OPINION

Europe's core problem

Leon Schreiber argues that economic integration without political integration is a recipe for disaster

The European Emperor is Naked

The results of the recent European parliamentary elections rattled the continent's political establishment, with the characterisation of the results as a ‘political earthquake' being very much en vogue. The chief source of concern was the spectacular increase in support for Eurosceptic parties across the continent. The strongest effects were felt in Britain, France and Denmark, where the National Front (25 percent), the UK Independence Party (27.5 percent) and the Danish People's Party (27.5 percent) won their respective elections outright. Total support for radical rightwing and leftwing Eurosceptic parties more than doubled.

There can be no doubt that high levels of unemployment, voter apathy, the continuing Euro-crisis as well as the rise of nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments played important roles in the voting patterns. But something much deeper lies behind the economic and political crisis in Europe: the failure of political leaders to articulate a clear vision of where European integration is ultimately headed. The spike in support of Eurosceptic parties has vividly exposed the fundamental contradiction of the European Union (EU). It is a half-baked Union of economic integration without sufficient political integration.

The attempt to ascertain the root cause of the crisis in Europe must commence with an examination of the reunification of Germany in the early 1990s. It is of course common knowledge that the process of European integration accelerated significantly since the iconic tumbling of the Berlin wall in November 1989 and the associated collapse of the Soviet Union. While the reunification of Germany in and of itself is often not included in current debates about Europe, it offers valuable insights into the underlying political processes that are involved in any attempt at integration.

The one feature that stands out unopposed in any study of German reunification is the fact that there was no possibility for the continued existence of two, separate, sovereign Germanys. The idea naturally sounds preposterous today, as most people simply assumed that the former West- and East Germany needed to be reunited and fully integrated. But this seemingly obvious principle of total political and economic integration had important consequences that expose the weaknesses of the current European project.

From a financial perspective, integration meant that the Länder of the former West Germany had to subsidise the regions of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR). The subsidies were - and still are - massive. Berlin, the former capital of the DDR and once again capital of a reunited Germany since 1998, has effectively been bankrupt for the last few decades. The system is largely maintained through the subsidies paid by wealthy western regions.

The important point is that there was never truly any doubt about the necessity of the subsidies. It is also striking how little was demanded in return for the money from recipient Länder. This feature is especially remarkable given the context of neoliberal ‘structural adjustments' that were forced upon other post-Soviet states in order to qualify for financial support during the same period. The logic, however, is clear: because the DDR was now politically part of Germany, it seemed only natural that the rest of the country should contribute towards repairing the damage caused by communism.

The principles that supported this process are almost entirely lacking from contemporary Europe, for the simple reason that Europe is not a sovereign country. In the case of Europe - and despite the similarities between the current structural position of countries like Greece and that of the former DDR during the 1990s - it is by no means a straightforward fact that wealthier European regions should subsidise struggling ones. When financial rescue packages are sent from wealthier countries (such as Germany, France and the Netherlands) to countries like Greece, Spain or Portugal, it is never without the concomitant demands for structural adjustment.

Why is there such a striking contrast between the compassionate approach taken by Germany during the reintegration of the DDR, and the rather ruthless one that the EU is currently taking with regards to Europe - especially given the similarity of the structural challenge? The simple answer is that Europe, unlike Germany, is not one country. National politicians are still only accountable to the citizens of their respective countries and therefore have to protect their interests (and tax monies) against the interests of fellow Europeans.

In actuality, ‘Europe' is nothing more than a quasi-federal collection of still independent sovereign states, without access to a central tax system and with only indirect sources of income. As a result, the continent suffers from a massive democratic deficit. This fact is currently in the process of being strikingly illustrated in the manoeuvring surrounding the election of the next president of the European Commission (EC) - a situation characterised by Der Spiegel as ‘Europeans vote, Merkel decides'. The root of the problem is that European political integration is incomplete. The crisis in Europe will continue as long as political leaders are not responsible to all of Europe and as long as there is no central tax authority - the crisis will continue as long as Europe is not a federal country like the United States of America.

The continent's leaders have attempted to integrate without sacrificing enough of their sovereign integrity. The EU in its current form is purely a compromise; an attempt to have the European cake and eat it. It is a dangerously unsustainable situation. There are only two possible solutions. Europe must either decide to return to the earlier model of competition between sovereign states, or complete the process of integration through founding a ‘United States of Europe'.

This situation has created the perfect conditions for the rise of anti-establishment parties. The most remarkable feature of the debate in its current form is that the only voices seriously discussing the issue of incomplete integration come from the anti-Europe camp. Regardless of the validity of their arguments, the fact is that this group is articulating a clear vision to voters regarding the unsustainable compromise currently represented by European integration. Marine le Pen, leader of the National Front in France, clearly understands the root of the problem in Europe when she asserts that French political leaders have ‘sold out our sovereignty little-by-little to the EU. We simply must win back our sovereignty; it is the most fundamental thing'. These kinds of parties thus offer voters a clear vision: the only way to resolve problems such as high unemployment, the Euro-crisis and immigration is to return to the model of competition between sovereign states. 

What about the vision of supposed pro-European groupings? The answer is that they simply have no vision for the future of European integration. These groups have largely been in government during the previous two decades, a period characterised by their attempt to milk economic integration for every possible cent. They paid little attention to that which is so fundamental to Le Pen and co., namely issues surrounding sovereignty and how full-scale political integration would ultimately be achieved (or not).

The reason for the recent success of Eurosceptic parties is due to the fact that they offer a clear vision of European integration, while their pro-European opponents stare blindly into an unimagined future.

Economic integration without political integration is a recipe for disaster, especially when there are large disparities between the integrating regions. That is exactly the position that Europe currently finds herself in. Both the Euro-crisis and the rise of radical political parties result from the fact that the continent tries to act like a federal country, without being prepared to actually become a federal country. The economic crisis will continue, while Eurosceptic and nationalist sentiments will continue to gain traction, for as long as pro-European political forces deny this reality.

Leon Schreiber is a South African Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the Freie Universität Berlin in Germany. The views expressed are his own. This article first appeared on his blog at http://theschreiberei.wordpress.com/. He can be followed on Twitter here.

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