment to Zimbabwe.

The European Union has an arms embargo against Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is rated as 6.5 ("Not Free") by Freedom House and it does not report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Zimbabwe was rated as one of the most repressive societies in the world and one of the "Worst of the Worst 2009" by Freedom House.

3.6 North Korea (Peoples Republic of Korea) 

Deal Status

System

Description

Authorised

Radar warning receivers for antennae used on submarines.

Radar warning receivers are used to detect emissions from radar systems and can be used by submarines to identify and evade aircraft.

The NCACC approved a marketing permit for a company based in our country that exhibited and demonstrated radar warning receivers for submarine antennae over a period of less than six months in North Korea.

We should not be selling weapons systems or military support equipment to North Korea.

The United Nations and the European Union have arms embargoes against North Korea.

North Korea is rated as 7.0 ("Not Free") by Freedom House and does not report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. North Korea was also rated as one of the most repressive societies in the world and one of the "Worst of the Worst 2009" by Freedom House

4. Action Steps

The DA calls on NCACC chairperson Jeff Radebe to urgently convene a meeting of the new committee in order to do the following:

  • investigate the arms deals that have been authorised by the committee in respect of Libya, Syria and Venezuela, and stop the export of weapons systems or military support equipment if it has not already been delivered;
  • investigate the arms deals that are pending authorisation by the committee in respect of Iran, Syria and Zimbabwe, and stop the export of the weapons systems or military support equipment to those countries;
  • investigate the issuing of permits to the company that exhibited and demonstrated military support equipment in North Korea; and
  • release the annual reports for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.

The DA will also call for NCACC chairperson Jeff Radebe, NCACC deputy-chairperson Naledi Pandor and members of the secretariat to appear before the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans to explain what corrective action will be taken at the NCACC.

5. Conclusion

What is going on is wrong.

We are about to provide thousands of aviator G-suits to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran.

We have sold multiple grenade launchers and glide bombs that can be used to deliver nuclear, biological or chemical weapons to Muammar Gaddafi of Libya.

We have sold multiple grenade launchers and want to provide thousands of sniper rifles to Bashar al Assad of Syria.

We have sold more than a thousand multiple grenade launchers and thousands of upgraded assault rifles to Hugo Chavez of Venezuela.

We have allowed a company to exhibit radar warning receivers for submarines in North Korea.

And what about the consequences?

If we do not stop the sniper rifle deal with Syria, how long will it be until state of the art sniper rifles produced in our country will be used to fire on people in Israel?

And if we do not stop the deal with Zimbabwe, how long will it be until state-of-the art ammunition produced in our country will be used to fire on people in Zimbabwe?

This is just plain wrong.

And it must stop.

Statement issued by David Maynier MP, Democratic Alliance shadow minister of defence and military veterans, August 2 2009

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