The persecution of minority communities in SA - AfriForum

The World Must Know report outlines the way in which such groups are currently being treated


The persecution of minority communities in South Africa

A Report by Afri Forum January 2020

Co-authored by: Alana Bailey Carien Bloem Henk Maree Ernst Roets Ernst J. van Zyl Natasha Venter


South Africa is not only diverse in terms of its peoples and cultures, but also in terms of the challenges that the country is confronted with. In recent years, the international community showed increased interest in the situation in South Africa.

This is mostly as a result of reports of large-scale corruption by members of the ruling party, violence on South African farms, xenophobic violence, the failure of the electricity supplier and the South African government’s initiative to change the Constitution to empower the state to expropriate private property without compensation.

In the turmoil that currently exist in South Africa, many voices have come to the fore in either criticizing or defending the actions of the South African government and the ruling ANC. There are also conflicting reports about the true extent of these problems in South Africa. For example, one report by an agricultural organization in South Africa claimed that violent attacks on South African farms was at a nineteen-year low.1 This was widely reported by the international media and was also used to criticize those who are calling for a more comprehensive reaction to these crimes.2 However, that report was soon proven to contain inaccurate information3 and its authors have subsequently concluded that they were given inaccurate information by the South African Police Service.4

In another report, certain percentages were provided about the racial breakdown of ownership of land in South Africa. Among other, it was claimed that 72% of the 30,4% of land in South Africa that is owned by individuals (thus excluding the state, companies, trusts etc.) was owned by white people.

The claim was thus that white individuals own 21,9% of land in South Africa.5 However, the report was widely reported in the international media as having concluded that white people in South Africa own 72% of all farming land (or even of all land) in South Africa.6

Moreover, there are some prominent conspiracy theories about events in South Africa, such as the conspiracy that South Africa is in fact ruled by “white monopoly capital”. This conspiracy is still popular, even though they have been disproven.

Developments such as these have only resulted in more confusion about the true state of affairs in South Africa.

In reaction to the South African civil rights organization AfriForum’s liaison tour to the US in 2018 to inform researchers and policy makers in Washington about the developments in South Africa, the South African government undertook its own liaison tour to the US, during which President Cyril Ramaphosa claimed that there was no such thing as farm murders and that there were no land grabs in South Africa.8

What makes it even more difficult to obtain an accurate grasp on the situation in South Africa is the political climate that currently exists in the world, in which frictions between different ideological predispositions are evidently on the increase. This may be defined in many different ways, whether left v. right, liberal v. conservative, the West v. the rest, and so forth. As a result, many opinion pieces were published in which the author was more driven by the need to strengthen a particular side of the argument, rather than to provide a proper presentation of the facts to help readers to create an informed understanding of the situation.

Supporters of the ruling party in South Africa have declared its actions as necessary steps to dismantle the legacy of the apartheid system,9 while critics of the ruling party’s policies are sometimes depicted as supporters or denialists of the apartheid system.

While it is certainly true that apartheid was a system under which gross and indefensible human rights violations occurred – and a system that must never be returned to – simply declaring critics of the current government as fascists or supporters of a similar system is not only false, but also not useful for constructive dialogue.

All of this begs the question: What are the actual facts about South Africa? These facts are provided in this report, with a particular focus on the manner in which minority communities are being treated in South Africa. We use conservative numbers and provide sufficient and independent source references to enable the reader to check every fact mentioned in this report.

It is our goal to ensure that the world knows about the true extent of the crisis in South Africa; not a watered-down version of the facts, but neither an exaggeration of cherry-picked facts.


Former President Zuma said in Parliament in 2012 that his understanding of democracy was that minority communities should have “fewer rights” than the majority:12

Sorry, we have more rights here because we are a majority. You have fewer rights because you are a minority. Absolutely, that’s how democracy works.

This comment sparked significant controversy. Some decided to give the President the benefit of the doubt by explaining that it was not really the ruling party’s position and that the President misspoke. The fact is, however, that President Zuma’s comment is very much aligned with a number of similar explanations of the concept of minority rights that were made by other prominent ANC leaders.

During the negotiations for a new South Africa in the early 1990’s, ANC leader Pallo Jordan acknowledged that the recognition of minority rights was indeed a prerequisite for empowerment and self-determination (of minorities), but said that it would be “reactionary” to acknowledge minority rights in South Africa, since the recognition of minority rights was regarded by the ANC as undermining the rights of the majority.13

President Ramaphosa – who was the chief negotiator for the ANC during the time of the negotiations – made even more alarming comments on how the ANC intended to deal with minorities if the party were to come to power. In his memoirs, political veteran, Dr Mario Oriani-Ambrosini wrote what Ramaphosa confided to him in a private conversation in the early 1990’s:14

In his brutal honesty, Ramaphosa told me of the ANC’s 25-year strategy to deal with the whites: it would be like boiling a frog alive, which is done by raising the temperature very slowly. Being cold-blooded, the frog does not notice the slow temperature increase, but if the temperature is raised suddenly, the frog will jump out of the water. He meant that the black majority would pass laws transferring wealth, land, and economic power from white to black slowly and incrementally, until the whites lost all they had gained in South Africa, but without taking too much from them at any given time to cause them to rebel or fight.

AfriForum wrote an open letter to Ramaphosa to explain his statement, but Ramaphosa did not respond, nor did he deny making such statement.15

Zuma’s sentiment on minority rights was also echoed in 2017 by the ANC’s spokesperson Zizi Kodwa. When members of the mostly coloured community of Eldorado Park in Johannesburg protested the appointment of a black principal at a local high school, Kodwa responded that people who had played an integral part in the struggle should not feel as if they had been reduced to the status of a minority group.16


The concept of equality is controversial because there are so many different definitions for equality. In its most basic form, “equality” means that people who are in the same situation should be treated the same.17

The dominant view of equality in South Africa has become inseparably linked to the notion of representivity, however. In a South African context, this means that the national demographics of the country must be represented in every sphere of society, including the different sectors of the economy and the different levels of employment. This notion of equality found its way into various laws that regulate various spheres of society, but in particular the labor market.

Affirmative action was introduced by the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act 55 of 1998),18 which states that equitable representation must be achieved in all occupational levels

in the workforce. The designated group that should receive preferential treatment according to the Act is defined as “black people, women and people with disabilities.”19 “Black people” is defined as “a generic term which means Africans, coloureds and Indians”.20 Practically speaking, the “designated group” earmarked for preferential treatment includes virtually everyone except white men without disabilities.

The Act compels employers to take steps to promote “equal opportunities” in the workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination.21 The Act further states, however, that it is not unfair to discriminate against people when affirmative action measures are taken consistent with the purpose of the Act.22

Every employer is compelled by the Act to implement affirmative action measures to promote the interests of the designated groups.23

The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003 (Act 53 of 2003) was adopted with the aim of developing a legislative framework within which black economic empowerment must take place. “Black people” are again defined in the Act; there is, however, no definition for “white people” in the South African legal system – particularly since the Populations Registration Act, 1950 (Act 30 of 1950) was repealed due to the fact that it was generally regarded as racist.

Black Empowerment is defined by the BEE Commission as follows:24

It is an integrated and coherent socio-economic process. It is located within the context of the country’s national transformation programme, namely the RDP. It is aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and equitably transfer and confer the ownership, management and control of South Africa’s financial and economic resources to the majority of its citizens. It seeks to ensure broader and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to achieve sustainable development and prosperity.

The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (Act 4 of 2000), better known as the Equality Act, declares that constitutional democracy cannot realize in South Africa as long as social and economic inequality are not eradicated.25 While the Equality Act prohibits unfair discrimination,26 it also states that:27

It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the members of such groups or categories of persons.

The use of the term “categories of persons” is significant, because it implies that it is not necessary to prove that an individual has been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, but merely that the person has to be part of the right category.

Personal circumstances of the individual, such as socio- economic circumstances, are thus irrelevant.

It is thus clear that the overarching goal of affirmative action in South Africa is merely to categorize people according to skin color and to provide preferential treatment to “categories of persons”, regardless of their socio-economic circumstances.

Consequentially, race-based quotas are found in a myriad of facets of South African society – from university enrollment to job appointments and sports teams.

Prescribed racial quotas in sport is another example of discrimination against minorities in South Africa. Explicit racial quotas are used under the guise of transformation to deprive minorities of fair and equal opportunities to represent their respective provinces and country. The ANC’s 50th National Conference decided that government should put legislation in place which would allow the Minister of Sport to intervene proactively in sport to serve as a vehicle for achieving national goals.28 As a result, sport in the national context was no longer perceived as a tool to build a non-racial democratic sport industry, but rather as a vehicle to achieve social transformation.

Markedly, an acceleration in the interventionist attitude of the governing ANC party was noted at the 51st National Conference. Resolutions called for “government to play a central and, where necessary, interventionist role in the transformation of sports and recreation”, among other.29 The South African government proposed legislation in 2019 that calls for even more power to be given to the government, to increase government’s role in all spheres of South African sport.30 The clear political interference in sport in South Africa can be further demonstrated with numerous examples. In 2019 the Gauteng province’s netball trials became mired in controversy after evidence had revealed that several white players between the ages of 12 and 18 were not selected simply because of their skin color.31 In 2019 white athletes as young as 9 years old who qualified to represent their provinces at the national championships were almost left at home because South African Schools Athletics (SASA) had declared that only one white child per item would be allowed to represent their province at the championship. This decision was later changed.32

First-year students at most South African universities are registered on a racial quota basis. In many cases, there are different admission requirements for different races.33

The South African Police Service (SAPS) operates on a quota system policy for hiring and promotion. Positions are left vacant if a candidate of the appropriate race cannot be recruited, even if another qualified person of a different race is available.34 In 2016 the Labour Court found that the SAPS’ previous Employment Equity Plan (2010–2014) was unlawful and invalid as it imposed racial quotas.35

Companies are scored based on the quota of black ownership, black senior managers, black training, as well as black suppliers. These scores then translate to their ability to compete for government tenders. However, rather than righting the economic wrongs of the past, BEE was used as a vehicle for corruption and cadre deployment.36 It only serves a small, connected elite, rather than the impoverished – often at the expense of the latter.37

It is considered taboo or politically incorrect in the current South African political climate to question aspects of transformation, black empowerment or racial quotas. Any attempts to assess the mode of transformation or aspects thereof are met with hostile reaction from the government. The former Chairperson of the National Assembly’s portfolio committee on sport and recreation, Butana Komphela, said that the Constitution requires transformation and that doing away with this policy would amount to treason.38 Racial transformation and quota systems enforced on various spheres of society are used interchangeably and it is often asserted that quotas are legitimate, even though the South African Constitution makes no mention of either transformation or quotas.

The ANC’s definition of transformation displays ignorance and a lack of understanding of the issue. For example, former Director- General of the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) in the Presidency, Joel Netshitenzhe, wrote that transformation entails that all levers of power (state institutions) must be brought under the control of the National Liberation Movement and that “they should reflect in their composition the demographics of the country; and they should owe allegiance to the new order.”39 In others words, the transformation defined by the ANC does not focus on building unity or improving society’s ills, but entails the social reengineering of society and is accompanied by a hegemony over institutions through cadre deployment.


After the ruling ANC had adopted a policy of land expropriation without compensation at its 54th National Conference in December 2017, Cyril Ramaphosa, its newly elected President, said that redistributing land from white landowners to black people would increase food production and that “South Africa could turn into the ultimate paradise if the implementation of the policy of expropriation of land without compensation leads to higher food production.” He added: “We can make this country the Garden of Eden.”40

On 27 February 2018, the South African parliament adopted a motion that a process had to be started to amend Section 25 (the property rights clause) of the South African Constitution to provide for expropriation of land without compensation.41

Shortly thereafter, David Mabuza, the Deputy President of South Africa, threatened white farmers with a “violent takeover” should they not volunteer to hand over some of their land.42

It is argued that this policy must be implemented so that more black South Africans can own property. It is, however, evident from public statements and the policy documents of the ruling ANC that the intention is for the state – not private individuals – to own the land. This point is further proven by the fact that a mere 6,3% of land bought by the state has to date been transferred to private ownership.43

Furthermore, the call for expropriation of private property is usually framed as a necessary step to undo the history of injustices in terms of land ownership. However, it ignores the fact that a restitution programme has been in place for more than a quarter of a century, according to which 1,8 million black South Africans had already received compensation.44

The Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994 (Act 22 of 1994) provides for people to institute claims for land that they had been deprived of as a result of racially discriminatory practices, such as forced removals. 82% of land claims were for urban land rather than rural land.45 Furthermore, what came as a source of frustration to the government was the fact that over 90% of those who had instituted land claims indicated that they were not really interested in owning agricultural land and that they would rather prefer money as compensation.46 The government responded angrily to this, stating that black people’s preference for money over land was “hurting land reform”.47 Bheki Mbili, in charge of land restitution support in KwaZulu- Natal, explained what black land claimants said:48

Many of the claimants already have small pieces of land and some don’t even live in those areas where their forefathers were removed from. Some say to us that they don’t want more land than they already own and the risk involved if they ask us to buy them those huge pieces of land that will go out of production.

He then explained why this was a problem for the government:

The problem with this is that if you look at the outcome of first phase of the land audit, the amount of land that is private land particularly that is owned by white people in this country is still in the region of between 70 and 80%. We can only change the land ownership pattern if people opt for restoration. If they opt for financial compensation the pattern stays the same. If you take the money you don’t dent the problem that currently exists.

Notwithstanding the fact that the figures of white landownership provided by Mbili are inflated (at least 34,5% of all land in South Africa and 26,7% of agricultural land is black-owned),49 the problem is therefore that the South African government is dedicated to reducing the amount of land owned by white people, while this is not regarded as a priority by the majority of black South Africans.

This is also evident from the rapid pace at which urbanization among black South Africans is taking place. Black South Africans, more than any other group, appear to desire to live in cities rather than in rural areas. From 2000 to 2015, the population of black Africans in Johannesburg increased by 76,7%. The corresponding number for Cape Town is 122,4% and for Pretoria 71,6%. In the same period, the number of white people in Johannesburg declined by 8,1% and in Cape Town by 0,7%. In Pretoria, the number of white people increased by a mere 2,7%.50

The South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR) surveyed South Africans and asked them what they believed had to be done to improve their lives, only 8% indicated that they believed that land reform would improve people’s lives. The survey also found that a mere 2% of people in South Africa want land distribution to be a top priority for the South African government. It is noteworthy that according to this survey white South Africans regard land reform as a more pressing issue to be resolved than black South Africans.51

According to the South African government, almost 8 million hectares – about 9% of agricultural land – have already been distributed to black African people.52 However, it also admitted that more than 90% of farms distributed by the state to black African communities had failed and had usually reverted very quickly either to subsistence farming or to squatter camps.53 A 2017 study by the Land Bank found that of approximately 4 000 farms had been acquired since 1994 at a cost of R10 billion, only 10% were still productive.54 While the South African government already spent more than R45 billion on land reform, only 6,3% of the land that were acquired by the state have been transferred to private owners.55

The statement in 2018 by Zweli Mkhize, Minister for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, that no property of any black person or black group would be expropriated, further gives a racial dimension to government’s expropriation plans.56

According to a 2017 land audit by AgriSA, black South Africans own more than or almost half of all agricultural land in three of South Africa’s most fertile provinces: The Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal. Furthermore, landowners who are not white control more than 46% of South Africa’s agricultural potential. In KwaZulu-Natal alone 45,4% of agricultural land (surface area) is owned by black people. This represents 73,5% of the agricultural potential of the province.57

A special report by the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2018) states that a total of 17,44 million hectares have been transferred from white ownership since 1994, which is equal to 21% of the 82,76 million hectares of farmland in freehold in South Africa.58

Furthermore, 24,03% of land in South Africa is state-owned.59

It is quite disheartening that the motion to review Section 25 of the Constitution disregarded the facts about the real progress that has already been made with land restitution and ignored some of the financial realities of farming.


You are South Africans but remember, you are Africans, living in a continent called Africa. Never despise people who have the same skin colour [as] us… There are many others with a whitish colour. You don’t know them. They are there. You see them all the time but you can’t say this one ke le kwerekwere.60

These comments61 were made by Ace Magashule, the current Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s ruling party. The comments were made in the heat of an outbreak in xenophobic violence directed at foreign nationals. Magashule’s comments were supposed to be a condemnation of xenophobic violence but turned out to be a racist slur in which those who were engaging in xenophobic violence were encouraged to direct their violence to white people. He continued:

They have never been attacked because they are also so-called foreigners but because their colour is white.

This led to applause from his audience of ANC supporters.

Given Magashule’s senior position in the ruling party and the lack of any comment from President Cyril Ramaphosa, Magashule’s remarks may be interpreted as the ruling party’s official stance on the xenophobic violence crisis in South Africa. Instead of taking steps to solve the violence, the ruling party’s message is simply that the target of the violence should be changed.62

Since the early 1990s, a political climate – or zeitgeist, if you will – has started to develop in which white farmers in particular are continuously presented as the source of evil in South Africa. It is a climate in which white farmers are depicted as racist “criminals” who stole the land and who exploit the workers.

Consequently, white farmers in particular are repeatedly slandered from political platforms, in speeches, in statements and even in struggle songs. Violence towards white farmers is frequently romanticized, especially in struggle songs. These songs are not merely sung by fringe groups, but by government leaders. In 2010, the ruling ANC went to court to protect the right of its leaders to lead its supporters into the chanting of a well-known struggle song, Dubula iBhunu (translated as “Shoot the Boer”) during political rallies.63

Even the South African President joined in. During the centenary celebrations of the ANC in Bloemfontein in the Free State on 8 January 2012, Jacob Zuma led its supporters into song. The words of the song can be translated as follows:64

We are going to shoot them with the machine gun

They are going to run (x2)

Shoot the Boer

We are going to hit them

And they are going to run (x2)

We are going to shoot them with the machine gun

They are going to run (x2)

Shoot the Boer

We are going to hit them

And they are going to run (x2)

The Cabinet is going to shoot them with the machine gun (x2)

Later that year, then ANC Youth League Deputy President, Ronald Lamola – who would later become the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services in the Ramaphosa Cabinet – said during a press conference:65

I am just giving a warning to white South Africans: They must voluntarily bring back the land, and voluntarily bring back the mineral resources … there will be a moment when these service-delivery protestors will invade the land of Mr Van Tonder and Mr Van der Merwe and we can no longer be able to guarantee the continued safety of Mr Van der Merwe …

During the ANC’s 2013 election campaign Cyril Ramaphosa (then Deputy President of South Africa) told people that they should vote for the ANC, otherwise “the Boers”66 will come back into power, presumably to oppress black people.67

In March 2017, during a session of the National Assembly – where the crisis of farm murders was discussed for the first time in the South African parliament – ANC member of parliament (MP) Duduzile Promise Manana shouted “Bury them alive!” during a speech by a leader of an opposition party in which he pleaded for the prioritizing of government’s reaction to farm murders.68

Julius Malema, former ANC Youth League President who would later break away from the ANC to form his own party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), addressed his supporters in Newcastle in 2016, saying:69

We are not calling for the slaughter of white people‚ at least for now … The rightful owners of the land are black people. No white person is a rightful owner of the land here in SA and the whole of the African continent.

Speaking at a follow-up rally, Malema elaborated:70

We are not talking violence, we are not promoting violence, but I cannot guarantee the future. I am not a prophet. I am talking now. We are not carrying any weapons. I will never kill white people. Why should I kill them? I will never revenge for what they did. I am asking politely for the land to be returned. And if they don’t return it, I cannot guarantee what will happen.

We are not scared of Afrikaners! This is not your land! You must know your place; you are visitors here. And the long stay of visitors depends on their conduct. If you continue to misbehave, feeding our people to lions, putting our people who are still alive in the coffins, then you are applying for something else.

It would seem inconceivable that the bearer of the highest office of state could utter these words without attracting international outrage, and yet, no significant outrage followed the then President’s singing of this song.

As is the case with the ANC’s leadership, Malema’s hate speech is usually directed at white people in general, but importantly also to a certain cultural ethnic group in particular – the Afrikaners or Boers. In the month following Malema’s speech about white people and Afrikaners in Newcastle, 12 farm murders were committed as opposed to the monthly average of 6,25 for that year.71 This constitutes an upward variance of 92% in farm murders.72

After Malema’s repeated public singing of Dubula iBhunu – when he was still President of the ANC Youth League – AfriForum filed charges of hate speech against him. The ANC came to his defence by also becoming a party to the matter and defending him in court. During the court proceedings, Malema was asked why he was convinced that it was inappropriate to sing “Kill the Boer, kill the farmer”, but acceptable to sing ‘Dubula iBhunu’. His response was:73

When we were discouraged to sing ‘kill the Boer, kill the farmer’ (by the leadership of the ANC), the explanation was that ‘the farmer’ is directed at a particular group of people. And what is worse is that farmers are not only whites. You are going to even kill people who are part of your struggle if you want to kill farmers, so you are actually pushing away the potential supporters of your struggle when you say ‘kill the farmer’.

In 2018, seven days after Malema said that the mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay had to be removed from office because he was white, adding that “we are cutting the throat of whiteness”,74 South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Deputy President David Mabuza publicly invited Malema to return to the ANC. “We would love to have Julius Malema back in the ANC. He is still ANC down, deep in his heart,” the President said.75

There have also been numerous cases where white farmers were attacked or murdered and where the attackers publicly admitted to their political or racial motives in committing these crimes. One such example is that of Ntuthuko Chuene, who murdered Godfrey Frederick Lanz Heuer on 22 August 1992 in front of his wife. Chuene was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He testified that the only reason he had committed that murder was because he had been influenced by the ANC’s chanting of “Kill the Boer, kill the farmer”. He explained:76

I could have killed any other white man I came across at that time. My frustrations were directed to white men because they had what we did not have.


A study by AfriForum found that it is common for farm attacks and murders to increase in the months following incidents of hate speech that received substantial coverage in the media.77 For example, in the month after former President Jacob Zuma sang “Shoot the Boer”, 16 farm attacks occurred in which six people were murdered. The result was that farm attacks in the month thereafter were 11% and farm murders 36% higher than the average for 2012.78 After analyzing five incidents of high- profile hate speech directed at white farmers, AfriForum found an average increase in farm murders of 74,8% in the months following these incidents.79

Farm murders have become a serious crisis in South Africa – a crisis, however, of which the existence is downplayed by many in government, but that is downrightly denied by the President himself.80 AfriForum, on the other hand, argues that farm murders are a unique phenomenon that deserves a focused counterstrategy by the South African government – for several reasons.

For the purpose of this report, attention will only be given to the frequency and brutally of these attacks.

In terms of the unique frequency at which these attacks are happening, the statistics on farm attacks and murders are controversial largely because conflicting statistics are released – even by the South African Police Service (SAPS).81 According to the most credible numbers provided by the SAPS, however, there was an average of 680 farm attacks and 94 farm murders per year over a period of 21 years. This translates to 1,9 farm attacks per day and 1,8 farm murders per week.82

The unique levels of brutality inflicted upon the victims cannot be overstressed. Torturing typically includes excessive stabbing, strangling, severe beating, burning with fire, boiling water, hot irons or melted plastic, gouging out the eyes and raping. Unique methods of torture include dragging victims behind vehicles over dirt roads, torturing with electric drills, or forcing bleach or other poisonous liquids down the victims’ throats.83 In the financial year of 2016/17, victims were tortured in at least 13 (17,6%) of the 74 farm murders that occurred that year.84

Despite the severity of the crisis, the South African government embarked on a gradual process of deprioritizing its reaction to this phenomenon. The crisis was recognized by the South African government in the 1990s, and former President Nelson Mandela hosted a Rural Safety Summit.85 Mandela said at the time:86

The government deplores the cold-blooded killings that have been taking place on the farms in the past few years. While killings on farms, like crime in general, have been a feature of South African life in general, the incidents of murder and assault in farming areas have increased dramatically in recent years.

However, in 2003 – without any prior notice or warning – former President Thabo Mbeki announced that the commando system87 would be phased out. This came as a shock at the time, as there was no indication of any plans to take such a step. The commando system was the cornerstone of the Rural Protection Plan (RPP) and the closing down of the commandos effectively implied the end of this plan.88

Then, in 2007 – and again without any announcement or explanation – the publication of statistics on farm attacks and farm murders was summarily stopped.89 This happened despite a 25% increase in farm attacks in the last year in which statistics were published: according to SAPS data, there were 794 farm attacks in the financial year of 2006/07, up from 636 in 2005/06.

According to this new policy, farm attacks and farm murders were, despite the sharp increase, officially no longer a priority.

Since then, it has become common practice for senior leaders of the ruling ANC party to either deny the existence of farm attacks, to downplay the extent thereof or to justify these attacks by suggesting that farmers deserve it. The most popular explanation is to link farm attacks to labor-related concerns, suggesting that white farmers are murdered because of their treatment of black farm workers. This, despite the fact that the government-initiated Commission of Inquiry into Farm Attacks had found that only 1,6% of these attacks were the result of labor-related issues.90 This sentiment was even expressed by senior officers of the Department of Land Affairs91 and the Department of Police, including the Minister of Police, among others.92 In 2014, for example, the Deputy Minister in the Presidency, Obed Bapela, re-emphasized:93

We find that most of the issues of the killings are labour related in many respects. And then also others are because of the ill treatment that people go through and they then come back and [take] revenge. But there are obviously other patches where people just go in for the robbing, to go and rob.

The denial of the crisis of farm attacks culminated in President Cyril Ramaphosa proclaiming to the international media in 2018 that the crisis doesn’t even exist.94


As is the case in most countries, South Africa’s past is characterized by controversy, strife and ideological conflict. In the preamble of the South African Constitution of 1996, recognition was given to the complexities of the past by stating:

We, the people of South Africa,

Recognise the injustices of our past;

Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;

Respect those who have worked to build and develop our

country; and

Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.

This sentiment was often echoed by the late President Nelson Mandela, for example when he warned against the unconsidered removal of statues of Afrikaner icons:95

We must be able to channel our anger without doing injustices to other communities … Some of their heros [sic] may be villains to us. And some of our heros [sic] may be villains to them.

Legislation was revised to ensure that all South African heritage resources would henceforth be protected. To give effect to this, the South African Heritage Resources Agency, provincial bodies, local organizations, as well as committees such as the South African Geographical Names Council were established through legislation such as the South African Geographical Names Council Act, 1998 (Act 118 of 1998) and the National Heritage Act, 1999 (Act 25 of 1999).

In practice, however, the heritage resources of South African minorities in general are under severe threat – in some cases due to benevolent neglect; in others to malignant attack, as the following examples illustrate.

National anthem

The South African national anthem is a symbolic demonstration of the ability of South Africans to compromise in the interests of unity, as it combines five of the country’s official languages and two songs, namely the pre-1994 anthem (“Die Stem”; English: The Call) and “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika” (English: God bless Africa), a hymn traditionally sung at anti-apartheid rallies and gatherings.96 However, the EFF (a political party) has since 2014 been demanding that the Afrikaans verse should be removed, as it represents a “white supremacist consciousness”.

An often-used excuse is quoted to justify this demand, namely that the call is not a rejection of Afrikaners, but merely an effort to relegate apartheid heritage to non-public spaces.97 The fact is completely disregarded that the old anthem dates as far back as 1921 and had been the country’s anthem years before the inception of the apartheid era.98 The authorities and ruling ANC usually sidestep the issue and do not condemn these calls to abandon an imaginative compromise that has even won international recognition.99

Scapegoating by distorting historical facts and criminalizing European forebears

Senior South African politicians and representatives, from former President Jacob Zuma to South Africa’s ambassador to Denmark, Zindzi Mandela, have publicly blamed white South Africans for social ills in the country and have referred to the descendants of Europeans in extremely derogatory terms.100

Name changing

Since 1994 name changing has become commonplace in both official and private South African spheres.101 Often names of cities, towns and streets that are of great cultural historical significance to especially the Afrikaner community have been targeted. The ongoing battle for the name of the country’s capital is a shining example. A compromise exists, namely that the municipal name of the area including the city is Tshwane and the place name Pretoria. This debate continually raises its head, however.102

In Pretoria some street names were also changed amid great controversy, even up to the level of the Constitutional Court. A majority ruling was in favor of the changes, but this raised serious questions about the current interpretation of the Constitution and its implications for South African culture and heritage. In an opinion piece on the ruling, the FW de Klerk Foundation commented:103

The judgment has other very disturbing implications. Does it mean that the history of white South Africans is nothing but a one-dimensional litany of oppression? Was there nothing since 1652 that is worthy of commemoration and celebration? … What does the judgment mean for the foundational right of white South Africans to human dignity – with which their cultural and historical identities are inextricably linked? How can they be regarded as having a right to equality if their history condemns them to moral inferiority?

Elsewhere the renaming processes continue. At the University of Pretoria even the names of student residences were changed. Most of the men’s residences had Afrikaans names of trees and the ladies’ residences those of flowers, but

these was deemed offensive.104 Here a happy compromise to accommodate multilingualism and cultural diversity while retaining tradition would have been to translate the tree and

flower names into more indigenous languages. However, in the name-changing game compromise falls victim to ideological aims and opportunities to foster mutual recognition and respect are lost.

Vandalizing and relocating statues and monuments

It is a common occurrence for monuments to be vandalized in South Africa. Reasons include metal theft, treasure hunting, wanton destructiveness and making political statements. In 2015 a spate of attacks on statues and monuments dating back to before 1994 took place.105 It started with students’ protest against a statue of the British imperialist Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town.106 When the statue of Rhodes was eventually removed in response to the students’ demands, the actions of the protestors were equated to that of a lynch mob.107 In a town called Uitenhage, the vandalism resembled the act of “necklacing”, a practice of extrajudicial torture and execution favored by ANC supporters during apartheid. It entails forcing a rubber tyre filled with petrol around a victim’s chest and arms, then setting it on fire. When statues are symbolically “necklaced”108 it sends a very hostile message to minority groups represented by such symbols.

The vandalism of heritage resources representing contributions by minority groups points to a strong presence of intolerance towards these groups. Many of the targeted statues were erected to honor heroes of the Afrikaner community; however, even statues representing non-Afrikaners were attacked, including those of the above-mentioned Rhodes,109 the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa,110 Gandhi,111 Queen Victoria112 and even a monument commemorating the contribution of horses during the Anglo Boer War (1899–1902).113

These illustrations of intolerance correlate with many anti- minority, anti-white and specifically anti-Afrikaner statements that are made in public by prominent ANC and EFF politicians.

In response to the growing violence that went hand in hand with these acts of vandalism, Nathi Mthethwa, the Minister of Arts and Culture, appointed a task team in 2015 to investigate the “transformation of heritage”. When presenting the final, non-unanimous recommendations of this team to parliament in 2018, the Minister said:114

Monuments, statues and place names project the foundational values and authority of the state. They serve a legitimising role in society, cultivating popular acceptance and consent to the authority of the state. Consent derives from identification with the state. This implies that people have to embrace the values espoused by the state.

Monuments are therefore a constant, public reminder of the foundational values of the state and those in power. Their role is to conscientize the public.

He never mentioned the fact that monuments and statues have a historical context, simply to memorialize events and people

of the past, leaving the decision on whether they were heroes or villains open for interpretation. The fact that the purpose of such heritage resources was in his opinion only to conscientize the public to the values of the state is quite ironic, as this was the time when the staggering extent of state capture under President Jacob Zuma was coming to light. This illustrates how sentiments for heritage are often stirred up to deflect attention away from more pressing issues.

It is worth noting that, despite the great number of instances of vandalism in 2015, no significant arrests or prosecution of vandals took place.

The Minister showed himself to be in favor of removing “offensive” statues to a theme park115 – ostensibly modelled on the Russian example.116 Many statues and symbols from the pre-1994 have already been systematically removed from public spaces, anyway. In this regard, the Minister said:117

Of course, removal of statues is not the end-goal. It is part of an on-going project towards transforming our society, to make it humane for black people. Relocating statues of the old order simply adds impetus to our collective endeavour to realise the dream of a just and non-racial society.

Thus, according to the Minister, only the sentiments of one section of the South African population must be accommodated. The compromise of adding more statues and monuments without removing existing ones in order to create a more comprehensive and inclusive image of the checkered South African past seems not to be considered as an option.


Many more examples of the threat facing South African heritage – and especially the heritage of minority groups like Afrikaners – can be cited. These include the underfunding of heritage resources like archives and museums,118 politicized historical commemorations with accompanying reinterpretation of facts,119 a lack of protection of heritage resources due to dysfunctional conservation bodies120 and self-imposed censorship.121

The ANC is failing miserably as far as nation building is concerned, as it is focused on creating a monoculture which requires South Africa’s unique cultural diversity and heritage to be sacrificed for ideological purposes. Objectivity falls victim to scapegoating by attempting to distract attention from government’s mistakes and short-term political aims. This leaves South Africans despairing for the future of our past.



Afrikaans is recognized in the South African Constitution as one of South Africa’s eleven official languages. It is a unique language with roots in Europe, Africa and Asia, and a truly African language since it originated in Africa. The majority of Afrikaans native speakers are non-white.122 It is the third most spoken language in South African homes, growing rapidly with a total of 6,85 million speakers in 2011, compared to 5,98 million a decade earlier.123 Despite this progress, Afrikaans speakers have since 1994 seen their language increasingly being phased out of all public institutions, including education facilities.

Constitutional bodies created to protect South African languages and language rights – namely the Pan South African Language Board and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities – offer no relief in this regard as they suffer from a lack of financial resources, mismanagement and limited powers of execution.124 At best they make recommendations when they find that an action amounts to a contravention of language rights – yet the perpetrator is then free to either implement or ignore such recommendations.

It is a fallacy that all South Africans speak English,125 especially to a degree where they can conduct business in it. The perception exists that especially older people struggle with the language, but international education studies reveal that even the youth’s general literacy is severely lacking, including in English.126

Public institutions

The Constitution provides for legislation to manage the use of official languages by public entities. For years, efforts to create such legislation came to nothing. Eventually, a private language activist had to take the state to court to ensure that such a law would come into existence.127 However, by 2020 the resulting Use of Official Languages Act, 2012 (Act 12 of 2012) has still not been implemented by all entities and non-compliant entities face no consequences.128

At a conference on linguistic human rights, an academic pointed out:129

The government shows no political will to fulfil and promote the [language] rights as laid out in the Constitution, although for example, the cost and capacity needed to translate all legislation since 1994 would be minimal.

The resulting contravention of language rights impacts negatively on the speakers of all indigenous language groups in South Africa, as public entities increasingly become monolingually English. One example is the judiciary. In 2017 South African Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng announced

that English would henceforth be the only language of record in the country’s courts. Despite agitation by various stakeholders against this decision, it is still being upheld.130 English remains the only official language in which all South African legislation is required to be published. A case to dispute this inequality was unsuccessful.131

Professional admission examinations in all fields are also mostly in English only, thereby ignoring the high function language status of Afrikaans and denying other indigenous languages from developing to this level.132

Private sector

With English being the de facto single language of the public sector, the private sector has also anglicized. The language rights of non-native English speakers are also contravened by the private sector.

Primary and secondary education

Afrikaans has been used as a language of tuition in South African schools since 1914. Schools are increasingly pressured by the Department of Basic Education to phase out Afrikaans as a primary language of instruction in favor of English.133 This often impacts most heavily on the most vulnerable members of the Afrikaans community.134

Some Afrikaans learners can still be taught in their native language, but in many provinces, despite the predominance of Afrikaans speakers,135 Afrikaans-medium schools have virtually disappeared, and Afrikaans children are forced to attend English schools, more costly private schools, use homeschooling or board in other provinces.

This lack of mother-tongue education also impacts heavily on the speakers of other South African languages. For most of them, English is a third or fourth language and because they have four years or less instruction in their native tongue, many never learn to read with comprehension or to master abstract subject matter, for example in mathematics.136

According to the Federation of School Governing Bodies in South Africa, Afrikaans schools and schools that also offer Afrikaans as language of instruction have decreased ‒ in 2019 there were 1 126 Afrikaans public single-medium schools and 1 112 double-medium schools (Afrikaans and English). Thus, there were only 2 238 schools in the country that still used Afrikaans as primary language of instruction. In comparison, there were a total of 5 812 English single-medium public schools in South Africa. In 2017, there were 1 279 Afrikaans single-medium public schools.137 The decrease by 153 schools by 2019 cannot be ascribed to a shrinking Afrikaans-speaking population and globalization only, but amongst others also to the influence of negative attitudes of senior representatives of the Department of Basic Education. Especially notorious in this regard is the MEC for Education in Gauteng, Panyaza Lesufi, who regularly makes ideologically-driven, polarizing statements

against Afrikaans.138 Gauteng’s current school placement system does not even provide for a choice of language of tuition.139 Persistent negative interference is also experienced from the side of some education unions.140

Tertiary education

In 1994 South Africa had five predominantly Afrikaans public universities. In 2020 only a single campus of a single university (the Potchefstroom campus of the North-West University) offers Afrikaans as primary language of instruction, with simultaneous interpretation for speakers of other languages to ensure inclusion. Yet, in 2018 calls had already started that even this university should revise its language policy.141

The decision of the University of the Free State to make English its sole primary medium of instruction from 2017142 had been challenged, but the Constitutional Court approved the English- only policy.143 The Court stated that, to allow for a choice for mother-tongue instruction in Afrikaans, would in fact sanction segregation.144

Court cases against policies designating English as the only primary language of instruction at the University of Pretoria145 and the Stellenbosch University146 also failed to restore Afrikaans to its former position as a language of instruction there.

AfriForum is currently awaiting judgment in a case heard in November 2019 by the Supreme Court of Appeal on the English- only language policy of the University of South Africa. As the latter is a distance learning public facility, the argument of segregation cannot be raised here; however, the university also chose to discontinue tuition in Afrikaans.147

In the case of the Stellenbosch University, the Constitutional Court made a majority ruling.148 One of the judges comprising the minority opinion stated:149

One does not need international studies, of which there are many, to realize that this state of affairs entrenches English as the dominant language not only in tertiary education, but also, as we will see, from primary through secondary school to university.

These rulings contribute to the decline of Afrikaans schools discussed above, as some Afrikaans parents argue that, by placing their children in English schools, the children will be better prepared for future tertiary studies.

Agenda revealed

In 2019 the Solidarity Movement 150 started construction of a privately-funded Afrikaans technical training facility, Sol-Tech.151 The above-mentioned MEC Lesufi slammed the news of

this project.152 Senior government representatives like him apparently are not satisfied with phasing out Afrikaans as language of instruction in public education, but also appear to be opposed to private sector funding of Afrikaans educational institutions. Mother-tongue education in all South African indigenous languages becomes the biggest victim in this onslaught against Afrikaans.153

International experts are clear on the need for mother-tongue education to promote social cohesion,154 yet in South Africa the ideological choice for English and a crusade against Afrikaans seem to have become more important than either cohesion or quality education.


Double standards regarding the condemnation of racism has become a serious crisis in the South African political landscape. For the sake of brevity, only some examples of this vast topic will be mentioned.

In 2019, Zindzi Mandela, South African ambassador to Denmark, described white South Africans collectively as “rapists” and “uninvited visitors”.155 While her comments sparked outrage among minority communities, there was no reaction from either the South African government or the ruling ANC.

In 2016 Penny Sparrow, an unknown estate agent from KwaZulu-Natal, posted a racist message on her Facebook profile, in which she complained about black people littering on the Durban beachfront, describing them as “monkeys”. The post immediately went viral. Sparrow was ordered to pay a R150 000 (currently about $10 316)156 fine and received a two-year suspended prison sentence. A local Capetonian, Matthew Theunissen, used the derogatory and racist k-word on Facebook to describe members of the South African government. His comment was universally condemned and he was fined by a court to do community service.157 After Vicki Momberg, another white woman, used the k-word multiple times on a video in 2016, she was sentenced to two years in prison.158

In 2018, a video by a man named Adam Catzevelos – initially sent over the networking app WhatsApp – was leaked onto social media. In the video he also used the k-word to refer to black people and expressed his joy at not seeing any black people at his holiday destination in Greece. This incident caused social media to erupt and it became national news, with universal condemnation of Catzevelos, who eventually settled with the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to pay a fine of R150 000.159

While the condemnation of Sparrow, Theunissen, Momberg and Catzavelos’s racist actions should be welcomed, the blind eye that is turned to anti-white expressions of racism is alarming.

Two days after the first publication of Sparrow’s racist Facebook post, Velaphi Khumalo – an ANC member and employee of the Gauteng Provincial Department of the South African government – posted a message on a political discussion group on Facebook in which he called for South Africa to be “cleansed” of white people.160 He stated that he wanted it to be done in the same manner that Adolf Hitler had targeted Jews. He also said that South African whites should be “hacked and killed” and “skinned”, and that their “offspring” must be used as garden fertilizer. Upon receiving many complaints from the public, the government department for which Khumalo worked temporarily suspended him and gave him a “final written warning”, valid for six months only (after which it would be removed from his file).161 The ANC referred a complaint to the Equality Court, only to withdraw the complaint shortly thereafter, having reached a settlement with Khumalo.162 The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), however, also instituted a complaint at the same court. Khumalo was interdicted by court from repeating the utterances and was ordered to remove all references to the statements on social media.163

During the drought of 2017 and the subsequent water shortage in the Western Cape province, Esethu Hasane, Spokesperson for the Minister of Sport, tweeted:164

Only Western Cape still has dry dams. Please God, we have black people there, choose another way of punishing white people.

AfriForum formally called for the dismissal of Hasane because of his racism towards minority communities.165 No action was taken against Hasane, however.

An even more concerning case is the SAHRC’s recent verdict on the complaints of hate speech against Julius Malema – leader of the third-largest political party in the country, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – for saying among other things that “we are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now” and “we are cutting the throat of whiteness”.166 In its verdict, the SAHRC stated that certain words and expressions will depend on whether it is uttered by a white or a black person and against a white or a black person. The commission said this was an important factor to consider when determining whether something amounted to hate speech or not.167

Several studies have also pointed to the double standards not only in the way racists are responded to by the courts in South Africa and the SAHRC, but also to the manner in which racism is reported on by the South African media.168

A report by the Media Monitoring Project reveals that there is a predominantly “black victim/white perpetrator” narrative in South African media. It found that:169

 Blacks consistently appear in the role of victim both of the crime committed against them and the unjust manner in which the justice system hears their cases. The media tends to represent the justice system as serving the interests of the rich and usually white people who can afford the best legal representation.

Upon analysis of all the news articles monitored for the purpose of the report by the Media Monitoring Project, a list was compiled of the propositions that were most prevalent on the topic of race.170 It was found that the proposition that “all whites are racist” was most prevalent, followed by “Africans are victims” and “race is the primary explanation”.

A study commissioned by AfriForum on media reporting of violence on farms found that the race of the perpetrator was the single biggest determining factor with regard to how the media would respond to an incident. The report found that incidents where the perpetrator was white and the victim black received on average 16 times as much press coverage as incidents where the victim was white and the perpetrator black.171

The good news, however, is that racism in South Africa remains a problem confined to the fringes. In a 2019 survey by the South African Institute of Race Relations,172 members of the public were asked what Government’s top priorities should be. The vast majority pointed to unemployment, corruption and education, while only 2% felt that fighting racism should be the top priority. Furthermore, 58% of respondents indicated that they had never personally experienced racism. In response to a statement that all the talk of racism and colonialism was an excuse by politicians to divert the attention from their own failures, only 64% agreed.

These findings correlate with similar studies by other institutions. The so-called progressive think tank Plus 94 found in 2017 that 73% of people reported not to have experienced racism.173 The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) found that less than 25% of people in South Africa regarded race as the primary source of division among people in South Africa, and that 20,7% of people had experienced discrimination in the workplace.174


Another concerning phenomenon is the ruling ANC government’s susceptibility to anti-West conspiracy theories, as well as its tendency to support dictators and regimes across the globe known for abusing human rights.

In 2018 Joseph Nkosi, South Africa’s ambassador to Venezuela, even went as far as announcing that South Africa would provide military support to the Venezuelan government to fend off what he believed was a threatening US invasion. “If it is necessary that we bring our soldiers to fight against the Americans we will do it, we cannot allow ourselves to be dominated by the American administration,” Nkosi said.175 “The days of the US dominating the world are numbered.” He later retracted his comments and apologized.176

In 2019 the ANC sent a senior delegation on a solidarity visit to Venezuela’s president under siege, Nicolás Maduro.177 The visit was intended to provide moral support to Maduro amid the crisis that faced the country and himself. South Africa also opposed the US and supported Maduro at the UN Security Council.178

As a member of the UN Security Council, South Africa participated in the Security Council meeting on the Venezuela crisis in February 2019. Of the 15 members of the Security Council, South Africa was one of only three countries that voted against the resolution put forth by the US that called for the recognition of opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, as interim president of Venezuela pending new elections.179

The South African government’s stance on Venezuela is not surprising when one considers that it has repeatedly endorsed dictators and human rights abusers, including Muammar Gaddafi,180 Robert Mugabe,181 Hugo Chavez,182 Omar al-Bashir183 and even Mao Tse Tung.184

Current ANC Secretary General Ace Magashule said that sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe were simply designed to force countries who disagreed with the Western powers to toe the line. Magashule said sanctions had been used in Venezuela,

Cuba and Palestine to force these countries to agree with the West. He said that the ANC had always shared the same ideology with these countries and would not allow the use of sanctions because of their political beliefs.185

During the 2019 xenophobic attacks in South Africa, Magashule said that the proliferation of drugs and the recent violence against foreign nationals in South Africa could be the work of imperialists and colonialists who wanted to create rifts between South Africa and the rest of the continent. He also asserted that “third forces” were attempting to destabilize South Africa.186

Gwede Mantashe, former ANC Secretary General, claimed in 2016 that the US was holding secret meetings “seeking to mobilise and plant seeds of anarchy” in South Africa and that the US was plotting a regime change at the US Embassy in South Africa.187 He later continued, claiming that Western powers turned to the practice of overthrowing political authorities considered inconvenient to Western interests.188

In 2008 the ANC proposed that Pretorius and Schoeman Streets – the streets between which the American Embassy is situated – be renamed Fidel Castro and Che Guevara Streets, respectively.189

In February 2019, the governments of the US, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland wrote to the President of South Africa, warning him that failure to act against corruption would hamper his bid to draw foreign investment to South Africa. The ANC responded by accusing these countries of attempting to influence South Africa’s upcoming elections. The letter was described by the ANC as a threat from “imperialist forces”. The ruling party issued a statement saying that they “shall not allow South Africa’s Constitution and sovereignty to be undermined by these latter-day colonialists.”190

The US recently threatened to cut funding to South Africa after it emerged that South Africa is among the countries in the United Nations that is most likely to vote against the US.191

In January 2020, members of the ruling ANC and its alliance partner, the South African Communist Party, protested outside the US embassy in Pretoria, chanting “one American, one bullet.”192

Issued by AfriForum, 28 January 2020. This item was converted from PDF, as such there may be resultant errors in the text. The original PDF can be accessed here


1 See for example:

- Visser, K. 2018. Farm Attacks: One of agriculture’s challenges. Politicsweb, 31 May. Available at /documents/on- farm-attacks--agrisa. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

- Borman, J. 2018. Farm murders lowest in 20 years, ‘remoteness’ the reason for brutality. News24, 31 May Available at https://www.news24. com/SouthAfrica/News/farm-murder-rate-lowest-in-20-years-remoteness-the-reason-for-brutality-20180531. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

2 See for example: De Greef, K. & Karasz, P. 2018, 23 August. Trump cites false claims of widespread attacks on white farmers in South Africa.

New York Times, 23 August. Available at Accessed on 16 January 2020.

3 See for example: Politicsweb. 2018. News24’s dodgy “farm murder” report. Opinion piece by The Ratcatcher, 1 June. Available at https://www. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

4 Liebenberg, T. 2018. 62 farm murders in 2017/18, not 47 as earlier claimed – Agri SA. Politicsweb, 11 September. Available at https://www.

5 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. 2017. Land audit report. Version 2. Pretoria: DRDLR. Available at http://www.ruraldevelopment. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

6 See for example: Crowley, K. 2017. Whites own 73% of South Africa’s farming land, City Press says. Bloomberg. Available at com/news/articles/2017-10-29/whites-own-73-of-south-africa-s-farming-land-city-press-says. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

7 See for example:

- Roets, E. 2018, 4 September. Farm murders and the question of genocide. Politicsweb, 4 September. Available at / opinion/farm-murders-and-the-question-of-genocide. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

- BusinessLive. 2017. Report fingers Bell Pottinger in ‘white monopoly capital’ campaign. TimesLIVE, 4 September. Available at https://www. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

8 Bloomberg Markets and Finance. 2018. South Africa’s Ramaphosa sees rand as undervalued. Video on YouTube, 26 September. Available at: https:// Accessed on 16 January 2020.

9 Apartheid was abolished on 2 February 1990 when the prohibition of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and other organizations aligned with communism was rescinded, after which ANC leader Nelson Mandela was freed from prison and negotiations for a new South African dispensation started. A new interim constitution was adopted in 1993 and the ANC came to power in 1994. The interim constitution of 1993 was replaced with the 1996 Constitution, which is sometimes referred to as the “Final Constitution”.

10 Roets holds a master’s degree (cum laude) in Constitutional Law.

11 AfriForum is a civil rights organization that operates within South Africa. With more than 235 000 individual members contributing to the organization’s work, AfriForum is the largest civil rights group in Africa. AfriForum aims to promote civil liberties for all in South Africa, but also with a particular emphasis on the rights of minority communities. AfriForum believes that the test for a well-functioning democracy is whether minority rights are protected.

12 2012. Zuma’s minority rights gaffe: What HANSARD says. 17 September.

13 Giliomee, H. 2012. Die Laaste Afrikanerleiers. Cape Town: Tafelberg, p. 334.

14 Kane-Berman, J. 2017. The ANC and Ramaphosa’s 1994 plan for the whites. Politicsweb, 17 September. Available at / opinion/the-anc-and-ramaphosas-1994-plan-for-the-whites. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

15 AfriForum. 2017. Ramaphosa must explain why he compared white people to a frog in boiling water. Media statement, 21 September. Available at Accessed on 16 January 2020.

16 Prince, L. 2017. Rasgedrewe voorvalle oor SA heen kwel ANC. Beeld, 3 Augustus. Available at Accessed on 16 January 2020.

17 Currie, I. & De Waal, J. 2013. The Bill of Rights Handbook. Sixth edition. Cape Town: Juta, p. 210.

18 Section 2(b) of the Employment Equity Act

19 Section 1 of the Employment Equity Act.

20 Section 1 of the Employment Equity Act.

21 Section 5 of the Employment Equity Act.

22 Section 6(2)(a) of the Employment Equity Act.

23 Section 13(1) of the Employment Equity Act.

24 BEE Commission Report (2001), p. 2. A lengthier definition is provided in the Black Empowerment Act, section 1.

25 In the preamble to the Equality Act.

26 Section 6 of the Equality Act.

27 Section 14 of the Equality Act.

28 African National Congress. 1997. 50th National Conference: Resolutions - Social transformation. Available at web/20150319194454/ Accessed on 21 January 2020.

29 African National Congress. 2002. Resolutions adopted by the 51st National Conference of the African National Congress. Available at https://web. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

30 National Sport and Recreation Amendment Bill, 2020 (x2019). Available at Accessed on 21 January 2020.

31 AfriForum. 2019. AfriForum reveals: 56 white schoolgirls excluded from Gauteng netball teams based on their race. Media statement, 5 June. Available at Accessed on 21 January 2020.

32 Botton, W. 2019. Quotas debate rages on. The Citizen, 6 March. Available at rages-on/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

33 BusinessTech. 2016. Questions over racial quotas at SA universities. 10 February. Available at questions-over-racial-quotas-at-sa-universities/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

34 See for example:

- Monama, T. 2014. Solidarity to fight for minorities in the SAPS. IOL, 5 September. Available at minorities-in-saps-1746787#.VBoAXaFwbiw. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

- South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (CCT 01/14) [2014] ZACC 23; 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC); [2014] 11 BLLR 1025 (CC); 2014 (10) BCLR 1195 (CC); (2014) 35 ILJ 2981 (CC). Available at Accessed on 16 January 2020.

35 Wicks, J. 2017. Solidarity, police settle in landmark affirmative action case. News24, 31 July. Available at News/solidarity-police-settle-in-landmark-affirmative-action-case-20160731. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

36 Mantell, S. 2019. BEE inadvertently became ‘prime enabler of State Capture and corruption’ in South Africa. Daily Maverick, 3 April, Available at africa/. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

37 See for example:

- Head, T. 2019. BEE scandal at Eskom exposed: Fake certificates dished-out to Guptas. The South African, 25 September. Available at https:// Accessed on 16 January 2020.

- Levitas, B. 2019. A choice between jobs or BEE. Politicsweb, 31 July. Available at /opinion/a-choice-between- jobs-or-bee. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

38 Coetzee, G. 2005. Tutu not a traitor – Komphela. News24, 2 February. Available at Accessed on 21 January 2020.

39 Leon, T. 2004. Deconstructing the ANC’s agenda. Speech at the Johannesburg Press Club, 10 June. Available at . Accessed on 21 January 2020.

40 News24. 2018. Taking land should increase food production – Ramaphosa. 7 January. Available at taking-land-will-turn-sa-into-the-garden-of-eden-ramaphosa-20180107. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

41 Gerber, J. 2018. National Assembly adopts motion on land expropriation without compensation. News24, 27 February. Available at https://www. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

42 Ndaba, B. 2018. Mabuza appeals to white farmers to share their land. IOL, 7 April. Available at to-white-farmers-to-share-their-land-14299969. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

43 Interview with Johann Bornman on 19 April 2018. Bornman is the Chairperson of Agri Development Solutions ( aspx).

44 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. 2014. End of term report: 2009–2014. Pretoria: DRDLR, p. 22.

45 Walker, C. 2008. Landmarked – Land claims and land restitution in South Africa. Johannesburg: Jacana.

46 Zuma, J. 2017. State of the Nation Address. 9 February. Available at 9-feb-2017-0000. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

47 Nair, N. 2017. Land claimants want the cash not the land, says KZN Land Claims Commission. TimesLIVE, 30 May. Available at https://www. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

48 Ibid.

49 Agri Development Solutions database; interview with Johann Bornman on 19 April 2018.

50 South African Institute of Race Relations. 2017. South Africa Survey 2017. Johannesburg: IRR, pp. 28–29.

51 Jeffery, A. 2019. Unite the middle – Reasons for hope 2019. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations. Available at reports/occasional-reports/files/reasons-for-hope-report-final.pdf. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

52 Cousins, B. 2018. Land debate is clouded by misrepresentation and lack of data. TimesLIVE, 10 March. Available at news/south-africa/2018-03-10-land-debate-is-clouded-by-misrepresentation-and-lack-of-data/. Accessed on 16 January 2020.

53 Mail & Guardian. 2010. Land reform: Use it or lose it, says minister. 2 March. Available at lose-says-minister/. Accessed on 17 July 2020.

See also: Johnson, R. W. (2015). How Long Will South Africa Survive? London: Hurst & Company.

54 Sihlobo, W. & Kapuya, T. 2017. Land policies try to solve imaginary issues at expense of real problems. Business Day, 6 June. Available at https:// Accessed on 17 January 2020.

See also: George, L. & Eybers, J. 2017. Govt. sits on 4 000 farms, yet hints at expropriation. Fin24, 22 May. Available at Companies/Agribusiness/govt-sits-on-4-000-farms-yet-hints-at-expropriation-20170522. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

55 Interview with Johann Bornman on 19 April 2018.

56 Janse van Vuuren, A. 2018. Land expropriation plans to exclude black-owned land. Fin24, 6 July. Available at South-Africa/land-expropriation-plans-to-exclude-black-owned-land-mkhize-20180706. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

57 AgriSA. 2017. Land in black hands: The definitive report - Agri SA. Available at /documents/land-in-black-hands-the- definitive-report--agri-sa. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

58 Sihlobo, W. & Kapuya, T. 2017. Special Report: The truth about land ownership in South Africa. Business Live, 23 July. Available at https://www. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

59 Gildenhuys, B. N.d. Land in South Africa: A geospatial perspective. Pretoria: AfriForum. Available at uploads/2019/04/AfriForum-Land-and-land-reform.pdf. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

60 Derogatory term for African foreign nationals.

61 News24 Wire. 2019. Magashule questions why ‘foreigner’ never applies to white people. The Citizen, 5 September. Available at https://citizen. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

See also: Mavuso, S. 2019. Magashule calls white people ‘foreigners’ as he pleads for black solidarity. IOL, 5 September. Available at https://www. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

62 Politcsweb. 2019. Magashule insinuates violence should be aimed at white people. 5 September. Available at / politics/magashule-insinuates-violence-should-be-aimed-at-w. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

63 AfriForum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) SA 240 (EqC).

64 A video of the speech is available on YouTube: Euronews. 2013. Jacob Zuma sings ‘Kill the Boer’ at ANC Centenary Celebrations in Bloemfontein, South Africa. Video posted by Smal, J., 3 February. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

65 Le Roux, P. 2012. AfriForum se haatspraakklag teen Ronald Lamola. Maroela Media, 10 Julie. Available at meningsvormers/afriforum-se-haatspraakklag-teen-ronald-lamola/. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

66 The term “Boers” (with a capital B) denotes the cultural community also known as the Afrikaners.

67 Mail & Guardian. 2013. Ramaphosa warns against the return of ‘boers’. 11 November. Available at warns-voters-against-the-boers/. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

68 Politicsweb. 2017. ANC MP calls for white farmers to be buried alive – AfriForum. 14 March. Available at /politics/anc- mp-calls-for-white-farmers-to-be-buried-alive-. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

69 The Citizen. 2016. We won’t slaughter whites… for now – Malema. 7 November. Available at slaughter-whites-now-malema/. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

70 Politicsweb. 2016. No guarantees, if whites don’t give up their land – Julius Malema. 14 November. Available at / documents/no-guarantees-if-whites-dont-give-up-their-land--j. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

71 Hermann, D. & Van Zyl, C. 2013. Treurgrond. Centurion: Kraal Publishers.

72 Roets, E. 2017. Kill the farmer – A brief study on the impact of politics and hate speech on the safety of South African farms. Pretoria: AfriForum, p. 16. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

73 Unpublished transcript of the proceedings of AfriForum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) SA 240 (EqC).

74 Areff, A. 2018. ‘We are cutting the throat of whiteness’ – Malema on plans to remove Trollip. News24, 4 February. Available at https://www.news24. com/SouthAfrica/News/we-are-cutting-the-throat-of-whiteness-malema-on-plans-to-remove-trollip-20180304. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

75 Gous, N. 2018. Ramaphosa and Mabuza to Malema: ‘Come back home’. TimesLIVE, 11 March. Available at politics/2018-03-11-ramaphosa-and-mabuza-to-malema-come-back-home/. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

76 IOL. 1999. ‘Kill the Boer’ slogan led to murders. 5 October. Available at murders-16165. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

77 Roets, E. 2017. Kill the farmer – A brief study on the impact of politics and hate speech on the safety of South African farms. Pretoria: AfriForum. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

78 Roets, E. 2017. Kill the farmer – A brief study on the impact of politics and hate speech on the safety of South African farms. Pretoria: AfriForum, p. 8–9. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

79 Roets, E. 2017. Kill the farmer – A brief study on the impact of politics and hate speech on the safety of South African farms. Pretoria: AfriForum. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

80 Bloomberg Markets and Finance. 2018. South Africa’s Ramaphosa sees rand as undervalued. Video on YouTube, 26 September. Available at https:// Accessed on 17 January 2020.

81 See for example: Liebenberg, T. 2018. 62 farm murders in 2017/18, not 47 as earlier claimed – Agri SA. Politicsweb, 11 September. Available at: /politics/culture-of-violence-against-farmers-unacceptable--. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

82 For a comprehensive list of sources and an analysis, see: Roets, E. 2018. Chapter 3: Frequency: What are the numbers? In Kill the Boer: Government complicity in South Africa’s brutal farm murders. Pretoria: Kraal Uitgewers. 11

83 For examples of tortures in which all these methods were used, see: Roets, E. 2018. Kill the Boer: Government complicity in South Africa’s brutal farm murders. Pretoria: Kraal Uitgewers.

84 Roets, E. 2018. Kill the Boer: Government complicity in South Africa’s brutal farm murders. Pretoria: Kraal Uitgewers.

85 Burger, J. & Boshoff, H. 2008. The State’s Response to Crime and Public Security in South Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, p. 9; The Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks. 2003. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks. Available at uploads/2013/11/Final-Report-Committee-of-Inquiry-Farm-Attacks-July-2003.pdf. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

86 South African Human Rights Commission. 2014. Report of the SAHRC national investigative hearing into safety and security challenges into farming communities, p. 11. Available at COMMUNITIES%202015%20pdf.pdf. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

87 In the South African context, a commando system was a system that allowed ordinary citizens to work with the South African National Defence Force and in cooperation with the South African Police Service to combat crime in rural areas.

88 Ibid., p. 55.

89 Burger, J. 2012. From Rural Protection to Rural Safety: How Government Changed its Priorities. In Solidarity Research Institute. An Overview of Farm Attacks in South Africa and the Potential Impact Thereof on Society, pp. 61. Available at An-overview-of-farm-attacks-in-SA-1.pdf. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

90 The Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks. 2003. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks, p. 411. Available at wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Final-Report-Committee-of-Inquiry-Farm-Attacks-July-2003.pdf. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

91 Interview with Johan Burger on 20 September 2017.

92 Solidarity. 2012. Minister van polisie se statistieke oorplaasaanvalle is ‘duimsuig’. Nuwe boek oor plaasaanvalle sluit sowat 500 nuwe aanvalle in. Media statement by Solidarity, 27 September. Available at duimsuig-nuwe-boek-oor-plaasaanvalle-sluit-sowat-500-nuwe-aanvalle-in/. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

93 Panel discussion on ANN7. SA Decides. (21 March 2014). A copy of the video is available from Ernst Roets ([email protected]).

94 Bloomberg Markets and Finance. 2018. South Africa’s Ramaphosa sees rand as undervalued. 2018. Available at watch?v=tUn1_XYNW40. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

95 Wilkerson, I. 1994. Apartheid is demolished. Must its monuments be? The New York Times. 25 September. Available at https://www.nytimes. com/1994/09/25/world/apartheid-is-demolished-must-its-monuments-be.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

96 Brand South Africa. 2017. South Africa’s National Anthem. Available at south-africas-national-anthem. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

See also: Department of Education. 2006. My country South Africa. Celebrating our national symbols & heritage. Second edition. Pretoria: Department of Education. Available at Accessed on 21 January 2020.

97 See for example:

- Eyewitness News. 2014. EFF: Remove ‘Die Stem’ from national anthem. 13 July. Available at from-national-anthem. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

- Mahlati, Z. 2019. EFF calls for Die Stem to be removed from anthem following apartheid flag ruling. IOL. 12 August. Available at https://www.iol. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

98 Accessed on 21 January 2020.

99 Nkanjeni, N. 2017. It’s official! SA’s national anthem ranked best in the world. Traveller24. 28 December. Available at Explore/its-official-sas-national-anthem-ranked-best-in-the-world-20171228. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

100 See for example:

- Corke, E. 2015. Zuma: SA’s problems began with Jan van Riebeeck. Eyewitness News. 19 February. Available at Zuma-reiterates-SAs-problems-began-with-van-Riebeeck. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

- Fabricius, P. 2019. Naledi Pandor slaps down Zindzi Mandela for undiplomatic and personally insulting tweets. Daily Maverick. 20 June. Available at insulting-tweets/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

101 Accessed on 21 January 2020.

102 See for example:

- Saks, D. 2012. Pretoria or Tshwane? Mail & Guardian. 4 June. Available at tshwane/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

- Business Tech. 2016. Pretoria name change going ahead: mayor. Available at change-going-ahead-mayor/. Accessed on 21 January 2020. 13

103 Steward, D. N.d. The Constitutional Court implies that cultural tradition founded in history finds no recognition in the Constitution. Available at no-recognition-in-the-constitution. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

104 Department of University Relations. 2018. University of Pretoria changes some residence names. 3 October. Available at student-affairs/news/post_2724246-university-of-pretoria-changes-some-residence-names. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

105 See for example:

- News24. 2015. Louis Botha statue outside Parliament defaced. 9 April. Available at statue-outside-Parliament-defaced-20150409. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

- Pijoos, I. 2016. CR Swart statue vandalised at UFS. News24, 23 February. Available at statue-vandalised-at-ufs-20160223. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

106 Accessed on 21 January 2020.

107 Van Onselen, G. 2016. [Opinion piece on identity politics]. Sunday Times. 24 January. Available at sunday-times-1107/20160124/281874412421354. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

108 Spies, D. 2015. War memorial in Uitenhage ‘necklaced’. News24. 2 April. Available at statue-in-Uitenhage-set-alight-20150402. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

109 Petersen, C. 2015. Rhodes Memorial defaced, painted. IOL. 15 September. Available at statue-defaced-spraypainted-1918707. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

110 Payet, C. 2015. Poet’s statue covered in paint. IOL. 12 April. Available at covered-in-paint-1843807. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

111 BBC News. 2015. Mahatma Gandhi statue vandalized in Johannesburg. 13 April. Available at Accessed on 21 January 2020.

112 News24. 2015. Queen Victoria statue vandalized in PE. 10 April. Available at vandalised-in-PE-20150410. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

113 Spies, D. 2015. EFF damages PE horse memorial. News24. 7 April. Available at horse-memorial-20150407. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

114 Mthethwa, E.N. 2018. Report on transformation of Heritage landscape. Address by Minister Mthethwa on the occasion of the tabling of the report on transformation of the Heritage landscape at Freedom Park, Tshwane Friday. 23 February. Available at mthethwa-report-transformation-heritage-landscape-23-feb-2018-0000. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

115 The Citizen. 2015. Proposal to move statues to theme parks. 22 April. Available at meeting-on-statues-heard-call-for-theme-park/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

116 The Museon in Moscow. See Accessed on 22 January 2020.

117 Mthethwa, E.N. 2018. Report on transformation of Heritage landscape. Address by Minister Mthethwa on the occasion of the tabling of the report on transformation of the Heritage landscape at Freedom Park, Tshwane Friday. 23 February. Available at mthethwa-report-transformation-heritage-landscape-23-feb-2018-0000. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

118 Centurion Rekord. 2015. Voortrekker monument in financial crisis. 24 August. Available at monument-in-financial-crisis/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

119 See for example:

- Mail & Guardian. 2015. Fallen soldiers of SS Mendi dragged into battle. 27 March. Available at soldiers-dragged-into-battle/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

- Ramaphosa, C. 2019. Blood River: Dingane’s Zulu warriors were freedom fighters. Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the occasion of the National Day of Reconciliation, Bergville Community Sports Complex, Okhahlamba Local Municipality. 16 December. Available at https:// Accessed on 21 July 2020.

120 Prins, H. 2016. Frescura, with good reason, suggests that conservation in South Africa is a disaster. The Heritage Portal. 3 February. Available at Accessed on 21 January 2020.

121 See for example:

- Coovadia, I. 2019. UCT Art Row: Without freedom of expression, the rule of South Africa’s tyrants would be absolute in the future. Daily Maverick. 15 January. Available at rule-of-south-africas-tyrants-would-be-absolute-in-the-future/. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

- Daniels, W. 2019. UCT: Censorship in plain sight. Open letter to UCT Works of Art Committee, 3 January. Available at https://www.politicsweb. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

122 Statistics South Africa. 2012. Census 2011 – Census in brief. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Available at census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

See also: News24. 2013. Majority of Afrikaans speakers not white. 22 April. Available at Afrikaans-speakers-white-20130422. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

123 Monama, T. 2013. Afrikaans must be one of the official languages. The Sowetan. 5 June. Available at wetan/20130604/281522223634731. Accessed on 15 January 2020.

124 See for example:

- 702. 2019. CRL Rights Commission wants existing language policies properly utilised. 19 November. Available at articles/367368/crl-rights-commission-wants-exisitng-language-policies-properly-utilised. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

- Rickard, C. 2020. PanSALB fiasco home-grown graft in any language. LegalBrief, 21 January. Available at matter-of-justice/story/pansalb-fiasco-home-grown-graft-in-any-language-2/print/. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

125 Nkanjeni, U. 2019. Only 8% of South Africans speak English at home – report. TimesLIVE. 5 June. Available at south-africa/2019-06-05-only-8-of-south-africans-speak-english-at-home-report/. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

126 Spaull, M. 2017. PIRLS exposes SA schools’ dire state of illiteracy. IOL, 9 December. Available at sa-schools-dire-state-of-illiteracy-12330534. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

127 Du Plessis, T. & Lubbe, J. 2015. Suid-Afrikaanse Taalregtemonitor. Bloemfontein: Sun Press, pp. 33–37.

128 Pan South African Language Board. 2019. PanSALB to release comprehensive report on the use of official languages Act 12 of 2012. PanSALB, 18 March. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

129 South African Office of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 2017. Conference on multilingualism and linguistic human rights. 21 September. Available at Accessed on 20 January 2020.

130 Docrat, Z., Kaschula, R.H., Lourens, C.J.A., Bailey, A. & Ralarala, M.K. 2017. Courts should promote all languages. News24. 17 September. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

131 Lourens v Speaker of the National Assembly of Parliament and Others (20827/2014) [2016] ZASCA 11; [2016] 2 All SA 340 (SCA) (10 March 2016).

132 See for example: South African Institute of Chartered Accountants. N.d. SAICA exams language policy. Available at LearnersStudents/Examinations/ExamInformation/SAICAExamsLanguagePolicy/tabid/4298/language/en-US/Default.aspx, Accessed on 21 January 2010.

133 See for example:

- Nkosi, B. 2018. Afrikaans single-medium public schools under fire. IOL. 16 November. Available at afrikaans-single-medium-public-schools-under-fire-18141958. Accessed on 3 November 2019.

- The Citizen. 2018. Lesufi’s trying to kill Afrikaans in schools. 10 March. Available at editorials/1851029/lesufis-trying-to-kill-afrikaans-in-schools/. Accessed 7 November 2019.

134 Keppler, V. 2018. It is a ‘war on Afrikaans education’ in Gauteng. The Citizen. 6 March. Available at afrikaans-education-in-gauteng/. Accessed on 18 November 2019.

135 See for example:

- Statistics South Africa. 2012. Census 2011 – Census in brief. Statistics South Africa. Available at census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf, pp. 23–27. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

- Nkanjeni, U. 2019. Only 8% of South Africans speak English at home – report. TimesLIVE. 5 June. Available at news/south-africa/2019-06-05-only-8-of-south-africans-speak-english-at-home-report/. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

136 Heugh, K. 2019. The science is clear about ‘mother-tongue’ education. So why are we attacking it? News24. 26 May. Available at https://www. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

See also: Tyler, R. 2016. Sink or Swim. YouTube. 11 November. Available at Accessed on 17 January 2020.

137 Essop, P. 2019. Al hoe minder Afrikaanse enkelmedium-skole. Netwerk24. 8 October. Available at hoe-minder-afrikaanse-enkelmedium-skole-20191008. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

138 Eloff, T. 2019. Does Mr Lesufi deserve a pass? 24 June. Available at articles?download=1008:does-mr-lesufi-deserve-a-pass. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

139 Alberts, A. 2019. Lesufi’s registration model aims to destroy Afrikaans. Politicsweb. 5 November. Available at /politics/ lesufis-registration-model-aims-to-destroy-afrikaa. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

140 AfriForum. 2019. #LesufiMoetVal. 12 December. Available at Accessed on 20 January 2020.

141 Gaanakgomo, C. 2018. Potch students petition over its language policy. IOL. 20 May. Available at potch-students-petition-over-its-language-policy-15069485. Accessed on 15 October 2019.

142 Chabalala, J. 2016. Dropping of Afrikaans at UFS violates Constitution – AfriForum. News24. 20 June. Available at SouthAfrica/News/dropping-of-afrikaans-at-ufs-violates-constitution-afriforum-20160620. Accessed on 15 November 2019.

143 News24. 2017. ConCourt: No further Afrikaans instruction at UFS. Huffpost. 29 December. Available at: concourt-no-further-afrikaans-instruction-at-ufs_a_23319278/. [Accessed: 26 October 2019]

144 Botha, C. 2018. The ConCourt and Afrikaans. Politicsweb. 23 January. Available at /opinion/the-right-to-be-taught-in- afrikaans-inescapably-le. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

145 Afriforum and Another v Chairperson of the Council of the University of Pretoria and Others (54451/2016) [2016] ZAGPPHC 1030; [2017] 1 All SA 832 (GP) (15 December 2016)

146 Gelyke Kanse And Others V Chairperson of the Senate of the University of Stellenbosch and others Cct311/17;

See also: Ngatane, N. 2019. Concourt Rules in favour of Stellenbosch University’s language policy. EWN. 10 October. Available at https://ewn. Accessed on 5 November 2019.

147 AfriForum. 2019. Judgment reserved in AfriForum’s appeal case on Afrikaans at Unisa. Media statement by AfriForum. Available at https://www. Accessed on 1 December 2019.

148 Karrim, A. & Seleka, N. 2019. Constitutional Court rules in favour of contentious Stellenbosch University language policy. News24. 10 October. Available at policy-20191010. Accessed on 10 November 2019.

149 Eloff, T. 2019. Is this the end for Afrikaans in public schools? Politicsweb. 26 November. Available at /opinion/does- concourt-judgement-signal-end-for-afrikaans-i. Accessed on 3 December 2019.

150 See: Accessed on 15 January 2020].

151 Hermann, D. 2019. R300m construction of new Sol-Tech campus begins – Solidarity. Politicsweb. 15 September. Available at https://www. Accessed on 5 November 2019.

152 Nkanjeni, U. 2019. Panyaza Lesufi slams new Afrikaans university: ‘Don’t remind us of apartheid’. TimesLIVE. 17 September. Available at https:// Accessed on 20 November 2019.

153 Heugh, K. 2019. The science is clear about ‘mother-tongue’ education. So why are we attacking it? News24. 26 May. Available at https://www. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

154 United Nations – General Assembly. 2019. Provisional agenda and annotations. Provisional agenda for the twelfth session of the Human Rights Council Forum on Minority Issues. 18 September. Available at: English.pdf. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

155 News24. 2019. Zindzi Mandela faces hate speech complaint over land tweet. 9 July. Available at mandela-faces-hate-speech-complaint-over-land-tweet-20190709. Accessed on 5 December 2019.

156 At an exchange rate of R14,54 to the USD (21 January 2020).

157 City Press. 2016. Racism: Penny Sparrow fined R150k, community service for Theunissen. 10 June. Available at News/racism-penny-sparrow-fined-r150k-community-service-for-theunissen-20160610. Accessed 20 January 2020.

158 Pijoos, I. 2018. Vicki Momberg sentenced to an effective 2 years in prison for racist rant. News24, 28 March. Available at SouthAfrica/News/vicki-momberg-sentenced-to-an-effective-2-years-in-prison-for-racist-rant-20180328. Accessed on 28 October 2019.

159 702. 2019. Adam Catzavelos to pay R150,000 after settlement with SAHRC. 29 August. Available at catzavelos-to-pay-r150-000-after-settlement-with-sahrc. Accessed on 20 November 2019.

160 Singh, K. 2018. Velaphi Khumalo apologises for calling for South Africa to be ‘cleansed’ of white people. News24, 16 November. Available at Accessed on 15 November 2019.

161 Antoni, M.-L. 2018. Velaphi Khumalo’s strange defenders. Politicsweb, 23 October. Available at /opinion/velaphi- khumalos-strange-defenders. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

162 Ibid.

163 Singh, K. 2018. Velaphi Khumalo apologises for calling for South Africa to be ‘cleansed’ of white people. News24. 16 November. Available at Accessed on 15 November 2019.

164 @EsethuHasane. 2017. Tweet on Twitter, 27 February.

165 Sport24. 2017. AfriForum calls for sacking of spots ministry’s media man. Sport24. 28 February. Available at South-Africa/afriforum-calls-for-sacking-of-sports-ministrys-media-man-20170228. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

166 Tandwa, L. 2019. SAHRC finds Malema comments referred to commission not hate speech. News24. 27 March. Available at https://www.news24. com/SouthAfrica/News/just-in-sahrc-finds-malema-comments-referred-to-commission-not-hate-speech-20190327. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

167 South African Human Rights Commission. 2019. Findings of the South African Human Rights Commission regarding certain statements by Mr. Julius Malema and another member of the Economic Freedom Fighters. Available at Julius%20Malema%20&%20Other%20March%202019.pdf. Accessed on 20 July 2020.

168 See for example:

- Brink, E. & Mulder, C. 2017. Racism, hate speech and double standards: Not a simple black and white matter. Centurion: Solidarity Research Institute. Available at matter-of-bla. pdf. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

Herbst, E. 2018. A brutal tale of unbalanced, selective, racism-inciting media-coverage – Herbst. BizNews. 3 January. Available at https://www. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

169 Mtwana, M. & Bird, W. 2006. Revealing Race: an analysis of the coverage of race and xenophobia in the South African print media. Johannesburg: Media Monitoring Project. Available at Accessed on 20 January 2020.

170 This list was compiled from a list of six of South Africa’s largest daily newspapers, six of South Africa’s largest weekend papers and one particularly influential weekly paper. All the articles that dealt with race and racial discrimination for the period from February 2006 up to and including May 2006 were monitored.

171 Report by AfriForum. (2019, August). Complicit: A critical evaluation of the mainstream media’s reporting of incidents of violence on South African farms. Available at Accessed on 20 January 2020.

172 Jeffery, A. 2019. Unite the middle – Reasons for hope 2019. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations. Available at reports/occasional-reports/files/reasons-for-hope-report-final.pdf. Accessed on 21 January 2020.

173 Report by Plus 94 (August 2016) Racism Monitor. p. 42.

174 Potgieter, E. 2017. Reconciliation Barometer. Cape Town: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, p. 32. Available at wp-content/uploads/2018/03/IJR-Barometer-Report-2017-WEB-final.pdf. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

175 Daniel, L. 2018. South African ambassador to Venezuela wanted SANDF to fight the United States. The South African. 17 August. Available at https:// Accessed on 21 January 2020.

176 Fabricius, P. 2018. Washington sleeps easy: SA envoy to Venezuela calls off ‘plans’ for military action against US. Daily Maverick, 17 August. Available at against-us/. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

177 Fabricius, P. 2019. Ace Magashule to lead Tripartite Alliance’s solidarity visit to Venezuela’s president under siege, Nicolás Maduro. Daily Maverick. 1 March. Available at president-under-siege-nicolas-maduro/. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

178 Department of International Relations and Cooperation. 2019. South Africa reaffirms support in Venezuela at the UN Security Council. Media statement by DIRCO, 28 February. Available here: venezuela-un-security-council. See also SABC News. 2019. ANC Supports Venezuelan president Nicholas Maduro. 9 April. Available here: http://

179 See Statement by the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations. 2019. Explanation of vote by South Africa at the UN Security Council vote on the situation in Venezuela. 28 February. Available here: venezuela_20190228.html. Accessed on 23 January 2020.

180 See for example:

- Scholtz, H. 2011. Report: SA soldiers helped Gaddafi. News24, 23 October. Available at soldiers-tried-to-help-Gaddafi-20111023. Accessed on 20 November 2019.

- Conway-Smith, E. 2011. Gaddafi death “regrettable,” South Africa’s ANC says. PRI, 21 October. Available at: stories/2011-10-21/gaddafi-death-regrettable-south-africas-anc-says. Accessed on 1 November 2019.

- Kirchick, J. 2011. South Africa stands with Qaddafi. The Atlantic, 6 September. Available at: archive/2011/09/south-africa-stands-with-qaddafi/244584/. Accessed on 20 November 2019.

181 See for example:

- ANC. 2019. ANC mourns the passing of friend, statesman & revolutionary comrade Robert Mugabe. Media statement by the ANC, 6 September. Available at mugabe-ripmugabe. Accessed on 20 July 2020.

- Phungula, W.. ANC praises ‘hero’ Mugabe. The Daily Sun, 19 September. Available at mugabe-20190918-2. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

182 SABC Digital News. 2018. SA Land Policy Under US Spotlight. YouTube. 23 August. Available at Accessed on 20 January 2020.

183 Khoza, A. 2017. South Africa failed to arrest Al Bashir. News24. 6 July. Available at to-arrest-al-bashir-icc-20170706. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

184 Mudzuli, K. 2014. Chairman Mao gets go-ahead in Tswhane. IOL. 29 August. Available at mao-gets-go-ahead-in-tshwane-1742914. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

185 Mkhwanazi, S. 2019. ANC shows support for Zimbabwe over sanctions. IOL, 26 October. Available at shows-support-for-zimbabwe-over-sanctions-35958937. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

186 Stone, S. & Khumalo, J. 2019. ANC Redirects Xenophobia Narrative as Magashule Blames Imperialist and Colonial Forces. City Press,

16 September. Available at colonial-forces-20190916. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

187 eNCA. 2016. Mantashe claims US is meddling in SA. Report on 19 February. Available at us-trying-enforce-regime-change-sa. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

188 eNCA. 2016. The Depth of the Third Force on SA’s Democracy. Report on 11 May. Available at third-force-on-sas-democracy. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

189 IOL. 2008. ANC’s ‘Insane name changes’. 21 October. Available at in-tshwane-1742914. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

190 Business Tech. 2019. ANC says corruption memo is “imperialist” Germany, UK and USA pushing for regime change. 5 February. Available at https:// Accessed on 20 January 2020.

191 Pather, R. 2018. US Threatens to cut funding to South Africa. Mail & Guardian, 30 April. Available at to-cut-funding-to-south-africa/. Accessed on 20 January 2020.

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