Unmandated reflections - Thabo Mbeki

DP's discussion document on the tasks of the ANC in the new epoch of democratic transformation (August 9 1994)




AUGUST 9, 1994.



1.0. For 82 years, the ANC has been in the forefront of the resistance struggle waged by the national liberation movement for the defeat of white minority rule and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial democracy.

1.1. During this period, as a result of the establishment of colonialism of a special type, the ANC represented an African majority that was almost totally excluded from the country’s constitutional framework. Consequently, it could only express its views and promote its interests through extra-parliamentary means, aiming at the fundamental restructuring of the constitutional and political order.

1.2. The first time when this majority and its representatives could act meaningfully within the constitutional framework was during the period 1990-1994 when negotiations took place to establish a new and all-inclusive constitutional order.

1.3. The April 1994 elections established the national liberation movement as the principal political force in the country, entrusted with the mandate to govern the country for the five-year period designated by the new constitution.

1.4. The Government of National Unity inaugurated from May 10, 1994 put the ANC and the democratic movement as a whole, in place as the principal and predominant force in the government of the country.

1.5. This marked the moment of decisive change which would define the ANC as no longer an opposition resistance movement entrusted with the responsibility to overthrow the established order. From that point onwards, it became the struggle for the reconstruction and development of South Africa into a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous country.

1.6. The short and longer term tasks of the ANC in the current epoch derive from the imperative to achieve this new strategic objective.

1.7. To begin to address the question of the role and tasks of the ANC in the new epoch, we need, among other things, carefully to study the results of the first democratic elections in our country with a view to drawing all the necessary conclusions.



2.0. The election results show that the ANC is the party of:

2.0.1. The African rural masses;

2.0.2. The African urban working class;

2.0.3. The majority of the African middle strata;

2.0.4. Significant sections of the Coloured middle strata, especially in the Western Cape;

2.0.5. Significant sections of the Indian middle strata, especially in the Transvaal; and,

2.0.6. A very small section of the white middle strata.

2.1. The ANC emerged from the elections as the party of the African masses, consistent with the historic objective of the democratic revolution of securing the most oppressed and exploited section of our population.


3.0. The election results show that the NP is the party of:

3.0.1. All sections of the white population;

3.0.2. The Coloured working class;

3.0.3 The Indian working class;

3.0.4. The majority of the Indian middle strata in Natal; and,

3.0.4. A very small section of the African middle strata.

3.1. The NP emerged as the party of the national minorities, indicating the importance of racist sentiments, fear of the African majority and the significance of material advantage relative to this majority, in the formation of the political consciousness and sentiments of these national minorities.


4.0. The election results show that the FF (and the CP) probably representing about a third (1/3) of the white population and possibly half (1/2) of the Afrikaners, is:

4.0.1. Concentrated in the OFS and the provinces carved out of the Transvaal;

4.0.1. A party of the Afrikaner farmers in these areas;

4.0.2. A party of the blue collar and less skilled Afrikaner workers in these areas; and,

4.0.3. A party of the lowest sections of the Afrikaner middle strata.

4.1. Among other things, these results demonstrate the persistence of the social consciousness carried by sections of the Afrikaner population from the Eastern Cape to the northern provinces 150 years ago.


4.0. The election results show that the IFP is a party of:

4.0.1. A significant section of the Natal Zulu-Speaking rural population;

4.0.2 A significant section of the Zulu-speaking migrant workers; and,

4.03. Fragments of the white right wing and the Indian population in Natal.

4.1. It is commonly accepted that there was considerable electoral fraud in many parts of KwaZulu-Natal. This makes it difficult to assess the balance of political forces in this area. This is further complicated by the difficulty of measuring the possible impact of the belief among many of the Zulu-speaking voters that the King of the Zulus supported the IFP.


5.0. The election results show that the DP is a party of:

5.0.1. A small minority of the urban white (English-speaking) middle strata and sections of big English-speaking capital.

5.1. This support is concentrated in the PWV, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London and is almost certainly made up of the highest echelons of the white middle strata in the country.


6.0. The election results show that the PAC is a party of:

6.0.1. A very small African nationalist-chauvinist tendency in the national liberation movement.

6.1. This tendency is thinly spread throughout the country, with its heaviest concentrations being in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town.


7.0. As between the two parties which, together, represent almost 85 percent of the South African population, the ANC and the NP, the clear dividing line was a racial one and not one based on class distinctions. This emphasises the continuing centrality of the national question in South African politics.

7.1. It also bears on and makes more difficult the realisation of the strategic objective of our movement of ensuring that it is itself a non-racial movement and that our country is transformed into a non-racial entity.

7.2. Despite the fact that the Indian and Coloured national minorities are concentrated in the Durban and Western Cape areas respectively, this does not mean that the approach to the national question with regard to these minorities is a responsibility of the movement structures in these areas. It is a matter that the movement as a who[le] must attend to.

8.0. The efforts of the white minority regimes to fragment the African majority into ethnic political entities has been defeated by the decades-long struggle to unite the African people and to “bury the demon of tribalism” which Seme called for at the foundation of the ANC.

8.1. Great care will have to be taken to ensure that in the pursuit of greater provincial powers, we do not undo this historic victory by setting up as distinct and opposing entities a Xhosa-speaking Eastern Province, a Tswana-speaking North West, a Zulu-speaking KwaZulu-Natal, a Sotho-speaking Orange Free State, a Swazi and Ndebele speaking Eastern Transvaal and a Pedi, Venda and Shangaan speaking Northern Transvaal.

8.2. At the same time, the offensive aimed at weakening the influence and leadership of the ANC by presenting it as an ethnic, Xhosa-supported organisation has been roundly defeated.

9.0. The African majority demonstrated its political maturity with regard to the non-racial platform of the ANC and its general strategic perspective leading to a negotiated settlement by its almost total rejection of the PAC.

10.0. The defeat of the neo-classical liberal-democratic tendency as represented by the DP confirmed its rejection by the majority of the people as a serious platform for the resolution of the challenges facing our country and demonstrated the weakness of the social base of that section of big capital which is most interested in promoting the concepts of “the freedom of the market” and the related political philosophy of individualism.



11.0. The next test of the popular strength of the ANC, the demonstration of the social composition of its support base and its further empowerment to carry out our reconstruction and development plans will arise as a result of the local government elections scheduled for April-May.

11.1. Obtaining a decisive victory in the forthcoming local government elections is one of the most important and urgent tasks facing the movement. In this regard, we must realise the following objectives:


11.1.1. Hold on to our proven African support.

11.1.2. Win back the support we lost to the IFP.

11.1.3 Win over the Coloured and Indian working class.

11.1.4. Retain and increase our support among the Coloured, Indian and white middle strata.


12.0. An important objective we will have to pursue during these elections will be to hold on to our main support base, namely, the African majority in both rural and urban areas. This requires that, globally, we attend to five matters in particular. These are:


12.0.1. Delivering change to these communities;

12.0.2. Ensuring that the provincial governments are sufficiently organised to be able to deliver this change;

12.0.3. Ensuring that we have strong structures of both the ANC and the broad democratic movement capable of reaching and politically mobilising these sectors of our people;

12.0.4. Ensuring that the structures of both the ANC and the broad democratic movement are able to and actually participate in the process of delivery of material change, especially through the grassroots mobilisation of communities to participate in the process of delivering change to their own life conditions;

12.0.5. Ensuring that the Civic Organisations, the democratic NGO’s and CBO’s are empowered and enabled to participate in the process of delivering material change to the people;


12.0.6. With regard to the delivery of change, attention should be paid to immediately implementable elements of the RDP, namely: Organising for the successful implementation of the Health Ministry-administered school-feeding President’s Project; and,

12.06.2. Organising for the successful implementation of the President’s Project aimed at the renewal of urban and rural settlements.

12.06.3. Fighting crime and political violence, paying particular attention to reinforcing community policing and concluding police-supported peace accords where there is continuing political violence.


12.1. With regard to the successful implementation of such projects, it is important to bear in mind the following:

12.1.1. The ministries concerned should, after the necessary consultation, work out the concept and details necessary for the implementation of these programmes;

12.1.2. The leadership structures of the ANC national parliamentary caucus should ensure that the ANC parliamentarians are properly briefed about these programmes so that they can go back to their provinces and constituencies to ensure their implementation;

12.1.3. These leadership structures should also ensure that the ANC provincial legislative structures are similarly informed and mobilised to implement these programmes;

12.1.4. The ministries would, as a matter of course, engage the provincial governments in the implementation of these programmes; and,

12.1.5. The ANC Head Office would ensure that the national and provincial structures of the ANC and the broad democratic movement outside of parliament are themselves mobilised to implement these programmes, acting together with the national and provincial governments and the national and provincial parliamentarians.


12.1.6. This approach ensures that we move away from the dangerous concept that the movement has split into various factions – the extra-parliamentary, the parliamentary and the executive – and ensures that all members of the organisation act together in pursuit of common goals, regardless of where they are deployed.


13.0. The second important objective we have to accomplish during the local elections is to win back the traditional ANC constituency that we lost to the IFP.

13.1. To achieve this goal, it is necessary that, in addition to the global aims stated above, we realise a number of objectives, namely:

13.1.1. Action must be taken to end the political violence which continues to plague the province of KwaZulu-Natal and, to some extent, the East Rand.

13.1.2. It is necessary that the Zulu Royal House and the traditional leaders in Natal be persuaded that they should not be involved in supporting any of the parties and organisations that will participate in the local government elections.

13.1.3. It is imperative that we deal firmly and decisively with violence originating from within our ranks whether directed against competing political parties or other members and supporters of the movement. We must move away from the pretence that such violence does not occur or that it is so insignificant that we should not be concerned about it. It is important to understand that while this violence originating from within the movement continues, it puts the movement in a position that is no different from other organisations which resort to violence. It creates the situation in which the ordinary people will vote for that party which carries out the greatest violence, in the hope that this would buy them peace.

13.1.4. We must ensure that we have strong organised structures of the ANC and the broad democratic movement capable of reaching the masses, especially those in the rural areas.

13.1.5. We must work to ensure that living conditions in the hostels are improved.

13.1.6. We must also work to ensure that the relations between hostel-dwellers and township communities are improved and stabilised.


14.0. Success in this area depends on a correct approach to the solution of the national question – the heart of the democratic revolution at this stage.

14.1. During the elections, and with regard to both sectors, the NP took the position that it could win these two sectors by:

14.1.1. Frightening them that they would lose their better material status vis-à-vis the Africans, especially through the implementation of a policy of affirmative action;

14.1.2. Exploiting racist sentiments among these sectors, many of who see themselves as being superior to the “kaffirs” and are fearful and perhaps contemptuous of “black majority rule”;

14.1.3. Taking advantage of the religious beliefs and other prejudices of these communities by threatening them with the spectre of “communists in the ANC”; and,

14.1.4. Promising them that, should the electorate give the NP the necessary support, this party would protect and advance the interests of these sectors and that nobody else had the objective necessity and desire to discharge this responsibility.

14.2. A central platform in the strategic objectives of the ANC is the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial country. In a sense, it is not possible to solve any other major question outside the context of this non-racial perspective.

14.2.1. (The important place that the matter of non-racial wages and conditions in the economy assumes in the current collective bargaining process, emphasises the importance of the objective of a non-racial society. The battle over the language question falls within the same category. Common sense should tell us that one of the principal issues of the next five years will be the national question, in whatever way it expresses itself. This will put great pressure on the democratic movement to address the interests of all national and ethnic groups in a manner that uplifts the most disadvantaged, the Africans, while not being seen as threatening by the rest of the population.)

14.2.2. The first stage of our post-election victory with regard to the solution of the national question during the democratic transition, with its objective of establishing a non-racial society, must centre on convincing these other sectors of the black population, who were/are themselves and super-exploited, that the democratic revolution has been effected to serve their interests as well.


14.3. Having determined our strategic and tactical approach, we must set up task forces for each area of concentration of the sectors of our people.

14.3.1. Within each one of these areas, we must deploy many organisers to do door-to-door work, a good number of these organisers being African, to address the “threat” question.

14.3.2. It would also be important to deploy a fair number of white organisers to join in this effort, to give reassurance that the new power is also based among the “super-powerful” white minority.

14.3.3. The message that the organisers must communicate to these communities is that the democratic transformation requires their skills and talents and therefore considers them a valuable national asset and a vital components of the forces that we require to build a better life for all our people.

14.3.4. Each task group must make sure that it fully understands the social composition of the community it is working with so that, in each community, we are able to: Address the specific social needs to each section within each local community and the community as a whole; and, Mobilise these communities for involvement in the implementation of reconstruction programmes, drawing people from the middle strata of these communities into this work.

14.4. It will also be necessary to pay attention to the media that is targeted at these communities to ensure that we are able to reach the greatest possible number of these communities on a consistent basis.


15.0. It is important to activise this sector of our population by:

15.0.1. Engaging it in the process of planning programmes for reconstruction and development at the local and national levels;

15.0.2. Drawing it into the implementation of these programmes at both local and national levels;

15.0.3. Involving it in the political mobilisation of the people; and,

15.0.4. Involving it in the empowerment of the people to enable them to participate in the socio-economic transformation programmes.

15.1. It is also important to elaborate concrete programmes for the training and appropriate deployment of members of this strata, to:

15.1.1. Increase its size;

15.1.2. Continuously reduce the race and gender imbalances within this sector;

15.1.3. Ensure the increased social contribution of this sector through improvements in its efficiency and effectiveness within each field of expertise; and,

15.1.4. Draw especially the African middle strata into the appropriate governmental institutions, in keeping with its expertise.

15.2. Particular attention will have to be paid to affirmative action/ catching-up programmes for the black middle strata to expedite the realisation of the objectives stated above.

15.3. Especial attention will also have to be paid to the question of helping, in particular, the African business community to establish itself outside its traditional areas of activity and to grow. This cannot happen without a multi-pronged government intervention, which should also draw on the resources being made available by the international community to assist in this specific development sphere.


16.0. Various forces will continue to oppose the ANC in pursuit of a number of objectives:

16.1. Among the most important of these opposing forces are:

16.1.1. The National Party;

16.1.2. The IFP;

16.1.3. The old counter-insurgency forces; and,

16.1.4. Sections of the “liberal” establishment, perhaps epitomised by the DP.


16.2. We must expect that this struggle will be waged both within the country and internationally.

16.3. The BASIC AIM of these opposition forces will be to create the atmosphere where it will be possible for them either to displace the ANC as the leading political force in the country or to ensure its transformation so that it ceases to pursue the objective of the fundamental reconstruction and development of the country and is unable to ensure that our country plays an independent role in world politics.

16.4. Some of the objectives that these forces will pursue to achieve this aim, whether acting jointly or not, will be:

16.4.1. to weaken and discredit the Government of National Unity, targeting especially the ANC component of this government, both domestically and internationally;

16.4.2. to discredit and isolate the ANC from as many sectors of the South African public as possible;

16.4.3. to destroy the ANC from within; and,

16.4.4. to create contradictions and conflict between the ANC and other formations of the democratic movement.


16.5. The opposition forces will wage a sustained campaign aimed to convince the public that:

16.5.1. The GNU ( and the ANC within the GNU) has no realistic and implementable policies to translate the RDP vision into reality;

16.5.2. The GNU is incompetent, has no capacity actually to govern and no internal coherence within itself;

16.5.3. The GNU is composed of people who are only interested in themselves or otherwise improving the own personal life conditions and who are not immune from corrupt practices; and,

16.5.4. The GNU is bound to drag the country down so that South Africa, too, suffers from the same “malaise” that has affected many other African countries.

16.5.5. This campaign will be at its most sustained during the period when the GNU is trying to settle down and to consolidate its positions, i.e. the early life of the administration.

16.5.6. The opposition will not be adverse to creating conditions or initiating provocations which will enable it to “prove” the truth of these allegations.

16.5.7. This opposition will take advantage of the “critical posture” of the white-owned and controlled mass media, to broadcast its message far and wide. It is necessary to bear in mind that this media is itself driven by fear of a truly non-racial order because of its concern to preserve its own racial status quo with regard to various matters, including ownership, editorial control and policy and staffing.

17.0. The offensive against the ANC will concentrate on a number of issues, among others:

17.0.1. Splitting the organisation and fomenting an internal struggle on the basis that the ANC is made up of at least three component parts, these being: The ANC in government (the executive at all levels of government), which will be portrayed as having betrayed the interests of the masses; The ANC in parliament (the legislature at all levels of government), which will present itself as “the revolutionary watchdog” over the treacherous ANC in the executive; and, The ANC outside government (the grassroots structures at all levels), which will be projected as the true representative of the soul of the movement, with a historic task to be “the revolution watchdogs” over the ANC members in the legislatures who, it will be said, have been coopted by “the new system” represented by the GNU, which itself epitomises the height of the betrayal of the masses. Efforts will be made to convince the movement that there is competition between two centres – the ANC in Cabinet, on the other hand and the NEC, on the other – to decide where the decision-making centre of power resides.

17.0.2. Splitting the ANC around the issue of leadership, with various comrades within the movement being set up against one another on the basis that they represent different competing tendencies within the movement and ensuring that such a leadership wrangle assumes precedence over all other matters of interest to the organisation; (This will of particular relevance to the forthcoming National Conference of the ANC.) Ensuring that such a contest or contests at the top, is/are replicated at all other levels of the movement; and, Encouraging tension among the leadership of the ANC through a press campaign aimed to incite inter-personal competition among this leadership.

18.0. It is in the interests of the opposition forces to break up the broad front of democratic forces, as led by the ANC, aiming at:

18.1. Breaking up the tripartite alliance by:

18.1.1. Encouraging the SACP publicly to project itself as “the left conscience” which would fight for the loyalty of the ANC to the cause of the working people, against an ANC leadership which is inclined to over-compromise with the forces of bourgeois reformism; Inciting the SACP to use its independent structures as a party to carry out such a campaign while also encouraging the members of the SACP within the ANC to form themselves into an organised faction to pursue the same objective;

18.1.2. Encouraging the constitution of an ultra-left political formation which would, itself, challenge the policies and revolutionary credentials of the SACP, to force the latter to intensify its offensive to “rectify the line” within the ANC.

19.0. Encouraging COSATU and its affiliates to project the pursuit of political and socio-economic objectives different from those that the ANC has set itself as a governing party;

19.1. Encouraging COSATU to exploit the fact of the democratic transition and the place of the Anc (sic) in government to interpret this to mean that the ANC has an obligation to “its electorate”, namely the African working class, to support it in all its demands or face denunciation as a traitor;

19.2. On these bases to encourage the launching of a major and sustained mass campaign which, while addressing various legitimate worker demands would, at the same time, pose the spectre of ungovernability; and,

19.3. Otherwise encouraging the unions to be suspicious of the intentions of the “ANC in government” on the basis that the latter is likely to act in a manner intended to appease the domestic and international business world and the multi-lateral financial institutions.

20.0. We should also expect that efforts will be made to drive a wedge between the ANC and other formations of the democratic movement, including the civics, the student, youth, religious and other organisations.

20.1. In this regard, use will be made of the legitimate demands of the people to demand of the government that it delivers change at a pace that is practically impossible.

20.2. Use might also be made of the tensions that have existed in the past as, for example, between sections of the ANC and sections of SANCO.

21.0. In considering the operational effectiveness of the forces opposed to the ANC, it is necessary to bear in mind the important reality that the network established by the counter-insurgency forces, the spearhead of the counter-revolutionary offensive against the democratic movement, has never effectively been dismantled.

21.0.1. The resources available to these forces are: Command centres that continue to exist; Operational units that have never been dismantled; A network of informers and agents spread throughout the democratic movement, the media, the educational institutions and other areas, which the commanding officers refuse to disclose even to the President; Access to the counter-revolutionary strategy, plans, information and personnel put in place as part of the National Security Management System elaborated during the period of P.W. Botha’s presidency; Continuing access to weapons and funds.

21.1. It is also necessary to bear in mind that these counter-insurgency forces have a direct interest in the perpetuation of their own existence, if only to maintain their capacity to cover up for their past crimes, many of which were committed in the period since the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations.

21.1.1. It is this fear of discovery and punishment which would drive the counter-insurgency forces to seek the achievement of the situation in which this threat is removed, through the relevant changes in the composition of government or through permanent changes in government policies.

21.1.2. To achieve their purposes, these forces still have the capacity, among others: to destabilise the movement from within through the use of agents provocateurs; to provoke mass actions hostile to the objectives of the democratic movement; to carry out assassinations; to conduct a disinformation campaign through the media.

22.0. We should also bear in mind the importance of the international community to the success of our goals of reconstruction and development and, consequently, the interest of the forces of opposition in ensuring that we lose our base among this community.

22.0.1. Accordingly, we must expect that hostile forces will try to ensure that the movement gets discredited among and isolated from various forces, including our traditional supporters, the mass media, the business community and others.


23.0. The creation of the conditions for the successful defence and advance of the democratic revolution constitutes the CENTRAL STRATEGIC TASK of the democratic movement.


24.0. For the next five years, the centrepiece of the defence and advance of the democratic revolution has to be the deracialisation of South Africa, the creation of a non-racial society or what used to be described as dismantling apartheid.


25.0. Understanding of these two objectives by the broad leadership of the democratic movement in its entirety, as well as the tactical tasks that derive from it, is one of the most critical elements of the process of creating the conditions for the accomplishment of what we have described as our central strategic task.

25.0.1. Securing understanding of these objectives by the leadership will ensure that: it moves together as a united force; it is able to counter all moves aimed at subverting genuine democratic, non-racial and non-sexist transformation; and, it is capable of correctly leading the members of the democratic movement, the masses of the people and the country as a whole.


26.0. It is also vital that we secure the unity of the ANC, the tripartite alliance and the broad democratic movement around a common strategic and tactical approach, elements of which are contained in this presentation.

26.0.1. Tasks consistent with this approach need to be broken down for the implementation by even the smallest unit of the movement, such as the ANC branches.


27.0. It is necessary that the government, acting together with other role players in civil society, should, as a matter of urgency, work out concrete and realistic short-term and medium-term plans covering all aspects of human activity, aimed at meeting the challenge of creating a non-racial society.

27.0.1. It is important that these plans should: be realistic with regard to the availability of resources; be consistent with the objective of defending and advancing the democratic revolution; spell out implementation plans for any programmes that may be worked out, including the involvement of civil society.


28.0. The changes we visualise can only be brought about by a strong and properly-functioning government and strong and properly-functioning organisations of civil society, including our movement. The strengthening of these institutions must therefore be addressed as a matter of urgency.

28.0.1. Determined work should be carried out among the black public sector workers to ensure that they do not allow their legitimate demands to be exploited by hostile forces to motivate these workers to embark on actions that objectively undermine the possibility to create space for the establishment of a strong democratic government.

28.0.2. The movement structures must take it as one of their responsibilities to assist with regard to the establishment of the government structures. This applies in particular to the provincial and transitional local government bodies. This is particularly important given the fact that we are the majority party in 7 of the 9 provinces and will, similarly, represent the majority of the people in many local areas. In this regard, we also need to draw attention to the possibility of a dangerous drift towards “federalism”, deriving from a justified effort to ensure effective provincial government without taking into account the need to build national unity and the integrity of the country as one unfragmented entity. One of the dangers we face in this regard, is the exacerbation of ethnic and racial hostilities emanating from the inter-provincial competition for scarce resources and a reluctance to share resources to address the question of uneven development among the different areas of our country. This is an eventuality which we should not underestimate and which the structures of the movement must oppose, consistent with the historic objectives of the movement to establish a non-racial society and to “bury the demon of tribalism”.

28.1. It is also our responsibility to ensure that neither the government nor the organs of civil society are stampeded to embark on ambitious transformation programmes before they have the capacity properly to plan and implement these programmes.

28.1.1. The leadership and the activities of the movement therefore have a responsibility to reach out both to the membership and the population at large, among other things to spread understanding for the need to prepare for successful action, the need to avoid actions which can only serve the interests of forces opposed to fundamental change. This would help to defeat the forces that seek to mobilise the people against the government on the basis that change must be effected now. It would also help to contain those forces among our ranks which, having draped themselves in the cloak of radicalism, objectively act to discredit and weaken the government.

28.2. At the same time, it is the responsibility of the leadership and the activists to ensure that the membership does not just waiting [sic] for things to get ready, but gets involved both in planning the programmes for transformation and in creating the strong structures that would participate in the implementation of these programmes.


29.0. The government in particular and the relevant organs and members of the movement must take all necessary measures to ensure that, as a matter of urgency, the structures originally established for counter-revolutionary purposes are dismantled.

29.0.1. The movement must also get ready to deal with the challenge of the exposure of some of its members as having been informers and agents of the apartheid secret services. In this context, we must understand that the new democracy cannot allow for hostile surveillance of the democratic process and the participants in this process. Change also demands that the ANC and the democratic movement as a whole should be able to shed some of is [sic] “members”, regardless of how this might be exploited by our opponents to discredit the movement.


30.0. It is important that we prepare properly for this conference, to ensure that it deals with the substantive and critical issues of the defence and advancement of the democratic revolution rather than a scramble for positions of leadership.


31.0. We must take very seriously the issue of raising funds among our membership and people to finance the movement. It will no longer be possible to sustain ourselves on the basis of donations by foreign governments and supporters. Neither would it be possible or correct to siphon state funds to ensure the survival and operations of the ANC or any other formation of the democratic movement. To borrow a phrase—democrats you are on your own!


32.0. The leadership of the movement and our headquarters have a truly historic responsibility to ensure that we actually succeed to defend and advance the democratic, non-racial and non-sexist revolution.

33.0. We must elaborate the slogans that will mobilise the people to act for the realisation of these aims.

34.0. We must organise ourselves and act in such a manner that we achieve this objective.

35.0. We must defeat any action which seeks to deny our people, the peoples of Africa and the world this victory.