Whistle-blower protection: Does South Africa match up? - Part III
19 July 2018
Internal reporting mechanisms
A coherent, stringently observed process for the reporting and investigation of wrongdoing is a powerful tool against infringement of whistle-blowers’ rights. The TI Guidelines highlight the importance of whistle-blowers having trust in the reporting mechanism and feeling comfortable enough to make use of it. There are generally three avenues to report wrongdoing: at work, to relevant authorities, or to external parties (a public disclosure). Whistle-blowers should be made aware of what avenues are open to them, and what requirements must be met when making the disclosure for protection to apply.
The TI Guidelines cite studies that show that most whistle-blowers turn to internal reporting mechanisms at first. This is good reason to require (or strongly encourage) organisations to put in place effective internal reporting mechanisms. And this is exactly what the PDA prescribes, but in a manner that is unlikely to be effective or enforceable.
Section 2(a) of the PDA places an obligation on every employer to “authorise appropriate internal procedures for receiving and dealing with information about improprieties” and “take reasonable steps to bring the internal procedures to the attention of every employer and worker”. It is highly doubtful that all employers comply with this – particularly as the PDA does not prescribe a penalty for failing to do so.
Further, the provision is a somewhat blunt instrument that places obligations on large corporations and small organisations alike. It would be unduly onerous on employers with very few staff to implement whistle-blower procedures. A more reasonable approach would be to make use of a threshold, such as requiring employers with over a certain number of employees to put in place such a mechanism. This approach is adopted in France, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. A penalty, such a fine, can be imposed on those who do not comply.
Components of whistle-blowing mechanisms
Transparency International suggests that the following four components are essential for internal whistle-blowing mechanisms:
promotion and training for all staff, including special training to managers and those tasked with implementing whistle-blowing policies;
confidential or anonymous channels;
an effective response system; and
robust user protection.
Providing confidential or anonymous channels is particularly important in South Africa as the PDA does not protect whistle-blowers’ confidentialityi. Practically, ensuring confidentiality can take the form of making use of independent third-party whistle-blowing services, anonymous reporting boxes to receive written submissions, or telephone hotlines.
An effective response system ensures thorough, timely and independent investigations of whistle-blowers’ disclosures. The TI Guidelines recommend that whistle-blowers should be informed as to the progress and outcome of the investigation and be given opportunities to participate where appropriate. They might also be able to comment on the outcome or report following an investigation.
Section 3B was inserted into the PDA in 2017. It sets out in detail the procedure to be followed once a disclosure has been made, including – commendably - time frames. It makes provision for the whistle-blower to be informed at various stages of the process.
An important provision in section 3B states that if the disclosure could be investigated or dealt with more appropriately by another person or body, the person initially receiving the disclosure must refer the disclosure to that person. This provision has a two-fold benefit: it takes the burden off the whistle-blower to find the right forum for his or her disclosure and also facilitates reporting of the disclosure to the person best placed to take appropriate action. This amendment is a step forward for whistle-blower protection.
In providing “robust user protection” to whistle-blowers, the TI Guidelines state that best practice is for:
“legislation to require employing organisations to have internal procedures for ensuring protection not only against retaliation, but also support for whistle-blowers, prior to retaliation occurring”.
One way to do this is to place a positive obligation on organisations to take steps to protect whistle-blowers, with a corresponding sanction if they fail to do so. Best practice, according to the TI Guidelines, is to give whistle-blowers a right to compensation not only where he or she suffers an occupational detriment, but also where the employer fails to meet an obligation to protect the whistle-blower from unfair treatment.
The PDA’s protection against anticipated retaliatory attacks appears to exist only in the definition of “occupational detriment”, which states that a threat by the employer to commit any of the listed detriments (such as dismissal, refusal of promotion, etc) is itself an occupational detriment. Therefore, if a threat is made, the whistle-blower is entitled to seek the same remedies as if a detriment had already occurred. This form of protection does not go far enough in terms of the TI Guidelines, in that there is no requirement for the employer to actively take steps to prevent harm to the whistle-blower. A more robust protection would be to place an express obligation on employers to protect whistle-blowers against retaliatory actions, with a provision made for compensation if this is not done adequately.
If internal reporting is not effective, a whistle-blower should have the option to approach an external authority with their disclosure. The TI Guidelines recommend that there be no requirement for whistle-blowers to report wrongdoing internally before turning to the authorities.
Under the PDA, a whistle-blower is entitled to report wrongdoing to certain external authorities such as a member of Cabinet or a provincial Executive Council (in limited circumstances) or to other specified persons or bodies (such as the Public Protector) without having reported to his or her employer first. However, “general” disclosures to the public are only protected if the whistle-blower can show reasons why he or she cannot disclose to an employer – such as a belief that the employer will cover up the wrongdoing. This is subject to a caveat: a whistle-blower can report to the public without having to show reasons why he or she did not report to the employer first, if the impropriety alleged is of an “exceptionally serious nature”.ii
The TI Guidelines support such a caveat, relying on the principle that
“In cases of urgent or grave public or personal danger, or persistently unaddressed wrongdoing that could affect the public interest, individuals shall be protected for disclosures made to external parties such as the media, civil society organisations, legal associations, trade unions, or business/professional organisations”.
This acknowledges that not all wrongdoing can be solved behind closed doors. At times, the only way to resolve an issue is to ventilate it fully in public. This can be done, for instance, in cases where the disclosure relates to matters that are politically sensitive or involve large amounts of money. Whistle-blowers should be able to report wrongdoing to bodies such as trade unions, to civil society organisations, or the media. However, such reporting does come with risks – if, for instance, it is shown that the disclosure was unfounded, the subject of the disclosure may have already suffered reputational damage. Therefore, to impose some restrictions on such reporting is a reasonable approach.iii
Matters of national security or state secrets
What should happen when the disclosure concerns a matter of national security or is classified? Disclosure of such information can have serious implications for the whistle-blowers. The TI Guidelines note that such disclosures are among the most contentious areas of whistle-blowing and comes with the most severe retaliation – “not only do [whistle-blowers] lose their jobs, they face criminal investigations, prosecutions and harsh sentencing”.
The principle adopted by the TI Guidelines is that in such cases:
- Special procedures and safeguards for reporting that take into account the sensitive nature of the subject matter may be adopted in order to promote successful internal follow-up and resolution and to prevent unnecessary external exposure;
- Such procedures should permit internal disclosures, disclosures to an autonomous oversight body that is independent of the security sector, or disclosures to authorities with the appropriate security clearance; and
- External disclosure would be justified in demonstrable cases of urgent or grave threats to the public, if internal disclosure could lead to personal harm or the destruction of evidence, and if the disclosure was not intended to likely to significantly harm national security or individuals.
A recommendation from the Council of Europe is that a special scheme can be created in relation to information that concerns national security, defence, intelligence, public order, or international relations. Whistle-blowers would then be empowered to report wrongdoing through this scheme and receive protection.
It is important that the type of disclosure that is subject to the special regime be defined narrowly and clearly. In 2013, a set of Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information were finalised in Tshwaneiv. These “Tshwane Principles” recommend firstly that organisations that deal with national security and official secrets should be obliged to put internal procedures in place and designate persons within those organisations to receive disclosures. Special considerations should apply, such as ensuring that the persons dealing with information received are authorised to handle classified information and have adequate powers and mandate to investigate the disclosure.
In addition to recommending conditions that should apply in respect to disclosures to the public relating to information concerning national security, the Tshwane Principles also suggest that the law should provide for a public interest defence that can be invoked by whistle-blowers who make disclosures that are not protected and who are facing sanctions in criminal, civil, or administrative forums. This would involve considering whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in non-disclosure.
The PDA contains no provisions in respect of this special category of information. The law currently in place concerning the disclosure of information relating to national security is the Protection of Information Actv. This law prohibits the disclosure of certain information which relates generally to state secrets, unless such disclosure is to a person “to whom he is authorised to disclose, to whom it may lawfully be disclosed or to whom, in the interests of the Republic, it is his duty to disclose it”. It is assumed that a disclosure under the PDA will constitute a lawful disclosure and is therefore not prohibited by the Protection of Information Act.
It is intended that the Protection of Information Act will be repealed by the Protection of State Information Bill (“Bill”) once (or if) it is signed into law by the President. The legislative process in respect of Bill was highly fraught, with many critics pointing out that it did not adequately protect whistle-blowers. The Bill was amended to exclude disclosures protected under the PDA and other laws from the offence of unlawful disclosure of classified information. Despite this, the Bill in its current form has still been heavily criticised for not adequately protecting whistle-blowers.vi It has been over five years since the Bill was passed, with no sign of it being signed into law by the President. Whether the Bill will be passed in its current or amended form (and the constitutionality of doing so, given the time that has passed) is made even more unclear following the resignation of former President Zuma, under whose watch the legislation was crafted, and the instalment of President Ramaphosa.
If the President declines to sign the Bill and instead sends it back to the legislature for reconsideration, this would be the ideal opportunity to redraft it to include clear public interest protections in respect of disclosures relating to state secrets. In addition, provision could be made for a special regime for the disclosure of reports of wrongdoing in line with the Tshwane Principles.
This part of the brief series considered procedural aspects of whistle-blower protections. While clear and relatively simple procedures do much in ensuring that whistle-blowers’ disclosures are received by the suitable authority and are dealt with properly, it is important to remember that a one-size-fits-all approach is not always appropriate. This is illustrated by the need for a special regime to apply with regard to disclosures concerning state secrets or matters of national importance.
Part IV will consider further procedural issues such as investigation of disclosures and remedies, as well as whether the legislative structures used for whistle-blower protections in South Africa are designed so as to best serve their intended purpose.
Part IV follows below.
i This is discussed further in Part II of this brief series.
ii In Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another  ZALC 104, the Court stated at paragraph 197 that for the purposes of section 9(2), “[a]llegations of corruption against a Minister is an exceptionally serious matter, irrespective of the amounts involved”.
The case of Malan v Johannesburg Philharmonic Orchestra  ZALAC 24 considers whether a disclosure made was “serious”, eventually stating the following at paragraph 38:
“The requirement that the impropriety should be serious is an important requirement. One must bear in mind that the PDA should not be interpreted in a manner which would result in the victimisation of the employers. For whistle blowers to receive protection, it is necessary that the impropriety that they disclose be serious and not simply reveal alleged breaches of contract when there is no evidence that those who are allegedly the victims of the breaches have taken any action about it.”
iii As discussed in Part II of this brief series, however, the PDA’s requirement that whistle-blowers should not stand to gain from their disclosure is not reasonable and should be removed.
iv A copy of the Tshwane Principles can be accessed at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/global-principles-national-security-10232013.pdf (accessed on 15 June 2018).
v 84 of 1982.
vi See, for example, K Premhid “POSIB: President urged to act” accessed at https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/posib-president-urged-to-act on 15 June 2018, Corruption Watch “Secrecy Bill passed by Parliament” accessed at http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/secrecy-bill-passed-by-parliament/ on 15 June 2018, V Harris “What is still wrong with the Protection of State Information Bill” accessed athttps://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/what-is-still-wrong-with-the-protection-of-state-information-bill on 15 June 2018.
Whistle-blower protection: Does South Africa Match up? - Part IV
The last instalment in this four-part brief series will continue with examining the procedures contemplated in the Protected Disclosures Acti (“PDA”) to protect whistle-blowers in the public and private sectors, comparing them against the best practice standards set out in the best practice guidelines for whistle-blowing legislation (“TI Guidelines”) published by Transparency International. It will also provide some concluding remarks regarding the approach the legislature should adopt towards such protections going forward.
INVESTIGATION OF DISCLOSURES
The act of whistleblowing would be meaningless without investigation. Investigatory procedures must be regulated to ensure that disclosures are investigated timeously, diligently, and consistently. It is important that whistle-blowers have confidence that their disclosures will be acted upon. The TI Guidelines state that there is a duty on the body receiving the disclosure (whether internal or external) to assess its merit and to determine whether further investigation is warranted.
To minimise delay from the time that the disclosure is received, the TI Guidelines recommend that organisations devise a procedure for dealing with disclosures that set out time limits. The PDA provides that a decision must be taken whether to investigate or refer a matter – and the whistle-blower must accordingly be informed of the decision – within 21 days of the disclosure being made. If this cannot be done within that time period, the body that received the disclosure must inform the whistle-blower of this and periodically notify him or her that the matter is still pending. A decision whether or not to investigate the matter must, however, be made within six months after the disclosure is made. The imposition of time frames adds much needed structure to the process of investigation. However, it must be noted that should an investigating body not comply, the PDA contains no enforcement mechanisms or sanction that can be used by whistle-blowers.
Once a whistle-blower makes a disclosure, the matter should not end there for him or her. The TI Guidelines suggest that whistle-blowers should be informed as to the outcome of their disclosure. The PDA makes provision for this in section 3B(4). Some jurisdictions allow for whistle-blowers to give their comment on the findings that are made pursuant to the investigations. The PDA makes no provision for this, nor does it preclude it. Therefore, it would be left to the investigator’s discretion whether or not to seek the whistle-blower’s input or comment on the outcome of the investigation.
Whistle-blowers want assurance that, should they suffer unfair treatment as a result of their disclosure, they will obtain relief. The International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation by Transparency International provide that
“a full range of remedies must cover all direct, indirect and future consequences of any reprisals, with the aim to make the whistle-blower whole”.
The TI Guidelines recommend that relief measures should include all losses – direct, indirect, financial and non-financial. In essence, to the closest degree possible, the whistle-blower should be restored to the situation that he or she would have been in, had he or she not made the disclosure.
More people will be encouraged to come forward to report wrongdoing if they see that the relevant laws are applied consistently, thus allowing whistle-blowers to obtain redress for occupational detriments. To create a climate where whistle-blowers are comfortable coming forward, laws and policies should be drafted to minimise obstructions to obtaining relief.
One way to curtail hindrances to relief is by providing for a reverse onus in cases where whistle-blowers allege that they have suffered an occupational detriment. This would mean placing a burden on the employer to show that action taken against an employee was not related to whistle-blowing. In addition, whistle-blowers themselves have little resources and access to information that could assist in making a case that they were unfairly treated due to their whistle-blowing. A reverse onus would assist in rectifying the power imbalance between employers and whistle-blowers.
The TI Guidelines recommend that, to make use of protections, the person making a protected disclosure should only need to make out a case at face value that firstly, he or she made a disclosure, and secondly, suffered a negative treatment. The employer would then have to show that the negative treatment was not linked to the disclosure.
In applying the PDA, judicial authorities have concluded that the onus to show that a whistle-blower’s disclosure is protected lies on the whistle-blower. In Randles v Chemical Specialities Limited, the Labour Court set out what the whistle-blower must do:
“…if the whistleblower wishes to succeed…on the basis that he or she had suffered an occupational detriment…the whistleblower must first prove that the disclosure was protected as contemplated by the PDA and that he or she was subjected to an occupational detriment. Having said this, it should be pointed out that the issue of onus in the context of the PDA is not specifically regulated in the PDA. The whistleblower must, however, set out his or her cause of action in his or her statement of case and in doing so must plead such facts that will bring him- or herself within the parameters of the relevant sections of the PDA”.ii
The courts therefore approach onus in the same way as cases relating to automatically unfair dismissalsiii, but this does not take into account the unique considerations that apply in the context of whistle-blowing. For the various reasons set out above, the PDA should be amended to bring its provisions in line with the principle of a reverse onus.
What form should relief take?
The TI Guidelines note that relief can take the form of reinstatement to the same or equivalent position in the case of dismissal, transfer, or demotion. If the whistle-blower had been denied access to opportunities for promotion or training, such access can be restored. In certain cases, reinstatement is not possible or does not go far enough to redress the harm suffered. In such circumstances, compensation may be the appropriate form of redress. Compensation can be paid for lost past earnings, for future loss of earnings, as well as costs linked to a change of occupation.
The timing of the relief is very important to whistle-blowers. It must not be forgotten that access to remedies is essentially a legal matter and their rights must be upheld through the courts, as is specifically provided for under the PDA. This can take a long time. Interim remedies should therefore be available from the outset. Such orders can help protect whistle-blowers against unfair treatment while the disclosure is being processed.
Section 4 of the PDA concerns remedies. This section provides that whistle-blowers can approach any court having jurisdiction for appropriate relief, with the caveat that only employees (as defined) can approach the Labour Courts. Section 4(1B) provides an open list of potential remedies, including compensation, damages, or a mandamus directing the employer (or client) to take steps to remedy the occupational detriment. Crucially, it is left to the courts to determine “an appropriate order that is just and equitable in the circumstances”, which can include interim reliefiv. The PDA therefore leaves the door open for a wide range of remedies which is to the benefit of whistle-blowers.
One way that governments can assist whistle-blowers is by making them eligible for legal assistance in any legal proceedings to vindicate their rights, should they not have the funds to do so. Unfortunately, South Africa’s legal aid system is already under significant strain and resource constraints prevent funding assistance from being provided to all whistle-blowers. Presently, a whistle-blower that approaches Legal Aid South Africa would be subject to a means test.
There is good reason to consider creating a special fund to assist whistle-blowers with legal costs. A legal fund is a practical way of realising whistle-blowers’ rights, which are rendered illusory if they cannot be enforced due to a whistle-blower’s financial constraints. The removal of this obstacle would provide encouragement to whistle-blowers to make disclosures, as they would not bear the financial risks arising from legal exposure. The rules of such a fund could provide that funds received from costs orders in successful cases must be repaid to the fund as a way to improve its sustainability.
A positive way to encourage whistle-blowing would be to create a system of rewards or honours. This can take the form of a pecuniary or ceremonial acknowledgement of the courage that it takes to report wrongdoing. The TI Guidelines suggest that where a reward system is established, it should come in addition to a comprehensive national whistle-blower protection framework.
In the United States, the False Claims Act allows whistle-blowers to receive a portion of monies recovered following a disclosure relating to the defrauding of the government. The US Department of Justice reported that the government had paid out $392 million to whistle-blowers who exposed fraud and false claims in the amount of $3.4 billion in the 2017 fiscal year.v In 2015, the Deputy Public Protector remarked on the effect of this law and suggested that South Africa should consider the idea of a “sweetener” for whistle-blowers seriously.vi
South Africa’s PDA makes no provision for rewards, financial or otherwise. The idea of creating such a regime should not be dismissed lightly. The aim of providing rewards or honours would not be to enrich whistle-blowers but rather to encourage a behavioural shift away from apathy, paralysing fear, or indifference and towards disclosure of wrongdoing.
One suggestion in the TI Guidelines that has no traction in South Africa is the establishment of an independent agency responsible for the oversight and enforcement of whistle-blowing legislation. An existing agency’s powers can be extended to undertake such functions or an entirely new institution can be set up. The vision in the TI Guidelines is that such an agency should:
Be independent and have sufficient power and resources to operate effectively;
Be competent to receive, investigate and address complaints of unfair treatments;
Provide advice and support to whistle-blowers;
Monitor and review whistle-blower frameworks, collect and public data and information regarding the functioning of whistleblowing laws and frameworks;
Raise public awareness to encourage the use of whistle-blower provisions; and
Enhance cultural acceptance of whistleblowing.
The role of providing education and advice sorely needs filling in South Africa. While non-governmental organisations do provide some assistance in this regard, they are constrained by lack of resources and often are not be able to provide individualised advice. More education is needed to explain how disclosures come to be protected and how to go about enforcing whistle-blower rights. Potential whistle-blowers may well be emboldened by having a dedicated, knowledgeable institution to which they can turn for advice. This can well make the difference between disclosure and silence.
A whistle-blower authority could make useful contributions to research and policy-making by collecting and publishing information regarding the implementation of the whistle-blowing legislation, such as the number of disclosures received and the actions taken in response.
Unfortunately, with the many pressures on the national fiscus that leave even Chapter Nine institutions underfunded, the possibility that such an agency will be established is remote.
Legislative structure and review
The TI Guidelines recommend that laws relating to whistleblowing be consolidated into once piece of legislation “to lend both clarity and coherence to the legal framework protecting whistle-blowers”. South Africa’s PDA provides a general statute relating to all whistle-blowers, whether in the public or private sector. As mentioned in Part I of this brief series, provisions relating to whistle-blowing can be found in other pieces of legislation, namely:
The Companies Actvii;
The Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Actviii;
The National Environmental Management Actix;
The Protection from Harassment Actx;
The Witness Protection Actxi, and
The Promotion of Access to Information Actxii.
What is needed is a rationalisation of the laws relating to whistle-blowing. As has been discussed in this brief series, in many respects the PDA and the abovementioned Acts do not provide adequate blanket protections to whistle-blowers. For instance, a whistle-blower may not meet the threshold requirements to be a “witness” for the purposes of the Witness Protection Act but may face danger equal to or more severe than that which is faced by witnesses who do qualify for such protection. Whistle-blowers need to be able to make use of the safeguards of that Act or be provided with a comparable regime for protection. The 2017 amendment of the PDA, while commendable in some respects, failed to entrench wide-scale protections that cover the field of harms potentially faced by whistle-blowers.
In line with the suggestion that in the TI Guidelines that laws regulating whistle-blowing be reviewed periodically – such as every five years – it is suggested that South African legislators do not become complacent following 2017’s amendment to the PDA. Rather, research and information-gathering should be embarked upon with some urgency, paving the way for revision of the legal regime to further enhance whistle-blower protections.
The surreptitious nature of corruption makes it difficult – if not impossible - to quantify the costs of such practices to our national fiscus.xiii A 2018 report by PwC stated that “economic crime in South Africa is now at the highest level over the past decade”xiv. Given that corrupt practices have been linked to negative outcomes such as decreased economic growthxv, the need to fortify mechanisms in place to combat fraud and corruption is urgent.
Whistle-blower protection is one such mechanism. In sprawling institutions with hundreds or thousands of employees, the best way to identify corrupt practices is to have eyes on the ground. The act of witnessing must then be turned into the act of reporting before investigation and sanction can follow.
The whistle-blower is the key that unlocks the process. But, at present, the law as it stands does not adequately consider the whistle-blower’s position, including the various pressures and disincentives that he or she faces. It fails to take into account the impact of not protecting a whistle-blower’s confidentiality, of uncertainty as to who to approach to make a disclosure, or of how he or she may not be able to access legal advice or services to ensure protection of rights. South Africa’s legislative framework regarding whistle-blower protections should be reconsidered with a view to expanding them in line with the recommendations contained in the TI Guidelines and international best practice.
It is not the just the law, but the entire approach to whistle-blowing that needs an overhaul. There is a need to move away from being suspicious of whistle-blowers and towards providing wide-reaching protection for bona fide disclosures with minimal procedural obstruction. A reversal of onus to prove that a disclosure is protected is one way to do this. Another is to empower more organisations to receive protected disclosures and refer them to more appropriate authorities as required. The personal safety of whistle-blowers and their families must be prioritised. We should consider rewarding those who take on the risks associated with whistle-blowing for the common good.
There is so much more that can be done. As this brief series has shown, by protecting and encouraging each “lone voice” to speak out, a rousing chorus against corruption and wrongdoing can be created.
By Cherese Thakur, Legal Researcher, Helen Suzman Foundation.
These articles first appeared as HSF Briefs.
i 26 of 2001.
iiRandles v Chemical Specialities Limited (2011) 32 ILJ 1397 (LC) at paragraph 17.
iii See Dorey v TSB Sugar RSA Ltd  ZALCJHB 168 at paragraph 38.
iv See Griev v Denel (Pty) Ltd  ZALC 17.
v Department of Justice news release “Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017” accessed athttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 on 19 June 2018.
vi K Malunga “Whistle-blowing in South Africa” accessed at https://www.outa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Whistle-blowing-in-South-Africa27-Jan-2015.pdf on 19 June 2018.
vii 71 of 2008 at section 159.
viii 12 of 2004 in a general sense, with specific provisions relating to conduct in relation to witnesses at section 18.
ix 107 of 1998 at section 31.
x 17 of 2011 generally, that can be invoked in protecting whistle-blowers against threats.
xi 112 of 1998 generally.
xii 2 of 2000.
xiii S Chiumia and A Van Wyk “Has South Africa Lost R700 million to corruption since ‘94?” Africa Check accessed athttps://africacheck.org/reports/has-sa-lost-r700-billion-to-corruption-since-1994-why-the-calculation-is-wrong/ on 20 June 2018.
xv Ahmad et al, “Does Corruption Affect Economic Growth?” Latin American Journal of Economics 49(2) 2012.