



UMRABULO



NGC2020 SPECIAL EDITION


LET'S TALK POLITICS



NGC2020
DISCUSSION
DOCUMENTS



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The Changing Balance of Forces around the South African Transformation Agenda

INTRODUCTION

1. A continuous discussion of the domestic and global Balance of Forces is a requisite for the successful prosecution of our struggle for a National Democratic order in South Africa.
2. We need to appreciate the objective and subjective factors which are likely to impede or expedite the advancement of our transformation agenda on an ongoing basis in order to devise pertinent ways and means of achieving our goals.
3. The balance of forces is intrinsically connected to how we understand and define our mission – the strategic intent of our efforts. The way we envision the ideal end-state of our struggle will inherently guide the identification of the social and political forces which should be mobilised in support of our agenda for change.
4. The ANC Strategy and Tactics document as adopted by the last National Conference at NASREC in 2017, encompasses an assessment of the Balance of Forces in 2017.
5. The 2015 National General Council also produced a discussion document which helped conference to consolidate views around the balance of forces. This document together with the Strategy and Tactics as adopted by the Nasrec conference remain relevant. Twenty-four months is a relatively short period of time to expect significant macro social changes which warrant a revision of our strategic positions.
6. However, there are developments which occurred post-NASREC that further amplify observations which underpinned the conclusions made in 2017. This discussion document must be read with the NASREC **Strategy and Tactics** document for completeness.

‘COLONIALISM OF A SPECIAL TYPE’ – OUR IDEOLOGICAL LAUNCHING PAD

7. The theoretical expose of the South African Revolution, from the ANC's point of view, has always been premised on the scientific perspective that our struggle was against colonialism of a special type in which the liberation of blacks in general, and Africans in particular, was its strategic intent. This is the premise from which the ANC has explained many complex dimensions of our transformation project.

8. The strategic breakthrough of 1994 made it possible for the ANC to commence work in earnest to realise the liberation of blacks in general and Africans in particular in a programmatic way.
9. The constitution of our country will arguably remain a valuable heritage our liberation struggle has bequeathed generations to come in South Africa because it is more than a mere legal framework for the governing of our public affairs.
10. The constitutional principles for a democratic South Africa which former president Oliver Reginald Tambo initiated in the late 1980's was an act of astute, proactive leadership and foresight which anchored our journey beyond the transition firmly on the policy precepts and traditions of our struggle.
11. The political rights and the institutional checks and balances in our constitution, underpinned by the second generation rights in the bill of rights of the South African constitution, derive their origin from the demands of the Freedom Charter. The ideals of the Freedom Charter are embedded in our constitution today.
12. In its preamble, the constitution of the Republic of South Africa asserts that the people of South Africa: *"Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land"*, and proceeds to give an injunction to South Africans to *"Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations."*
13. In 1994 we set out to realise the strategic slogan of our NDR, the call for **"a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa"** by honouring our constitution. We led the dismantling of the statutory and institutional edifice of racial domination, sexism, autocracy, and we unified our nation-state again the way it emerged historically in 1910.
14. An evaluation of the balance of forces must seek to answer the question whether we have been able to achieve the injunctions and vision of our constitutional dispensation.
15. In other words, we should seek to distinguish between what has changed and what remains unchanged with regard to the above challenges. We must define the achievements of the past 25 years objectively and truthfully. This must involve an evidence based assessment of the political and socio economic changes in our society today.
16. Efficiently handled, this dialogue must enable us among other things, to adopt appropriate tactics and programmes. We must craft new slogans to communicate and popularise tasks of the current phase of our revolution.
17. In discussing the balance of forces there are two approaches we can employ. We can either start the discussion

by moving from “the general, to the particular” or the other way round, i.e. from the international to the domestic environment. In this regard, this document opted for the latter approach.

THE DOMESTIC BALANCE OF FORCES

Characteristics of a deepening National Democratic Revolution (NDR)

18. Ours is a National Democratic Revolution (NDR). It is more than a classical National Liberation Revolution (NLR) in that it is designed to go beyond the attainment of nationhood and formal political rights, by encompassing the achievement of socio-economic emancipation.
19. Our struggle is one in which there is a symbiotic relationship between the resolution of the antagonisms thrown up by national oppression and the fundamental problem of social injustice, economic deprivation and patriarchy. Our transition to a National Democratic Society, as we argued at the 2012 ANC National Conference, is one process characterised by different phases with different emphases.
20. The cumulative changes brought about by universal suffrage in 1994, particularly within the black populace, resulted in changes to the social structure of our country, albeit to a limited degree. “*Political freedoms in the form of free speech and elections help to promote economic security,*” argues Amartya Sen, the contemporary Indian thought leader and winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics. Furthermore, he explains that political freedoms must also be seen as “*instrumental freedoms*” because they also “*help to advance the general capability of a person*”. Combined with the socio-economic programmes introduced since the attainment of democracy, these changes continue to impact on the alignment and re-alignment of the objective interests of the motive forces of our revolution.
21. The reforms of the past 25 years have been life changing and the view that these reforms are insignificant because the task of socio-economic emancipation remains work in progress, is inconsistent. Similarly to say everything we have achieved over the past 25 years is reversible, is debatable and an over simplification of the complexity of human development.
22. On the other hand the dismantling of white privileges on which the comfort of the white working and middle classes rested, has had the effect of levelling the playing fields and equalizing the dichotomy of opportunities between the black and white communities, albeit with limitations engendered by legacy issues. Furthermore, the very rich at the top end of South Africa's economic ladder have become even richer due to free and bigger access to global markets which were inaccessible under apartheid isolation.
23. Research on the changes of South African's social structure in the recent period importantly focused on the growth of the middle class because of the belief that it is one of the indicators of the impact of economic policy. The growth of the middle class is thought to create knock-on effects such as enhanced buying power, better education and skills, which in turn attract investments and therefore create more job opportunities.

24. Regardless of the many ways of measuring the middle – class population, all the methods social scientists employ point to a significant growth of the middle class in South Africa, in particular the black component of this strata. Data suggest the black middle class has more than doubled from 7% to 14% of the black population between 2004 and 2013, and constitutes between 48% to 52% of the national total, see: **Measuring South Africa's black middle class: Markus Korhonen:** Stellenbosch University, 2018.
25. This development should not escape our attention in assessing the Balance of Forces for the following reasons:
- 25.1 The driving force of our revolution, as it has always been emphasised, is the black masses. Changes within this social base will naturally have a direct effect on the prospects and momentum of our revolution.
- 25.2 The capacity and propensity of the middle class to influence the direction of social upheavals is legendary in the history of world revolutionary movement. Revolutionary vigilance requires that the ANC must always have keen interest in the dynamics of the South African middle class, especially the black segment of this community.
- 25.3 The middle class is not a homogeneous social strata. It consists of various sub-groups which differ significantly in their occupations, income bands and cultural traits.
26. It is from these middle class social forces that the 2007 ANC Strategy and Tactics laments the preponderance of greed, crass materialism and conspicuous consumption. Among them is the petty-bourgeoisie, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, some professionals and political elites, the parasitic comprador bourgeoisie (many of whom rely on connections in state structures).
27. These challenges define the very core of our transformation agenda and therefore critical in appreciating the threats and obstacles on our way. Former President Thabo Mbeki offered a historical expose of South Africa's DNA in his Nelson Mandela lecture delivered on 29 July 2006 in which he referenced a seminal paper he delivered in Ottawa, Canada in 1978 when he said:
- "The historical compromise of 1910 in granting the vanquished Boer equal political and social status with the British victor it imposed both the duty to defend the status quo against especially those whom that status quo defined as the dominated. The capitalist class, to whom everything has cash value, has never considered moral incentives as very dependable. As part of the arrangement, it therefore decided that material incentive must play a prominent part. It consequently bought out the whole white population. It offered a price to the white workers and the Afrikaner farmers in an exchange for an undertaking that they would shed their blood in defence of capital...The workers took the offering in monthly cash grants and reserved jobs. The farmers took their share by having black labour, including and especially prison labour directed to the farms. They also took it in loans to help maintain a 'civilised standard of living'..."*
- "Within the context of the development of capitalism in our country, individual acquisition of wealth produced through the oppression and exploitation of the black majority, became the defining social value in the organisation of white society"*
- "Because the white minority was the dominant social force in our country, it entrenched in our society as a whole,*

including among the oppressed, the deep-seated understanding that personal wealth constituted the only measure of individual and social success. As we achieved our freedom in 1994, this had become the dominant social value affecting the entirety of our population”.

“Inevitably as an established social norm, this manifested itself even in the democratic state machinery that had seemingly “seamlessly” replaced the apartheid state machinery. The new order born of the victory in 1994 inherited a well-entrenched value system that placed individual acquisition of wealth at the very centre of the value system of our society as a whole. Society assumed a tolerant or permissive attitude towards such crimes as theft and corruption, especially if these related to public property. This phenomenon which we considered as particularly South African, was in fact symptomatic of the capitalist system in all countries”.

South Africa's lumpen strata

28. Significant swathes of the middle strata constitute a veritable community of lumpen elements. They operate in various spheres of human endeavour, including in the grey area between legality and illegality or in fully-fledged criminal networks.
29. In their genesis under early capitalism, Lumpens as a social group came out of the surplus population which was churned out by chronic unemployment within the proletariat, as a function of the logic of the capitalist labour-market. What critically defines the lumpen elements has always, and is remains the alienation from labour – productive activity in society.

30. Whereas in their origins unemployment was a curse in the lives of lumpens, it evolved over time to be a status issue a badge lumpens wear with honour. Non-involvement or participation in labour has to be elevated to a virtue, a value they worship. Lumpens have a disdain for people who live their lives out of their honest labour because they (the lumpens) live better lives without working. Marx castigated them as ‘parasitic criminals’. From contemporary scholars and researchers of social class and criminal behaviour, there is a valuable body of knowledge which concurs with the view of former president Thabo Mbeki.

31. The Marxian sociologist Bonger argued that “a capitalist economic system is necessarily based on competition and exploitative exchange, the inherent product of which is demoralization of humans and rampant egoism. Therefore, because of selfishness and the destruction of human sentiment all members of a capitalist society are crime prone”. In his critique of social class and criminal behaviour published by the Oxford press Charles Tittle argues that the old adage “*the more you have, the more you want*”, seem to apply. He postulates the view that, “*the idea that the bourgeoisie will be more constrained from criminal acts because they have greater human sentiment*” is class mythology.

Who are some of these lumpen elements? Broadly, they can be found among:

- The parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie, some of whom seek to capture state institutions and repurpose them for their own accumulation;
- Sections of the political elite and bureaucracy who use their positions in state institutions for venal self-enrichment;

- Some leaders within the trade union movement who swindle unions or their investments arms;
 - Troupes of religious leaders who use their institutions as platforms of spiritual deceit for purposes of larceny from devotees;
 - Elements among student and youth leaders who take advantage of their positions for purposes of making money;
 - Groups that demand 'empowerment cuts', outside of the law, in projects being carried out in various localities;
 - Some leaders of local protest movements who use distressed communities' grievances to worm their way into political, bureaucratic or procurement opportunities;
 - The traditional lumpen proletariat in crime syndicates; and
 - Small time criminals who aspire for more comfort.
32. All these and others constitute a lumpen element within South Africa's middle and upper strata. Their interests and activities intersect in various areas of social endeavour. They collaborate across social networks and professional spheres. What characterises them is illegitimate and illegal self-enrichment and a posture that sees ethical and capable state or civil society institutions as inimical to their crass materialistic interest.
33. Because of that self-interest, this lumpen element seeks to subvert everything progressive if it interferes with their selfish desires. They are driven by greed. They eschew social solidarity and worship elitism. They imbue communities with their value-system of crass materialism, individualism, corruption and criminality leading to social decadence. Yet at the same time, the more cunning among them profess a populist radicalism – often combined with narrow nationalism – that takes advantage of the slow progress in social transformation to legitimise their criminal enterprise.
34. As elaborated in the Strategy and Tactics and other documents of the ANC, monopoly capital and various elements of the erstwhile colonial bourgeoisie often act in a manner that undermines or slows down the process of transformation. Further, among these and the rest of the white middle strata, there are lumpen elements of various types some of whom have found common cause with their peers among the emergent black middle and upper strata.
35. The irony of the dynamics described above, pertaining to the lumpen elements of the emergent middle and upper strata, is that some of them position themselves publicly as sworn enemies of, and fighters against, the remnants of the colonial capitalist establishment. Yet, because they are driven by selfish personal interests, the cumulative effect of their conduct has the same effect (as that of the established capitalist class) of undermining or slowing down social transformation.
36. This is a novel phenomenon that requires constant interrogation and vigilance. It is broadly about the strategic question of managing class formation and value systems in an emergent post-colonial society. It also relates to the fundamental question: how and from where can counter-revolution congeal in the current phase of the National Democratic Revolution!
37. From the above it is apparent that from the original motive forces for change, there is always a possibility of a coalescing of interests which may paralyse further movement forward.

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN AND AROUND THE 5 PILLARS OF STRUGGLE

THE STATE

38. Following the 1994 breakthrough we forged a vibrant multi-party democracy based on a constitution that enjoys the allegiance and support of the overwhelming majority of South Africans. *“We transformed state institutions and put in place formal instruments of accountability. We also created space for organs of civil society to thrive. What seems to be new, with major implications for state legitimacy is the deeply-entrenched corrupt practices driven by a few state employees, public representatives and the private sector and arrogance by some in the leadership positions which has directly affected service delivery.”* (**Balance of Forces** document, NGC 2015)
39. The weakening of the state as a result of corruption deserves more attention. It is a matter for debate whether this is a problem of just a few in the bureaucracy, the private sector and among public representatives as the S&T suggests. The inclination among those who occupy public positions to enrich themselves is widespread. If not vigorously combated, it is destined to be the biggest threat to South Africa's revolutionary change.
40. Corruption is a societal problem. What is happening within the state and government institutions is incubated in communities and society broadly. The state's prevalent culture cannot be different from what obtains within the broader society. Anecdotes of shocking low survivalist morals in different spheres of life in our communities are told with monotonous regularity. These stories no longer raise eyebrows.
41. It is obvious that a heightened sense of unease characterises the political situation in our country. The capacity of the state to deliver the dream of 1994 is increasingly compromised by a public service which is losing its professionalism due to among others, corrupt practices.
42. *“When poor decision-making that suggests patronage and cover-ups; and appointments that defy any rational logic, the state as a whole starts progressively to lose the confidence of the people. The hope that prevents South Africa's social tinder from catching fire can thus dissipate”.* (Ibid, 2015 NGC). The annual reports of both the Auditor-General and the Public Service Commission bear testimony to this.
43. Several areas of government have been targeted by rogue and corrupt lumpen elements, including particularly at local government level. Several schemes and ruses are devised to realise wholesale looting of public coffers leading to paralysis of service delivery. Several municipalities, estimated by SALGA at about 40 in August 2019, are currently under administration by higher authorities partly because they've been collapsed by corruption induced mismanagement. (<https://www.parliament.gov.za/news/salga-concerned-about-high-number-section-139-interventions-municipalities>)
44. Since 1994 the legislative arm of the state at all levels contributed decisively to the transformation we have achieved because of the decisive, democratic political dominance of the ANC. The legislatures, which are meant to be tribunes of the people, have also been assailed by pseudo-political militancy over the past five years, which has subverted the very meaning of democracy – the rule of the majority.

45. This has replaced a fundamental defining feature of the victory scored in 1994 with a dictatorship of the minority, through disruptions and even threats of violence. This calls upon the ANC urgently to ponder over the efficacy of the strategies it has deployed in dealing with a tendency that not only undermines the legitimacy of representative institutions; but also threatens to collapse processes of parliamentary discourse.
 46. If allowed to continue, this disruptive streak will pervade other institutions of social change and destroy our revolutionary gains. It is a direct attack on the country's constitutional values. Again, ironically, it has tilted the power-balance in a way that emboldens South Africa's conservative, right-wing political forces to assail the democratic dispensation.
 47. Part of the lumpen tendency described above, this pseudo-revolutionary militancy is used to shield some of the worst cases of corruption. In effect, it is a tendency with counter-revolutionary implications.
 48. Just as the COVID-19 pandemic has tested the capacity of our state and the efficiency of government, it has also profiled opportunities to grow our capacity to realise a myriad of our developmental endeavours. As the alliance's perspective suggests, we need programmes which addresses unemployment, poverty and inequality taking advantage of the needs of the moment.
 49. The capabilities developed in the past months since the onset of this pandemic, to have scientific and evidence based planning and executive, swift targeted action in response to challenges, intergovernmental coordination and implementation, effective communication and coherent leadership capacity must be consolidated going forward.
- ### THE ECONOMY
50. The distribution of wealth and incomes in South Africa is largely still characterised by the racial and gender demographics of the colonial past. Currently, 6.7% of the economically active population, which happens to be white males, constitutes 52% of Board positions, and 76% of both CEOs and CFOs – (BUSA 2011) in formal enterprises. In 2013, according to Stats SA, unemployment among Africans was at 27% compared to 7.2% among whites.
 51. Low economic growth and a huge budget deficit are compounding the difficulties in realising the ideals enshrined in the Constitution. As succinctly argued by Amartya Sen, "*Freedom is development*". As a consequence of this dilemma, the poor get further exposed to abuse by lumpen politicians who promise them heaven on earth, who speak fine and look very brave. But who in truth are painfully ignorant or less interest in devising solutions this economic challenges.
 52. While progress has been made in the two-and-half decades of freedom to extend basic services and reduce poverty, distribution of income and assets still reflects the fault-lines of apartheid colonialism "*The issue of distribution of national income – the fundamental question of political economy – now occupies an important place in mainstream discourse.*" (Ibid, 2015 NGC)
 53. As argued by Joel Netshitenze in another input on the balance of forces, "*Economically, compared to 15 years*

ago, the balance of forces has shifted against the forces for change. The debt burden and legacy of the State Capture wear down the fiscus leaving little room for manoeuvre. Measures to stabilise the fiscal situation, such as VAT increases, have an immediate negative social impact, and agencies like Eskom are strangling the economy. Tragically we have in recent regressed with regard to quality of some basic services such as health, educational infrastructure, water, electricity and roads; and poverty headcount worsened between 2011 and 2015".

54. The COVID-19 pandemic will result in severe contraction of world economies. There will be a huge surge in unemployment globally and on the continent in particular. The ILO estimated in April that up to 25 million people could lose their jobs in 2020. Trade will be affected negatively with less exports in the foreseeable future. Debt levels of countries will increase drastically. This syndrome will further deepen poverty and hardships among millions of ordinary citizens.
 55. The economic recovery plan provides us the opportunity to achieve a sustainable economic future and to overcome the constraints of economic exclusion, unemployment and inequality. It can unlock enormous potential for development, better environmental management, human health and well-being. For South Africa to embrace a green stimulus as part of our overall recovery would have tangible advantages.
- ## THE MOTIVE FORCES AND ORGANS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
56. "Revolutions are about the mobilisation of the greatest possible masses of people to engage in their own liberation. The primary mission of the ANC therefore was, and remains, to mobilise all the classes and strata that objectively stand to gain from the success of the cause of social change." 2002 Stellenbosch conference S&T.
 57. The motive forces of change in South Africa, as previously organised, are at their lowest ebb. Few if any of their formations have survived the syndrome of factional wars which have gripped even the most critical force of this movement, organised labour. While there are multitudes of underlying factors for this phenomenon, the lumpen tendency described above is central among them.
 58. The truth is that for more than half a century, the strength of South Africa's liberation movement rested on the Tripartite Alliance. Without a strong Tripartite Alliance, forces of fundamental change will be on the back-foot. The ANC is the leader of the Alliance, and its members must display their appreciation of this responsibility.
 59. As argued earlier, lumpen tendencies are flourishing in many structures of civil society today. The battle-tested structures are increasingly high-jacked by networks of self-serving individuals, and are buckling under the weight of societal ills prevalent among the previously oppressed.
 60. These toxic elements have also targeted the ruling party and state structures for penetration, especially at local government level. With the weakened in-

ternal capacity of the ANC to ward off these deviations, some veterans and other groups and individuals from the old democratic fold took up the cudgels to engage and fight back against these devious political tendencies.

61. The divisions within South Africa's labour movement today is one monumental set-back which dramatized the level of demobilisation which has occurred within the traditional motive forces of our revolution. This development is still to be properly put under the microscope. The breakup of COSATU cannot be reduced to the differences of individuals. It may only be the form in which a much profound shift of interests expressed it-self. What those interests are? Is still to be understood. To the ANC it is a matter which should not be left unattended, implying that there is an acceptance of the state of affairs.

IDEOLOGICAL CONTESTATION: **THE BATTLE OF IDEAS**

62. The theatre of ideas is a vital centre for change because it talks to unceasing efforts to ensure that social values, views and opinions that enjoy hegemony are those which support change.

63. Our national transformation project is taking place *"in the context of a growing global information and knowledge society, which along with changes in forms of production in the developed world, undermine traditional approaches to politics and political organisation. This has seen the decline and increased individualisation not only of party-political organisations in the West, but also in trade union organisation.*

64. Coupled with the growing values of self-advancement and individualism

and a cynicism about 'politics and politicians', the citizenry in these countries have either turned towards more extreme political parties (as in France and the Netherlands), disengaged from political participation or are joining civil movements organised around issues such as the environment or anti – globalisation" (Discussion Document, Special 51st ANC National Conference Edition, 2002).

65. Combined with manifestations of social inequality, this global trend, in part, accounts for the weakened social cohesion in South Africa to a point where the irrational signs of racism begin to rear their ugly head again. Consequently, social cohesion and hope within broader society is wearing thin.

66. The ANC has a historical obligation to defeat racism in all its forms, and to uphold non-racialism and non-sexism within its ranks and broader society. In this regard, its performance in the recent years has left much to be desired.

67. Misplaced raw narrow nationalistic sentiments and ethnic chauvinism do not only scoff at the legendary vision of the founders of the oldest liberation movement on the continent, but strategically bedevil the mobilisation of the motive forces for the new phase of our struggle. Added to this are continuing manifestations of gender oppression.

68. Two decades ago we undertook to ensure that *"our program to transform education is not only addressing access to and the quality of education, but also education as a socialisation institution for the transmission of new values, national identity and our constitutional order of democracy, non-racialism, non-sexism, human rights and equality through initiatives such as values in*

education, civic, education and the teaching of history projects". It is evident that the greater part of this work remains to be implemented. These lofty ideals require urgent attention today more than ever before.

69. The discourse on liberation and social transformation is today cluttered with simplistic and revolutionary-sounding phrases with a shallow understanding of strategy and tactics, the balance of forces and how a revolutionary movement is meant to attain hegemony, so its ideas become the ideas of the nation as a whole. On the one hand, a technical approach to 'social delivery' has taken root, tending to assume a form of patronage. On the other hand, demands and policies which are not immediately attainable are advanced as immediate objectives, creating popular expectations that only worsen impatience and social discord. The ANC has to pay full attention to ideological work as part of its renewal.

THE ANC AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE

70. The ANC Strategy and Tactics adopted at the 2017 conference asserts *"The ANC faces declining fortunes. Internal squabbles, money politics, corruption and poor performances in government, all conspire to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public. Some progressive formations and individuals who historically have been part of the broad front of forces for change are challenging the movement on important current issues, particularly corruption."*

71. There can be no revolution without revolutionaries, no revolutionaries without

a revolutionary organisation. Every society which is going through change, must have agents who are the sponsors of that change and are repositories of its characteristics.

72. The ANC Strategy and Tactics explains this revolutionary tenet in the following way: *"Leadership collectives should, as a whole, reflect the motive forces of change and the various centres of power. This should help burst the bubble of professional politics in these collectives: a bubble in which government functionaries and full-time ANC employees operate as if in an echo chamber, thus widening the social distance from the rest of society. The various terrains of social endeavour, gender, age, and other criteria must be taken into account. Leadership integrity also relates to criteria to qualify for such responsibility, including length and quality of service, as well as ideological, academic and ethical attributes. In this regard lifestyle audits by structures in which the membership has confidence is critical."*

73. The further laments the fact that deviant conduct was becoming deeply entrenched in the ANC. It observed that, *"arrogance, factionalism and corruption have been identified by large sections of society, including ANC supporters, as dominant tendencies within the movement. Gate-keeping, money politics and fraud characterise most ANC electoral processes. Underhand practices increasingly define interactions between various spheres of government and the private sector; and private interests seek to capture and control not only state organs, but also the ANC itself."*

74. At the end of the day, the ANC as *"a strategic centre of power should command both legitimacy and authority,*

deriving from the quality of its collective ideas and the discipline of its members.

75. *It should ensure its mandate is carried out by its members, wherever they are located. It should be able to monitor and evaluate the implementation of its policies. When and where there are weaknesses – whether these are a result of poor policies, weak implementation or poor leadership – it should be able to act decisively.* (**Strategy and Tactics**, 2017)

76. To deal with the above debilitating practices requires a genuine and sincere commitment to execute the National Conference resolution on renewal, re-engineering and unification of the ANC without fear or favour. In this context, the movement will need to find the right balance between pursuit of unity on the one hand, and renewal on the other. Some may argue that these objectives are not inconsistent with each other. But, given the lumpen tendencies described above, the fundamental issue about unity being based on principle, on promoting revolutionary values and ethics, and on selfless service to the people should inform the process of organisational regeneration. It should be expected that there will be opposition from within our ranks to the cause of renewal.

77. Therefore, central to this work is the obligation of the NEC to establish an Independent Electoral Commission as a matter of urgency and unflinching support to the work of the ANC Integrity Commission.

THE OPPOSITION AND ELECTORAL POLITICS

78. In the early years of the transition, the trajectory of change in the broad body politic of South Africa pointed to the moral superiority of the struggle to end racial oppression. The main protagonists of minority rule and white privilege, the National Party validated this by their bold decision to fold up with some of them joining hands with the ANC. This marked the biggest victory of the struggle for human rights by South Africans as a whole. The overwhelming majority of political parties which existed in the former Bantustans joined the ANC too.

79. Beyond that historical point, the changes in South Africa's electoral politics suggested that our democracy is gradually outgrowing the earlier national sensitivity around injustice which was based on racism.

80. The legitimate question posed by the developing trends as suggested at the 2015 ANC-NGC is *“whether there are things that the ANC is doing which create fertile ground for, and in fact ironically legitimise, incipient revolt against it and the government it leads. Is it implementing the resolutions taken at the 53rd National Conference to correct its weaknesses and to renew itself; or when it finds itself in a hole, does it in fact dig deeper?”*

81. The phenomenon of political groups breaking away from the ANC since 1994, also presents an interesting picture. Everything remaining the same, it would have been expected that splinter groups from the ANC in parliament, because they all profess to subscribe to the historic mission of the ANC – that of ending national oppression by removing the remaining impediments to level

the playing fields across the board – they would find common cause with the ANC on fundamental issues of transformation. Whether this has actually played out; and if not why not, is a question that the ANC needs to interrogate both in relation to its own posture and the character of the forces that broke away from it.

82. The recent national elections provide sufficient evidence that the ANC itself has the remedy to its own morbidity. In its analysis of the election outcome in which its percentage of support (57.5%) improved from the aggregate in the 2016 municipal elections (54.5%), and yet marked a decline compared to all general elections since 1994, the ANC asserted the following: ANC performance reflected continuing confidence of the people in the organisation; but it was also a warning that the movement needed to do more in speeding up social transformation and dealing with malfeasance within the state and in its own ranks. The question is whether there is the requisite courage by ANC members to drink the prescribed medicine.

83. In the 2019 elections the opposition parties could not grab the throne from a competitor who was literally on the floor from own debilitating weaknesses. Instead, the wheels are coming off the wagon of the marriage of convenience between the DA and the EFF. However, both the two main opposition parties face existential challenges.

84. The DA on the one hand has exposed its lack of principle and desperation merely to attain political office; and its lack of ethics has come out for all to see. At the same time, it has been unable to resolve the challenge within its ranks about the co-existence of 'clas-

sical' and 'socially-conscious' liberalism within one party, in a society that reflects racial fault-lines of apartheid colonialism.

85. On the other hand, the EFF seeks to exploit impatience and poor strategic acumen, especially among sections of the youth, to position itself as the genuine revolutionaries of our age. Yet, its most senior leaders are implicated in monumental acts of corruption and they evince the crudest manifestations of the lumpen tendencies elaborated earlier. With minimal possibilities for it to lay its hands on the leavers of power, the EFF is likely to become more desperate and more disruptive.

GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

86. In this section, we briefly reflect on the global balance of forces, in the main, to the extent that it impacts on the domestic prosecution of our struggle. This is taking into account the fact that the analysis contained in the 2017 Strategy and Tactics document does not require much elaboration or an update, and that a separate NGC discussion paper deals with this matter.

87. Half-a-century ago at Morogoro, the ANC asserted the view that our struggle was part of the global movement in which more and more countries the world over, were moving from exploitative societies towards non-exploitative societies.

88. In the intervening period the world has witnessed events which have altered global affairs drastically. A new complex environment of international relations has emerged. This was acknowledged by the ANC back in 2002 at the Stellenbosch conference: "*Our transi-*

tion to democracy is taking place in a world in which the system of capitalism enjoys dominant sway over virtually the entire globe. But it is also a world in which the agenda of the working people and the developing nations can find creative expression in pursuit of a humane, just and equitable world order."

89. This is the context in which we are called upon to continue the prosecution of the struggle to transform our country. But, how broad is national awareness about these challenges in South Africa today? Put differently, is the ANC still ideologically hegemonic in the way the broad public views the world? This is more than just about theoretical debates; but it relates keenly to the opportunities and dangers that our struggle faces at domestic level.

The twentieth century was remarkable for three major civilisation-shifting developments:

- The establishment of socialist orders in vast parts of the world;
 - The liberation of formerly colonised countries, with the end of apartheid being the last major development. and
 - The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of socialism in many countries.
90. While Fukuyama's End of History may have trumpeted the dominance of capitalism over all other economic systems, critical developments in the early 21st century have shown up not only the weaknesses of the capitalist system but also ways in which it could be challenged and changed in a more progressive way. Some of the major defining moments in the evolution of the global environment are discussed below.

THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM

91. Neoliberalism is a system, characterised in the main by advocacy of "strong private property rights, free markets and free trade" (Harvey 2) and the relegation of the role of the state to the periphery of economic activity and a secondary one relative to the markets. In accordance with the precepts of neoliberalism the state is pushed to the margins of economic activity.
92. The rise of neo-liberalism and its framing of globalisation was not without dire consequences particularly for the poor and developing countries upon which structural adjustment programmes were imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
93. The dominance of neo-liberal ideological precepts brought about the influence of the "market society" a product of globalisation. The dominance of the market created a distorted dominant value system and frame of ideological discourse which encouraged "greed, crass materialism and conspicuous consumption".
94. "A market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of human endeavour. It's a place where social relations are made over in the image of the market. The great missing debate in contemporary politics is about the role and reach of markets."
95. However, even within the bastions of capitalism, there has been a questioning of the foundations of that system. For example, the United States' Business Roundtable in its August 2019 statement, signed by 181 CEOs, it pointed out that all previous statements have 'stated that corporations exist princi-

pally to serve their shareholders'. But in this year's issue it said 'we urge leading investors to support companies that build long-term value by investing in their employees and communities'.

CHINA BECOMES A GLOBAL ECONOMIC POWER

96. Within a period of roughly more than three decades China has emerged as a world economic giant. This is borne out by the following figures: In 2019 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China was estimated at 14.10 trillion U.S dollars. From 1979 until 2010, China's average annual GDP growth was 9.91%, reaching an historical high of 15.2% in 1984 and a record low of 3.8% in 1990. Such growth has enabled China, on average, to double its GDP every eight years and helped raise an estimated 800 million people out of poverty.

97. The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) of 25 June 2019 once again expresses concern stating that *"China's growing global economic influence and the economic and trade policies it maintains have significant implications for the United States and hence are of major interest to Congress"*.

98. The growing hostility towards China as expressed in the US' so-called Asia Pivot, the designation of China as a strategic competitor by the European Union and trade wars has implication for the whole world and particularly the developing countries. How the US, the EU and Japan respond to the shift in global power balances towards developing Asia is one of the fundamental questions of our time. Any escalation of conflict *"could have devastating effects on the world economy"*.

99. Contemporary imperialism marked by a vicious cycle of social energy and climate crisis, deprived of overt colonies and with emerging new regionalisms and tri continental alliances is a feature of geo-politics we must guard against. Imperialism has systematically deployed extra economic and violent force to commodify both labour and land and to offload the course of social reproduction onto the working people themselves especially women.

THE 4TH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

100. The 4IR has come to dominate every facet of global society. We can no longer talk of it as imminent, we are in the midst of it. Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum, in his publication, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*, underlines *"hyper connectivity, data-science, Artificial Intelligence and robotics as key drivers of productivity"*.

101. The **2017 Strategy and Tactics** document characterises these developments in the following words: *"Over the past three decades, the world has experienced an explosion of technological advances with massive potential to improve the human condition. Information and communications technology, bio-technologies, genetics and the science of small particles (nano-technology) have opened many frontiers of progress in health sciences, agriculture, space exploration and other sectors. Along with this, robotics, three-dimensional (3D) printing, the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence hold out the possibility of redefining, in a fundamental way, the nature of work. What overall impact the fusion of these advanced technologies in the physical, digital and biological spheres – the so-called fourth*

industrial revolution – will have on humanity's quality of life is still a matter of conjecture.

102. *"In terms of their potential, these advances are boon for humanity. But how they are owned, managed and let loose on society can have devastating consequences. The danger is that these successes of human civilisation are being appropriated by a few, in spite of the fact that many of them originated from, or with the variegated support of, public institutions. They can be directed to benefit a small layer of society, with the mass of the people condemned as surplus to humanity. Many of the technological advances lend themselves to cynical military and intelligence applications."*

INEQUALITY

103. The debates about the future of capitalism arise in the context, not so much of particularly heightened left-wing agitation, but growing concern on the part of politicians, academics and business leaders around the effects of deep and fundamental flaws in the global economic system. These include the effects of climate change, rising inequality as well as threats to the global systems of governance and trade.

104. According to Oxfam (2017), more global wealth is owned by the richest one-percent than the rest of humanity; and 'eight men now own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world' (Oxfam: 2017). In most developed economies, the working class has in the past two decades experienced stagnant incomes and a declining quality of life. Growing

inequality is also to be found even in some of those countries that have extricated hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

105. The work by Thomas Picketty in **Capital in the Twenty First Century** served to highlight not just poverty and underdevelopment, which had been our focus for much of the 20th century, but also the level of inequality and the socio-economic impacts thereof. He argued that there is nothing natural about inequality but that it is a 'social, political and historical' construction due to a number of factors such as tax systems, political and economic factors etc.

POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

106. While populism and authoritarianism are bedfellows, it would be wrong to assume an equivalence between the two tendencies. Erica Frantz, in her book on authoritarianism, points out that of the 75% of the regimes which became authoritarian between 2000 and 2010, most took the form of a personal leader who exploited populist rhetoric. Such leaders are often 'hyper-masculinist and patriarchal rulers'. (Jillian Schwedler and Kevan Harris)

107. Frantz points out that a large part of these regimes saw democracy being eaten out from within, as the larvae of some wasps eat out host spiders. Amongst the features which authoritarian regimes display, include a narrow inner circle of trusted people; the installation of incompetent loyalists in positions of power; promotion of members of the family; and the creation of new security services loyal to the leader.

THE AFRICAN DIMENSION

108. The African continent is counted as one of the richest in the world in terms of its natural resources. These include diamonds, sugar, salt, gold, iron, cobalt, uranium, copper, bauxite, silver, petroleum, cocoa beans, woods and tropical fruits. It goes without saying that because of its natural resources the African continent will continue to occupy a strategic position in the global socio-economic and political arena.
109. All diplomatic, political economic and trade relations that Africa enters into will be guided and informed by what is in the national interests of those countries with whom Africa chooses to enter into partnerships. Some developed countries have deliberately sponsored wars and promoted chaos in Africa for purposes of destabilisation and to access the mineral resources that they so covet and would like to acquire by whatever means possible.
110. It is therefore in the best interests of the continent to promote intra-African trade which would be mutually beneficial to the member states. By implication, this means that Africa needs to develop a collective approach in terms of its relations with other regions of the world.
111. The continent also needs to take full advantage of its youthful population and ensure that the demographic dividend becomes a reality. According to the estimates of the United Nations, the population of Africa constitutes 16.72% of the world population. This makes Africa the second highest populated continent in the world after Asia with about 60% of the world population. Further, of the global number of young people between the ages of 15 and 24, about 20% are located in sub-Saharan Africa; and these are expected to increase faster than in any other continent, by about 89% between 2019 and 2050.
112. It goes without saying that, for the continent to advance – in terms of both its socio-economic development and its standing in the global community – it needs urgently to resolve the remaining conflicts that continue to dog some of its regions.
113. Needless to say, the multidimensional costs of these conflicts are enormous. According to IANSA, Oxfam and Siferworld: *“There are the obvious direct costs of armed violence – medical costs, military expenditure, the destruction of infrastructure, and the care for displaced people – which divert money from more productive uses.”*
114. In this context, it is correct that, as South Africa assumes the Chairship of the African Union, it should put high on the agenda issues of economic integration, ‘silencing the guns’ and the advancement of women and youth.
115. Lest this is not fully appreciated: for South Africa, the emphasis on the Africa agenda is not a matter of solidarity or the convenience of contiguity. The positive attributes of the continent, outlined above, do stand South Africa in good stead to pursue higher rates of economic growth and development. A continental growth lag-gard in the current conjuncture, South Africa will increasingly rely on dynamics in the rest of Africa to lift itself up.

CONCLUSION

116. The attainment of democracy in 1994 fundamentally shifted the strategic balance of forces in South Africa in favour of the forces of national liberation and social transformation. This is underpinned by a democratic constitution with profound social content. This is an epochal achievement in centuries of South Africa's history.
117. Combined with this achievement is progress made in changing the lives of South Africans for the better in terms of access to basic services. Profound changes have taken place on such fronts as access to education, health services, water and sanitation as well as pursuit of gender equality.
118. Yet the breadth of access requires continuous improvement in relation to depth or quality of these services. Indeed, a major concern in the current period pertains to weaknesses and even reversals, especially at municipal level and the capacity of the state generally. Further, patriarchy still rears its ugly head, sometimes in the most abominable of ways as reflected in incidents of femicide and other forms of gender-based violence.
119. While much distance still needs to be traversed in breaking white dominance in critical sectors of the economy, the past twenty-five years have seen exponential growth of the black middle class and the steady entry of black entrepreneurs into various sectors of the economy. There have been profound changes in the class structure of South African society, especially within the Black community.
120. This process of post-colonial class formation has developed along with the emergence of lumpen elements littered across various areas of social endeavour, including the economy and the political sphere. These are dangerous forces that need to be confronted and defeated, if the revolution has to make progress.
121. All this is happening against the background of a contradictory global balance characterised by shifts in economic power and tendencies towards populism and authoritarianism. The conduct of the leadership, especially in countries that exercise immense global power, can tip humanity towards a conflagration.
122. The ANC remains, by definition, the vanguard of the National Democratic Revolution. Yet, as shown in recent elections, this status which has to be earned, depends on the movement's capacity to self-correct and implement programmes of organisational and societal renewal. The same applies to the Tripartite Alliance as a whole. This requires firmness in dealing with forces that seek to undermine and reverse the process of social change. As such, the pursuit of unity should be premised on the firm understanding that what is required is unity of principle and unity in action to take South Africa to a higher level of growth and development.
123. As experience since the 2017 National Conference has shown, this will be a titanic struggle.

“Transition is not a friendly game. It is a fierce struggle for the future and will bring about sharp divisions among us. . . We are living in transition times and you must know which shore it is you want to swim towards, because otherwise you will drown”. – I. WALLERSTEIN

The Pursuit of Progressive Internationalism in a Changing World

*A Discussion Document for the National General Council
by the ANC NEC Sub-Committee on International Relations*

1. INTRODUCTION

- a) In the period since the 54th National Conference, many developments have continued to shape the international situation including the balance of forces globally, on the continent and nationally. These include the growing threat of rightwing extremism across the global North, now rearing its ugly head in the global South as well. The nature and impact of this will be discussed later, save to say here that this phenomenon threatens to derail the pursuit of progressive international agenda including such goals as the strengthening of global and African multilateralism, the reform of institutions of global governance and the search for a just and fair world order.
- b) There are developments on the African continent that, as we will show below, suggest the weakening of South Africa and ANC's influence of continental affairs. Some of these lead to questions being raised about the revolutionary character of the ANC and its commitment to a progressive Africa. Yet, we have also made some advances that continue to the realisation of the AU Agenda 2013, which we need to build upon.
- c) The project of building a global progressive movement is facing huge challenges. Some of them come from within the alliances and networks of progressive forces and within progressive movements like the ANC itself. We are reminded again of the words of Comrade Amilcar Cabral who in 'Weapon of Theory' argues that we struggle also against our weaknesses.
- d) The ANC is faced with an urgent need to critically self-introspect, assess its ideological character and review its posture in international affairs if it is to remain a crucial catalyst in the building of a progressive global movement. In this regard, it is being challenged to relook at both how it relates with its historical allies and how it harnesses new opportunities such as progressive civil society and social movements networks.
- e) The explosion of protests in the US and solidarity protests in parts of Europe and Oceania over the brutal police killing of an African-American, George Floyd, has turned the world attention to the dark underbelly of the US system built on slavery and post-slavery discrimination against minorities like the Afri-

can Americans. The progressive voices throughout the world speak with one voice in an echo of the Black Lives Matter/ I Can't Breathe battle cries, calling for a fundamental transformation of the US society and state to make the lives of black people matter. We have not seen mass mobilization of progressive voices in Africa and South Africa though, which is a matter of great concern but may signal the need for soul-searching on our part in relation to our place among progressive forces of the world beyond the long-established traditional alliances. The new progressive platforms have opened up in hashtag social media activism led by young people, skillfully using new technologies to mobilize global public opinion.

- f) The National General Council is an opportunity both to review progress made towards the implementation of the resolutions of the 54th National Conference and to critically reflect on the conditions that will shape the period towards the 55th National Conference. While the international environment is yet to recover from the terrible effects of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, it now confronted with an even worse challenge as a result of the COVID19 epidemic that has devastated global health, economy and socio-economic situations, thus helping to make global economic recovery harder, the defeat of poverty and inequality even more complicated. This is presenting mammoth challenges for global multilateralism, African governance and our national governance.
- g) Guided by progressive internationalist outlook born out of the influences of pan-African, socialist, communist, rights and freedoms internationalism and the pursuit of the National Democratic Revolution, we have a duty to strengthen our revolutionary character and posture and improve our ability to imple-

ment resolutions while cognisant of the fluid international environment. In this regard, we need to reflect a lot stronger the gender and youth dimensions of our international relations, so that our foreign policy also enhances the role and contribution of women and youth in international relations.

2. BALANCE OF FORCES

2.1 International balance of forces

- a) As observed in 2017, growing challenges of poverty, unemployment, inequality, underdevelopment, violence/conflict, environmental degradation are the direct outcome of failures of the neoliberal international system. These are being exacerbated by the rise rightwing tendencies at national, regional and international levels across the world. The spread of rightwing extremism has displaced social democratic and centrist forces in Western Europe and North America. It has helped to sharpen the differences between the global North and the global South in international fora on anything from multilateral trade to climate change, and global governance to multilateralism. The right-wingers reject globalism because it constrains their ability to impose their will on the international system, undermine multilateralism and cooperation and weaken the principle of sovereign equality of states.
- b) The US-China trade war, the US attack on the Paris Accord on climate change, the World Trade Organisation, and recently the World Health Organization is a manifestation of this penchant for power games, unilateralism and masculine politics. Today, we witness heightened tensions between the US and China, not just over the origins of COVID19, but also over the role of the

WHO, China's developing country status under the WTO, the status of Hong Kong, and the South China Sea territorial disputes. These tensions can weaken international cooperation, while they may present opportunities for progressive forces to push for a more progressive new world order.

- c) With this comes an inward-looking approach to trade and industrial development marked by sharper expression of national self-interest and reluctance to enter into multilateral economic arrangements. Under these conditions, we have also seen the rise of new politics driven by neo-Nazism, homophobia, islamophobia, xenophobic tendencies, ethno-religious nationalism, antisemitism, and masculine politics. The attacks on social democracy, socialist alternatives and left civil society platforms have become more pronounced.
- d) But these right-wing tendencies are not limited to the global North, but they have surfaced also in parts of the global South. It has manifested in the rise of conservative nationalism, xenophobic and even racist tendencies in crucial countries of the global South. While the Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa (BRICS) forum have continued to pursue global reform and deepen intra-BRICS cooperation, signalled intentions to build alternatives to Bretton Woods Institutions through the New Development Bank, the emergence of the right-wing in some of BRICS countries threaten the internal ideological cohesion of BRICS around progressive agenda for global change. Attempts to re-energize the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) forum will confront the same challenge. There is insufficient coherence among emerging and developing powers within the G20 to effectively use this forum for the transformation of global governance. The weakness of the G7 component in the G20 as a re-

sult of internal contradictions presents opportunities for progressive emerging and developing countries like South Africa to build momentum for progressive change.

- e) The expectation that regional formations will champion progressive change is inadequate without concrete acts of mobilization on the part of countries like South Africa and its allies. Formations like the African Union (AU), MERCOSUR, Euro-Asian Alliance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; a China, India, the Middle East and Africa (CHIMEA) Indian Ocean nexus; a revived Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic; the Cuban-inspired Community of Latin American and Caribbean State (CELAC); South-Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); ASEAN+3; the CARICOM and others have a potential to build momentum in support of the restructuring of global power. But this requires leading nations of the South to mobilize with intent and energy.
- f) The core of the neoliberal international order is fracturing due to the aggressive posture of the USA. Tensions have emerged within the governing structures of NATO, divisions within the G7 after the exclusion of Russia over Crimea continue to intensify along ideological lines. The differences between the US and the EU have increased in light of the US position on BREXIT. Contestations between rightwing and centrist forces in Western countries have deepened with the latter losing ground. Right-wing political forces have continued to gain electoral power, often with only critical civil society mounting serious resistance on behalf of the poor and progressive. In this context, the greater potential for blow-back comes from social movements and critical civil society formations across the world. These are crucial for the ANC's international outlook.

- g) The US dollar, like its disproportionate dominance of arms supplies and military bases in the world, represents excessive US power that it wields on the world. The power of the dollar is evident in its being the dominant currency of cross-border transactions and the currency of the predominant amount of external debt developing countries have. This is a tool that enables right-wing president, Donald Trump, in the USA to increase unilateral coercive measures on some countries and now increasingly against institutions of multilateralism with some success. The sanctions against Iran, Syria, North Korea, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the economic blockade against Cuba are perfect examples of this bullying conduct that is intensifying. The withdrawal for the USA from the World Health Organization follows the unilateral defunding of the UN Relief and Works Agency and the UN Human Rights Council, withdrawal from the UNESCO and the Global Compact on Migration. The USA has also been intimidating the staff of the International Criminal Court to pressure it not to try cases involving US citizens. This conduct has intensified in the context of both the Covid19 pandemic and the Global Economic Crisis before it. The extra-territorial nature of international law enables the US to impose these measures with success, while the weaknesses of existing instruments for censure against misbehaving states enables it to act with impunity. This makes searches alternatives to the dollar-denominated financial systems ever more urgent if multilateralism and global governance is to transform.
- h) Imperialist designs continue to manifest in support of rightwing in Latin America. Nowhere is this felt more brutally than in Venezuela whose economy has wrecked through a combination of sanctions and sabotage, further deepening internal weaknesses and contradictions. This has led to a sharp rise in inflation, poverty and hunger. The country's political stability is severely weakened, its national security is fragile and its vulnerability to external machinations has increased. While onslaughts on Venezuela deepen, the solidarity with the government and progressive people of Venezuela has not improved. Russia and China have offered much-needed credit lines to the government of Venezuela and have joined forces at the UN Security Council to shine the spotlight on the USA's imperialist designs in Venezuela.
- i) A version of the USA's Munroe Doctrine of the Cold War designed to extend the USA imperial influence over Latin America and the Caribbean is widespread. The USA sponsors reactionary forces in Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and other countries, while it is drawn closer to Brazil. Progressive forces are being displaced in society and government.
- j) There seems to be a lack of bridge builders working to cement linkages and build alliances among progressive movements across the world in defence of principles, values and vision of the just and fair world. Revolutionary formations like the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, ALBA, SAO Paulo Forum, World Peace Council, the Organization of Solidarity for Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAL), and the World Social Forum are becoming weaker. So are such forums as the NAM, the G77+China, and the African Union faced by their internal challenges of lethargy and exhaustion of radical ideas within and preoccupation with procedural governance. In this context, the fight global against inequality, impoverisation, de-industrialization, environmental degradation, neoliberal food policies, autocracy

- and dictatorships, crass materialism, personalization of politics and such is on the decline.
- k) In this already complicated international environment, we witness the devastation wrought by the COVID19 pandemic since February 2020. It is aggravating weaknesses in global health, economy and social well-being. The pandemic is adding its havoc on the global economy, resulting in an astronomical rise in unemployment, poverty and inequality at national, regional and global levels. While both developed and developing economies are affected, the devastation is felt most acutely in the developing parts of the world. We also see signs that the short term emergency measures that some states have used through the army to contain the pandemic show signs that those measures will become routinised after COVID19. The pandemic will become a useful portal to increased militarization as lack of vertical and horizontal accountability become the new 'flattened' curve
- l) The post-COVID19 period is expected to present even tougher challenges for the recovery of the global economy and the achievement of longstanding development aspirations including the Sustainable Development Goals. It will thus make it harder to eradicate poverty, inequality and unemployment. It will require stronger international cooperation, international regimes regulating the behaviour of international actors, more robust and legitimate global governance and effective multilateralism. It presents an opportunity for revolutionary and progressive forces to seize the moment in generating fresh ideas to guide the reconstruction and restructuring of world relations and conditions going forward.
- m) The Middle East region is still suffering the devastating effects of the regime change agendas of the United States and its allies in Iraq, Libya and Syria, and their ongoing political, economic and other aggression against Iran and others. Using the pretexts of (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction, or 'humanitarian' support to local protests, or fighting terrorism, the US has continued to create political, economic and security havoc in the countries it has intervened in. Compounding this is the ever-growing aggressiveness of Israel (with the support of its US ally); through its support to terrorist groups in Syria; its increasingly brazen transgressions of international law, agreements and UN resolutions, particularly in relation to the Palestinians; and its total disregard for the territorial integrity of Lebanon and Syria. Turkey – under its current leadership – is attempting to escalate its hegemony in the region, some accusing it of trying to re-establish the Ottoman empire. Its continued disregard of UN resolutions on its occupation of northern Cyprus; its illegal invasion and occupation of Syria and support to terrorist groups there, and its intervention in Libya all point to the gestation of a new aggressor in the region. Syria itself can be described as at the centre of the global political storm. The growing resistance in Iraq to the US presence there and the successes of the Syrian army in retaking most of its territory, is slowly eroding the foothold of the United States in the region.
- n) On the other hand, Russia, Iran and China, in particular, are asserting their support for what is becoming known as the Axis of Resistance in the region. Now, as Turkey crosses Syria's borders in its pursuit of the oppression of the Kurds; and as ISIS attempts to regain the ground it has lost; so Syria becomes the military, political and economic battleground for the key global dynamics of the present period.

- o) The United Nations and associated institutions remain the most legitimate platform for reversing these challenges to multilateralism, but it too needs transform in order to strengthen its management and the legitimacy of its Security Council. To this end, the reform of the Security Council and the entire UN system should not be allowed to collapse completely. The reform of international finance financials especially the IMF and the World Bank is a key part of the transformation of global economic governance as a whole. But these formations are also actively trying to present themselves in the positive light, offering interest-free loans to countries hit by COVID19 and want to divert the attention from the need for transformation. The IMF and World Bank have over the past decade introduced new subtle forms of conditionality focusing mainly on austerity measures, privatisation of state agencies and reducing the public wage bill, which weakens the ability of creditors to recover from crises over the long-term. This calls for extreme vigilance including among emerging powers to ensure that this does not sink developing countries even deeper into debt and economic malaise.
- p) The international balance of forces has a gender dimension with patriarchal systems remaining entrenched the world over, helping to deepen poverty among women. Women bear the brunt of global trends in socio-economic inequality, conflict and violence, environmental degradation, exploitation and oppression. The calls for women inclusion in the economy, politics and global governance have grown and the role of UN Women is critical in this. 25 years later, the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action remain unrealised and the need for a progressive feminist movement across the world has become even stronger.
- q) Young people have also become restless throughout the world as poverty, unemployment and inequality affect them in ever more negative ways. Youth uprisings continue to serve as a reminder that the future of the world cannot be built without their participation. Yet the youth formations globally, continentally and nationally are weak, poorly linked and inadequately mobilized towards a progressive global agenda.
- r) Under the conditions, the revolutionary credentials of the ANC have also suffered. The challenge of governing the country, which includes the inevitable compromises on strategy and tactics, the rise of factionalism, the inability to rally progressive social forces around an ANC agenda, and so forth have resulted in some global progressive forces questioning whether the ANC itself is progressive. Subsequently, the ANC has had to rely on a government-centred international programme and its role in progressive international formations has declined. Thus, the ANC has not been able to build a global progressive movement as it had hoped to achieve the post-Cold War.
- s) The implications of this for the ANC is that it has to sharpen its revolutionary and progressive character and improve its ability to build effective alliances with a broad section of progressive forces in and outside state power towards a shared desire for a more equitable, just and fairer world. This will require internal ideological and political cohesion as well as strong ability to mobilize and galvanize support for a progressive international agenda across the world, in Africa and Southern Africa especially.
- t) The task of keeping the progressive agenda alive now rests increasingly with social improvements and critical

civil society in some cases, which are also in need of support. The potential to build a global progressive movement, identified in 2017, must overcome fragmentation and signs of exhaustion among progressive forces. It must harness growing youth militancy and radicalization including among student movements.

u) Our commitment to the vision of humane, non-sexist, non-racist and democratic world order is facing mammoth challenges. Yet there are many opportunities for the ANC as a revolutionary movement working with like-minded others across the world to build alliances for a progressive, just and fair world order. It will require strengthening the revolutionary ideological posture, strengthening progressive alliances at home, and reaching out to the social movements and critical civil society formations. In the process

2.2 The Situation on the African Continent

a) The actual balance of forces on the African continent and the southern African region is linked to the conduct of the governing parties in the region. Just as the strengthening of historical relations among liberation movements in southern Africa is an important explanation for the region's dynamics, their weaknesses also explain such dynamics as slow implementation of the regional aspirations. The ANC has shown weaknesses in galvanizing the region and continent to maintain a progressive and revolutionary posture in Africa. The return of Morocco, Israel, France and some Gulf states as key motive forces in the African agenda can be blamed on the inadequacies in the way the ANC and its allies have pursued the African agenda.

b) The pursuit of a prosperous and peaceful Africa and southern Africa remains strategic and principal. To this end, the commitment to strengthen the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community as platforms for a progressive African agenda is key. This has given rise to successful efforts to reform the AU, strengthen the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) agency, implement the African Common Free Trade Area (AcFTA) and achieve the African Agenda 2063. The signing and formal launch in 2019 of the AcFTA marks a major milestone towards an R50 trillion market for intra-African trade and investment.

c) Our commitment to the AU Agenda 2063 as an expression of the aspirations of Africans is central to view that the silencing of guns on the continent is as much a security matter as it is a governance and development imperative. In this context, the full operationalization of the AfCFTA; the further strengthening of NEPAD and the operationalization of the trilateral mechanism between SADC, COMESA and EAC; and the presidential infrastructure initiative as an industrialization catalyst are crucial manifestations of the dream of African renaissance that remains deferred. The work strengthening of links with the African diaspora as the 6th region of the AU should not be allowed to lose steam,

d) Yet, the impediments to the renaissance of Africa remain. The political economy of Africa has changed very little. The harmful effects of the global tendencies described above are seen in Africa's challenges of jobless economic growth marked by skewed income distribution, the volatility of national economic situations, fragmentation and uneven development across regions, resource dependency, political instability, and insecurity.

- e) No impediments matter more than widespread poverty, unemployment, inequality and underdevelopment, which rise to violence, despair and uncontrolled migration. The inadequacies in capacity development, health care, housing, access to technologies and innovations, entrepreneurial opportunities undermine the ability of the continent to its demographic dividend in the form of a large youthful population into real economic value.
- f) Under these conditions, African youth swell the numbers of those involved in internal and external migration. While this contributes to the world-wide circulation of skills and capital inflows in the form of remittances, it is also associated with the deaths of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean sea and the rise in xenophobic and racist tendencies in Africa and the world. In migration routes, wanton violence and violation are rife.
- g) The resurgence of violence in various parts of the continent is a recurring problem that has a negative bearing on African renaissance. Violence and conflict associated with terrorism, violent extremism, cross-border criminal networks and fights over grazing and cultivation land remain widespread. Parts of North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn, Central Africa, West, East and Southern Africa have seen this to a different extent remains a hotbed of a cocktail of militia and terror-driven violence, the collapse of governance and national security and imperialist designs of major powers. Somalia has yet to recover from similar trends, but terror incidents have increased in the past two years. Armed banditry is driving the proliferation of arms, which in turn fueling inter-cine violence all over the continent.
- h) The spike in terror attacks in Mozambique causes concerns that the terror problem will grip Southern Africa and cause long term damages to political stability and economic well-being seen in regions where terrorism has festered. This has a direct bearing on South Africa's national security and well-being. The evolving regional response and close observation by the AU hopefully mark a beginning of a holistic response.
- i) The Horn of Africa has continued to see growing militarization with external powers growing their military presence in Djibouti. With this comes concerns that this turns Africa and the Western Indian Ocean area into a zone for conflict and war instead of a zone for peace and development. The US has over 20 military outposts and is involved in more than a dozen other operations on African soil, thus bringing Africa within the orbit of the US war on terror and its devastating consequences for a peaceful and weapons-free Africa.
- j) While the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement has continued, internal situations in both countries remain areas of concern. Ethiopia, in particular, has seen rising internal tensions arising from challenges in its ethnic federalism. South Sudan and Lesotho have benefitted from successful regional interventions. Burundi's peaceful change of government just took place marks the end of a protracted transition that has seen delays. Elections continue to be associated with violence and politics linked to the winner takes all tendencies in conditions where there are not many alternative routes to resources and prosperity for the political elite. The struggle for democracy in Swaziland has not made new headways.
- k) The struggle for the self-determination of the peoples of Western Sahara remains incomplete and is facing new challenges with Morocco's attempts

to drive a wedge the AU away from its unity in support of UN resolutions calling for a peaceful resolution to the issue on the basis of the right of self-determination for the Saharawi people.

- l) The Morocco issue like the growing role of Israel in African affairs signals a waning influence of progressive African states including South Africa in African multilateralism. This fuels the perception that South Africa's sway in Africa has declined, its role in championing the progressive African agenda on the continent is seen as having weakened. In the context, Morocco and other forces not associated with progressive African agendas have taken a foothold and are weakening further the continental unity behind its long-established principles and values. While South Africa continues to enjoy the confidence of many as shown by its recent election to chair the African Union and the APRM, there is no doubt that its ability to work with others to lead a progressive agenda needs reinvigorating.
- m) The issue of the growing influence of Morocco is inextricably related to the continuing problem of FrancAfrique which sets French-speaking countries against others including English-speaking African countries in a manner that harms the cohesion of the African Union, its organs and programmes. This is also enabled by South Africa's poor handling of the Anglophone-Franco-phone dynamics. The role of monarchs from the Middle East is also key to these dynamics, linking up with Morocco, France and Israel move to influence African politics in their favour.
- n) South Africa has yet to put out for public discussion and discussions within the ANC the National Interest document adopted by the Cabinet. This discussion would aid in the coherence of policy and planning, strategy development, implementation and in projection not only on the continent but globally. It will be useful in rallying citizen support and/or participation in its progressive foreign policy agenda in pursuit of a just and equitable world order.
- o) While Africa is still reeling from the ravages of the Ebola epidemic, it now has to contend with the immediate and long-term effects of the COVID19 pandemic. COVID19 now affects 54 African countries with 100 000 cases confirmed, almost 4000 confirmed deaths, and 40 000 recoveries; South Africa as the epicentre. Health workers have been severely affected, while health facilities are stretched by a combination of COVID19 and general state of illness in many countries. This does not only undermine the already weakened health systems crucial for fighting the continent's battles with various infectious diseases and the rise of lifestyle diseases, but it also impedes economic recovery from the ravages of the global economic crisis after 2008. COVID19 followed a devastating locust infestation that severely damaged food and agricultural production and threatened livelihoods. Indications are the manner in which Africa is responding to this threat will in the long-term strengthen health systems, promote industrialization around the manufacture of essential health equipment, and lead to greater focus on resilience.
- p) Africa's response to COVID19 is also underlining the importance of cooperation, sharing of information, exchange of expertise and solidarity. This is part of a trend globally where we have seen the practical expression of solidarity mainly from the global South to the global North when the pandemic hit Europe very hard in March-April. We have seen international NGOs and

countries like China, Cuba, Russia and others extending a hand of friendship through the donation of equipment and resources to Africa and other parts of the world.

- q) South Africa's position as the chairship of the African Union and the APRM Forum of heads of state and government presents an opportunity for South Africa and the ANC to build a progressive movement in Africa, harnessing influence in the Pan-African Women Organization, the Pan-African Youth Union and ECOSOC. The challenges facing women and youth in Africa have deepened as poverty, inequality and unemployment grows. While women and youth formations have continued to mobilise for gender and youth empowerment, the African progressive movements in this area remain weak and fragmented.
- r) South Africa has finalised the hosting agreements with continental institutions that are critical for the African agenda. The challenges facing POWA and PYUM epitomise our weakness as a motive force for the progressive agenda in regional and continental integration. The assumption on our part that the progressive agenda is a common-sense such as natural resource sovereignty is shared by other governing parties as well as challenges facing countries from external influence leads to disappointments as is the case on resource control.
- s) While regional platforms like the SADC and the Conference of Liberation Movements are critical for pursuing a progressive agenda in the region including developmental regional integration, we as the ANC have not given this sufficient strategic attention to turn the potential into reality. We have not acted with sufficient vigour to ad-

dress the key challenges to the dream of developmental regional integration such as insecurity and instability, democratic reversals in some countries, weak implementation of the regional agenda as contained in the Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (2015-2020), the Regional Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan, and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ, and the inadequate strengthening of the SADC and its institutions. All these continue to be hampered fundamentally by insufficient political will on the part of regional states to give shared regional sovereignty a chance to work. This in effect is the failure to transcend the inherited notions of narrow national sovereignty that fragment the region. While liberation movements in the region have the potential to build the political movement for progressive agenda by turning the affinity among them into decisive collective action to achieve developmental regional integration now.

- t) To this end, the building of extensive party relations, relations with social movements and critical civil society, and its access to critical state power give the ANC a potential capacity to build momentum across Africa for turning consensus, policies and plans into concrete actions that bring about a progressive, prosperous and peaceful Africa in keeping with the African Agenda 2063.

3 IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS

3.1 The Implementation of Resolutions

- 1) The extent to which the ANC has led the government in ensuring that resolutions

are implemented without fail varies as evidence in the above tables show.

- 2) There is evidence of government integration of resolutions into the programme of government as reflected in annual plans and annual reports as well as progress reports above.
 - 3) There is no question that the government has shown a commitment to use resolutions in order to enhance South Africa's international relations and to express its transformational nature.
 - 4) The deployees leading the appropriate departments have demonstrated leadership in ensuring that their departments fulfil the mandate given by the people of South Africa to the ANC by working towards the implementation of resolutions.
- 8) While deployees participate actively in the Sub-Committee and provide regular updates on broad and strategic issues, not enough room is made for detailed progress reports on specific resolutions.
 - 9) The geopolitical shifts globally also have a bearing on the implementation of some resolutions as they affect the amount of resources available, change the realm of the possible in certain conditions and changing dynamics that informed some resolutions in the first place. For instance, the pursuit of UN Reform in the context of intense geopolitical tensions is harder to achieve. The push for the reforms of international financial institutions is easily overtaken by the need to deal with new crises like COVID19, putting action on longer-term issues in abeyance.
 - 10) Changing geostrategic dynamics on the African continent and in southern Africa have a bearing on the speed with which some resolutions can be realised. The resolutions on Western Sahara must now factor in the fact that Morocco is now an AU member, so the implementation needs new nuances.
 - 11) The national environment also has effects such as arise from the downgrading of the investment-grade of our economy puts pressure on the resources available causing re-allocation of budgets previously planned.
 - 12) The NGC presents an opportunity to enable the ANC to prioritise better on the resolutions that must be given higher attention than others based on a strategic calculus on costs and benefits or long term-short term gains.

3.2 Conditions that Impact Implementation

- 5) Yet, some crucial resolutions remain unfulfilled as a result of the inadequate focus on them. Conditions that affected the Implementation of Resolutions.
- 6) The capacity of the ANC structures to hold the government to account in relation to the ANC mandate remains a grey area as a result of the disproportionate distribution of resources between the government and the ANC.
- 7) The systems of monitoring and evaluation in the movement in relation to international relations are not sufficient.

3.3 Special Resolutions

Resolution	Activities/ Progress to date	Challenges	Recommendations
<p>Resolution on USA Embassy in Jerusalem</p> <p>a. Condemn the decision</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANC continues to participate in the week – long program on Israeli Apartheid Week in solidarity with the Palestinians. • ANC continues to participate in the Israeli Apartheid Week and also issues out regular statements in support of the Palestinian People and in condemning Israeli Occupation of most territories of Palestine. • The ANC continues to participate in solidarity campaigns that call on the release of political prisoners held in Israeli jails some of them being women and children. • The ANC continues to engage various stakeholders from the Region to facilitate various groups to come together and engage on peaceful engagements towards the resolution of the Palestinian issue. ANC met with various groupings from the Palestinian Liberation Movement including HAMAS and recently met with the new Palestinian Ambassador to discuss the new development on the annexation of Jordan by Israel. 	<p>Poor Coordination of the Continental and Regional Voice and action against USA unilateral decisions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANC must encourage its structures in the provinces to embark on campaigns for the release of political prisoners especially women and children and to rally support for Palestine, especially amid COVID-19. • Continue to monitor developments on the issue and to lobby progressive forces and the liberation movements to condemn the move and to encourage their governments not to move their Embassies to Jerusalem

Resolution	Activities/ Progress to date	Challenges	Recommendations
b. Call on the US Administration to reconsider its unilateral and provocative decision.			
c. Call on other countries with a resident diplomatic presence in Tel Aviv not to follow suit but maintain their Embassies in Tel Aviv.			
d. To affirm the OIC position that East Jerusalem is the recognised capital of the future State of Palestine.			
Resolution on LIBYA / SLAVE TRADE	The ANC condemns in the strongest terms this abominable crime against humanity.	None	None
a) To direct the SA government to work together with the Libyan authorities, the AU and the international community for an immediate end to these criminal practices and ensure the wellbeing of the migrants and refugees	Government has further played a prominent an influential role in the work of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya (AU HLC) since its establishment as a mechanism for supporting a sustainable and lasting political solution to the protracted and ongoing crisis in Libya	None	None
b) Welcome the ongoing efforts aimed at ending these criminal practices and resolved that the ANC directs the SA government to work together with the Libyan authorities, the AU and the international community to eliminate this scourge			

Resolution	Activities/ Progress to date	Challenges	Recommendations
<p>Resolution on LIBYA / SLAVE TRADE</p> <p>c. Call for support to the Libyan authorities, through international co-operation, in undertaking immediate action to fight against the perpetrators of such crimes.</p>			
<p>Nelson Mandela Centenary, 2018</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a year-long program of activities and events to mark the momentous centenary of Nelson Mandela in 2018 • Mobilize all sectors of society to engage and participate in activities and events celebrating the centenary of Nelson Mandela • Engage the International Community to organize events and programs that mark the centenary of Nelson Mandela 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nelson Mandela Centenary was successfully celebrated globally, nationally and in provinces. • Memorial Lectures in honour of Nelson Mandela were held highlighting the role He played in the struggle for freedom in South Africa and the values he upheld of human dignity, peace and solidarity amongst people and nations. 		

4 CONCLUSIONS

- a) The ANC's resolve on the creation of a better Africa and the World remains key to its revolutionary objectives, taking cognisance of the ever-changing objective and subjective material conditions in a world that is not static.
- b) We will not attain our goals if the balance of forces is not in our favour, hence in **"Pursuit of the Progressive Internationalism in a Changing World"** as our new theme reads, all efforts must be to rebuild and strengthen the progressive movement nationally, continentally and globally.
- c) Some of the decisions are becoming difficult to implement as they are or are taking longer due to these complex changes. For instance, the African Union (AU) has resolved to: *"Reform or transform of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the review of the Rome Statutes to be engaged with a view to strengthen without withdrawals"* rather than to withdraw from it, which means for us to withdraw would undermine the African consensus while being chair of the AU. In keeping with this AU position, a number of countries committed to withdrawing have changed their mind, also because Venezuela and Palestine have approached the ICC to challenge the USA and they will need the
- support of African countries. Further, the Malabo Protocol providing for an African alternative court to the ICC has been hampered by insufficient ratification. Therefore, this calls on the NGC to take note of these new developments that dictate a review.
- d) Indeed, the ANC's character and ideological orientation as a revolutionary liberation movement committed to the fundamental transformation of international relations are crucial. This enjoins the ANC to assess itself in this regard and arrive at ways in which this outlook may be strengthened. This historical duty of the ANC towards progressive internationalism also requires its ability to mobilise like-minded forces all over the world in pursuit of the transformation of the current world order towards one that is democratic, just and fair. To this end, the strength of the head office, the Department of International Relations especially, deserves utmost attention as a nerve centre from which solidarity, campaigns, party-to-party and multi-party relations, and the implementation of the plan of a better Africa in a transformed global order are coordinated, managed and monitored. The ANC needs to reinvigorate discussions and activities to pursue a progressive international order as its long-term goal.

5 ANNEXURE

5.1 The ANC's Historical Commitment to Progressive Internationalism

a) Two related forms of internationalism currently in vogue pose a serious threat to the ANC's pursuit of progressive internationalism:

- i. The first is neoliberal internationalism that wreaked havoc to the world for decades, extending the tentacles imperialist, capitalist, violent, and exploitative practices to the whole world.
- ii. The second rightwing internationalism rejects cosmopolitanism, globalism, multilateralism, multipolarity, but advocates crude ultra-nationalism and the pursuit of raw national interests evident in the America First cry by the US president.
- iii. Yet both of this internationalism is in continuity with the past five centuries of paradigms of violence, global racism, and crude forms of patriarchy, neocolonialism, capitalist exploitation and the domination of the periphery that explain the current inequality between the North and South, that the 2015 NGC document detailed.

b) Progressive internationalism, on the other hand, rejects the current international order for perpetuating inequality among nations and within nations and the prosperity of the few through capitalist exploitation of the periphery. It opposes the continued dominance of the former colonial empires and imperialist forces evident also in the skewed distribution of power in decision-making structures of global governance, in the militarization of international relations, in hierarchical trade and investment relations with developing countries, and wanton disregard by these powers for the international norm of sover-

ign equality of nations. It espouses the radical transformation of global power relations, international regimes that regulate international cooperation, demilitarization and de-nuclearization towards regions as zones for peace and development, respect for international law and justice, and the conduct of international relations based on fairness, shared prosperity and solidarity. In the 2017 discussion document, we said progressive internationalism "*envisages a just, equitable, non-racial, non-patriarchal, diverse, democratic and equal world system. It requires the building of alliances and solidarity with progressive forces in the South and North fighting for similar objectives in world affairs*". It also requires bold and militant advocacy of fundamental transformation of the global balance of forces, a radical restructuring of global governance, and a progressive global movement in which the ANC's posture is that of a revolutionary liberation movement committed to finishing the work entrusted to it by history since 1912.

c) The ANC's commitment to progressive internationalism as a revolutionary perspective begins in 1912 when it recognized the gravity of the link between the national question and the international situation represented then by the British Colonial Empire. As the 2015 NGC discussion documents details, the rise of an international system of imperialism was the basis of the making of the modern world from the 15th century and the arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck in the Cape in 1652, almost two hundred years after Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape, was an extension of that system to southern Africa with catastrophic implications for the peoples of this region of Africa.

d) The liberation struggles began in response to dispossession, exploitation,

dislocation, and domination that begins at this point, called primary resistance in mainstream history books. The Berlin Conference of imperialist powers in 1884-5 extended this colonial conquest and rule over the whole of Africa by consensus of western powers in an international conference, sparking liberation struggles all over the continent in response. The ANC was born in 1912 during a period of intensification of resistance to colonial rule throughout Africa and in the developing world.

e) As we said in 2017, these struggles had a strong internationalist outlook evident in the Pan-African Conferences that took place between 1900 and reached their heights in the 1950s, joining together African liberation movements and those of the African diaspora in what is sometimes called the Black Atlantic, which is North America and the Caribbean. This established pan-Africanism as a global perspective against colonialism and for the prosperity of black people everywhere in the world.

f) This was also a period of the ferment of critical traditions of internationalism that like the pan-African one influenced the outlook of the ANC on international affairs.

- First is the socialist internationalism committed to anti-imperialism and global peace in response to the paradigms of wars and imperial violence especially in the late 19th century, culminating in the birth of the Socialist International in 1889 consolidated at the International Socialist Congress held in Basel, Switzerland in 1912.
- Second, after the First World War, the paradigm of Communist internationalism or proletarian internationalism known by its famous slogan “workers of the world unite”,

found expression in the work of the Communist International founded in 1919 following the Russian Revolution. It declared in its manifesto opposition to “imperialist barbarism, monarchy, the privileged estates, the bourgeois state and bourgeois property, and all kinds and forms of class or national oppression.”

- Socialist internationalism championed by socialist and social democratic parties of Europe and Communist internationalism driven by communist parties are revolutionary perspectives of the world; they are anti-imperialist and foresee democratic world orders based on the solidarity of the oppressed.

g) Between the world wars, a rights and freedoms internationalism held the promise in its commitment to the rights of humans later enshrined in the Atlantic Charter. The ANC saw an opportunity in this as the struggle for liberation was also about the freedoms and rights of the oppressed. It is in this context that the ANC developed its African Claims in 1943 that the President-General AB Xuma who was also the organiser of the Atlantic Charter Committee in South Africa once called “The Atlantic Charter from the African's Point of View”. The Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People in 1955 was also an expression of this commitment to the bill of rights idea born out of early liberalism.

h) The international unity and solidarity of liberation movements marked a high point in the liberation struggle, especially after the Second World War. It is in this period that tricontinentalism as a key feature of progressive internationalism emerged where liberation movements, socialist, social-democratic and other radical formations from Africa, Asia, and Latin America joined forces under

the auspices of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) and the Organization of Solidarity for Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL) to champion anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, global peace, shared development, and radical world democracy, among other ideas. They joined forces with radical forces in Europe and the Americas in the World Peace Council and other formations. It was also in this context that the epochal Afro-Asian Conference took place in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 to cement South-South Cooperation and to oppose the hierarchical relations of the North-dominated imperialist/colonial order, culminating in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 (today is known as G77 + China). The internationalism of the South was also a melting pot of various strands of radical ideas that expressed in paradigms of south-south cooperation, right to development, and the new international economic order between 1955 and the 2000s.

- i) All these strands of radical and revolutionary internationalism- pan-African, socialist, communist, liberal rights/freedoms internationalism, and south-south cooperation - coalesced to underpin the progressive internationalism of the ANC. This enables the ANC to play a critical role in the building a truly international progressive movement in pursuit of a progressive, democratic, peaceful, fair and just international order in place of the imperialist, exploitative, unjust and unfair liberal international order today. This positions the ANC as a revolutionary movement committed to the transformation of the current international order by building alliances across the world in pursuit of a new order. This must be understood in order to understand how the ANC sees the world.

Discussion paper on Economic Transformation (DRAFT)

1 AIMS

The discussion document was asked to provide:

- A review of 25 years of economic policies and implementation, and why we are facing the current crisis.
- An analysis of the inability to address structural challenges and transformation (inequality, poverty, etc.).
- Historical injustice and the land question.
- A People's Path of economic transformation for next 25 years.


In March, the COVID-19 pandemic led to an unprecedented downturn in the global and national economy. Fighting the pandemic has fundamentally changed the context for economic policy, with events still unfolding rapidly. We here highlight some of the key challenges in this connection, based on the Alliance discussion document on the subject.

2 THE ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN AND THE COVID-19 RECESSION

In April 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic pushed the economy into a deep recession, with growth forecast to drop by over 7% for the year. This sharp downturn came on top of slowing growth from 2015 in the economy and in job creation. The impact of slower growth is particularly harsh because, although there have been gradual gains, unusually high levels of joblessness and inequality have persisted since the apartheid era.

As the following graph shows, economic expansion accelerated from the early 2000s to around 2011, despite a sharp dip due to the global financial crisis in 2008/9. It then slowed significantly, becoming particularly volatile and low after 2015. Job creation has generally tracked GDP growth. As the graph indicates, even before the COVID-19 recession, growth in both employment and the GDP fell increasingly short of the targets set in the National Development Plan (NDP). Judging by the experience of the 2008/9 global financial crisis, it is likely that employment will decline even more sharply than the GDP.

GRAPH 1. Growth from 2000 in the GDP (projected for 2020) and in employment compared to NDP growth targets




Source: GDP: IMF data; employment calculated from Reserve Bank data.

From the transition to democracy, the effects of slow GDP and jobs growth on low-income households were mitigated by extensive programmes to address poverty. Government supplemented these programmes in 2020 as the COVID-19 recession led to a large-scale loss of income for workers and businesses, especially in the informal sector.

In the late 2010s, around a third of all South Africans received some form of social grant. Because of high joblessness, social grants were the main source of income for a fifth of all households. They were targeted at people who physically could not work because of age or disability. In 2020, to address the loss of income from the COVID-19 recession, a new grant was established for unemployed people who did not already receive state support. Still, none of the grants were sufficient to lift families out of poverty. The old age and disability grants were twice the poverty line; the child grant was half of it until 2020, when it was increased to around 80% in response to the COVID-19 recession; and the new COVID-19 grant was just over a third of the poverty line for an individual.

In addition to grants, over the past 25 years millions of households have received upgrades in household infrastructure, improved education and healthcare, and access to formal housing, as well as a range of other benefits. Combined with the grants, the improvement in government services in low-income communities ensured a significant improvement in living conditions for the majority of South Africans over the past 25 years. To take a fundamental indicator, as **Graph 2** shows, the share of households where people went hungry at least sometimes fell from over one in four in the mid-1990s to one in ten in the late 2010s. Even as the economy slowed from 2015, the share of households suffer-

GRAPH 2. Share of households where people went hungry at least sometimes, 1996 to 2018

Source: Statistics South Africa household surveys.

ing from hunger remained essentially stable. The effect of the COVID-19 recession on the level of food insecurity will only become available until 2021, however.


Redistribution through the state alleviates some of the worst effects of a deeply inequitable economy. Moreover, these systems have proven critical for social protection during the COVID-19 recession, as household incomes fell sharply with employment from March 2020. Still, even before the COVID-19 crisis, joblessness and inequality remained central socio-economic challenges for most citizens. Long after the transition to democracy, South Africa continued to lag behind other upper-middle-income countries in employment levels and income disparities.

The long-run jobs backlog in South Africa emerges if we compare the share of the working aged population with employment with other countries. This indicator is known as the “employment ratio” or the “absorption ratio”. It counts both wage workers and self-employed people as employed. As the following graph shows, the employment ratio in South Africa climbed from 39% in 1994 to 42% in 2019. The international norm is around 55%.¹ In South Africa, the ratio peaked a decade ago, but then, in 2008/9 around a million jobs were lost in the global financial crisis. Since 2008, job creation has fallen behind growth in the working-aged population, resulting in a decline in the employment ratio.

From the 1980s, South Africa has also consistently ranked as having the most unequal income distribution amongst countries that report on it using the Gini coefficient. A higher Gini coefficient means the distribution of income is more unequal. In South Africa, from

¹ The figures here are normed ILO data to permit international comparisons. Statistics South Africa gives an employment ratio that is around 1,5% higher, but the trends are the same and the gap from other countries would still be on the order of 15%.

GRAPH 3. The share of employed people in the working-aged population, South Africa compared to other upper middle income countries, 1995, 2008 and 2018



Note: Average of 49 countries. Source: Calculated from World Bank. World Development Indicators.

the 1980s the Gini coefficient has been estimated consistently at over .60; in other upper-middle-income countries, it averages around .45. (See **Graph 4**) The data likely overstate the gap between South Africa and peer economies, however, since many of the most unequal countries in the world do not report a Gini coefficient at all. Less than half of all upper-middle-income countries published a Gini coefficient from the mid-1990s through the late 2010s.


As of April 2020, absent government intervention, the COVID-19 recession seemed likely to aggravate inequalities because:

- Professionals and managers are more able to work from home, and consequently less likely to be laid off;
- People in personal and entertainment services, such as restaurants and hairdressers, were often unable to re-open fully because of the high risk of catching COVID-19; and
- Informal enterprises, which employed around two million people, faced particular difficulties both because requirements for physical distancing limited their access to consumers, for instance at taxi ranks, and because their customers were more likely to see job losses and consequently to cut back on purchases.

South Africa's economic growth depends on both international and domestic conditions. The slowdown from 2011 in particular correlated closely with the international prices of

GRAPH 4. Gini coefficients for South Africa and the 16 other reporting upper-middle-income countries, mid-1990s and late 2010s (a)

Note: When the distribution of income is more unequal, the Gini coefficient is higher.



Note: (a) Figure for the earliest available year from 1995 to 1998, and the latest available from 2014 to 2017. (b) Population weighted average of 16 upper-middle-income countries other than South Africa, Brazil, Russia and China that reported a Gini in both periods. Source: Calculated from World Bank. World Development Indicators.

South Africa's main mining exports. Mining products, including refined metals and coal-based chemicals, account for over half of South Africa's total foreign sales. As the following graph shows, from the late 1990s the economic rate of growth has broadly tracked changes in the prices these products – mostly coal, platinum, iron ore and gold. Prices for metals hit a 30-year high in 2011, then dropped by between 30% and 50%.

While the slowdown from 2011 was driven largely by the sharp fall in export prices, a number of domestic factors also contributed. The following are most important.

- The electricity supply grew more and more expensive and unreliable from 2008.
- The climate crisis began to affect both agriculture and tourism, with more frequent and intense droughts and flooding.
- State capture and worsening corruption increased the costs of state-owned infrastructure systems and discouraged private investment.
- Government fiscal and monetary policies were generally pro-cyclical, although not to the point of austerity.
- Unusually deep inequalities and high joblessness fuelled increasing and unceasing contestation over policy priorities and strategies. That in turn tended to reduce private investment, since it aggravated investor uncertainty (as the ratings agencies invariably point out). Inequality also limited demand for basic consumer manufactures, making it more difficult to develop labour-intensive industries like clothing and plastics.


Taken together, these domestic and international factors led to relatively slow growth in South Africa compared to other upper middle income economies. As the following graph shows, since 2002 growth in South Africa has lagged most of these peer economies, although the divergence worsened after the metals price boom ended in 2011.

The COVID-19 recession brought a qualitatively different economic contraction. Because of the lack of treatments, immunity and vaccines to stop the pandemic, many countries imposed lockdowns to prevent physical contact between people, including in production. First China, in January, and then most other countries including South Africa from mid-March, restricted production outside of essential services. That in turn led to sharply falling incomes and rising joblessness, as well as a further drop in prices for South Africa's minerals and metals exports except gold. In addition, the auto assembly industry, which is South Africa's only major manufactured export, was effectively closed down as the global car companies shut down in Europe and the U.S. Finally, developing economies like South Africa saw a rapid outflow in financial investments, resulting in rapid depreciation of the rand.

The socio-economic impact of the lockdown was particularly harsh in South Africa due to the pre-existing inequalities in employment, incomes, savings and housing.

In theory, workers outside of the essential services were allowed to work from home at any phase of the lockdown. That is usually impossible for manual workers, however, as well as for retail. Formal employers, who account for four out of five jobs, generally tried to pay wages for the first month, but some applied no-work, no-pay rules. As of late April, it was not clear if they would be able to continue to meet salary costs for a second month


GRAPH 5. Annual percentage change in GDP compared to annual percentage change in international price of exported metals, ores and coal



Note: (a) Trade-weighted index of prices for coal, iron ore, platinum and gold.

Source: For GDP, Statistics South Africa; for prices, Index Mundi/IMF commodity prices.

GRAPH 6. Average annual GDP growth in South Africa compared to other upper middle income economies (UMIC), 2002 to 2011, 2011 to 2015 and 2015 to 2018



Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators.

as long as they were unable to produce. The situation was even worse for casual and temporary workers, who mostly lost their employment. The 1,7 million informal entrepreneurs generally had to shut down.

Loss of income due to the shutdown had a vastly different impact on rich and poor households. The richest 10% of households account for over half of all household income and more than three quarters of financial savings. They could manage a decline in income for a month or two. In contrast, the poorest 60% of households lives on less than R6700 a month. Two out of five survive on less than the food poverty line defined by Statistics South Africa. These households saw a sharp decline in income even if they received increased social grants or food relief.

The personal and family burdens of staying in one's own residence also vary with income. The 1,2 million families living in informal settlements (8% of all households) inevitably share space and facilities with neighbours. For instance, three quarters of informal-settlement residents rely on communal taps and toilets, and two out of five live in a single room. Defining their lockdown space as their personal shacks alone imposed impossible choices.

In short, the economy faced deep structural challenges even before the COVID-19 recession. Above all, dependence on mining-based exports left it vulnerable to international metals price cycles, and deep inequalities led to slower growth and continual conflict over policies. In this context, the COVID-19 recession seemed likely to have the

harshest impact on the poor; aggravate the downturn in commodity prices; and lead to even higher joblessness.

The next section summarises, in broad strokes, the ANC's strategies, achievements and shortfalls in addressing the structural economic challenges over the past 25 years.

3 STRATEGIES AND PROGRESS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The transition to democracy inevitably entailed some strategic decisions that shaped efforts to reconstruct the economy. In *Ready to Govern* and the RDP, the ANC essentially committed to avoiding extra-legal measures to transform individual or company ownership of economic, financial or personal assets (essentially businesses, company shares and government bonds, and housing), except to carry out land reform. Instead, it would work gradually to increase opportunities, wealth and incomes for black households. The aim was to ensure that big business and the wealthy would support gradual reconstruction of the economy in order to increase economic opportunities and jobs, incomes and government services for the majority, and reduce the profound inequalities entrenched under apartheid.

This approach led to a significant improvement in conditions for low-income households. But it did not generate the anticipated qualitative step up in job creation, equality and growth.

The strategy presumed that economic reconstruction would follow primarily from the institution of democracy, the end of discriminatory laws and legal segregation, improved government services for black communities, and expanded labour rights. In this context, government would support industrialisation, land reform and small business. These measures were expected to dramatically expand economic opportunities for the majority.

A core part of the approach was that government would respect the existing legal property rights of companies and individuals, with a partial exception for land. It also committed to maintaining individual employment rights – that is, no one would be fired based on their race or gender alone.

The ANC strategy reflected two hard realities. First, the immediate pressure was to avoid a flight of skills and capital with the transition to democracy. The RDP and other resolutions aimed to maintain space for real change while minimising the costs of the transition to a more democratic political and economic system. Second, the strategy accepted that the complex economies that have emerged over the past 50 years or so require a high degree of decentralisation. Enterprises, consumers and workers need to have the freedom to respond to changes in conditions, costs and prices. That in turn necessitates a mixed economy, with a significant private sector.

From this standpoint, the ANC approach aimed enable South Africa to move from a

highly concentrated and exclusive mixed economy to a more inclusive, broad-based one. In particular, the aim was to make economic actors more accountable to the majority as well as ensuring more equitable incomes and wealth. Critical steps included improving the position and power of working people in larger companies; generating more opportunities for smaller businesses; strengthening social ownership (collective ownership through co-ops, worker and community groups; non-profit social enterprise; and government ownership on behalf of citizens); and generally promoting collective action socially, economically and politically in order to empower working people and their communities.

Despite the decision not to pursue extra-legal measures, the democratic state retained significant power to drive reconstruction. Critical instruments included:


- Extending finance and infrastructure for new entrepreneurs,
- Expropriating land in the public interest,
- Supporting worker and community organisation and mobilisation to promote economic transformation and to drive projects,
- Ensuring that low-income children and workers had access to quality education and training,
- Utilising preferential procurement, and
- Setting tariffs and regulatory frameworks including around pricing, ownership and control in companies, and employment equity.

In practice, since 1994 there has been substantial progress in upgrading and expanding government services (including social grants) as well building democratic and labour rights. Nonetheless, economic reconstruction has fallen far short of popular expectations. An analysis of progress on central economic strategies helps understand the problem.

Starting with **Ready to Govern**, the ANC adopted seven core strategies to reconstruct the economy, which can be summarised as follows.

- Government would promote growth in manufacturing and value-adding services so as to accelerate the creation of decent work, increase incomes, take advantage of global markets, and reduce the risks of narrow reliance on mining exports.
- Basic municipal services, education, healthcare and social grants would be expanded and improved in black communities, increasing investment in our people and enabling them to take advantage of economic opportunities.
- Government would eliminate discriminatory laws around residential rights, business licences and finance.
- It would strengthen support for small businesses, including through the provision of finance, training, infrastructure and its own procurement.
- It would encourage greater workplace equality, replacing the unusually unequal, discriminatory and oppressive labour relations entrenched under apartheid.
- Large-scale land reform would improve livelihoods and promote broader agrarian reform, especially to benefit farmworkers and people living in impoverished and overcrowded areas of the historic labour-sending regions.

GRAPH 7. Average annual GDP growth in South Africa compared to other upper middle income economies (UMIC), 2002 to 2011, 2011 to 2015 and 2015 to 2018




Notes: (a) Manufacturing excludes basic foodstuffs, which are included under agriculture, and iron and steel products, which are included in ores and metals. (b) Mostly oil and gas outside of South Africa, and coal for South Africa. Source: Calculated from UNCTAD. UNCTADSTAT. Interactive database. Downloaded from www.unctad.org in October 2019.

- Fiscal and monetary policy would support growth and job creation without fuelling excessive public debt or inflation.

This section provides a broad outline of the main achievements and shortfalls in implementing each of these strategies over the past 25 years. A *separate document reports on implementation of Conference resolutions*.

Inclusive industrialisation: The economy remained dependent on exports from the mining value chain, which in turn meant that South Africa's economy was buffeted by global commodity cycles. In terms of value add, the fastest growing industries were finance, telecommunications and construction. As for employment, almost all new jobs emerged in business and community services, largely security and cleaning. Over the past decade there has been no employment growth in manufacturing, although food processing has increased jobs while heavy industry has shed them.

Manufacturing growth and exports have been dominated by metals and coal refineries (including Sasol); the small but world-class auto-assembly and capital goods industries; and food processing. Other light industry, in particular clothing and electronics, remained very small by international standards. The dominance of heavy industry meant that manufacturing growth did not create many new jobs. In contrast, in industrialising Asian economies, industrial policies won popular support by generating employment on a huge scale in clothing, appliances and electronics, plastics, food processing and other light industries.

GRAPH 8. Employment status in South Africa compared to other economies by income group, 2017

Note: (a) That is, self-employed. Source: Calculated from ILO. ILOSTAT. Interactive database. Downloaded from www.ilo.org in August 2018.

Government services, including education, municipal services and social grants, were vastly expanded from 1994 in historically black communities that had been largely excluded under apartheid. For Africans, the average years of formal education increased from eight years in 1996 to ten years in 2019. The share of African households with electricity climbed from 44% to 94%; with running water on site, from 47% to 70%; and with a flush toilet, from 34% to 58%. In the poorest 80% of households, one in five says they have received a housing subsidy.

While access improved, the quality of services for low-income households still lags far behind historically white areas. For instance, in the late 2010s there were around twice as many learners per educator in historically African schools as in historically white (but now mostly integrated) schools.

The RDP expected the expansion of services to provide a critical boost to the economy by enabling households to start small businesses. In practice, however, the effects were limited. In the late 2010s, self-employment remained very low compared to other upper-middle-income economies, as Graph 8 shows.

Overtly discriminatory laws on residence, access to finance and business licences were ended with the transition to democracy. From 1994, black people were legally permitted to live wherever they could afford, to start businesses and to accumulate assets, including financial investments, housing and land.

By 2018, Africans made up 60% of the highest-income 10% of households, compared to almost none before 1994. Still, even within that top 10%, white households had around

three times as much wealth as African households. Their incomes were not much above African households in the top 10%, but most white families had inherited financial assets, houses and often businesses. Moreover, in 2017 over half of directors of listed companies and 80% of their CEOs were white men.

For the bottom of the pyramid, the main benefits were the ability to move to economic centres and, in the urban areas, a sharp increase in home ownership. The share of the population living in the mostly impoverished historic labour-sending regions fell from half in early 1990s to a quarter in 2018. In 2018 half of African urban households owned their own homes (as did 80% of households in the historic labour-sending regions). Still, most township and rural houses had a market value of under R250 000, and many could not be used as security for loans because they could not easily be sold.

Overall, the distribution of wealth remained heavily unequal. The lowest-income 90% of households owned at most a third of all financial assets excluding retirement funds.

Support for small business was expected to lead to both a more dynamic economy and greater opportunities and agency for the majority of South Africans. Government supported emerging enterprises mostly through loans, some training, and by including procurement from empowered, especially small, enterprises as an element in larger companies' BEE status.

Still, as **Graph 8** shows, in the late 2010s the share of small businesses remained small by international standards. In every major industry, a handful of large, often globally competitive companies dominates production and sales. In 2019, there were 700 000 formal small businesses (up from around 550 000 in the early 2000s) and 1,5 informal businesses, compared to 1,3 million a decade earlier. Black people owned almost two thirds of formal small businesses in 2019, compared to a third in 2002.

Policies to promote workplace equality were expected to reduce South Africa's unusually deep inequalities in pay and workplace power. Government introduced labour laws that set a floor for conditions, especially leave and working time, as well as protecting workers' rights to organise. It also established employment equity requirements, stronger occupational health and safety, the SETA system and minimum wages. As originally conceived, all of these laws aimed primarily to improve career mobility and incomes for shopfloor workers.

The labour laws transformed conditions for formal workers, especially in large, unionised companies and the public sector. By the early 2000s, a third of the formal workforce belonged to a union, including over four out of five miners and two out of three public servants (mostly teachers, nurses and police). Since then, however, unionisation rates have remained flat. This a core problem both because it limits the power of a central ANC constituency and because the labour laws depend on unions to monitor and enforce compliance.

Minimum wages have had a visible impact on improving workers' conditions. In 2017, six out of ten farm and domestic workers earned under R2300. In 2002, when they first got minimum wages, the figure was nine out of ten (that is, 90% earned under R1000 a month in 2002 rand, which was equal to R2300 in 2017 rand). Moreover, even as pay has increased, both farm and domestic jobs have expanded substantially over the past decade.

Despite these gains, South Africa still has unusually unequal pay scales and hierarchical workplaces compared to the rest of the world. A third of formal employees, two thirds of informal employees and over four fifths of domestic workers do not earn enough to keep a family out of poverty (R3250 for a family of four in 2019). Most workers still have limited or no chance of promotion. Workers without matric are generally unable to get certified training on the job. This situation helps explain why South Africa consistently ranks amongst the countries with the most antagonistic workplace relationships in the world.

Land reform was expected to reverse the landlessness of the rural poor, especially farm-workers and people who had been pushed into the historic labour-sending regions. It remained a fairly small programme, however. In the late 2010s, almost a third of the 40 000 commercial farms were black owned. But only 0,3% of households nationwide, or 45 000, said they had received land as part of a land reform programme. In 2019, the national government planned to provide land to 89 emergent farmers and to support 8000 subsistence farmers. For comparison, 120 000 households depend primarily on their own farms for food or income.

Fiscal and monetary policies avoided austerity during downturns, except in the late 1990s. But they were generally aligned with economic cycles rather than compensating for them. From 2000 to 2009, during the height of the international metals price boom, public investment climbed from around 4,5% of the GDP to over 7%. It fell back to 5,5% in 2019, however, as international mining prices dropped and the economy slowed. Similarly, from 2002 to 2011, in constant terms government spending climbed 7% a year; from 2011 to 2015, it grew 3% a year; and from 2015 to 2017, it slowed to 2% a year. The trend reversed in the 2019 to 2021 budgets, as the GDP slowed. Government spending targeted a 4% annual increase above inflation, far outstripping tax revenues. But the increase in 2020/21 went mostly to bail out Eskom and SAA, while spending on the main social services lagged in real terms.

Similarly, monetary policy was pro-cyclical but not draconian. Real prime lending rates (subtracting inflation) dropped from over 10% in the late 1990s to 3% around 2011. Then, as the economy slowed, they began to increase again, reaching 5,5% in 2019. That compared to rates of around 4% in other upper-middle-income countries excluding China, and 1% in China.

Finally, the levies for the UIF and Compensation Fund were excessive compared to their pay-outs. As a result, they accumulated large surpluses, equal in 2019 to R160 billion at the UIF and R65 billion at the Compensation Fund. These resources effectively derived from legally mandated savings by workers and employers. They were, however, invested almost exclusively in listed companies and government bonds, rather than promoting economic reconstruction.

Table 1 summarises key achievements and shortcomings over the past 25 years for each of the main strategies that sought to generate more inclusive and equitable growth.

Table 1 Outcomes of main strategies to achieve inclusive economic development

	Achievements	Shortfalls
<i>Inclusive industrialisation</i>	<p>Diversification of mining exports into platinum, chrome and manganese as gold reserves were exhausted</p> <p>Strong manufacturing capacity retained in the mining value chain (capital goods, coal and metals refineries) and in food production and processing</p> <p>Development of world-class export industries in auto assembly, fresh and processed fruit and vegetables, and in health, education, construction and other services</p>	<p>Formal manufacturing lost 225 000 jobs in the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2010, and its employment has fallen by a further 100 000 since then</p> <p>Mining products (ores, coal and basic metals) still account for over half of all goods exports</p> <p>Manufacturing strengths are largely in capital-intensive industries (auto, capital goods, refineries), which only generate around 5% of all jobs and account for most of the manufacturing job losses since 2008.</p> <p>The increasing unreliability and cost of electricity has hindered new activities and investments.</p>
<i>Basic services</i>	<p>Average years of education for Africans increased from 8 years in 1996 to 10 years in 2019</p> <p>From 1996 to 2018, the share of African households with electricity climbed from 44% to 94%; with running water on site, from 47% to 70%; with a flush toilet, from 34% to 58%</p> <p>20% of households in the poorest 80% say they have received a housing subsidy</p> <p>Social grants reduce inequality and are the main source of income for one in five households</p> <p>EPWP provided 865 000 work opportunities (mostly lasting several months) in 2018</p>	<p>Access to quality education still depends on class and location, which largely align with race</p> <p>Most working class townships are still located far from economic opportunities</p> <p>African access to municipal services lags behind other groups (which have between 95% and 100% access) and quality in townships often visibly worse</p> <p>Old-age pension and disability grants suffice to raise 2 people out of poverty; the child support grant is half the poverty line for a single person</p> <p>There are no social grants for jobless adults who are not disabled; EPWP provided opportunities to around 4% of jobless adults.</p>

	Achievements	Shortfalls
End discriminatory laws on residence, finance and business ownership	<p>Share of population in historic labour-sending regions fell from half in early 1990s to a quarter in 2018</p> <p>50% of African households in urban areas own their homes (80% in historic labour-sending regions)</p> <p>Black households made up 60% of the highest-income 10% in 2018, up from an insignificant share before 1994.</p>	<p>Over half of directors of listed companies and 80% of their CEOs were white men in 2017</p> <p>Richest 10% of households get two thirds of income from financial assets outside of retirement funds</p> <p>For the poorest 60% of households, seven out of ten homes were worth R250 000 or less in 2018</p> <p>White households get three quarters of income from financial assets; in the highest-income 10%, white households have around three times as much wealth as African households.</p>
Small business	<p>Increase in formal small business from 600 000 in 2010 to 700 000 in 2019</p> <p>Black-owned share up from a third in 2002 to almost two thirds in 2019.</p>	<p>A handful of large companies still dominate every major industry</p> <p>One in 20 adults owns a business, compared to one in five in peer economies.</p>
Workplace equality	<p>In 2002, nine out of ten farm and domestic workers earned under R1000 a month; the share fell to six in ten in 2017, taking inflation into account (R1000 in 2002 had the purchasing power of R2300 in 2017)</p> <p>Laws established labour rights and floor on conditions</p> <p>Increase in unionisation to a third of formal employment in early 2000s, and over two thirds in public sector</p> <p>Over half of private managers and professionals were black in 2017, up from a third in 2002 (the figure was stable at four fifths in the public sector)</p>	<p>A third of formal employees, two thirds of informal employees and over four fifths of domestic workers do not earn enough to keep a family out of poverty (R3250 for a family of four)</p> <p>Since 2002, the share of union members in formal employment has remained stagnant at a third, with much lower rates for farm and informal workers</p> <p>SA still has unusually unequal paycales and hierarchical workplaces compared to the rest of the world</p> <p>Most workers still don't have access to certified training, with SETA funded training mostly limited to those who have matric and very limited certification for informal learning (Recognition of Prior Learning, or RPL)</p> <p>Unjustified workplace inequalities generate distrust and conflict, harming productivity and investment.</p>

	Achievements	Shortfalls
Land reform	<p>Almost a third of the 40 000 commercial farms were black owned in 2017</p> <p>Farming is the main source of income or food for 120 000 households.</p>	<p>45 000 households, or 0,3% of the total, said they had received land as part of a land reform programme in 2018 (0,1% in urban areas, 0,3% in historic labour-sending areas, and 1,9% in commercial farm areas)</p> <p>National government planned to provide land to 89 emergent farmers in 2019 and support to 8000 subsistence farmers.</p>
Fiscal and monetary	<p>Public investment climbed from 4,6% of the GDP in 1994 to 7,8% in 2009, although it fell back to 5,4% 2019</p> <p>Government revenues increased from 22% of the GDP in 1994 to 26% in 2019, and government spending is still growing faster than the GDP</p> <p>Real prime rates (subtracting inflation) dropped from over 10% in the late 1990s to around 5,5% in 2019</p> <p>Inflation fell from over 10% in the early 1990s to 4% in 2019</p> <p>The budget deficit fell from 6,6% of the GDP in 1993 to -3,9% in 2018/9 (but rose to 6,5% in 2019/20 and 6,8% in 2020/21).</p>	<p>Government spending and investment was broadly pro-cyclical, although not austerity. Government consumption grew at 4,6% a year (in constant rand) during the global commodity boom from 2002 to 2011, when the economy grew at 3,5% a year, but slowed to 1,5% from 2011 as growth declined to 1,3% from 2011 to 2019. Public investment (including SOCs) rose 10% a year from 2002 to 2011, but from 2015 to 2018 the state disinvested at 8,5% a year, with a further 2,4% disinvestment in 2019.</p> <p>Real interest rates fell from the late 1990s to 2002, but then climbed by 2%. In 2018, at 6%, real interest rates were higher than the norm for upper middle income countries (1% in China and a population-weighted average of 4% in other UMIC)</p> <p>Inflated levies for the UIF and Compensation Fund compared to pay-outs means they have accumulated large surpluses, which represent forced savings by workers and employers but are not being used for developmental purposes</p>

Source: Data provided by Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) based on information from Statistics South Africa and other official sources.

The government has adopted strong policies in response to the COVID-19 recession. It has had four main thrusts:

- Providing social protection and relief for low-income households and working people;
- Supporting businesses, especially smaller producers, in order to minimise bankruptcies and try to avoid retrenchments, so that the economy would not lose core capacities that would help the recovery;
- Reducing interest rates and using other measures to promote liquidity in an effort to sustain economic activity as far as possible; and
- Mobilising resources both domestically and internationally to maintain a large-scale economic stimulus, equal to 10% of the GDP, while accepting a sharp increase in the budget deficit.

In short, over the past 25 years, government went a long way in expanding services for historically excluded households, and in eliminating discriminatory laws and protecting citizens' and workers' rights. In contrast, it proved far more difficult to overhaul the economy in order to promote greater equality in ownership of businesses, financial wealth, land and other assets; incomes; and education and training. In this context, the immediate response to the COVID-19 recession was to avoid losing core economic capacities and jobs during the lockdown, and to mobilise resources for the recovery after growth was again possible.

4 THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

The ANC has long understood that once the colonial state had entrenched inequality and mining dependency, the market will tend to reproduce them. This section first unpacks why that happens. It then explores factors that have prevented the democratic state from intervening more rigorously and effectively to address the systemic pillars of inequality and mining dependency. A central problem is that in deeply unequal societies, it proves difficult to agree on disruptive actions. By definition, big changes impose costs on groups that benefit from the current situation. Moreover, policy innovations are risky and inevitably some will fail. In those cases, the blame usually falls on the state even if other actors actually caused the failure.

A variety of long-standing economic, legal, social and political relationships shape the balance of forces in the economy that continues to encourage dependency on mining and to deter growth in other sectors.

- In the private sector, South African companies have had 150 years to develop world-class capacity to support mining. These activities range from the initial finance and construction to mining itself; the production of capital goods and chemicals as inputs; downstream metals and coal-based chemicals refineries; and manufacture of metal products. The companies involved in the value chain often find it easier to look overseas for new opportunities linked to mining than to venture into light industry or value-adding services. Virtually all of South Africa's largest mining and construction companies have transformed themselves into international conglomerates, while many financial institutions have tried, with less success, to do the same.
- Support for mining is also embedded in decades-old regulatory systems. In infrastructure, deciding how and where to invest has long been shaped and largely funded by mining, from freight transport to water and electricity. During the metals price boom from 2002 to 2011, for instance, the SOCs increased their investments largely because the mines and refineries expanded, leading to higher demand. From 2011, however, the abrupt fall in minerals and metals prices fell from 2011 squeezed sales, however, and with it state investment. In addition, the regulatory frameworks for taxation, education and training, land use and support for research and development all incorporate long-standing concessions to facilitate development in the mining value chain.

Similarly, once inequalities in asset ownership, human capital, and work organisation and paycales have been established, they tend to persist. The reproduction of inequalities in ownership and control has obvious historical roots.

- Under apartheid small businesses were largely suppressed, while the regime promoted concentration in many industries. This history means that physical infrastructure, financial institutions, procurement systems, market access, managerial experience and other skills, and regulatory frameworks developed to serve large, established companies. In the absence of major reforms, they often cannot accommodate smaller, newer and riskier enterprises. In consequence, emerging businesses face a generally unsupportive ecosystem.
- In this context, the low level of self-employment in South Africa is a direct consequence of the destruction of small-scale African agriculture. Before 1994, African farmers were limited to historic labour-sending regions. These areas were largely delineated to exclude access to agricultural water and land; have large backlogs in economic, household and social infrastructure; and are often overcrowded. Only 25% of working-aged adults in these regions are employed, compared to half of those in the rest of the country. Under 5% of their households rely primarily on their own farms for income or food.
- At the level of households, rich people have higher incomes and can afford better qualifications. That in turn makes it easier for them to take advantage of economic opportunities and pass privileges on over generations.

In the education system, apartheid established deep disparities. From an economic standpoint, it aimed to limit the pool of skills in order to increase pay for people with qualifications. It generated some world-class graduates but left most school leavers unable to compete for higher-level jobs.

After the transition to democracy, wealthy households were enabled to buy better education both inside and outside of the public sector. Increasingly, access to top-tier universities and degrees depends on the ability to pay both school and university fees. The ability to charge fees in turn enables private and historically white schools to sustain higher quality infrastructure, lower educator:learner ratios and better facilities. While many are more representative in terms of race than they were in 1994, they are still largely closed to learners from lower-income households. In 2016, a third of all white students, but only 12% of black students, went to Stellenbosch, UCT or Wits.

In the workplace, work organisation was also shaped historically to maintain “European” pay for managers and professionals at the cost of other workers. Production depended on a few highly skilled and formally qualified positions, while most lower-level jobs were deskilled. Once these structures are established, most people cannot envision a more equitable workplace or educational system.

After 1994, very few established enterprises or, in government, bureaucracies tried to reform their work organisation so as to upskill and empower lower-level workers; establish more supportive and creative management styles; or promote career mobility. For most workers, workplaces remained oppressive and often arbitrary, with improvements available only through the annual pay increment. That is a recipe for hostility and conflict.

The systems that reproduce dependence on mining exports as well as inequality are long-standing and resilient. Various factors make it hard for the government to disrupt them.

First, as noted above, modern economies are highly complex. The state does not have the organisational or personnel capacity to take over most producers. That means it has limited power to order action by private companies. It can regulate businesses in a wide variety of ways that reduce its returns or raise its costs. But if government requirements impose long-run losses on an enterprise, it has no choice but to close down or move elsewhere. In addition, government directives are only one amongst a range of factors influencing companies' behaviour.


Second, the democratic state has some core weakness. They largely follow from the deep inequalities in society, which make it virtually impossible to achieve full consensus on economic policy. As a result, government must navigate between the demands of its constituents, who want real change in the economy, and pressure from business, which on the whole would prefer to minimise the disruption, risks and costs that would follow from far-reaching economic reconstruction. Within each of these camps, moreover, major fractions often disagree with each other vehemently. The most obvious divide is between the leaders of emerging and big business, but the interests of the financial sector, manufacturing, agriculture and mining also often diverge. These divisions often underpin debates within the ANC and the Alliance, as well as between government departments and agencies.

Managing policy contestation is harder because of the institutional fragmentation of the state, which is illustrated in **Figure 1**. Different state agencies have mandates that align with divergent constituencies. Lobbyists and pressure groups are able to forum shop. In this context, instead of defining and pursuing hard objectives, the state often functions as a big-tent coalition united around vague priorities. That approach permits considerable variation and even contradictions in specific policies.

The fragmentation of the state appears in the strong independence that national departments and the spheres of the state assert in developing and carrying out policies. The central government has struggled to impose coherent quality control on both the design and implementation of new initiatives. In effect, the power to block or quality control departmental initiatives falls almost exclusively to Cabinet, the Presidency and Treasury. Both Cabinet and the Presidency need far greater technical capacity and stronger mandating systems to evaluate and monitor often highly complex economic policies. For its part, Treasury has generally seen disruptive proposals as excessively risky. In consequence, it often does not fund them at all, or limits their resources to the point where they are largely ineffective.

In sum, apartheid entrenched a range of systems that promote both economic inequality and mining-dependent growth. Policies to disrupt these systems necessarily run into opposition as well as posing risks. On the one hand, the current beneficiaries have the resources and power to lobby effectively in favour of the status quo. On the other, the state has been fragmented and indecisive and generally lacks the capacity for economic analysis. Overall, its policies have appeared designed more to avoid the risks disruption poses to growth, while downplaying the risks that arise from growing popular anger about inequality, joblessness, and slow income growth.

Figure 1. Economic policy structures in the South African state, 2019



Source: Neva Makgetla. Forthcoming. "Economic institutions and the frustration of economic policy," in, David Platjies. *Making Institutions Work*. Forthcoming 2020.

In these circumstances, it has proven easier to focus on improving living standards through the extension of government services, without attempting far-reaching economic reconstruction. Continued dependence on mining exports, however, meant that the downturn in global metals markets from 2011 brought a sharp slowdown in growth. Moreover, the persistence of social and economic inequalities after 25 years of democracy has tried the patience of most citizens.

5 RESPONSES TO STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Even before the COVID-19 recession, South Africa was experiencing a difficult combination of depressed economic growth and rising popular impatience with the slow pace of change in joblessness and inequality. The COVID-19 crisis added to the challenges, with a sharp fall in production and high joblessness. The challenge was to ensure that the recovery from the lockdown delivered immediate benefits to key stakeholders, while laying the basis for restructuring the economy to ensure greater equality and dynamism.

Politically and socially, these measures can succeed only in the context of an enhanced strategy to manage the objective differences between powerful groups in the economy. The critical divides emerge in particular between both established and emerging business, on the one hand, and working people, including informal entrepreneurs, on the other.

This section first reviews some policy options and capacity needs. It outlines options for a pacting process to manage the effects of economic and social inequality on economic strategies.

5.1 Policy directions

The key areas for economic policy after the lockdown are:

- A sustainable package to revive overall economic growth;
- Measures that visibly improve economic opportunities for working people on a significant scale; and
- Improved management of business needs and expectations so as to promote investment and job creation without simply giving up on reconstruction.

As noted above, government has committed to mobilising resources to support business in re-opening the economy. The challenge historically has been to balance the need to support existing competitive centres of the economy – in particular the mining value chain, auto assembly, industrial food production and professional services – against the imperative of promoting diversification and small businesses that can generate more equitable and inclusive growth.

In this context, the recovery strategy must provide short-run programmes to reassure the majority of South Africans that we are serious about strengthening their economic opportunities and agency.

- Government should vastly increase support for organisations that promote social mobilisation in working-class communities, such as labour unions and other constituency-based organisations, the Presidential National Youth Service, and community-based public employment schemes.
- The minimum wage should increase at least 1,5% above inflation annually. For 2019/20, the increase was only at inflation, or around 4,5% in nominal terms. In addition, stakeholders – especially unions, communities of faith and NGOs – should be assisted to improve monitoring and enforcement, especially for low-income, often unorganised workers.
- Access to elite educational institutions, from primary to tertiary, should be improved for low-income learners, including by setting a quota for places without fees for learners from low-income households.
- Larger companies should be encouraged to invite unions to participate in their boards of directors, and to expand employee and community ownership.

In terms of building confidence from established business, progress has already been made around the regulation of electricity generation, easing visas for skilled people, water licences, restructuring the SOCs and addressing corruption. In this context, the top priorities are visibly and rigorously dealing with corruption, and ensuring affordable, reliable electricity generation (which requires disciplining Eskom rather than just trying to salvage it).

The most effective next step would be to introduce stronger systems for government to engage with business. That in turn requires both clear, efficient and disciplined mandating structures, and more rigorous quality control by the Presidency on policy proposals from an early stage. Government and ANC leaders need to have a well-defined understanding of what they want from engagements with business, their priorities in that context, and their leverage. They also need to maintain an analysis of the actual power, resources and objectives of different fractions within business.

The introduction of Master Plans to promote growth at the level of individual value chains represents a key opportunity to diversify the economy and promote more equitable growth while supporting the economic recovery. Their effectiveness will however depend on stronger quality control, alignment across relevant agencies, and technical resourcing. In particular, they require:

- Greater capacity at the level of the Presidency to prioritise and coordinate the process, monitor and unblock implementation, and where necessary ensure Master Plans are strengthened continually as implementation proceeds. A particular challenge is to ensure that all state entities, including SOCs and regulators, adequately support the Master Plans.
- A focus on actual or potential core industries rather than niche products.
- Greater capacity for departments to develop transformative, even disruptive, claims for the Master Plans. We need proposals that can decisively address the main constraints on competitiveness and growth in specific value chains, with realistic objectives, targets and alignment across the state, based on strong evidence-based economic analysis and effective, mandated engagements with organised business and labour. In many cases, a key challenge is to manage the rents on inputs, whether feed for livestock and poultry or iron ore for steel. Holding down upstream rents is often not a priority for business, but is critical for sustainable industrialisation.

The Master should be focused on industries that can generate employment on a large scale and/or meet new needs arising out of the pandemic. In line with this approach, the following industries should be prioritised; for several, Master Plans have already been initiated.

1. The auto industry
2. Steel fabrication (centred on bolstering producers downstream from AMSA and Columbus Steel)
3. Food processing, with separate programmes for maize and wheat products and for poultry and red meat (horticulture is a critical subsector but does not need additional support)
4. Appliances and white goods
5. Low-income personal transport – that is, light motorbikes, bicycles and tuktuks
6. Digital e-commerce and services (including software exports)
7. Clothing and textiles
8. Capital goods for infrastructure and mining
9. Furniture

10. Hospitality and recreational services, which are highly labour intensive but will take long to return to their pre-pandemic level even with substantial support.

For disruptive change to be sustained and affordable, the state requires far stronger risk-management systems. Crucial elements are stronger monitoring of implementation, with capacity to deal with blockages, and where necessary to modify policies that prove undesirable or ineffective. It is counterproductive to refuse to accept any disruptive measures because their consequences cannot be foreseen in advance. Instead, plans must be continually reviewed and where necessary modified in light of new information and experiences.

5.2 Managing policy contestation

Uncontrolled contestation between different power groups in itself gets in the way of economic reconstruction. Continual destructive bickering about every initiative can lead to a stalemate. This poses a particularly high risk in South Africa because it is an unusually inequitable but genuine democracy. The majority has the vote, but a small group of companies effectively control much of the economy based on their institutional capacity, ability to attract skills and mobilise financing, and legal protections.

These factors underlie the call for a social pact to manage contestation between stakeholders. The process should ensure that all the parties take a long-term view, recognising that inclusive growth will ultimately benefit all of them. To be effective, a pact would have to promote systemic changes that would bring about visible shifts in workplace relationships, asset ownership, employment, education and training, and the ecosystem for small business in five to ten years. It could not simply involve expressions of good will or cooperation on relatively small projects.

As with any other constructive engagement, success requires analysis of the realities of divergent interests and power. Specifically, pacting only works where:

- The parties broadly agree on the desired end state,
- They are clear about what exactly they want from each other – that is, what changes in behaviour they want to achieve,
- They know what they can compromise on, and
- They know what power each party can exercise, so that they can decide when to make concessions and when to hold firm.

From this standpoint, current proposals for pacting essentially incorporate the following trade-offs.

1. Established business would commit to higher investment especially in new, job-creating activities and efforts to promote more equitable workplaces and pay. In return, government would commitment to legal and regulatory certainty; toned down rhetoric about big business; improved management of SOCs and in particular to fix electricity challenge; a more effective industrial policy to support diversification; and greater

access to foreign skills. In that context, business would agree to support measures to improve equality in education and other government services; the Master Plans; and more progressive, less conflictual workplace relations.

2. All the parties would commit to promoting constructive engagement and win-win outcomes in the workplace and municipal disputes. The government would support the process through large-scale state support for employment creation, workplace transformation and improvements in social programmes and municipal infrastructure especially in low-income communities.
3. Business and labour would agree that social security funds could be tapped, responsibly, to address social and economic needs, in particular to deal with Eskom, promote small business, provide industrial financing, upgrade basic education in poor communities, and increase incomes for the working poor. They may also be needed to deal with the likely coronavirus outbreak.
4. The state could contribute the following.
 - a. A commitment to make explicit its vision for the end-state of reconstruction, defined amongst others by a broad view on the lead industries, the distribution of assets and income across households, the nature of education, and the regional allocation of production.
 - b. Immediate measures to deliver tangible, large-scale progress in working class communities, and to improve conditions for established business to promote growth and job creation.
 - c. Stepped up technical competence, risk management and consistency in developing and implementing economic policies and providing infrastructure and education, starting with improved capacity for economic analysis in the Presidency as well as a commitment to set and stick to unambiguous priorities.

Addressing the legacy of colonialism, apartheid and post-1994 violence through social cohesion, nation-building and gender equality:

2020 the Year of Unity, Socio-Economic Renewal & Nation-building

1. INTRODUCTION

Social cohesion has been proposed as the antidote to the trauma which grips our society. Not social cohesion which papers over the various fault lines but that which forthrightly addresses poverty, unemployment, indebtedness, racism, sexism and inequality. At its essence social cohesion requires restoration of trust between state and citizenry. It will need to be facilitated through social dialogue and a social compact encompassing all those who live in South Africa.

Multi-generation trauma is an affliction which runs through the body politic of South Africa, largely as a result of apartheid and colonialism, but compounded by persistent poverty and a lack of accountability in the present. There are underlying conflicts South Africans do not speak of, so as not to upset the democratic transition and as the fragility of the transition becomes more apparent, so too does the likelihood of its disruption. As Ramphela pointed out: *'What is overwhelming and unnameable is passed on to those we are closest to. ... This is how traumatic events can be passed on to the next generations.'* This "intergenerational" trauma manifests itself in the different forms of violence— racial attacks, violent crime,

gang wars, gender-based, vandalizing of public property, cyber bullying and hate speech. Those who are most vulnerable to such violence are women, farmworkers, infants, children and the elderly, LGBTQI+ communities, and migrants. The violence is not only physical – it takes the form of verbal attacks, racial tensions, breakdown of family structures, and outbreaks of chauvinism. It also takes the form of political assassinations, corruption and the looting of both the state and private sector coffers at all levels. This ultimately leads to a sense of hopelessness, depression and ennui.

Such manifestations were prevalent even before the Covid-19 virus attacked the very foundations of humanity – an assault which our country could not resist. While there is great uncertainty in how the world's community of nations will emerge, there is no doubt that it represents a cataclysmic moment. With large sections of the world population infected, rising mortality rates, and economies devastated, we will see our very social fabric having to be rethreaded. The tapestry which emerges could see the assertion of global solidarity and the glorification of our humaneness or it could see the continuation of pre-Covid-19 parochialism, rising narrow nationalism, inhumane levels of exploitation and inequality.

In the midst of the pandemic we have the resuscitation of the re-invigorated Black Lives Matter (BLM) which has become a global phenomenon. Unlike earlier incarnations, the current BLM has been joined by an array of causes as well as by a range of forces and peoples. It has put systemic racism in many parts of the world under the spotlight, as well as exposed countries like the US to the brutality of their police force. Not unexpectedly, right wing forces and racists have come to condemn and forcibly oppose its various manifestations. These developments have emphasized how the world still remains divided along the 'colour line'. The Covid-19 pandemic has served to magnify the socio-economic dimensions of racial behaviour – the discovery of the initial cases outside of Asia sparked a wave of irrational violent Sinophobia.

This paper will look at social cohesion and related terms such as social covenant, social compact and social dialogue as an antidote to the socio-political and economic challenges our country faces and which humanity will have to grapple with. Next the national question and how this relates to issues of national identity and the state will be addressed. In this context issues of sovereignty, citizenship, national identity, nationalism and the impact of race, ethnicity, language, history, civil society, the state and constitutions will be examined. The gender question will be viewed through the lens of the emergence of patriarchal societies and the impact this has on the position of women, as well as LGBTQI+ communities. It will entail examining gender along two tracks:

- The suppression, exploitation and disempowering of women, the struggle for women's liberation, and the strategies available for the liberation of women, and
- The discrimination faced by those who do not conform to the binary gender identities imposed by our cis-heteropatriarchal society.

A major part of the paper is devoted to understanding why the national question remains unresolved and the leading role the ANC can play in creating a prosperous, non-racial, democratic, non-sexist, healed society, at peace with itself and where gender differences are the basis for celebrating diversity and not imposing discrimination.

2. GLOBAL CONTEXT

Globally, pre-Covid 19 democracy was in retreat as was living standards with tensions increasing almost daily between nations and within nations. Currently there are low levels of trust in public institutions and representatives. It is also argued that we are living in a post-democratic era where societies call themselves democratic where people feel powerless to keep their representatives accountable, once the act of voting is over.

Dani Rodrik talks of an exponential increase in inequality of the populace who have entered a process of pauperization and precarization. This 'precarity' is due to increased use of technology in short-term contracts resulting in non-standard employment that is poorly paid, unprotected, and in its inability to support households, leads to increasingly precarious living conditions for workers. Referred to as the gig economy it is drawing in more and more women into increasingly exploitative work relations. Another feature of the global context is the rise of far-right populism and "nativism", which is an ideology stating that *"states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation), and that non-native people and ideas are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state"* (Cas Mudde).

From a continental perspective, Africa's star seems to have been ascendant with the "Africa Rising" narrative gaining mo-

mentum a few years ago. This period coincided with high economic growth rates, improved democratic governance, etc. One of the key factors was the global commodities boom. The economic slowdown in China appears to have had a negative effect on the growth rates of African countries, which may be exacerbated by the effects of the coronavirus. In global affairs, the voice of Africa has become almost non-existent compared to the previous decade. Africa does not seem to feature in the worldview, projections or configurations of the West anymore; at best in a marginal sense. South Africa's chairing of the AU for 2020 offers opportunities to advance the cause of Africa and build upon earlier efforts.

One of the global phenomena which we need to note for the South African context is the impact of evangelical Pentecostalism. Perry Anderson, writing of the ambiguous nebula of new religion, pointed out that 'more than a fifth of the population of Brazil are now converts to one variety or another of evangelical Protestantism. In the pattern of the Unification Church of the Reverend Moon, many – certainly the largest – of these are business rackets milking the faithful for money to erect financial empires for their founders'. In such situations the link between politics and pulpit is uncomfortably close.

The onset of Covid-19 pandemic has in the short-term exacerbated many hardships and caused immeasurable distress as illustrated by the large-scale unemployment and related socio-economic and psychological devastation. The world as we know it will change on the social and health fronts and the world of work. Working from home will remain where possible and the use of technology and telecommuting will be speeded up. This will become the "new normal" of working and socializing. This will in all likelihood further solidify the distance between the privileged and the

excluded. The various measures undertaken within countries has, in the developed world, been accompanied by closed borders and further anti-foreigner sentiments. Global trade is being severely impacted, having implications for our exports.

Globalisation will be further curtailed and substituted with a deepening emphasis on national production mechanisms and less reliance on global value chains. Most countries have responded with unprecedented stimulus packages to support workers and ameliorate the deprivations suffered by the general populace.

3. SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

South Africa is currently facing compounded crises. Our general malaise has been aggravated by the onset of the devastating Covid-19 pandemic. People are facing increasing immiseration as illustrated by official unemployment, poverty, indebtedness and inequality figures – with rural based, young, African females being most affected. The South African socio-economic reality stands in sharp distinction to the lofty proclamation in the preamble in the Constitution, to "*heal the divisions of the past and, establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights*".

Key features of the South African situation, pre Covid-19 but some of which have become worse, include:

- **Population patterns:** According to Stats-SA, in 2019 our country's population was 58.7m people, made up of 47.45m Africans ((80.7%), 5.176m coloured (8.8%), 4.65m whites (7.9%), and 1,5m (2.6 %) Indians.
- **Migration to SA:** South Africa is an attractive destination for migrants seeking better economic opportunities. According to the UN's Department of Economic

and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 2019 data on international migrants, South Africa's share (7.2% of total population) far exceeds the global rates (3.5%) and Sub-Saharan Africa rates (2.2%).

- **Persistence of racial inequalities:** Today, after 26 years of democratic rule, a two-tiered population has emerged in terms of income growth, level of poverty and education qualifications with Indians tracking whites in an upward trend, while coloureds track black Africans in downward trends. In addition to having worse employment outcomes, black Africans also earn the lowest wages when they are employed. The mean real income of whites is more than three times as high as amongst black Africans.
- **Gender Inequality:** We see a similar pattern in terms of differences between males and females as was observed for population groups. Female workers earn approximately 30% less on average than males. 11.4% of men and 12.85% of women borrow from financial institutions. Women borrow more from friends and family (74%) than men (67%) and store credit (21% women and 18% men). In addition, 51% of women borrowed money for food.
- **Poverty:** In 2015 more than half our population lived in a situation where they could barely afford the minimum living standards - 41.7% of females and 38.2% of men lived below the poverty line in 2015, a persistent trend since 1994. More than a quarter of our population had to survive days without food. In general, black-African females, women in rural areas, and those with no education are the main victims in the ongoing struggle against poverty. Poverty after decreasing since 1994, has increased since 2011.
- **Unemployment:** The 38.6m people of working age (15 to 64) are as follows: 16.4m are employed; 6.7m (29.1%) are unemployed; 2.8m are discouraged work seekers while 12.7m are not economically active at all. Women are more

likely than men to be unemployed due to lack of education and skills.

- **Indebtedness:** 10 million people in South Africa have bad debt — meaning they have missed three or more monthly repayments. On average those in bad debt spend 63% of their after-tax income on repayments. For some income levels, the debt to income ratio is as high as 135% (those earning more than R20,000 a month).
- **Youth dynamics:** Millennial women in 2018 had outpaced men in secondary school completion and in achievement of tertiary qualifications. The ratio of female to male tertiary enrolment is 58% of women and 42% men in 2018. This is a positive development which we must ensure leads to the continued empowerment of women. However, the racial gap in tertiary educational attainment had increased between black Africans and whites (from 28,4% in 2002 to 35,7% in 2018).
- **Govt delivery:** The number of social grant beneficiaries is expected to reach 18m this year – and that before the onset of Covid-19. In housing we have constructed 3.5m houses but not adequately addressed the apartheid legacy spatial inequalities. Since 1994 we have achieved near universal access to schools at entry level, but schools built in the townships do not have all the facilities as found in the suburbs. The health system is largely bemoaned in the public narrative and the media and concerns around the National Health Insurance (NHI) has not adequately been addressed; with many of our health personnel going to work overseas. How this will be impacted by Covid-19 in the medium to long term needs to be factored into our strategy for social cohesion.

Amongst the aspects which we can see worsening as a result of Covid 19 is that of multi-generational trauma.

4. The impact of Covid-19 on social cohesion

Covid-19 pandemic is unprecedented in our recent history, surpassing the impact of the 2003 SARS virus or the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Comparisons have been made with the current situation and the Great Depression of the 1930s, which took the US almost five years to recover from. The SA economy went into recession in 2008/09 for the first time in 19 years. Nearly a million jobs were lost in 2009 alone and the unemployment rate has continued to remain high since then with 29% in 2019. SA reached junk status in 2020, meaning that we face a triple challenge: dealing with Covid-19, reviving our economy in the context of a global slowdown.

Various scenarios indicate that the impacts of Covid-19 is going to be deeper and wider. Business for South Africa (B4SA) for example pointed out that there are three possible scenarios:

- **Mild:** a one-month full lockdown with a nine-month gradual improvement in the economy,
- **Medium:** a three-month full lockdown with a seven-month gradual improvement in the economy, and
- **Severe:** a three-month full lockdown with a seven-month gradual improvement in the economy, with the exception of the business confidence and supply chain components within the transmission channels that remain suppressed throughout the remainder of the calendar year and beyond.

After factoring in the effect of monetary and fiscal policy responses, for the mild scenario, South Africa could experience a real annual GDP contraction of 8.4%, -13.8% for the medium scenario and -20.4% for the severe scenario. The figure that was projected at the beginning of 2020 was 0.2% positive growth.

From South Africa's baseline unemployment rate of 29.1% in February 2020 unemployment would increase to 33.3% under the mild scenario, 39.6% under the medium scenario and 47.6% under the severe scenario. The various policy interventions government was rolling out was expected to have a limited impact: scenario unemployment would be reduced to S1 32.8%, S2 38.5% and S3 46.2%.

Covid-19 will deepen the faultlines which were prevalent before the virus hit our shores. For example, SA's densely populated, overcrowded and poor communities face the greatest vulnerability. Social distancing (SD) measures, while necessary, are difficult if not impossible to enforce in townships given the spatial realities. SD is also equivalent to isolation when people are forced to stay indoors during the lockdown. However, human beings are social beings and have a primordial need to socialise and be in public spaces.

Projections indicate that most of the workers who will lose their jobs in this period will be women (women are the majority in the service, hospitality and care industries), so the gender aspect will have to be addressed ever more urgently. In the words of Prof Jayati Ghosh: *"Women workers are more likely to lose jobs and experience major pay cuts, more likely to be rationed out of labour markets when jobs do become available, more likely to suffer during lockdowns because of enhanced possibilities of domestic abuse, and more likely to suffer from inadequate nutrition in a time of household food shortages."*

While global figures show that since Covid-19 lockdowns have been implemented, there has been a marked increase in GBV and domestic violence cases, South Africa seems to be bucking the trend. Chandre Gould, Senior Research Fellow at ISS has speculated the possible reasons for this including the impact of the ban on alcohol or simply because people may not be

able to make the calls they can to report abuse because of being under the eye of their abuser. She argues there *'is the possibility that lockdown and the crisis caused by the coronavirus has changed abusive patterns, for the better, and there has actually been a decrease. As unlikely as this scenario is, researchers and activists would make a mistake not to consider all possible options'*. To understand this, it will be useful to unpack the latest statistics on contact crimes such as murder, rape, attempted murder, and assault which have all decreased compared to April 2019. Gender activists have pointed out that it is extremely difficult for women to make a phone call during the lockdown period, being in close proximity (24/7) to a perpetrator. Contact crimes are mostly gendered and the granular detail of the proportion of women affected by the reduced number of reported crimes could shed light. Africa Check reported that in 2019, a total of 87,000 complaints were received, while during the first week of the lockdown alone, 2,300 complaints were received and after three weeks, 120,000 victims used the national helpline.

There is as yet no clear indication of what the mortality rates would look like. Much is going to depend on the specific health profile of South Africans, with its burden of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. According to the Dept of Health's modelling, South Africa's COVID-19 deaths, currently among the lowest in the world, could reach, according to pessimistic projections, 48,000 by November and the country could run out of ICU beds as early as June. But its optimistic scenario is not much better, with a projection of 40,000 deaths by November, with the ICU bed capacity, which stands at a mere 3 300, exhausted in July.

5. SOCIAL COHESION

The Indlulamithi Scenario Project was launched in 2017 and is an independent, multi-stakeholder project, which aimed to spark a national conversation on *"what would a socially cohesive South Africa look like, and to what degree is it attainable by 2030"*. According to this initiative, social cohesion refers to the levels of integration and inclusion in communities and in society at large. It reflects various measures of participation or non-involvement in social organisations or institutions. It is shaped by disparities in income and wealth as well as by levels of interpersonal and intergroup trust. Crime rates and frequencies of violence, as well as the overall wellbeing and the general health of populations are often mirrored in measures of social cohesion. It is often encapsulated via expressions of common values and expressed in senses of nationhood and of shared ethics and ideals. The project identified institutional capacity and leadership; resistance, resentment and reconciliation (RRR), and social inequality as the three key drivers impacting on social cohesion in South Africa.

According to the IJR's SA Reconciliation Barometer, the legacies of apartheid continue to have an economic and psychological impact on South Africans and in the absence of memory, a society is likely to repeat its costly failures. South Africans also do not have enough of a shared understanding of their history, and the country is replete with 'silent non-agreements' underlying conflicts that are not spoken of, so as not to 'upset' the democratic transition. Some have argued that South Africa emphasized truth at the expense of justice. The challenge of reconciliation (or lack thereof) has increasingly become more pronounced lately. It is in this context that the social cohesion agenda is said to have failed and this is evident in the growing mistrust and anger among young South Africans in particular. Trust is often regarded as an important indicator of the 'glue' that binds a society together, acting as

the foundation for relationships needed to overcome tensions and create an environment favourable to sustainable ties within a society. Trust also functions as the basis for contractual agreement and cooperation in a society.

During the period leading up to 2030, race will most likely continue to carry the greatest weight in defining disadvantage. However, resentment and resistance around issues of class, gender and age may increasingly gain greater prominence. Land reform in particular, has taken long and will remain unresolved for some time to come. Negotiations around land will be among the urgent issues that need to be attended to in the period leading up to the next two elections.

The results of both the IJR index and the Indlulamithi Barometer confirm that South Africa is very far from attaining social cohesion, with the most significant driver of this being inequality. Although the country has removed most apartheid legislation and a social wage created as an anti-poverty security net, inequality remains deeply rooted and unresolved. This can be detrimental in the democratic era and research by the World Bank suggests that inequality can exacerbate crime, violence and political unrest, thus fuelling other threats to social cohesion.

There is no doubt that SA's laudable response to Covid-19 has seen many positive elements:

- Government has placed the South African people at the centre of its concern, reflecting a return to our *ubuntu*-based core values. As President Ramaphosa said: 'While the nationwide lockdown is having a devastating effect on our economy, it is nothing compared to the catastrophic human, social and economic cost if the coronavirus could spread among our people unchecked.'
- Mobilisation of the country around a common enemy. We have seen rare

moments of cross-party support for the ANC-led government, and in particular for the President and Cabinet. Every part of society has not just been impacted but also been expected to respond. And this can be seen in the very many large and tiny initiatives to help the vulnerable in society – food for the hungry, assistance for the infirm.

- There has been an unprecedented mobilisation of civil servants and public resources. This has helped reduce the rates of crime – though sadly GBV continues unabated – and even from behind closed doors and gated entrances. The coronavirus pandemic equally presents us with an opportunity to effect systemic changes that could protect women in future.

However, there have been several negative developments as well. These include the conduct of the security forces, especially the army, in enforcing aspects of the lockdown. This may be due to the army not used to playing a civilian facing role. As the lockdown continues it is inevitable that there will be differences between government and key role players in business, labour and sections of civil society over the question of the relaxation of the restrictions. It was always going to be difficult to sustain a severe lockdown in South Africa, given our geo-spatial realities, characterised by relatively high population densities. The president and cabinet will have to continue to emphasise the need for a collaborative effort, around the slogan of 'saving lives and saving livelihoods' so as to avoid the political and social fallout after the pandemic.

The historian John M. Barry in his book about the 1918 pandemic **The Great Influenza** (2005) advises that the main lesson from that catastrophe is that "those in authority must retain the public's trust and the way to do it is to distort nothing, to put the best face on nothing, to try to manipulate no one."

6. CONCEPT OF A NATION-STATE IN 21ST CENTURY

Ernest Gellner, (modernist school), saw nationalism playing two roles: meeting the needs of industrial society by ensuring cultural homogeneity, leading to the second role of creating large units of society which can be serviced by standardized services such as education. Anthony D Smith and John Hutchinson (ethno-symbolist school) emphasize the ethnic root of nations. They argue that nations were a community of common descent, often relying on traditions and customs in its constitution. John Breuilly suggests that it was 'political entrepreneurs' and the political interests they represented which led to the creation of national entities. The postmodernist school, such as Homi Bhabha, prefers seeing nation as formed and transformed continuously.

6.1 National question

The origins of the National Question go back to the struggles for national liberation and the formation of nations in Europe. It was taken up again in the early 1900s this time in debates amongst nascent national liberation movements and parties of the left. The debate resulted, in 1929, in South African communists taking up the slogan of an independent native South African Republic which Moses Kotane explained '*in essence means a bourgeois republic ... must necessarily pre-suppose a democratic workers' and peasants' republic ...*'. This was the first expression of a two-stage national democratic revolution (NDR)– the first stage bringing universal democracy, the second giving rise to the advance to power of workers and peasants.

Colonialism actively sought to deny the colonies their sovereignty, which was understood to be a distinctly European institution. As far as our continent is concerned, Pan Africanism was the response. An example of early pan-African mobilization is

that of Henry Sylvester Williams who was responsible for the first pan-African conference in London in 1900. W.E.B Du Bois declared at the conference: 'The problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the colour line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea'. Marcus Garvey on the other hand saw the problem in cultural, economic and psychological terms. Booker T. Washington's ideology of entrepreneurship was taken up with gusto by John Langalibalele Dube, first president of the ANC, in his philosophy of self-sufficiency. The Bandung Conference of April 1955 represented the apogee of anti-colonialism. These leaders led the demand for 'political and intellectual decolonization' that emphasized modernization. Its ideology was rooted on the nation-state which was going to uplift its people through education and ambitious development projects.

6.2 State, sovereignty and citizenship

In looking at state sovereignty two key principles need to be borne in mind: the idea of sovereignty is that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere. In many parts of the postcolonial world there are two aspects to contemporary politics: contest over the sovereignty of the state, often taking the form of insurgent movements; and claims on governmental authorities over services and benefits, impacting on the very nature of the state.

Nationalism is distinguished from other identities because it locates the source of individual identity within a 'people' which is the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity'. In SA, as elsewhere, we must acknowledge that some prior forms of political authority persisted alongside new emergent locations of sovereignty. As far as the African context is concerned, writers

such as Mahmood Mamdani have shown that the postcolonial state must contend with its dual heritages of precolonial state formation as well as that created through the colonial legacy. Achille Mbembe argued in a similar vein that 'African regimes have not invented what they know of government from scratch, their knowledge is the product of several cultures, heritages and traditions of which the features have become entangled over time'.

6.3 National identity

In dealing with its apartheid legacies there is a national identity emerging in South Africa which has been crafted by leaders of the ruling nationalist movement or to use Breuilly's term "entrepreneurs", drawing on elements of precolonial history, colonial and apartheid period resistance, the constitution-mindedness of the modern state as well as South Africa's culture and social life. This prevailing identity is spawning its own subalterns creating autonomous domains along linguistic/regional lines. Traditional leadership arena is one such example. The subaltern approach inserts the overlooked classes such as the unemployed, the youth, as well as rural dwellers.

As far as race and ethnicity is concerned Ake is amongst those who argued that in Africa "*No project of social transformation can succeed by ignoring it (ethnicity)*". The devastating effect of race was captured well in Fanon's opening line of *Black Skin, White Masks* '*I will say that the black man is not a man*'. This was due to the crushing impact of colonialism, which had destroyed the self-worth of black people.

The relationship between culture and national liberation has been discussed over the past century. Amilcar Cabral, in a 1970 speech celebrating the life of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, leader the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) assassinated by Portuguese agents on February 3, 1969, said:

'we may consider the national liberation movement as the organized political expression of the culture of the people who are undertaking the struggle. For this reason, those who lead the movement must have a clear idea of the value of the culture in the framework of the struggle and must have a thorough knowledge of the people's culture, whatever may be their level of economic development'.

6.4 Nationalism

Nationalism is a process binding sovereignty and national identity. Working within colonial defined boundaries, which contained ethnic/tribal entities which had often been hostile to each other, nationalist leaders and their ideologies had to act as crafters of a new identity. In South Africa's case the entire idea of a country is a product of colonialism, without real indigenous foundations. It has been up to the liberation movement to wield all the people living in this country into a single entity, called the South African nation. India had a similar experience as captured in Khilnani's suggestion that '*The possibility that India could be united into a single political community was the wager of India's modern, educated, urban elite...It was a wager of an idea: the idea of India*'. India is the world's largest democracy with the liberal-secular Indian National Congress (INC) – the leader of the liberation struggle – remaining dominant for decades post-independence. INC was replaced by an era of coalition governments, and the dominance at the polls in 2014 of a new formation of virulent Hindu nationalism, under president Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

India's experience embodies perfectly concerns of Frantz Fanon when he acknowledged that nationalism did provide a vehicle for social unity but raised the dangers of a post-liberation scenario when he wrote: '*From nationalism we have moved to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism*'. He argued that national-

ism had to be enriched by 'a consciousness of social and political needs' lest it be reduced to 'sterile formalism'.

7 EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

7.1 Native question versus national question

The history of South Africa to 2020 can be considered as the history of two key nationalist narratives, i.e. the 'Native Question' and the National Question. The former referred to the framework which the colonizers used to develop responses to the question of how to manage and subjugate the numerically overwhelming indigenous population. The latter referred to how the response of the colonized was to be articulated in what evolved to be a search for national unity and liberation.

Until the end of the 19th century opposition to colonialism took the form of wars of resistance led by the various 'tribal' groupings. The longest lasting of these were the 'frontier wars' of the eastern Cape and those in Natal. From the 1850s onwards the efforts of Christian missionary education saw the emergence of the amakholwa. With the excursions many of the educated elite made to the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), it was inevitable that they linked up with the nascent Pan-Africanist movement, as well as the African Methodist Episcopal Church. The Africanist perspective thus garnered, combined with the internationalism experienced, and permeated with Christian values, was to be the birthmarks of the ANC – which remain written in the DNA of the ANC to this day.

Until 1910 the endeavours of several colo-

nizing groups had led to the creation of four republics in the southernmost tip of Africa. The South Africa Act consolidated them into one political entity in 1910 called the Union of South Africa, with four provinces. The 'Native Question' came to be formally addressed as part of the process leading up to the Union through the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC). One of the results of this was the eventual replacement of the Christian missionaries as interlocutors with the indigenous population by an emerging state apparatus, especially the Native Affairs Department.

The period from Union in 1910 to the 1948 elections saw the increasing bureaucratization of the management of the African majority accompanied by violent forms of suppression. The movement of the 'natives' to meet the needs of mining capital and then the manufacturing sector was the avowed aim of this system of administration. It was legislated through the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which legislated denial of the indigenous people's access to almost 87% of the land, as well as the legislation passed in 1923 and 1937, aimed at urban segregation and control of urban/rural movement. The Native Affairs Department became a state within a state meant to control all aspects of 'native' life.

The initial decades of the ANC's existence saw the organization struggling at many levels: internally working out how best the provincial formations it was based upon could be aligned, externally how it should articulate with the new political realities where the African elite found itself even further marginalized economically and politically as well as the emergence of new classes within the African community. Under John Langalibalele Dube, the ANC's first president, a moderate line in keeping with the political traditions established in late 1800s, was followed. Outside of the ANC there were moves afoot to achieve greater 'non-European' unity, but a nar-

row Africanism prevailing within the ANC ended the ANC's involvement in such initiatives. The unity of all South Africans and the creation of a democratic society dominated African nationalism's approach to the national question. The roots of the democratic constitution can be traced to the first few decades of the previous century when the founding fathers of the ANC sought to create a society free of tribalism and racism. It can also be seen in the assertion that South Africa could be an independent, predominantly black, republic.

These various changes saw a radical ANC Youth League under Anton Lembede emerge. Armed with a programme, **African Claims**, it pushed for a drastic change in the kinds of actions the ANC engaged in. Its efforts began bearing fruit in the form of various mass actions by the time the National Party (NP) took power in 1948. This was also the period in which South Africa came to be increasingly characterized as a 'colony of a special type', which Nyawuza explained as 'the situation where the colonizer and the colonized reside "side by side" in the same territory, which has been the case since 1910 when Britain granted political power to the whites in South Africa who used it to further oppress the black majority'.

With the electoral victory of the NP in 1948, apartheid became the official foundation of state policy, resulting in the deepening of the segregationist policies of previous governments. It saw the NP foster Afrikaner capital in various parts of the economy and promoting the use of Afrikaans in all aspects of society. With increasing radicalization of black (African, Indian and coloured politics) it soon realized that it had to draw the English-speaking whites into its fold.

The ANC, working closely with several anti-apartheid organizations, led what came to be known as the Congress Alliance and

engaged in increasingly militant opposition to apartheid. The alliance was consolidated in 1955 when the **Freedom Charter** was adopted as its Programme of Action. The Pan Africanist Congress was created as a breakaway from the ANC with members protesting the increasing non-racialism of the Congress Alliance. This was the result of increasingly heightened debate about the form of Africanism the ANC was espousing, a debate which had sharpened with the question of 'non-European' unity. The PAC members were also taking exception to the influence of the CPSA over the ANC.

The clampdown of the early 1960s, in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre, resulted in resistance going underground and the adoption of the armed struggle. Open, anti-apartheid political activity started re-emerging amongst intellectuals and students in the mid-1960s, especially under the banner of the Black People's Convention and the South African Student Organization – both espousing an ideology of Black Consciousness. The ANC's non-racial policies came to the forefront again in the eighties, finding its organizational manifestation in the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was created in 1983.

The critical issue to deal with here is the way the ANC has managed potential tension between its non-racial position, and its commitment to African leadership. The former has been the core policy position of the ANC, especially since the 1950s. In 1957 Chief Albert Luthuli, as ANC president, and in the midst of debates with the Africanists, argued that 'the ANC believes in a society in which white and non-white peoples of the Union will work and live together in harmony for the common good of the fatherland' (1977:101).

Non-racialism became a core principle of the ANC reiterated by the ANC at every turn. The ANC's Morogoro conference held in Tanzania in 1969 was significant in

that it admitted non-Africans to join the organization as individuals. Non-Africans were admitted to the National Executive Council (NEC) at its Kabwe, Zambia conference in 1985. This approach was evident in the ANC's Constitutional Guidelines, a set of pre-negotiations proposals drawn up in 1989 by the ANC, where it declared "*It shall be state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity...the state shall recognize the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people*".

The ANC had a clear understanding of the role of culture, as reflected by President OR Tambo when he said: "*let the arts be one of the many means by which we cultivate the spirit of revolt among the broad masses, enhance the striking power of our movement and inspire the millions of our people to fight for the South Africa we envisage.*" Cultural events, performances and productions were part and parcel of the exile experience as well as part of peaceful mobilization inside the country. However, the post 1994 experience has not maintained that fine history.

7.2 The Unresolved National Question in Post-apartheid South Africa

The period 1990 to 2004 represents the phase in our history when South Africa as a recently created postcolonial, democratic nation-state was consolidated. The period could be divided into two phases: the first began in 1990 when the ANC alongside other political organizations was unbanned and Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners were released, until the formal adoption of the new South African Constitution in May 1996. This was the period of the 'rainbow nation' – an attempt to project an inclusiveness towards all South Africans.

The second phase is from 1999 to 2004 - it is marked by an attempt to focus on the economic position of the majority of the

South African population, the African people, who had seen limited improvements in their lives since the first democratic elections in 1994. In 1998, Thabo Mbeki pointed out that through the period of colonial domination and apartheid *South Africans had been carved into two nations: the one black, the other white... [the latter] is relatively prosperous and has ready access to a developed infrastructure, and larger, nation of South Africa is black and poor, living under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped infrastructure*'.

The third phase has been that of the past decade which has been marked by a drop in economic growth and the increasing level of poverty, unemployment, indebtedness and inequality mentioned above. This is the phase we find ourselves in today.

The 1997 ANC Conference was a watershed with reference to the national question, since it was the first after the ANC had ascended to power in 1994. In a 1997 ANC discussion document, Pallo Jordan wrote that '*the ANC has always maintained that democracy, national liberation and non-racialism are inseparable. Jordan argued that 'the electoral behaviour of Coloured and Indian working-class people is less likely to change until visible delivery on the part of the democratic government demonstrates that there could be sufficient resources for all the disadvantaged*'.

As far as race is concerned, there has been much commentary on the stubbornness of racism. While South Africa's identification system is based on people self-declaring their race, this practice will still be required for a while to come to measure the extent to which the different apartheid defined races have fared under democracy. Bass et. al. conclude that '*non-racialism is improbable unless inequality is addressed*'.

Cabral's observation on different cultures needs to be recalled: '*It is true that the*

multiplicity of social and ethnic groups complicates the effort to determine the role of culture in the liberation movement. But it is vital not to lose sight of the decisive importance of the class character of the culture in the development of the liberation struggle, even when class structure is or appears to be in embryonic stages of development'.

In discussions around reconciliation, the successes or limitation of the TRC are brought into sharp focus. Its goal was to work within the provisos of the Constitution, adopted in May 1996, to help achieve national unity, proclaiming national reconciliation to be its essential prerequisite. The relevant Constitutional provision states that there shall be understanding instead of vengeance, reparation instead of retaliation, ubuntu instead of victimization. Ultimately, one of the largest achievements of the TRC was the capturing of a major part of South Africa's history. The ANC has to acknowledge that the TRC, far from completing a process, in fact is only the start of a process yet to be accomplished. For that to happen there needs to be agency. This has not been particularly forthcoming especially from the side of the state.

In the democratic era, the ANC has had to be even more sensitive to linguistic and ethnic issues.

For example, the redrawing of provincial demarcations saw the strengthening and emergence of 'ethnic entrepreneurs', often with violent consequences. The opposition by residents of Bushbuckridge being incorporated into Limpopo is an early example of this while the more recent example is that of violence around the incorporation of Vuwani into the Malamulela municipality. Ratshitanga pointed out that notwithstanding the fact that Vuwani and Malamulela were kept apart by apartheid design, to date there had been no acrimony between the Venda and Tsonga speaking communities (2016).

A further question which needs to be answered is: from where do these multiple identities arise? Jordan argued that under apartheid 'the revival of African ethnicity had little to do with nostalgia for past greatness on the part of the Africans. It was even less the articulation of a 'psychological urge', as the theorists of ethnicity claim. He argues that it was encouraged by the state to justify its policy of segregation and discrimination (1997:10).

Masondo (2015) has pointed out that '(y) earning for ethnic belonging also enables ethnic political entrepreneurs in our ANC-led movement to make demands for representation in public institutions. They start by supporting or joining ethnic based civil society movements. ...translate power accumulated within their ethnicised civil society environment into a political society and demand ethnic representation in the name of an ethnic balancing act and addressing the 'national question'. Consequently, nation building simply gets reduced to an ethnic numerical equation'.

To what extent can a South African culture emerge, transcending the divisive effects of narrow ethnic and racial chauvinism? This is critical to the process of crafting a national identity. The Fees Must Fall and Rhodes Must Fall Movements had as their targets symbols which reflect the cultural vernacular of the colonisers and the oppressors – a focus repeated by the Black Lives Matter movements.

7.3 The state in third decade of democracy

By 2000 the ANC had adopted the concept of the developmental state to frame its approach to governance. Mkandawire (1997:36) explained that the state must have some social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory manner and enables it to gain the authority of key social interests in the coun-

try. The political purposes and institutional structures of developmental states are developmentally driven, while their developmental objectives are politically-driven. Political factors have always shaped the thrust and pace of the development strategies through the structures of the state. These factors have normally included nationalism, regional competition or external threat, ideology and a wish to 'catch up' with the West (Mkandawire 1997:38).

It is clear that in 21st century South Africa there have been developments which could be seen as challenging its sovereignty. The prevalence of corruption in the various echelons of power, especially as it has been leading to 'state capture', has been cited as an example of challenges to sovereignty of the state. Further challenges to sovereignty has been the process the ANC-led government has been undertaking to grant additional power to traditional authorities, because of the control traditional leaders will continue having over access to land and work, and the loss of rights women and children will suffer. This has been quite correctly seen as part of the ANC's maneuvers to lock in the rural vote.

The ever increasing number of social protests, and the increasing turn to violence, can be seen either as the existence of a robust civil society, the strengthening of 'political society' or the erosion of the authority of the state. Chatterjee's notion of political society has been useful in appreciating a domain of politics which is occupied by the subaltern and which challenges the state to meet its demands for amelioration. While some of these activities may be initiated by disaffected members of the parliamentary parties, in many cases attempts by these parties to connect with this domain have been rebuffed. Undoubtedly this sentiment is borne out of a deep disappointment at the lack of service delivery in the context of increasingly dire economic

circumstances and suspicion of the interests represented by formal politics.

8. SOCIAL COHESION AND WOMEN'S STRUGGLES

When the ANC was formed, it did not accept women as members. In 1918, when the Union government threatened to re-introduce pass laws for women, the Bantu Women's League (BWL) was formed, as a branch of the ANC. The League was mostly involved in passive resistance while continuing to campaign against passes for black women under the leadership of Charlotte Maxeke. The ANC only accepted women as members at its 1943 conference and the ANC Women's League was subsequently formed in 1948. The first official president of the League was Ida Mntwana.

Women increasingly became active in the Defiance Campaign of 1952 playing a leading role, through the Women's League, in organising the 1955 Congress of the People, where the Freedom Charter was adopted – giving women an opportunity to lobby for the incorporation of their demands into the charter. On the 9th of August 1956, the women of the League confronted Prime Minister J.G. Strydom, under the auspices of the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) with a petition against pass laws. However, the banning of the ANC in 1960 disrupted the activities of the League as its leaders were forced to go underground and many fled into exile.

The women in exile, under the leadership of Gertrude Shope, organised themselves into the ANC Women's Section which mobilised international solidarity. Soon after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, the ANC Women's League lobbied all the women's organisations to set up a National Wom-

en's Coalition (NWC). The task of this coalition would be to do research, co-ordinate, and draw up a women's charter, based on the priorities and concerns of women, from all walks of life throughout the country. The NWC ensured their inclusion in the process of writing the Constitution. This in turn enabled the institutionalisation of gender within the legislature, with Frene Ginwala appointed as the Speaker of the National Assembly and the passing of a number of laws that sought to attain gender equality in South Africa.

In addition, independent bodies such as the Commission for Gender Equality were established in 1996 and the bureaucracy also became increasingly gendered. By 1997, Cabinet had approved the establishment of the Office on the Status of Women in the Presidency. Local governments were also encouraged to follow a similar path to ensure that gender is mainstreamed across all tiers of government. While the establishment of a Ministry for Women was rejected in 1994, the ministry was eventually established as the Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities (DWCPD) in 2009.

Women currently hold 44% of parliamentary seats compared with 25% in 1994. South Africa has achieved gender parity in enrolment in primary and secondary education. The current statistics in South Africa's private sector paint an even worse picture. About a third of corporates have no female representation in senior leadership roles; 22% of board directors are women, but only 7% are executive directors. Furthermore, only 10% of South African CEOs are women, and if we look solely at companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), this number drops to 2.2%. South Africa is on par with the rest of the African continent, where 29% of senior leadership roles are held by women, and performs better than some developed countries, such as the UK (19%) and Australia (23%). However,

the percentage of CEOs who are women in South Africa (10%) is lower than the global average of 12%.

The South African government has declared gender-based violence (GBV) a national crisis. In 2017, 39,633 rapes and 6,253 sexual assaults were reported in the country – with a low conviction rate of 8.4%. According to the 2016 SA Demographic and Health Survey, 21% of women aged 18 years and older have experienced violence by a partner. In 2015 one in five (21%) women experience physical violence by an intimate partner in 2015. Femicide in South Africa is a crisis; the killing of women because of their gender is five times the global average.

Gender-based violence is rooted in patriarchy that gives rise to gender conditioning and stereotypical attitudes. This results in misogyny and gender-based violence. Women and girls are subjected to high levels of rape, sexual offences, femicide, domestic violence and intimate partner violence. The LGBTQI+ sector is subjected to inhuman and violent crimes as a result of their sexual orientation.

While South Africa may have made strides forward towards gender equality in the public sphere, such as increased representation of women in government and some, albeit limited, progress in corporate leadership, the biggest challenge is the significant gendered power imbalance, especially in the private sphere. A key effect of the violence has been the prevailing culture of silence that has normalized violence, making perpetrators invisible and encouraging short-term responses. A historical National Presidential Summit on Gender Based Violence (GBV) was convened on 2 November 2018 where a Declaration was drawn up.

9. THE PREVALENCE OF VIOLENCE

Morbid symptoms of gender-based violence, violent crime, and xenophobic attacks emerge out of a confluence of socio-economic factors. It is a sign of desperation and despair, leading Karl von Holdt to describe South Africa as a violent democracy. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP), in a 2015 report titled *The Smoke that Calls* argued that increasing levels of inequality lies at the root of community protests. It highlighted that 'Many of those who participate in the violence are unemployed, live in poverty, and see no prospect of a change in these circumstances. There is a half-life, as they are unable to participate as full citizens in the economy and society. Impoverished young men experience this as the undermining of their masculinity' (2015:3).

This must be located within SA's high levels of insecurity, and unequal access to justice for the most vulnerable and marginalized. Homicide rate in South Africa is more than five times higher than the global average of 6.2 per 100,000 people. Crime disproportionately affects the disadvantaged, the poor and marginalized. The underlying causes of violence are often related to the general violent history of the country during the colonial-apartheid era, which normalized the behaviour and this is in addition to high levels of poverty, unemployment, alcohol and drug abuse. A 2020 Institute for Security Studies (ISS) report suggests that for citizens, violent protests are one of the few effective means of political participation.

According to the World Bank (2018), while internal migration reduces poverty, it can increase inequality. This inequality is a result of pressure on the public service network that can also in turn fuels social ten-

sions. Xenophobic attacks in townships are a symptom of this oversubscribed reliance on the public service network. With a continually widening gap between the rich and poor, foreigners including refugees and asylum-seekers become vulnerable to violent attacks. Such attacks can be said to be triggered by the rampant unemployment, challenges with service delivery and unequal access to material resources. Perceived as competing with locals for resources, social services, jobs and for spaces in cities for economic activity, migrants in the urban informal economy are often viewed with suspicion by local South African traders claiming similar space.

The ANC needs to address the issue of migrants at several levels. It must firstly acknowledge the waves of migrants who have become part and parcel of the rich tapestry which makes up South African society. These include those who arrived from Southern Africa as part of migrant workforce who worked on the mines, and settled here. Ramphela suggests that the impact of the migrant labour system as one of the many wounds inflicted by colonialism and apartheid system especially on African society, uprooting families and took men away from their homes and treated them as sub-human boys. This impact 'will not vanish because we ignore it'.

The ANC as the most progressive thought leader in the country must address the question of migration and the violence meted out to migrants. We need to recognize that the South African nation has to date included the waves who arrived from Eastern Europe and played progressive leadership roles in the SACP, ANC and trade union movements. It included those who arrived from India as far back as the 1860s and are now, in many cases, 5th generation South Africans. We have tended to see migration at best as a law and order issue, when in reality we need to see it is an issue that illuminates the hybrid nature of

our society, as informed by our history as a people.

In the Refugees Act of 1994 we have really progressive legislation. However, the government's progressive ideas are seldom reflected by the officials entrusted with implementing them. Officials, particularly in the departments of social development, education, home affairs and the police stand accused of bias, prejudice and unprofessionalism. Refugees also face many challenges in accessing their rights to social protections such as legal documents, social grants and security of stay.

Sikanyiso Masuku in his PhD research recommended: *'The most immediate interventions would be to streamline the workings of its asylum application system and the Refugee Appeal Board. Their technical capacity needs to be improved to cope with the volume of applications.'*

Stakeholders like academics, faith leaders and nongovernmental organisations can also play a part, as recommended by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework' (<https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-is-denying-refugees-their-rights-what-needs-to-change-135692>).

10. ELECTORAL POLITICS, THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND GENDER

The 2019 elections showed certain trends which require urgent attention for future elections. The turnout was 89% of registered voters in 1999, declining to 66% in 2019. National suburban turnout was 74.1% (a decline of 3%), while national black turnout was 62.7% (down by 7%). That's a +11.4% substantial differential turnout in suburban areas, benefiting parties that perform well in the suburbs, primarily the Democratic Alliance (DA).

For this last election, among the youth there was a 40% decline in registration among 18-and 19-year-olds, and 4% for those in their 20s. We need ask to ourselves if social distance between the electorate and the representatives is contributing to decline in participation in elections and leading to the kind of violent protests we see in our country? The 2019 election has also confirmed the following:

- The ANC won the 2019 election with 58% of the national vote, compared to 62% in the 2014. While turnout was down everywhere it was disproportionately down in the black electorate. This influenced the election outcome significantly, especially for the ANC.
- The DA sought to appeal to a wider electorate and thus to shift its strategic positions leftwards. A significant part of the losses the DA suffered arose from the shift among its core support base towards the FF+, which campaigned based on protecting 'minority rights', laced with Afrikaner nationalism.
- In terms of the rural/urban support bases, the 2019 results show the ANC's 'rural base' can no longer protect it from losses in urban areas. Comparisons generated by CSIR show the ANC's urban support dropped from 55 to 51% from 2014 to 2019 and rural support declined from 76 to 71%. DA urban support dropped from 31 to 20%, and its rural support remains stable at 4%; and EFF urban support improved from 7 to 11%, and rural support up from 5 to 10%.
- Women are the most loyal portion of the ANC's support base – 63% support ANC in elections, as opposed to 54% for men, yet are still disempowered and under-represented at all levels.
- The ANC lost support in all provinces with KZN being the highest at 10%.

11. SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND COMPACTING

In the 2020 SONA speech, President Cyril Ramaphosa said that the social compact 'is a covenant rooted in the strategic objective of our National Development Plan, which is to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030'. Admitting that the government cannot solve economic challenges alone he pointed out that compacting has been taking the form of the 'mini-compacts' approach he had articulated on many occasions before. This signalled the placing at front and centre the challenge of achieving social cohesion and developing a social compact. South Africa has a long history of trying to achieve the unity, trust and vision which, as we noted above, is required for social compacting.

This theme was re-emphasised in his address to the nation in the midst of Covid-19 on 21st April 2020, when the President said: "We are resolved not merely to return our economy to where it was before the coronavirus, but to forge a new economy in a new global reality. Our economic strategy going forward will require a new social compact among all role players – business, labour, community and government – to restructure the economy and achieve inclusive growth."

A key debate on the realisation of social compacts concerns NEDLAC: is it a bargaining forum where decisions are taken or is it a forum for consensus building. The ANC needs to take a long hard look at the role and future of NEDLAC. There are many challenges that NEDLAC faces; fossilised in its approach; each constituency pursues frozen mandates; representation has been "juniorised" and the interactions technocratic. The President has set the right example by leading his administration to hold meetings with social partners under the auspices of NEDLAC. However, when Cabinet members depart from such

engagements, it is left again to junior officials to continue the work.

Two important milestones towards compacting have been the 2012 and the 2020 Social Cohesion Summits hosted by the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC). The declaration which emerged from 2012 took as its starting point the well-known principle in the South African Constitution that '**South Africa belongs to all who live in it, both black and white, united in our diversity**'. However, speaking at the 2020 conference Minister Mthethwa noted: "*The privilege attached to race, class, space and gender has not yet been fully reversed*". On the same occasion, Netshitenzhe crystalized the basis for a social compact where he said: "*Four pillars of a social compact are identified, with emphasis on economic issues because of their catalytic effects*". Apart from economic growth, he identified "*a floor for a decent standard of living – in addition to employment, this requires an appropriate social wage (read social grants) to help address multi-dimensional manifestations of poverty and inequality*". The third element was a capable and ethical state and the fourth is ongoing social dialogue.

In 2006, the trade union movement Solidarity set up Afriforum, which campaigns for '*the protection and consolidation of civil rights*' and gives the Afrikaner community '*a voice in a society where minorities are increasingly being ignored*'. It works together with Solidarity's new centre on constitutional rights. Jacob Boersma (2012) argued that 'In a constitutional democracy like South Africa, it might not be surprising that the ANC's opposition phrases its arguments in a discourse of rights... Solidarity's trope of rights functions through a series of three oppositions: the domination of (black) majority rule is posited against (white, Afrikaans) minority rights; the gain of blacks' rights comes at the cost of whites' rights; and racial integration threatens the

right to be Afrikaans' (2012:415).

Faith based organisations have often been looked at as providing a base for social compacting. Religious freedom is enshrined in section 15 of the constitution. South Africa is home to a plethora of Christian denominations which does not have any particularly dominant denomination. This is not surprising given the various missions which impacted on the population here, as well as the emergence of the independent churches. It can be broken down broadly into:

- Mainstream Protestant which is about 32% of the total number of self-professed Christians. It includes the Methodist, Dutch Reformed, Anglican, Lutheran, and Presbyterian churches.
- Pentecostal, second largest at about 26%, which includes the Charismatic churches and the Apostolic Faith Mission.
- The total African independent churches represent about 25% of adherents, with the Zion Christian Church the largest at almost 14%, the Ethiopian and Shembe/Nazareth churches.
- Catholics make up about 9% of the total.

Bompani (2008:666) argues that the African independent churches, although hardly 'new' participants in public debate in South Africa, have much in common with 'new social movements'. André P. Czeglédy of Wits University pointed out how Pentecostal churches reflected the democratisation of 1994 that restored a collective authority as the representative of the population with the restoration of an 'original' Christianity closer to God. Similarly, a truly representative community of representatives framed by universal franchise is paralleled by a community of the faithful unblemished by ceremony, dogma or a mediating theocracy (2008).

12. THE WAY FORWARD

Social cohesion can be a critical element of our attempt at uniting the country, deepening our democracy and making it safer for all who live in it. Such social cohesion has to address the underlying causes contributing to the lack of social cohesion:

- The post-colonial, post-apartheid, post-1994 and post-Covid-19 sense of woundedness which different parts of our nation experience in different ways. This requires the ANC and its government to act as the 'healers in chief' so that we confront the realities of SA with a commitment to making our land a peaceful and prosperous one. For the ANC to play that role it must be united and resolute in leadership. As Abraham Lincoln put it: 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' This becomes ever more urgent as South Africa struggles to emerge from the devastating impact of Covid-19.
- Such a leadership can help develop a national identity by encouraging the cultural diversity of this country, by reigniting the 'RDP of the soul' project and by celebrating the various progressive elements of our heritage.
- Race will continue being a Faultline running deep into the South African psyche. It has to be addressed in a manner which is informed by what the Indlulamithi Scenarios 2030 call the Triple Rs of Reconciliation, Resentment and Resistance.
- It would require us to develop a social compact of business, government, labour, and the unemployed on the basis of commitment to growing the economy, enabling an ethical and capable state, and providing a durable social net. The ANC-led government must consolidate the social compacting we have been seeing in our society's response to Covid-19.
- The addressing of the position of women in SA needs the urgent attention of

the ANC: patriarchal practices within the organisation and within the government it leads, must be dealt with severely. At the societal level, we must initiate a multi-stakeholder dialogue aimed at addressing the root causes of gender-based violence and the disempowerment of women in all spheres of society.

- Social dialogue and conflict resolution require compromise and the conviction to communicate difficult decisions to our constituencies – decisions that may be unpopular in the short-term; but that lead to mutual benefit in the long-term:
 - o intellectuals, the religious community, traditional leaders, workers, youth, women, people with disability, LG-BTQ+ and the rest of civil society need to play their role. Besides pursuing interests of their own constituencies, leaders of civil society should also seek to identify the intersection between their own interests and those of society at large.
 - o More investment is needed to attract, train and deploy social work-

ers, psychologists, councillors and mentors to support the most vulnerable groups to be better able to become self-confident critical thinking citizens.

- At the centre of the social compact must be the involvement of the youth and the notion that we want them to inherit a better South Africa.
- Such a compact will be the product of and underwritten by robust social dialogue, a commitment to conflict resolution and the strengthening of social dialogue platforms.
- It would require the mobilisation of all leaders to commit to a united South Africa, where ubuntu prevails, as we have seen during the Covid-19 pandemic

We should be positive in the face of the current confining conditions and project hope for a better future as we continue to grapple with the fall-out and negative consequences of the novel coronavirus disease.

“Building a non-sexist society: The struggle against patriarchy and the emancipation of women.”

INTRODUCTION

1. This document is a contribution to the ANC National General Council policy discussions. It highlights some of the key interventions that the ANC, as both a political party and ruling party in government, has made on the question of gender transformation and gender equality. In November 1983, the ANC declared 1983 as the year of women. This being a recognition of the role that women played and continue to play in the liberation movement, and is a sentiment echoed in the following words by President Oliver Tambo:

“The liberation of the land of our birth and all its people will materialize as a genuinely popular victory on the basis of the involvement of the masses, including women in their millions, as a conscious and active part of the anti-racial and anti-colonial democratic movement of South Africa. One of the fundamental tasks that this process of national liberation confronts is the liberation of the women of our country from their triple oppression on the grounds of sex, race and colour.”

2. These words demonstrate the important role that women have always and continue to play in the life of the ANC and the country at large. The ANC,

through its constitution, Strategy and Tactics and documented policy conference resolutions, display a commitment to addressing gender inequality in the party and society in general. It is also important to note that women remain the most loyal to the party in proportion to men, this seen in the ANC's support base showing 63% support of the ANC in elections, as opposed to 54% for men.

3. Embedded in the history of colonialism and apartheid, the ANC understands the country's socio-economic and political context as underpinned by the systemic oppression of Africans in general and Black people in particular; a system which is still entrenched in our society today.

Such an understanding is one that also recognises that the South African society, like many others, is patriarchal and anchored on the historic marginalisation of women and the perception that women are not equal to men, specifically that they are inferior to men.

4. The ANC's theoretical approach to gender transformation and equality remains one that is influenced by Black women's experience of triple oppres-

sion on the basis of their sex, race and class position. In the current conjuncture it is also important to recognise that women [and men] who are gender non-conforming are further disadvantaged based on their sexuality. This therefore necessitates the recognition that across sectors of society, gender relations, are power relations, and how individuals identify with a certain gender generally informs their level of participation, inclusion, control and influence in a sector.

5. In an era where political awareness, activism and advocacy are thriving, masculinity and patriarchy have also evolved, presenting different variants of hyper and subtle masculinities that can be considered as allies to the struggle for gender equality. The process of deconstructing gender roles and norms in society has seen women's participation in politics, governance, business, religious and other sectors, thus proving the superiority of men to be false. Nonetheless – sexism, toxic masculinity and patriarchy are persistent and continue to stifle women's progress in these spaces, refusing to recognise women beyond the required quotas and affirmative action principles.
6. This policy document thus aims to critically review and shape the discussion on gender transformation and equality as understood in the ANC. Its premise is that which understands that, in order to change gender relations; gender stereotypes, gender norms and patriarchal practices, it is important to adequately respond to women's strategic and practical gender needs. This referring to; how women's lives are positioned to improve in terms of their positioning in the gendered power relations at a macro institutional level, but also to how women and other marginalised groups are able to address their day to day needs regardless of the context of their socio-economic status and relation to power.

BACKGROUND

7. This NGC takes place in the year that marks the 65th anniversary celebration of the adoption of the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter is anchored on the principles of freedom, equality and justice and must be the compass directing the policy discussions and resolutions that will be taken in this National General Council.
8. The point of departure must be a recognition of women's rights as human rights, affirmed and protected by members of the ANC in our communities as enshrined in the constitution. Understanding that South Africa is a largely patriarchal society, that has for many years recognised men as superior to women and custodians of all institutions in society, from the family to governance is important. This is so since it is this understanding is what will shape the platform for a critical analysis of gender transformation and equality in South Africa thus far.
9. A lot has been done over the years to deal with patriarchy and encourage women's rightful recognition as actors at the forefront of both the anti-apartheid struggle and the building of South Africa's democracy. There is however an entrenched patriarchal perspective in South African society, that manifests itself through a justice and economic system that doesn't adequately affirm women as equal citizens to men. This specifically as it relates to; the land question, traditional authorities, women's intellectual property, the gender wage gap etc.
10. This therefore calls for the ANC to consistently align itself with the evolving perspectives around a progressive type of politics that finds at its core political

values of justice, freedom and equality specifically as this concerns making systemic and impactful changes in the lives of women and other marginalised groups. This also necessitates that the ANC to be robust in its consideration of what its theoretical posture on gender is, by taking into consideration the character of the ANC today, and the multiple theoretical frameworks on gender politics that exist in the current political conjuncture. The ANC being a mass-based organisation with multiple schools of thought that shape the thinking of its membership, it is critical that it re-enforces its position as having a bias to the working class, in this regard a specific bias to women from vulnerable backgrounds, including the poor, youth and gender non-conforming people.

11. In the year of '**Unity, socio-economic renewal and nation-building**', it is important that we elevate the gender discussion by re-affirming it as an issue that cuts across all sectors including in the ANC itself. It is therefore critical to challenge the tendency in politics to treat the issue of gender equality as a secondary issue to what is considered as mainstream political questions like the economy, governance, land reform etc. Consequently, the issue of women's emancipation and bringing women to the centre must be taken seriously and re-affirmed as a priority issue for both the ANC and the country. It is not enough that policy reflects a commitment to transformation, while at the practical level there is only a marginal reflection of this.
12. Affirmative action, the country's gender machinery and institutions established for the advancement of equality, are outcomes of women having played an important role in the struggle

for liberation in South Africa and across the globe. The call for the emancipation of Africans and women continues to serve as the basis upon which many current struggles against racism, sexism, class oppression and others are founded. It is thus important to appreciate the importance of history in the building of the liberation movement and the women's movement specifically.

13. Women have played an important role in ensuring that, at a global and national level women and girls are prioritised; this is seen in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 5 on **achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls**. Women organising themselves politically remains an important aspect of the gender struggle, this in the African context anchored on the existence and historic role of the Pan African Women's Organisation (1962). The NGC must take into consideration that women's organising, still advocated for today, is founded upon multiple declarations, protocols and strategies such as the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies (1985), The Beijing Declaration and its Platform for Action (1995), the UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2007) and the revised Southern African Development Community, Gender and Development Protocol (2018).
14. Gender activists must realise how far we have come with advancing the gender struggle. They should appreciate the contribution of women's struggles in other countries, particularly those from the global south, and continue to affirm a women's liberation narrative that is informed by the daily struggles and specific gender needs of working-class women primarily.

15. Regarding this, it is important that we also remember the role that the Women's Movement in South Africa has played in shaping the discourse of representation and participation by women in structures of leadership. This includes articulating the deliverables for women, specifically – access to resources, employment and decision-making platforms among other things. In the next 25 years of South Africa's democracy, the ANC must look back to the political work done through the adoption of the Women's Charter for Effective Equality in 1994. Specifically reflecting on the where the gains are, and on areas where there has not been significant strides and achievements for gender transformation and women's effective inclusion.
16. It is necessary that this NGC assesses how women's lives have been improved by resolutions on gender responsive budgeting, gender mainstreaming and women's access to decision making platforms. The litmus test on gender transformation policy must rest on this, and on assessing the sustainability and consistency of policy interventions that have improved the lives of working-class women in rural areas and townships. The yardstick must as such be the extent to which all women's lives have changed and improved, assessing the sustainability of that change, and closing the gaps where needed.
17. The context of the novel coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic has already shown evidence of unequally affecting women and men, and in some instances reversing the gains towards gender equality and sustainable development more broadly. Available evidence according to the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation, suggests that global crises such as this pandemic have more adverse effects on women than men. From an economic point of view, women make up 57% of temporary workers and 40% of employed people globally. This therefore implies that; regression in the economy as a result of the pandemic, will further disadvantage women through job losses and pay-cuts, this in a world where most women are without financial safety nets.
18. The reality of the pandemic, is such that it leads to women becoming even more vulnerable and susceptible to domestic violence, especially given that there is mounted pressure in how they undertake their responsibilities in the home – including housework and child rearing. This NGC should consider and discuss the possibilities that can be explored towards shaping a gender equal future that includes systemic changes with specific contributions on how both the informal and care economy can be modelled to better protect women from being further disadvantaged by future health, climate change and other shocks.
19. The current conjuncture also offers the ANC an opportunity to take stock of the gains of the past 25 years and chart a way forward towards the National Development Plan's vision 2030. This discussion document must be informed by the understanding that even though the status of all women in South Africa has improved, gender equality has not been fully achieved.
20. It is important to recognise that over the past few years the political landscape in the country has seen South African women from all walks of life speak truth to power and exercise their democratic right to advocate for and mobilise

against issues that affect them as women in the work, political and domestic sphere. The emergence of women's movements across the country organising for gender justice especially around the issue of Gender-Based Violence in South Africa is quite significant.

21. The contribution of the ANCWL and its Young Women's Desk in this regard is of utmost importance, especially considering how the YWD has been able to speak out against gender injustices and Gender-Based Violence in society. The ANCWL plays an important role in the life of the ANC and the country, and its contribution to strengthening efforts towards gender transformation is valuable. It is notable that through the YWD there has been a broadened scope of gender issues to the extent that the voice of the LGBTQIA+ has found space within the party. It is however important that the ANC should also lead on the campaign to end violence against women and all marginalised groups.

22. As the people's organisation, it is important that the ANC be considered as a voice that represents most women. This NGC should therefore, also reflect on the extent to which the ANC, ANCWL & YWD and the ANCYL remain relevant structures for women to participate in. The NGC must contend with the extent to which ordinary South Africans feel heard and accommodated by these structures.

A REVIEW

The year 2020 marks a very important year for women's empowerment globally as it is the year that commemorates 25 years since the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, a global

commitment anchored on '...advance[ing] the goals of equality, development and peace for all women everywhere in the interest of all humanity.'. The African National Congress anchored on its' pursuit for a National Democratic Society (NDS), which is a society that has done away with class, race and gender contradictions, must continue to serve as a champion for gender equality and the empowerment of marginalised groups in society.

1. The Beijing 25+ anniversary report coincides with the review of 25 years of South Africa's democracy. Both the 25-year review and the Beijing 25+ report offer an objective, and accurate perspective of how the lives of South Africans has changed over the years. It is through the perspective of these reports that this NGC should reflect and inform policy resolutions moving forward.

2. In reporting on the progress made in addressing gender transformation, equality, and women's representation, it is important to acknowledge the ANC's leadership and deployment policy as progressive and having played an instrumental role in the current representation of women in all structures within the organisation and governance where the ANC exists.

3. This must however be followed by an assessment of the extent to which responding and addressing gender equality through the existing quota and affirmative action policies translates to women's issues being prioritised, and women being able to meaningfully play a role in the country's democracy and strategic leadership. This assessment must reflect on the role of the ANC Gender Committee and its function, as well as scrutinise gender representation

in structures of the ANC specifically at the office bearer and working committee levels from the branch to the national executive committee (as reflected in the table below).

4. This assessment must assist with determining whether women's political participation has been enabled or improved as a result of women holding leadership positions in the ANC or not. It must specifically look at the unequal representation of women in office bearing positions in ANC structures across the country and consider how this contributes to the status of women and the extent to which the voices of the majority of women in South Africa are heard and their issues attended to.

5. Regarding women's economic transformation, progress has been made by the ANC government's introduction of policies and programmes that facilitate women's equal participation in the economy:

*'...to provide business resources, information and opportunities for South African women entrepreneurs, as well as a range of interventions designed to achieve women's empowerment and gender equality in the agriculture sector.'*¹

Weak economic growth has however limited the success of the interventions to achieve the economic emancipation of women, this therefore hindering the process of most women becoming financially secure and coming out of poverty, and oppressive social contexts.

6. Black African women still represent those with the highest burden of poverty in the country. *'In 2017, although women constituted 51% of the total*

*population of South Africa, they made up only 44.3% of the employed workforce, which is often concentrated at lower levels of organisations.'*² Women dominate the small business sector, and struggle to enter the mainstream economy, or break the ceiling of senior management especially in the private sector.

7. It is in the interest of the ANC to ensure that economic inequality does not persist in the next 25 years, and that there are re-enforcements in policy and practice aimed at integrating women in the private sector, especially in previously male dominated fields like manufacturing, mining, construction, agriculture, science, technology engineering & mathematics (STEM), finance etc.

8. Regarding women's access to basic services, specifically access to water, electricity, sanitation, housing and food security, affordable transport and access to information – it has been critical that government make the needed interventions and programmes to support women, as those who mainly bear the brunt of poverty in South Africa.

9. The inroads that have been made in this regard include:

- 9.1 Increasing access to piped water at approximately 60% of women headed households. Access to services and interventions addressing poverty in South Africa remain disaggregated according to gender, with educated white men having the most access, while Black African women have the least access.

- 9.2 Improved access to safer and more convenient sources of energy especially for women in rural areas, although energy access remains unequally disaggregated among

male and female headed households. This is linked to the education and economic security that exists in those households. Whereas access to reliable electricity has generally been stable, the context of challenges in ESKOM further disadvantage women the most, as they carry the additional burden since they already carry the responsibility of cooking, child rearing and household responsibilities.

9.3 Providing convenient sanitation and hygiene minimises vulnerability and risk to Gender-Based Violence for women and promotes dignity. In this regard, women's access to sanitation and hygiene has improved such that in '*...2016, 49.5% of toilets were located in the yard of households; 45.6% in the dwelling and 4.9% outside the yard.*'³.

9.4 Access to housing and security of tenure for women remains an important aspect in bringing about women's emancipation and gender equality. While there have been increases in government housing subsidies allocated to female headed households, as well as in offering security of tenure for female headed households, it is still insufficient. Towards the next 25-years, it is important that policy processes and interventions reflect on the role of customary law and traditional leadership, and the limitations that exist for young women professionals looking to secure property.

9.5 On the question of women and health, the South African policy on

Universal Access to Primary Health remains the main gain for women's health, especially women from vulnerable backgrounds.

9.5.1 Pregnant women and children under the age of six years continuing to receive free health care and access to reproductive health care programmes and ante-natal care services are amongst the achievements of the health care system. The life expectancy of women has increased from 54.8 years in 2005 to 65.1 years in 2016, this underscored by a decline in adult mortality rate from 38% in 2012 to 33% in 2016 as result of the extensive roll-out of Antiretroviral (ARV) treatment. The global challenge of high maternal mortality rates persists, and as a country, specific interventions to reduce maternal deaths need to be strengthened.

9.5.2 Access to contraceptives and family planning for women has increased over the past 25-years. Persistence in unplanned pregnancies, especially among youth and more vulnerable women is largely associated with socio-economic factors such as the rural-urban divide, women's economic status, education levels, cultural norms etc. Strategies must be put in place to address the misconceptions and misinformation about contraceptives especially in rural areas. Early pregnancy

Notes

- 1 25 Year Review (2019)
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid

plays a role in determining the future of a girl child and must as such be prioritised as a gender and health issue.

9.5.3 Adequate support for the 90-90-90 HIV strategy campaign will yield specific gains for reducing the impact of illness on women and female headed households, this important in alleviating the burden on those vulnerable to disease and its impact on livelihoods.

9.5.4 With all the interventions that have been made regarding women and health, it is important that the resolution on the implementation of the National Health Insurance (NHI) be re-enforced. There is a direct relationship between improved quality of healthcare and Universal Health Care coverage. Women being the most burdened by the quadruple burden of disease, will particularly benefit from the NHI.

While the context of the COVID-19 pandemic undermines the improvement of health outcomes, it does also more broadly offer an opportunity to improve on health infrastructure and the overall access to quality healthcare.

9.6 Significant gains have been made in addressing the issue of women and education in South Africa, specifically regarding both enrolment in basic and higher education. There are however still challenges that persist in relation to school completion, and enrolment in STEM courses by women and girls.

9.6.1 While academic success in basic education has, since 2008,

seen better performance by males, tertiary education enrolment and success at the undergraduate level favours women with more males being enrolled for Master's and Doctoral degrees. The ratio of female to male tertiary enrolment (%) in South Africa was reported at 1.4319 % in 2017, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. According to Professor Ahmed Bawa, CEO of Universities South Africa (USAf), whose members comprise the heads of the country's 26 tertiary education institutions, 58% of the students in South African universities are women and 42% men (2018). Education remains a contested and gendered terrain which cannot be addressed without applying an intersectional lens to better understand the conditions leading to varied academic outputs.

9.6.2 Socio-economic factors such as the urban-rural divide, vulnerability to rape, sexual crimes, harassment, trafficking, inadequate access to sanitary towels, the high female dropout ratio in secondary schooling and teenage pregnancy among secondary school-going girls further create a stumbling block for women's success in education. It is therefore critical that this NGC further deliberates on the kind of interventions required for equitable access and success in schools and institutions of higher learning. The declaration that the 'doors of learning must be

open for all' must be assessed based on the extent to which access to education improves the lives of women and girls.

9.7 The scourge of gender-based violence and femicide continues to reverse the gains of South Africa and threaten the freedoms of many women and girls across the country. The declaration from the Presidential Summit against Gender Based Violence and Femicide in 2018 must be used as the basis upon which eliminating GBV and femicide can be made possible.

9.7.1 There is a need for the ANC to critically reflect on and prioritise interventions on Gender-Based Violence – including the specific discrimination against the LGBTQIA+ community and sex workers. Having highlighted the areas where significant strides in fighting patriarchy, emancipating women and creating a non-sexist society have been made, the ANC must wage the battle against Gender Based Violence and femicide more rigorously.

9.7.2 In line with the resolutions of the 54th National Conference, the ANC must re-affirm its stance on applying stricter punitive measures for perpetrators of any form of violence against women and the LG-BTQIA+ community. The position to utilise the full might of the criminal justice system to the extent that includes denial of bail and the sentence regime must be implemented urgently.

9.8 Having generally highlighted the broad gains and gaps that exist with

regard to the progress made in the 25-year democracy, it is important that this NGC deliberate further on the kind of policy interventions that may be required to re-enforce the work that has been done thus far.

9.9 This includes assessing how institutions that have been established to strengthen women's voice and advance the plight of women have been successful. To do this, it is important to look at the Department of Women, Youth and People with Disabilities in the Presidency, the Progressive Women's Movement of South Africa, the Commission for Gender Equality etc. and establish how these have influenced and improved the lives of all women. Attention must be given to addressing the specific needs of young and working-class women from rural backgrounds.

9.10 Strengthening gender sensitive responses to addressing gender inequality is important.

The need to further mainstream gender and use gender disaggregated approaches to policy is fundamental for the emancipation of women and breaking the hold of patriarchy over society.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

1. Considering the areas where gains and challenges exist in the pursuit to building a non-sexist, equal society which has addressed systemic and deeply entrenched patriarchal social values, norms and behaviours.
2. This NGC should further identify the areas that require specific interventions and immediately put in place mecha-

nisms to address these. This requires that an in-depth assessment takes place, where we not only ask if a policy exists, but also how it has improved and benefitted the lives of the majority working-class women of the country.

3. Building on the already established foundation in the various sectors, at the core of engendering change must be a more robust and community-based approach to processes that include but are not limited to; consultation for the purposes of implementation, monitoring and ensuring accountability.
4. The ANC must define its role and facilitate further implementation of strategies for gender equality especially in the following areas:
 - Strengthening capacity in the ANC and governance structures for implementation of gender mainstreaming, gender responsive planning, budgeting, monitoring, evaluation and auditing as per the existing government framework. This includes in depth gender disaggregation of data to ensure proper reporting and interventions as guided by the mandate from the Office of the Status of Women (2008).
 - Prioritisation of areas such as health, education, housing and land tenure; this including campaigns aimed at prioritising sexual and reproductive health, towards addressing stereotypes around career choices, creating a conducive environment for women's economic participation, land ownership and tenure.
 - Transformation of business leadership and governance in the private and public sector resulting in more representation of women in senior positions, and championing of a gender sensitive agenda that is inclusive and meaningfully contributes to the advancement of women and women's issues.
5. Thus far, the gains that have been made are notable but still require that we further build on them. ANC branches must begin to identify areas in their communities that need specific interventions. It is also important to recognise that efforts towards gender equality require partnership with relevant stakeholders in government, civil society, religious organisations, academics, labour etc.
6. The international partnerships with other countries and partner's such as the Beijing Platform for Action, the Pan African Women's Organisation, the Progressive Women's Movement of South Africa also play an important role in furthering the agenda for women's emancipation and gender equality, and relations with these organisations must be strengthened to achieve the objectives of a non-sexist society. In this regard, women in the ANC and the country must further define their role in the global political landscape, and what approaches can be used to elevate their voice.
7. A consolidation of the efforts that the ANC at a national level and across its structures have made is important in order to chart a way forward on how to adequately respond to the persistent challenge of gender equality in South Africa. While this requires an in-depth understanding of the theories of gender, power and development more broadly, they also require specific attention to be placed on better understanding the material conditions in branches of the ANC and communities more broadly. In the work that is to be done towards gender equality and

gender transformation, the litmus test of the extent to which lives of all women, specifically marginalised, elderly, youth and rural groups must be transformed, and sustainable solutions im-

plemented. Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls in South Africa, is indeed an integral part of strengthening our democracy, and should as such remain a priority.

GENDER BREAKDOWN OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN ANC STRUCTURES

Achievements	Committee	Male	Female
NATIONAL	National Office Bearers	5	1
	National Executive Committee (Direct)	44	45
	National Working Committee	13	13
PROVINCES			
Gauteng	Provincial Office Bearers	4	1
	Provincial Executive Committee	15	15
	Provincial Working Committee	8	8
Limpopo	Provincial Office Bearers	4	1
	Provincial Executive Committee	34	17
	Provincial Working Committee	10	7
Eastern Cape	Provincial Office Bearers	4	1
	Provincial Executive Committee	19	17
	Provincial Working Committee	9	8
Western Cape IPC	Provincial Office Bearers	2	1
	Interim Provincial Committee	16	15
	Provincial Working Committee	7	7
Northern Cape	Provincial Office Bearers	4	1
	Provincial Executive Committee	18	17
	Provincial Working Committee	9	10
Kwa-Zulu Natal	Provincial Office Bearers	4	1
	Provincial Executive Committee	20	20
	Provincial Working Committee	9	8
Free State	Provincial Office Bearers	3	2
	Provincial Executive Committee	18	19
	Provincial Working Committee	9	8

GENDER BREAKDOWN OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN ANC STRUCTURES

PROVINCES (CONTINUED)			
Achievements	Committee	Male	Female
Mpumalanga	Provincial Office Bearers	2	1
	Provincial Executive Committee	18	17
	Provincial Working Committee	9	7
North West IPC	Provincial Office Bearers	1	2
	Provincial Working Committee	5	5

A Discussion Document for the National General Council on

Youth

BACKGROUND

The youth of South African are important assets in the building of our envisaged national democratic society. Youth are a driving force for change and social transformation. The youth of South Africa has been significant to the history of the ANC and their role continues to be important in the life of the organisation. Under Apartheid, it was South Africa's youth that drove mass mobilisation and the organisation of the oppressed to oppose the Apartheid state and fight for national liberation and democracy.

The United Nations gives a clear definition of youth as *“a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to the independence of adulthood..”*¹ However, there are necessities that enable the transition from dependency of childhood to independence of adulthood, which include access to education, health care, land and employment.

Each new generation has its own mission of social emancipation and its own dynamism. This is true for the young people of South Africa. The generation of the mid-1940's formed the ANC Youth League and brought radicalism into the ANC. This subsequently resulted in the formation of the armed-struggle – Umkhonto we Sizwe. Currently the youth of South Africa is confronted with the surge of gender-based

violence, a climate crisis, that impacts their future, high levels of poverty, limited access to quality education, and very high unemployment. However the youth of South Africa also have the potential to shape social and economic development and challenge current social structures.

INTRODUCTION

1. The year 2020 marks 26 years since the end of apartheid's white minority rule and the ushering in of a post-apartheid democratic dispensation. From inception, an ANC-led post-apartheid South Africa identified disrupting and redressing the intergenerational legacy of gender, class and race-based poverty, inequality and depravation as its apex priority. To achieve this mammoth task, the RDP policy framework widely held that South Africa's transition from apartheid's white minority rule to democracy requires that all existing policies, practices, institutions and values are reviewed and rethought in terms of their fitness for the new era. At the heart of the new era remains our resolve to create a better life for all, by developing a pragmatic national reconstruction and development program. This program is aimed at addressing the the social, economic, spatial and political legacy of our colonial and apartheid past.

¹ <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf>.

The United Nations giving clear definition of the Youth.

2. The ability to deliver on a better life for all remains entrenched as a yardstick against which the African National Congress assesses itself and earns its political legitimacy as a vehicle that carries the hopes and wishes of all South Africans; the poor and working classes, blacks in general and Africans in particular. In other words, to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, underdevelopment and inequality underwrote and guarantee the political legitimacy and appeal of the ANC in the eyes of the poor and the marginalised who are its motive forces, as well as the intended majority shareholders of a post-apartheid South Africa.
3. With the above background in mind, the wellbeing of the Youth (aged 18-34), who currently constitute almost a third (17,84 Million) of South Africa's population, and their prospects of a socially, economically and politically secure future, is a yardstick against which the ANC is measured by this constituency.
4. South Africa's youth population is a blessing that can also turn into a curse. A largely unemployed, idle and economically inactive youth population presents the most immediate threat to South Africa's socio-political stability, the country's productive capacity and the possibility of equitable social mobility. Paralysed social mobility not only adversely affect the achievability of national development goals but further weaken the image of the ANC as a genuine custodian of the youth's hopes and wishes, making the achievement of a national democratic society and total liberation seem a distant reality.
5. Due to a widening in educational, information and technological/digital gap between working-class youth and their privileged counterparts, much of South Africa's potential human capital and productive potential is lost; as many talented young South Africans living in rural and township communities are unable to access and succeed in post-schooling opportunities. Consequently, 26 years later, the majority of the unemployed and those in the NEET (not in employment, education or training) category remains largely rural, black, female, young and of poor and working-class origin.
6. This trend continues to feed into a widening trust deficit between the youth and the African National Congress. As witnessed during the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall protests, the youth see the ANC as an animal that speaks left and walks right, bemoaning the gap between the movement's transformative policy positions and its practice. It is this widening trust deficit between the movement, the youth and to a certain extent their parents, that poses an existential threat to the image and appeal of the African National Congress. It must be addressed with urgency to halt the widening trust deficit.
7. Evidence from parts of Europe and North America show that, if left unattended to, the extent of intergenerational injustice and inequality leaves the youth constituency vulnerable and drawn to waves of right and left wing populism. The ANC needs to study and understand the youth and the prevailing balance of forces, which should guide how the movement organizes itself around and mobilises within this critical constituency.
8. Lastly, post-apartheid South Africa's pre-occupation with university education as a single pathway to desired social and occupational destinations

has led to a gross underutilisation of the military's capacity to massify sector-specific skills development and job creation for the youth. The poor uptake and graduation from TVET colleges that offer occupational skills training is also a matter of major concern. The higher education and training sector and its ever-rising cost has and continues to exclude an overwhelming majority of poor and working-class youth. This group is ultimately condemned to the NEET Category and all the social ills that accompany it. Given the social and economic devastation that will likely be left behind by Covid-19 and the well documented role of militaries in recovering from pandemics and recessions, there is an urgent need for the ANC to commission a study into the feasibility of an SANDF led Mandatory Military Service. At the same time we need to ensure that the government strengthens the TVET sector and aligns it more closely with societal and economic needs. Key reforms needed include government playing a stronger role to get TVET students access to internship opportunities to complete the practical part of their training.

Do not homogenize youth

Youth is a commonly misapplied concept that assumes a uniformity of conditions experienced by young people. It overlooks the often-profound importance of a difference in gender, social status, class, ethnicity, religion and other demographics. Often the only youth voices heard are those of the student, economic and political elites.

The voices of all youth matter. As part of re-engaging with the youth constituency, the movement must avoid elevating the voice of certain youth over that of youth whose voices remain on the margins of society. The voice of the youth must carry the

same weight regardless of gender, race, class, geographic location or educational status. The #FeesMustFall protest raised the voice and challenges of Youth in Universities above those of youth in TVET Colleges. Similarly, the spotlight was shone on the voice and challenges of youth in elitist institutions, such as Wits University and the University of Cape Town, at the expense of the youth in historically black institutions. In order to restore trust and arrest the widening trust deficit between the movement and the youth constituency, the ANC must meaningfully engage with the immediate challenges and wellbeing of rural and township youth across language barriers, educational and occupational status.

It is important to recognise that as a political party that represents the majority, the ANC must ensure that they can relate to, and represent every young person in South Africa, and that it remains the space where young people's ideas can be formulated and contested in order to influence the policy debates in government.

Youth and the balance of forces

The democratic transition during the post 1994 period, has as its central content the erosion of the national, class and gender barriers that previously determined access to economic, social and political opportunities. This consists of not only removing the legislative framework of the colonial and apartheid state but also any transforming exclusion based on race, class and geographic location. It seeks to overcome the deep and pervasive fault lines of inequality, unemployment and poverty.

South Africa's youth have been concerned with transformation since the inception of the ANC Youth League in 1944. We have also in this epoch witnessed the

rise of numerous new social movements, many of them organised and led by the youth of South Africa – recent examples are the #RhodesMustFall, #FeesMustFall and #MeToo movements.

The ANC has been advocating for the inclusion of young people in decision-making processes, particularly in the area of policy. However, the youth of South Africa needs to organise and mobilise more effectively in order to play a dynamic and powerful role in influencing and building a national democratic society.

The youth of South Africa need to understand that they are an integral part of society that evolves every day. Hence, Algerian revolutionary contended that, “each generation must discover its mission, fulfil it or betray it.” The Youth of today face serious challenges in terms of employment and pursuing education and work opportunities under the COVID-19 lockdown. Young women for example have been massively impacted by the shutdown of almost all childcare and ECD centres in townships.

The youth need to discover their mission in advancing youth interests and building a national democratic society that address the challenges faced by young people.

In addition, South African youth make up about 60% of the unemployment rate. There is great frustration and impatience within the youth of South Africa – mainly because of the struggles of unemployment, poverty and violence. COVID-19 has worsened the impediments faced by youth of South African, as unemployment continues to increase, and this disproportionately affects young women in rural and township areas.

It must be noted that being young does not translate into being progressive. Therefore, it is the role of the ANC to build progressive youth that strive to reclaim their space in building the envisioned developmental state. . Such youth need to understand the weak economy and its constrained capacity to create jobs, that causes the crisis of youth unemployment.

National Democratic Society and Youth

*“Such a society should be premised on the obvious fact that workers’ rights are human rights; and these rights should find expression in law-governed measures to ensure decent jobs, job security and a living wage”.*²

South Africa's youth rallied by the ANC Youth League in line with the ANC must campaign for greater participation in, and influence on, the strategic sectors of the economy. The youth of South Africa need to lead the charge in influencing government to impose a living minimum wage and a basic income grant.

Intra-class inequalities in South Africa are persistent, and inequality between the black African middle and working class has increased dramatically due to the rapid growth of this middle class since the end of Apartheid. This predominantly urban middle class seem to be the drivers of political discourse, whilst the marginalised youth from informal settlements and rural areas do not have expression in South Africa's discourse due to lack of organisational and institutional platforms as well as media access.

Some of the middle class youth have ascended to political leadership in the ANC

and as public representatives in councils, national parliament and legislatures. Our young leaders need to be rooted in the struggles of youth in our country. We need youth leaders who are schooled in the values of the ANC and who question the conspicuous consumption of a capitalist and celebrity culture. Joel Netshitenzhe contended that:

“Standing in the eyes of peers, possibilities of entering intimate relationships, followership on social media... all this and more increasingly depend on and in turn to feed that celebrity status, with money and conspicuous consumption at the centre of it. The greatest danger, in my view, is that young cadres are emerging into positions of more serious responsibility within the context of a value system that may be corrosive of the humanism and selflessness that fundamental social transformation demands.”³

The building of the National Democratic Society and the developmental state needs to be inclusive of all the youth of South Africa regardless of political affiliation, class, race, gender, and religion etc. Throughout South Africa's youth appear to be in the midst of an existential crisis – driven by the social media discourse of individual aspirations, and neglecting the struggles of downtrodden youth in our rural areas and townships.

Speak Directly to Youth Issues

A notion that must be dispelled is that young people are unaware of what they want and need. Young people are very clear on the issues that affect them and even have many potential ideas on how to solve them. The approach that the older generation has taken by trying to tell young people what is good for them, has

never been and never will be the correct approach. Young people do not feel listened to nor do they feel like they play a meaningful role in decision-making, both by the ANC and the government. Hence the growing agitation on the ground of young people demanding a seat at the table.

Amongst the most important issues that face young people are education, unemployment, support for small businesses, land redistribution, corruption and the economy. These matters must be the focus of our work and our campaigning. Young people want their issues to be directly and specifically addressed. It is not sufficient for the ANC and the government to say it will create jobs. The governing party needs to say **“We will be able to secure ‘x’ amount of jobs by doing the following things. We plan to do more next year by tackling that sector, that sector, etc.”**

Youth and Education

By the time people reach young adulthood, the public institution that they have most interacted with is the school system. This makes school and tertiary education the most important site of mobilisation of the youth toward public participation. To this end, schools ought to cultivate a culture of responsibility and citizenship within the learners. It is schools that must inspire faith in public institutions.

It is also schools that must enlighten the youth on their responsibilities as citizens and not merely produce work-ready individuals – work-readiness is only one measure of the schooling system and not the most important one. This is because where our country cannot afford opportunities to those who

3 Joel Netshitenzhe **“THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE PARTY AND EXPECTATIONS OF ANC PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES”** 22 June 2019

are work-ready, those people will look elsewhere for that opportunity and potentially leave the country to pursue that. This is evidenced by the level of graduate relocations on the continent and to other parts of the world for employment.

Whereas if we successfully cultivate a culture of national pride and citizenship, individual career pursuits will not be the only consideration in the youth's consciousness. Youth innovation and energy are needed to ensure the growth of local industry and local opportunities for others. A youth that is set on finding or creating local opportunities from a sense of pride for their country will naturally engage with public and political institutions.

In South Africa however, we have a dropout rate of 60% between grade 1 and grade 12. Likewise, Grade 12 numbers often reflect about 52% of the age-appropriate youth still enrolled in schools and many more drop out after failing their matric exams.

These dropout rates inhibit the attempt to mobilise the youth to participate in public and social life and exercise their social responsibility. Research indicates that the way the youth spend their leisure time has a huge impact on whether they stay in school or not. Leisure time spent in boredom is more likely to produce negative results i.e. school dropouts and substance abuse.

Engagement in healthy leisure time can act as a mitigating factor against this kind of negative behaviour and increase an adolescents' self-esteem, academic performance, peer-group affiliation and overall school engagement. All this may reduce the likelihood of dropping out.

What then must the education system do

in order to cultivate healthier practises?

- Firstly, before we change anything, we must ensure that learners' school experience is pleasant and enriching.
- Schools must prioritise History and introduce "Citizenship" studies into their curriculum, either through the existing course structure (i.e. into the Life Orientation program) or as a separate subject. This will allow learners to leave school with an understanding of what their social responsibilities are and why they are important. Currently, education is focused on how the individual can survive in the world as opposed to how cooperation can make it better.
- Basic education must ensure that learners willingly remain in the system all the way from grade 1 to completion, minimising the drop-out rate. This is because losing a person at a young age alienates them from the development of social inclusion cultivated by merely being present in the social context of a school. Without such inclusion, we cannot hope to achieve social responsibility because the individual is not invested in a society from which they feel excluded.
- The schooling system must teach young people the skills to change boredom during their leisure time to something more interesting. This may mean ensuring the ability to read as early as possible – a skill South African pupils acquire much later than much of the peaceful world. There may be a need to introduce an aggressive and systematic curriculum of cultural and recreational activities – the learning of music, theatre and sport. This will allow the youth to have more skills at their disposal for use during their leisure time and for creative upliftment.
- There is also a need to instil in learners the importance of what they are learning so that they can motivate themselves to improve and not have to rely solely on external motivation. This will become easier as we attempt to widen the ar-

ray of skills at their disposal as they are more likely to develop a passion and specialise.

- This must also feature in our tertiary education institutions. Students in TVETs and in Universities must have social responsibility cultivated in their learning. Note that this does not have to mean teaching everyone “*Citizenship*” as they did in high school. The program could teach students how to build local industries in their field and how to make a social impact with their work. So that there is no need for deviation from the core subject that would result in an additional workload.

Youth unemployment on the Continent - Putting it into context

Africa has the youngest population in the world. Angola, Mozambique, Niger and Uganda have a median age for their population below 18 years. With the great efforts and success against infant mortality rates, this translates into a continent-wide “*Youth Bulge*” where youth between 16 and 35 become the largest age-group in the overall population.

Each year millions of young people enter the labour force across the continent. While this is positive, it is difficult for Africa to maintain the rates of economic growth and generation of productive jobs needed to absorb new work seekers.. Youth unemployment and underemployment remain very high. As a result, many youths end up self-employed, in vulnerable occupations, or in the informal sector. Additionally, a large proportion of university graduates are finding it difficult to find jobs, as they lack employable skills or face skill mismatches with labour market requirements.

Youth Unemployment rates in North Africa are above 25% in countries such as Egypt

and Tunisia. While sub-Saharan Africa displays the highest youth and worker poverty rates in the world at about 70%.

Nigerian youth unemployment rapidly rose from 15% in 2015 to 35% in 2018, with more than 55% of young people being unemployed or underemployed. Nigeria thus has the double problem of staggering unemployment and crippling worker poverty. This is a problem that South Africa is all too familiar with, with youth unemployment remaining persistently around 40%. The Covid pandemic has pushed youth unemployment over 50%.

Youth Unemployment in South Africa

South African youth are very vulnerable in the labour market. Those aged 15–34 years are considered as youth. There is a need to identify the type of youth unemployment that the country is faced with – that is whether it is structural or cyclical in nature. This identification will create a path for the solution i.e. if the problem is structural and we are creating youth who have outdated skills, we can address the tertiary education sector. If the problem is cyclical, and a consequence of economic conditions, we address the greater macro-economic issues.

South Africa has, roughly, 20 million people between the ages of 16 and 35 which makes up about 34% of the population. More than 30% of young South Africans between the ages of 15-24 are not employed (narrow definition – actively looking for work but not employed), or in education or training opportunities; 46% of young South Africans aged 25-34 fall into this category. This equates to 7.9 million young people. In 2018 close to one in three young South Africans between the ages of 15 and 24 years were disengaged with the labour mar-

ket and were not in the process of upskilling themselves to engage in the market. This indicator is important as these young people are likely to remain structurally unemployed in the long run. The economic devastation brought about by Covid-19 has dramatically impacted the employment figures for youth and may have taken youth unemployment over 50% for the foreseeable future.

Job seeking costs about R500 per month, according to a UJ study published in 2016.

89% of the Class of 2019 Matriculants were child grant beneficiaries. The majority are now over 18 which means that they are no longer eligible for the grant. This coupled with the consideration that 30% of them are likely to fall into the NEET category (see above 18-24 stats) and that they no longer receive the grant leaves them with no jobs and not enough money to effectively look for work.

All of this leads to a reliance on government, a financial burden that government cannot bear, thus failing to support this group of South Africans. It is vital that youth engage in the current discussion on a basic income grant.

It is important to note that the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) does not fund postgraduate studies – it only funds undergraduate. However to practise and be employable in many sectors e.g. psychology or economics, one now needs a postgraduate training (which is not funded). Therefore there is a creation of unemployable graduates coming through the system who are not able to build on their skills base through education and training – they are not in employment, education or training.

The NEET rate, seen in conjunction with the

unemployment rate suggests that young South Africans face extreme difficulties engaging with and entering the labour market. Many face a lifetime of unemployment or under-employment.

Certain factors such as lack of experience and length of unemployment may increase the vulnerabilities of these young people in the difficulties they have in finding decent work.

The **burden of unemployment is also concentrated amongst the youth as they account for 63,5% of the total number of formally unemployed persons.** The unemployment rate among the youth is higher than other age groups regardless of educational level. The graduate unemployment rate was 33,5% for those aged 15–24 and 10,2% among those aged 25–34 years, while the rate among adults (aged 35–64 years) was 4,7%. Just over 30% of the youth have jobs and about half of them participate in the labour market. Within the youth, those aged 15–24 years are more vulnerable in the labour market with an unemployment rate of over 52%, an absorption rate of about 12,2% and a labour force participation rate of 25,6%.

When young people are employed in the South African labour market, they work mostly in agriculture, retail and services, finance and other business services. Youth with higher skill levels are mostly employed in community and social services (including government) as well as finance and other business service industries.

The bottom line is that it is very difficult for young people to get jobs and sustain themselves. This must be directly addressed in a solution orientated fashion if we hope to gain the support of young people more broadly.

Youth and Organizational Renewal

From the 53rd National Conference in 2012 through to the 54th in 2017, the ANC recognised the need for Organisational Renewal. This need arose, from the realisation that the ANC is losing credibility among ordinary South Africans. Noting that this is due to the ANC's perceived and real /alienation from society, poor service delivery in some areas of government, along with other issues such as corruption, elitism, arrogance and manipulating organisational processes. These can be generally referred to as the "*sins of Incumbency*" commonly suffered by governing parties that stay in power for a long time and become complacent and arrogant.

Importantly, in the 54th National Conference Resolutions, it is noted that many organisations and thought leaders in society have become critics of the ANC and its leadership, leading to a massive loss of influence and appeal among South Africans, and more specifically among young intellectuals and students. This is an unfortunate development as the ANC is built on and has historically cultivated intellectualism among its members and leaders and losing the support of students and intellectuals is the loss of the very resource that built and sustained this organisation through the years.

The ANC is not just losing students and intellectuals however, there is also a large cohort of urban youth that do not find the ANC attractive for the same reasons as the more fortunate youth. In addition, given the rural to urban migration that occurs in pursuit of work, many of the rural youth also experience urban discontent. This is on top of the discontent they may carry from their rural homes such as not yet having adequate access to resources and services. The lack of analysis of working class, rural and poor youth is a massive blind spot in the analysis made in the 53rd and 54th

National Conference about the character and nature of the youth the movement is losing. It is not just students and young intellectuals – it is the youth as a whole. The students and young intellectuals could be considered the loudest voices as well as the cohort with the most access to media and the largest social capital to successfully express their discontent with the ANC.

It is therefore important for the ANC, in order to attract the youth, to make bold and swift steps toward Organisational Renewal and addressing these issues. So that it can achieve the ends it set forth in restoring integrity and ethics in the ANC, building its resilience, enhancing its transformative and governance capacity and its adaptability to changing situations; so that it can continue to serve and lead the people" of South Africa.

Social Cohesion and Youth

The ANC aims at harnessing social cohesion and nation building for the building of the national democratic society. It is important for the ANC to influence and help shape the consciousness of the youth. However, the consciousness must stem from the core values of the ANC and contribute to social cohesion, the national question and uniting South Africans for nation building.

Like the majority of countries in Africa today, modern South Africa is a product of European colonialism, liberation and independence movements and the various challenges and opportunities experienced by new states in an era of neo-liberalism and globalization. South Africa continues to carry the distinct social formation and historical legacy of an economy based on the extraction of resources, institutionalised racism, and colonisation of the special type which continues to influence our post-apartheid development.

South Africa's development continues to be racially embedded – it is troubling that 1% of South Africans own 95% of the economic production. However, in order to build social cohesion and nation building that is rooted in the national democratic society, it is important that the wealth of our society be more equitably distributed. Wealth and poverty correspond neatly to racial demographics. The face of wealth is white and the face of poverty is black. Alternatively, we can say that blackness is cast in reality as a synonym for poverty and underdevelopment whereas whiteness is cast in reality as a synonym for wealth and prosperity.

Youth Alienation

The concept of alienation identifies a psychological (subjective) and social (objective) ill, and it involves the problematic separation between the Self and the Other that actually belong together. Subjective alienation is the psychological feelings of separation between Subject and Other, whilst objective alienation is the material fact of the separation of subject and other. Alienation allows us to analyse the actions of the youth in terms of the context of the youth's problematic separation from public and economic life, and the resulting political actions/expressions.

This separation is problematic, in that it either frustrates the two entities or causes conflict with the harmony of the two objects. For example, being alienated from public institutions is in conflict with the youths proper inclusion and participation in greater society and thus leads to a socially alienated youth who cannot identify with, and find no place for themselves within public institutions.

There is widespread acceptance of the youth's separation from public institutions. The youth are not organised in traditional

modes of political engagement. Young people are not very active in the leadership of political parties, they tend to be difficult to unionise and often find themselves in informal and unprotected economic sectors, they vote in much lower numbers than their adult counterparts. This is problematic because, while the youth do not feel represented by these institutions, their vote is still very important in terms of political participation and building the future national democratic society.

We therefore need to change the youth's attitude toward formal political engagement and the appropriateness of our organisational and institutional structures and programmes in their aim to attract and meet the challenges of young people.

Many begin to identify with their alienation and accept their lives as marginal in that community or country. In response to their marginality, they find other ways to express their humanity that do not need approval from formal political institutions. These forms of expression may range from benign forms like an obsession with popular culture, to very harmful forms such as the potential for drug abuse or socially destructive behaviour. The objective of the ANC should be to have our citizens as the central concern of our public institutions and this must be reflected practically.

The Silent Drug Epidemic

South Africa over the years has experienced a rise in the abuse of substances among youth. Townships are ravaged by drugs like "nyaope", tik and "dagga" as well as alcohol (this is true for most of the country). The socio-economic impact is devastating - from the dangers of addiction and drug-related illnesses, to increases in crime, violence in general and violence against women and children in particular, to family and relationship breakdown.

Climate Change

If there is one threat that has the capacity to decimate the future of our country and the world as we know it, it is the climate crisis brought on by greenhouse gas emissions and the resultant global warming.. The issue of climate change is one that plays a frontline role for young people both globally and locally. Young people are forcing this issue onto the agenda of lawmakers, politicians and decision makers. In South Africa the movement for climate justice has begun to play itself out in grassroots level organizing. It is prominent in the fight for food security (exacerbated by the current COVID-19 crisis) and features in the land discussion in terms of sustainable agriculture in a warmer and dryer climate.

The green economy also presents a unique opportunity for job creation, new skills development and sustainability in the country. With the correct policy interventions that are driven and based on research and clear evidence, we can address the crisis of youth unemployment, climate change and even our energy crisis all in one. Therefore we cannot discount the positive ripple effect that these elements can create.

The climate crisis has already taken hold and crippled many parts of our society. Carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions are the biggest contributors to global warming which is the source of the massive changes in the earths' climate patterns.

Youth have a very direct interest in the future and climate change is one of the biggest threats to our sustainability as a country.

Day Zero - South Africa's Water Challenges

Cape Town was the first modern city to experience an imminent loss of water. The

drier period associated with the El Nino weather phenomenon was exacerbated by the effects of warmer global temperatures and poor management of water resources in the region. What we witnessed in 2018 was a dangerous drop in the potable and usable water resources in the Western Cape, specifically affecting the City of Cape Town. Currently, the Northern and Eastern Cape provinces are crippled by drought. While South Africa may not be the driest country, the geography of our landscape means that localised dry areas are severely affected by insufficient water resources. This means that at a national level, we may not be experiencing huge water crises but at a local level, we are experiencing big challenges when it comes to water.

Johannesburg, the economic jewel of the African continent, cannot meet its own water needs and as a result, has to pump water from Lesotho to supplement the Vaal Dam catchment areas. The citizens of the City of Johannesburg are consuming 530 million litres more than they should be. The rapid rate of urbanisation is worsening the situation in all of South Africa's big cities.

What is needed is a systemic shift in our storage and management of our water resources so as to prevent a water crisis from befalling our country. We also need to educate our population on the importance of using water sparingly. In some instances, we may even need to regulate water usage to protect this precious resource.

The Rising Sea - The regional weather crisis

South Africa is located in an area which is impacted by the climate patterns in Antarctica. This past year, a record temperature was measured on Seymour Island in Antarctica at 20.27 degrees Celcius. This

is some 10.27 degrees higher than the upper average range of 10 degrees Celsius. This massive rise in temperature could affect what we call cold fronts, which are vital weather phenomena that contribute to our rainfall. While this may see an increase in the amount of rain we get, the violent storms that it could bring could lead to a severe loss of life as well as severe damage to property and vital infrastructure.

As a result of rising sea levels coastal erosion will soon become a problem. The warmer sea temperatures in the Indian and Atlantic oceans are a threat to fishing grounds and will bring more droughts on the west coast and more hurricanes and floods in the east coast.

The Burning Planet -

South Africa's contribution to the Climate Crisis

South Africa is unique in the context of the developing world. Despite being a developing country, South Africa's contribution to the global carbon pollution numbers is on par with some developed countries and is higher per capita than China. Our contribution of 460 million tons of Carbon to the atmosphere puts us 14th on the list of biggest polluters in the world. This is mainly due to our reliance on coal for energy production. We have recently signed the Paris agreement which committed us to peak emissions by 2025 and plateau them for a decade and then begin to reduce its emissions. This is simply insufficient to address the crisis that is upon us. We are blessed with an abundance of natural resources that can be used to produce energy. Solar and wind power are our most valuable assets for power generation and the shift must be made.

A Just Transition - what we need

Climate change, both the science and the social implications thereof need to be added to the national curriculum, from primary to high school. School children need to understand the up-to-date, relevant and solid science, that is available. (South Africa, specifically Wits university has some amazing climate scientists who have even been part of writing reports for the UN, namely the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.)

Among the urgent steps we should take are the following:

- We need to strengthen our disaster prevention and emergency services, improve their numbers and capacity to deal with not only more intense but also more frequent crises.
- We should place a complete and immediate ban on any new fossil fuel projects. This means no new explorations of oil, gas or coal. No new licenses should be issued to any companies planning to embark on extractivist projects that will harm the environment further. An important balance must be struck. This must be done in consultation with communities including workers and young people.
- A conscious, focused, rolled out a move to renewable energy. This must be done as a phase-out to a just transition. An effort must be made to make sure workers are not left behind, it must be just.
- Immediately set up funding mechanisms to fund the just transition, to make provisions for Climate Jobs in a way that the One Million Climate Jobs Campaign covers. It is important that we do not replicate what is referred to as "greenwashing" or green neoliberalism. This must be a truly transformative process where work itself is transformed.
- The establishment of a climate/green fund to be used to move the country to-

ward being more climate just. This could be funded from Carbon tax and other taxes placed on companies that continue to harm the environment.

- Rethink spatial planning of cities and towns to make sure our buildings, roads and institutions can cope with the destructive nature of the climate shocks to come. The poor must be prioritised in this. Informal settlements cannot stand the destruction of floods, strong winds and storms. We need to be building houses and buildings which are equipped with renewable energy, strong structures that can stand a storm and flood as well as built with eco practices and materials.
- Take a strong stance internationally on climate issues. South Africa is the biggest polluter on the continent and 14th in the world. We have a responsibility to act. the climate crisis is a deeply political issue which poses the most severe threat to the most vulnerable in our society, and South Africa can be a leader on this issue. On the continent and beyond, we must show that it is possible to make the transition to a climate just state, one that prioritises people and planet over profit and takes seriously the existential threat of the climate crisis.

The Youth Perception of the ANC

The current perception of the governing party amongst young people is largely negative. Granted, there is growing positivity since NASREC but it does not have sufficient momentum to win a resounding victory at the ballot box. There are many who celebrate the fundamental role that the ANC played in the liberation of our people, however many also believe that that generation has now passed and are no longer in leadership positions of the ANC.

Amongst the greatest negative percep-

tions of the ANC is that it does not take young people seriously enough due to a lack of youth representation. The ANC is not perceived as a young person's party and therefore the majority of youth do not relate to it. There is a need to create more space for young people to take up serious positions in the ANC and in government to influence policy and its implementation. There are many young people who can be utilized within the movement for this purpose.

Another perception is that it is anti-womxn because of the gender reality in the ANC's top six as well as the multiple scandals that have plagued the ANC over the last few years. It is perceived that the ANC has not taken a strong enough approach to have womxn and young people in their structures, especially not young black womxn. There is also the negative perception that the ANC is an old-aged home or retirement centre. Our leaders and the imagery of the ANC does not inspire or appeal to young people.

What is lacking is inspiration about the vision and the society we want to build, and demonstration that we have the political will and the leadership capacity to take us there. Young people feed on role models and the ANC does not have enough young role models in positions of power whether it is in the party or government. Where this is the case, it must be demonstrated and shown to the country. This is another battlefield that we do not need to lose to the opposition. We have many talented, inspiring and competent young leaders but need to include and showcase them more actively.

The perception of how the organization functions in terms of patronage networks and the politics of gatekeeping, contributes further to driving the wedge between young people and the ANC.

There is a need for us to revive the ANC Youth League as it can serve as an antithesis to the above perceptions as well as be a fighting and mobilising force to meet challenges faced by the youth of this country. Perhaps one of the reasons that the EFF has been able to capture many young minds could be the dormant ANC Youth League that has lost its radical and militant approach on issues pertaining to the youth. At the moment, the youth league and youth structures of the ANC are not considered as structures that represent young people. In the upcoming congress, it will be important to include strong womxn representation as well as educated youth leaders to make the youth wings of the ANC more inclusive.

Ultimately there is a need to create a younger ANC, one that is more appealing to young people and the issues they face. There is also a need to tackle the concept of what is the identity of the ANC post-apartheid, especially given the current political landscape. The task after reimagining the ANC is to take that fresh look at the ANC and how it relates to society at large. The ANCYL has to be in touch with young people and their struggles – be it around education, employment, access to services, childcare, support for substance abuse and survivors of GBV, access to grants, loans and opportunities. It is this ANC that can and will recapture the imagination of the youth.

State leadership and Micro-economy

As we call for expanded access to capital for the black youth, we also recognise the need to campaign for expanded developmental markets that support the enterprises that we want to develop. Currently, the established white companies have monopoly over market access. This is through

their established monopoly over the production value chain and capital access that enables high scales of production at a cheaper rate. By implication, it is established capital that shapes markets in the South African economy. Therefore, there must be set asides in both government and private procurement for enterprises owned by young people and support to young business people to scale up production and reduce costs. We have already made progress with this campaign, with government currently institutionalising a minimum of 30% set-asides for youth owned enterprises in its procurement expenditure. We must escalate this campaign to demand a 30% procurement set-aside for all big businesses that operate in this country.

Employment creation and Decent Work

A radically improved South African economy also needs us to fight for the promotion of decent work. This is why we have also pointed out the urgent need for the demolition of labour brokers that continue to abuse our people who are desperate for jobs. These casual workers are mainly young people. We must also struggle for the removal of experience-requirements for entry level positions and the introduction of a retention policy at the end of Internship programmes.

The Marikana situation in the platinum belt resuscitated debates around the question of a living wage. We need to hold the political position that the wage structure in South African industrial relations retains its colonial Apartheid core elements. This is justified by the historic fact of particularly the mining sector being founded on the exploitation of cheap migrant labour recruited from the former homeland areas. The siphoning off of super-profits by big industrial corporations in a semi-colonial economy like ours has visited devastating effects on

the livelihood of workers and has led to the reproduction the migrant labour network - feeding off the industrial backwardness of our rural provinces from which the cheap labour is drawn.

What do we (the ANC) do to Captivate the Youth

The ANC has lost favour with young people and this has led to a fall in its electoral dominance, and a hostile online and physical attitude among the youth.

Part of the problem is that, as noted previously, young people are not interested in formal public participation and some even display poor social responsibility. Young people vote less and are less likely to participate in mainstream politics and formal political institutions. This is attributable to the fact that young people feel that their interests are not being safeguarded and taken into account by those in charge of those institutions. There is a global trend of youth disengaging with formal politics and organisations, while increasing expression of individual political opinions on social media.

An important part of the analysis that is missing is that the ANC itself has become so suspicious of criticism that it has pushed young people, often a critical demographic, away from itself. In being so resistant to criticism, the ANC runs the risk of permanently alienating itself from the youth. When the ANC should have been listening and watching with a sharp and critical eye, progressive young critics in the professional and academic space, were dismissed as representing “middle-class”, “capitalist” or “imperialist” interests.

The ANC is either right in its assertions or it is wrong. The result of the ANCs heightened

suspicion to criticism and dismissing these concerns is that it loses the opportunity to have an open discussion that engages the youth and other disgruntled citizens. The ANC, therefore, shuts its ears to the concerns of the public and the youth thereby alienating them from the ANC and the ANC from them. Of course, the ANC has opponents, but the lack of discernment between political opposition and good faith criticism from progressives is hurting the ANC.

This is a major reason why so many progressive South African youth organise politically but distance themselves from the ANC. This means that the ANC not only loses potential voters and members but they also make it difficult for our progressive ideas to permeate society and form part of the modern social consciousness among youth.

This places the ANC apart from and seemingly unaccountable to the public. This causes disillusion among many and distance between those who are politically engaged but do not want to put their credibility into question by being associated with an unapproachable and unaccountable ANC. There is no chance under these circumstances that the ANC can attract the youth.

Internally there is a significant amount of gatekeeping in the ANC that frustrates meaningful member participation (particularly youth participation). This practice will disproportionately affect the youth as most newcomers to the organisation will be young people. Thus the ANC loses otherwise engaged young people. This culture of gatekeeping exists even in ANC youth formations and thus condemns them to dysfunction, as evidenced by the paralyzed state of the Youth League.

What then must the ANC do in order to

gain the trust of the youth:

- The ANC must at all times stay true to principles of democracy and freedom of expression, both internally and when dealing with members of the public. This means taking seriously concerns that arise about the ANC's conduct from its members and the public. Elections are not the sum total of democracy, it involves constant participation. Stifling that participation will inevitably lead to an unpopular ANC.
- The ANC needs to govern effectively with integrity and honesty. Delivering services to people, and being honest about its own failures – people know them, they just want to know that the ANC also knows and will address them. Unlike the older generation, the youth have little to no allegiance to the ANC for its anti-apartheid achievements so this is much more important in order to attract them.
- Many young people are not interested in mainstream politics and many of them are single-issue activists. We need to reconsider the manner in which the ANC organises itself and its members (existing and potential). Given the reality that young people are not engaged and have little allegiance to the ANC, we need for the ANC to reach out to them in the spaces in which they exist and not just in spaces the ANC would like them to exist.
- Young people have causes that they pursue and this is evident from the amount of criticism and protest against the government. We must ensure that the ANC is responsive and complementary to all progressive causes being pursued by young people. Many young people are not interested in mainstream politics and may never even join. It is much more important for them to feel that their issues are seen and heard by the ANC than to sign a membership form.
- In allowing for this complementary relationship, the ANC must enable the existence of progressive causes without always attempting to be at the centre. We should allow the space for young people to take the lead on the issues that concern them and their future. This approach to listen and support also needs the political maturity to not dismiss every critical or dissenting view as anti-ANC.
- The youth in the ANC, and the ANC itself, need to pursue socio-political causes beyond the corridors of formal power structures. It is surprising that the organisation that has perhaps sacrificed the most in the struggle for social justice, is today often found wanting on issues of social justice. We have become suspicious and antagonistic to movements that arise in pursuit of some or other social justice issue. Instead of seizing the moment when society may be mobilised for change, we become defensive and criticize those who challenge the status quo. When a member of the public pursues a progressive issue, they should be able to see the positive track record of the ANC with regard to that issue, not simply what the government has or has not done.
- Curb conspicuous consumption among its members and leaders. The ANC leadership behaving like popular celebrities and being known for big bills at night clubs, and luxury cars and clothing, only serves to hurt the ANC as a political organisation. We attract people who are excited by two-metre-long alcohol bills for tens of thousands of rands. More dangerously, it says to the public that the ANC leadership get rich and spends the people's money on expensive alcohol and fancy cars. This hurts the ANC's credibility, among poor South Africans and others who find the behaviour crass. Challenging this behaviour is also important if the ANC is to lead the country out of its drug and alcohol problem.
- In curbing the distance between the

youth and politics, and specifically the ANC, we must meet young people where they are. Young people are constantly participating in political causes and many of them are involved grassroots organisations on those causes. Organisations spring up when people have a common interest and realise that together they can pursue their interest more effectively. The ANC has left the grassroots space fallow by turning the focus of branches inward and away from our constituency. Many branches are mere voting proxies for factions and slates for ANC elections. Community activist youth should be our first target to engage and get into the formal political space. They are already involved and we should at least lend support to their causes and encourage them participate in elections and make their voices heard.

- There are however youths who do not care at all for any social initiatives. They will be especially difficult as they are an even bigger distance away from the ANC and formal politics. However their challenges and problems remain real and as the representatives of the people we have to serve them and their needs beyond trying to just recruit them. Part of our mission has to be to influence consciousness and social transformation through the way we organise and the way we deliver and act in government. It is only when we inspire hope and confidence among the youth that we will attract more youth votes.
- We need to consider more flexible ways for people who do not want join an organisation but are passionate about a particular issue, to participate in campaigns and social movements.
- Many young people will be truly inspired to participate only by a good government, and good and responsive representation by public representatives. At the moment they have nothing that inspires them and drives them to the

ballot. Older people are also abstaining from the vote and good, honest political work, across the board, might be much of what the youth thirsts for from the ANC.

- In the context of Organisational Renewal, it is necessary for the ANC to reconsider its configuration. Inspired by the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1944 as a recognition that not only were the leaders of the ANC frustrating youth ambitions but that the structures of the organisation themselves were also an impediment.

We must ask the question, have we not reached a similar impasse as the pioneers of the Youth League? If we have, the conversation of Organisational Renewal needs to seriously consider whether the architecture of the organisation is suited for the 21st century and the kind of organisation the ANC aims to be. Is the current configuration of the structures appropriate for what the ANC wants to achieve? The current architecture has got us here, the question is, can it take us into the future?

In closing, all is not lost. In fact, there is a very bright future for the ANC if we can navigate this difficult time in our history. If we are able to re-orientate the party to be more youth focused while not losing our credibility, there is a great possibility that the ANC will have new life injected into it. There are dedicated, committed and passionate young people within our ranks who are ready and willing to do the necessary work. We have the tools at our finger tips to reach out to young people – all we need to do is actually utilize these tools. The ANC must be able to again drive the political narrative of the country and not be doomed to follow or chase it.

Young people are crying out, let it be the ANC who answers the call.

ARTS, CULTURE AND HERITAGE: The Strengthening of the Link in ANC Policy and Strategic Repositioning in the Post-apartheid Era

Policy concept document of the ANC Archives Committee

“In our country a new social and political order is being born. Our artists have to play an even bigger role as midwives of this glorious future.”

(OR Tambo)

“The present is the past rolled up for action, and the past is the present unrolled for understanding”

(The Lessons of History by Ariel Durant)

“The doors of learning and of culture shall be opened. The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life.”

(Freedom Charter)

A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

South Africa has reached a milestone of 26 years since the transition to democracy. There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to assess the performance of the ANC as a party that has been in government since 1994. Most of reviews that are documented have tended to focus on economic and political indicators to the exclusion of the arts, culture and heritage sector. This paper is a brief overview of this knowledge gap as it focuses on ANC performance in

this sector. This paper is mindful of extensive material on this subject but it settles for a modest and yet important task of a critical self-introspection that is meant to highlight key areas of ANC performance, strategic importance of arts, culture and heritage in challenging dominant ideologies or hegemonic systems as well as outlining key areas of possible interventions going forward.

The current unexpected black swan global pandemic, Covid19, is expected to unleash an economic and social disaster

across the world. This further heightens the need for an urgent attention with regards to the arts, culture and heritage sectors as they are often the first victims of funding cuts or austerity measures when there is an economic distress in a society. A constructive reflection on the future of the sector becomes a preemptive and strategic conversation about the future of the sector that will potentially forestall negative effects of post-Covid19 interventions by providing innovative ways of advancing the sector. There have been numerous pronouncements that this crisis also present an opportunity to do things differently and revisit our socio-economic trajectory. Factoring in arts, culture and heritage becomes an important opportunity after many lost opportunities in the past two decades of our democratic transition

There are social numerous pathologies that indicate a society whose social fabric has been severely weakened or ravaged. The scourge of gender-based violence, children abuse, rise of child-headed families, rampant crime and gangsterism, collapse of families and communities as institutions of social security, drug and alcohol abuse, spread of violent crime, increasing tolerance of corruption, environmental pollution and degradation, tensions in relations between locals and foreign nationals. There is also a growing realization of a society that is experiencing an acute crisis in its social and cultural fabric right from family level to communities up to a national level. Many other social forces have sort to fill this vacuum as shown by the rise of charismatic churches which have occupied what once were retail shops and factory warehouses to receive a captive audience of distressed people who are being promised instant miracles to solve their problems. There is also resurgence of primordial identity politics which are being exploited by some as a mobilizing tool mainly to access resources and positions. It is argued that, the absence of an articulation and implementation of a well-thought progres-

sive position on arts, culture and heritage including indigenous knowledge systems, has created a vacuum that is being exploited by all kinds of reactionary and retrogressive forces.

The above-mentioned justifications for reflection on the performance of the sector assume a new level of importance and urgency as the ANC is going to be holding its 5th National General Council to review its performance and policies. It is against this backdrop that this paper is presented. Its critical introspective stance is meant to stimulate rigorous discourse on this often-understated strategic area with the aim of generating concrete policy interventions and programmes to protect, promote and preserve our arts, culture and heritage. In the final analysis, it is argued that it is inconceivable that ANC's National Democratic Revolution (NDR) would fully succeed without elevating arts, culture and heritage (social power) to the same level as economic and political power.

B. AN OVERVIEW OF ANC PERFORMANCE IN THE ARTS, CULTURE AND HERITAGE SECTOR

As mentioned in the foregoing narrative, this think piece is a synopsis that examines some observed weaknesses in the ANC's stance on culture and heritage during the post-apartheid transition. It is argued that the ANC had deliberately utilized culture as one of the most effective weapons of resistance against the apartheid regime and it had prominently profiled its envisaged cultural policy for a democratic dispensation. This included a range of international conferences for the enforcement of the cultural boycott and the utilization of artists as a platform for mobilizing people and international solidarity movement against the apartheid regime. Conferences and festivals of anti-apartheid cultural workers were

organized in 1982 in Botswana (themed Culture and Resistance) and the same year in Netherlands (themed Cultural Voices of Resistance) as well as the 1987 Culture in Another South Africa, held in Netherlands. During the exile years, the ANC seemed to have a good grasp of the strategic importance of arts, culture and heritage as demonstrated by the reflection of President OR Tambo when he proclaimed that "let the arts be one of the many means by which we cultivate the spirit of revolt among the broad masses, enhance the striking power of our movement and inspire the millions of our people to fight for the South Africa we envisage." (OR Tambo)


During the democratic transition, however, the ANC almost exclusively focused on political and economic issues in its policies and strategies, leaving arts, culture and heritage as a residual segment of lesser importance. It is argued that this robbed the ruling party of one of its most potent weapons in challenging the dominant ideology, mobilizing the masses and defining an alternative society in a programme of nation-building.

Success or failure of transformation that defines the character of political transition in a society always depends on deep understanding of hegemonic power in all its manifestations. Understanding of the dominant ideology and locus of power in its obvious and subtle pervasive forms is key to developing an effective strategy and tactics to dismantle and dislodge the inherited system. In most social science literature power is classified as residing in three spheres and these are:

1. Economic (dominance of the means of production and the value chain of economy from production, distribution and consumption)
2. Political (control of government and public policy)

3. Social (Arts, culture and heritage)

The interplay of these different components or levers of power are illustrated below.



In South Africa's negotiated settlement and transition, the ruling ANC attained, to a large extent, political power in 1994 and has dominated this space since. This political lever of power was meant to be used to transform the economic and social levers of power in a deliberate counter-hegemonic struggle as guided by the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). The ANC's position on culture and heritage during democratic transition has been, in the main, ad hoc, tentative and poorly expressed in its policy documents. It is often subsumed under a range of other policies with no dedicated focus. It is telling that ANC has had no dedicated arts, culture and heritage policy commission in its conferences since 1991. As a consequence, much of arts, culture and heritage policies were developed and implemented by public servants or technocrats with little authoritative input from the ANC's policy position. Very often, Government Green and White Paper policy blueprints on this sector are an expression of and diffusion of diverse stakeholders in the sector, distilled and synthesized by consultants or technocrats, with little policy directive or input from the ruling party.

In early 1990s, the ANC's RDP policy document was more focused on economic issues and social infrastructure as well as social security issues. Resources were then injected in building and sustaining democratic institutions (new constitution, chapter 9 institutions, parliaments, provinces and local government institutions, election policies and processes etc.), economic and social infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, sanitation, transport system, hospitals, schools) as well as social security (social grants of all kinds, poverty alleviation, trade and commerce). Little attention was given to arts, culture and heritage in form of institutions and resources at all levels of government. When the transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed and cabinet constituted, the Arts and Culture portfolio was the first to be given to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) as it was deemed to be of lesser strategic value at the time.

C. RICH HISTORY OF THE ANC IN ARTS AND CULTURE

As already mentioned, ANC had a better coordination and articulation of anti-apartheid cultural workers' resistance. Leaders such as Barbara Masekela, Mandla Langa, Wally Serote, and Willie Kgositsile had played a prominent role in leading these efforts with the support of ANC leadership. It is also noteworthy that Nelson Mandela helped to secure a partnership with Fort Hare University to host repatriated ANC archives from the early 1990s onwards. With less clarity or clear guidance on what Fort Hare was supposed to do beyond hosting of a significant segment of ANC archives, there has been no significant work done to enhance or upscale the value of these collections. [There has been an ongoing process of digitizing the archives and ensuring their online presence]. Outside this positive decisive intervention, ANC seem to have had a fragmented and opaque idea of what it was to do with its own rich history

and archives leaving this to different individuals and institutions to help themselves on this treasure trove. It is for this reason today that ANC archival material is scattered across the world, often as a consequence of individuals who negotiated portions of what they had in their possession at the time.

It is not clear today that the ANC has intellectual property rights to most of its own material, some of which still need to be repatriated. This painful picture repeats itself in terms of diverse and rich SA heritage and archives strewn across the world, some of which has featured in auction sales at breathtaking prices. The SABC, the national South African public broadcast had accumulated priceless archival material on the country's colonial, apartheid and liberation histories as well as archives on the democratic transition but again these were barely protected when allegedly sold to Multi-Choice.

D. DOES CULTURE REALLY MATTER IN A COUNTER-HEGEMONIC STRUGGLE WITHIN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY?

A compelling theoretical and conceptual expression of the importance of culture was articulated by an African intellectual and liberation leader, Amílcar Cabral, when he delivered a lecture in memory of assassinated Mozambican liberation leader, Eduardo Mondlane. In his lecture, titled **"National Liberation and Culture"** (1970) he presents a compelling argument when he asserted that

"History teaches us that, in certain circumstances, it is very easy for the foreigner to impose his domination on a people. But it also teaches us that, whatever may be the material aspects of this domination, it can be

maintained only by permanent, organized repression of the cultural life of the people concerned...The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated. Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history, by the positive or negative influence which it exerts on the revolution of relationship between man and his environment, among men or groups of men within a society, as well as among different societies. Ignorance of this fact may explain the failure of several attempts at foreign domination-as well as the failure of some liberation movements"

It should be noted that virtually all powerful nations, empires, colonial powers in history understood the importance of culture and heritage and deployed a considerable amount of resources to effectively use these as tools to gain hegemonic control of people. Even current emerging and modernizing regional and global powers such as China, India, Turkey and South Korea have effectively deployed and projected their cultures (histories of their struggles, museums, languages, cultural symbols, cuisines, traditional healing methods, ancient civilizations and set of values and norms) as the core element of their soft power and cultural diplomacy.

During the anti-apartheid liberation struggle, ANC understood the potency of culture as a mobilizing and conscientizing tool for the masses and the world as shown by cultural struggles deploying music, poetry, theatre, and dance. Groups such as Mayibuye and Amandla Cultural Ensemble as well as musicians such as Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela, Jonas Gwangwa, Abdullah Ibrahim, Letta Mbulu and Caiphus Se-

menya as well as a range of similar cultural formations within the country are indicative of a liberation movement alive to the potency of arts and culture as a weapon for propaganda work and a rallying point for the people. In late 1980s, together with international anti-apartheid movement solidarity partners, the ANC organized a conference to outline a blueprint of post-apartheid arts and culture landscape. This momentum or focus was lost during democratic transition.

The ANC produced more reflective arts and culture documents in late 1980s and early 1990s before taking its eyes away from this strategic portfolio, as shown in this ANC Draft Arts and Culture Policy document of 1989.

Arts and culture policy deals with custom and tradition, belief, religion, language, identity, popular history, crafts, as well as all the art forms, including music, theatre, dance, creative writing, the fine arts, the plastic arts, photography, film, and, in general is the sum of the results of human endeavour.

Culture is an integral component of the processes of development, in that it contributes to such processes, but also that it can play a facilitative or destructive role in the unfolding of the developmental process. Culture also seeks to inform and contribute to nation-building efforts. These two processes are of the highest priority in our country at present, and culture has a central role to play in the successful unfolding of these.

A cursory assessment of South African social and cultural landscape immediately reveals that, though a numeric majority, Blacks, (particularly black Africans) remain a weak cultural minority whilst the dominant culture that defines and regulates

public spaces and consciousness as well as memory, is that of a minority. Black culture is still behind the dominant ideology that also links to the global neo-liberal and western ideological outlook of the global system and values.

It should also be emphasized that culture and heritage are a double-edged sword that can be used as a progressive force of mainstreaming unity in diversity as espoused by the constitution or it can rekindle corrosive chauvinistic identity politics if not well conceptualized and articulated. Some of provincial boundaries coincide with dominant ethnic groups and this has, in some instances, been abused as a mobilizing base of primordial identity politics which militate against ANC's effort to forge a broader national identity which recognize and affirm diversity especially of previously marginalized black cultures (languages, music, cuisine, health systems, philosophies of life, dress etc). Effort to rejuvenate arts, culture and heritage should be mindful of these potential pitfalls while at the same time not fall into a default path of embracing the current dominant hegemonic culture of dominant ideology of the west. ANC's progressive stance on arts, culture and heritage could ensure that regressive elements of culture and heritage such as patriarchy, tribalism or any form of ethnic chauvinism or theocratic tendencies are effectively nullify and also help to amplify ties that bind diverse cultural communities including those which were forged during the course of liberation struggle. Absence of the ANC in this public discourse or programmes will increase chances of re-introduction of some of conservative and regressive aspects of our diverse cultures in direct contradiction to our constitution which has enshrined the principle of embracing unity in diversity.

It should not have come as a shock when the 2015/2016 student protest movement targeted statues, place names, language

es, history and institutional culture of public universities. It is also the case that name changes for streets, towns and geographical places in general, has met fierce resistance from those who are custodians of the dominant cultures. Indigenous languages are largely missing in public participation in our democracy and in commerce and education. English and to a lesser extent, Afrikaans, still dominate the space with few cosmetic changes. Ultimately, it is for this same reason that South Africans do not have a shared memory of history, something that is a pre-condition for social cohesion, unity, collective memory of a nation as well as basis for understanding tradeoffs necessary for building an inclusive society. It is also against this backdrop that there has been a persistent and a growing call for decolonization of this cultural space especially from the youth which is demonstrating a new sense of political consciousness and activism. ANC is losing ground in this socio-cultural public discourse especially among the youth agitating for genuine transformation and other political forces are taking advantage of this weakness.

Key policy documents such as the **National Development Plan** and leadership policy pronouncements often invoke social cohesion as an intended goal of our society, something that our constitution also emphasizes. And yet, arts and culture, the essential ingredients of social cohesion, have not found prominence in its articulation and resourcing. It is often invoked in the aftermath of a serious tension in a society only to be put in the back banner once the temperature has gone down, often without the underlying issues being resolved.

In some notable instances there are policies as well as blueprint government policy documents on the sector, but poor implementation, lack of resources and poor coordination among departments conspire to cripple the sector. Education is one of the most important socializing agents that

shape the character, consciousness and outlook of the youth in its formative years. Yet, this lever of power and influence has not received a deliberate and dedicated attention on how a new south African personality is developed beyond the cliché of preparing learners for the market. It is in our education system that the ANC government weaknesses in driving a transformation agenda is clearly demonstrable. There is general failure to enforce transformation programmes on language of instruction as well as the introduction of an authentic history of the country. At tertiary levels there was a time when the shift to focus on science and engineering was done at the expense of social science such as history, philosophy, anthropology, which are essential in unmasking societal dynamics and instill critical understanding of theory. There are promising developments such as the introduction of a new authentic history as a compulsory subject at schools. However, this cautious optimism is tempered by a history of poor implementation of policy decisions.

Archie Mafeje's observation is instructive on the importance of culture in fueling the dominant ideologies and hegemony:

"As Gramsci would put it, hegemony belongs to those who enjoy the greatest ideological resonance in society. It would be foolish to deny the fact that in Southern Africa the English-speakers have the greatest intellectual capital and ideological influence than any other group. They are the undisputed representatives of the international order in the region; they have the greatest and the longest influence on the education system; their political values have universalistic pretensions and enjoy supremacy in the region, as is shown by their general acceptance among what is considered to be more credible black nationalists i.e. those who fit into the liberal mode; and they are recognized custodians

of western culture and civilization which is seen as an epitome of development globally."

An almost exclusive focus on economic and political power has missed the cultural and heritage realm of power which permeates and influences both political and economic discourse and policies, defining parameters of inclusion and exclusion. It is in the cultural space that public perceptions, prescriptions of what is acceptable and unacceptable norms, values, etiquette, collective memory of history and legitimization of certain ideological positions take place. It is this reason that the African philosophy and worldview of Ubuntu/Botho never gained traction and had to be removed from the SA Constitution preamble of 1996 after making a brief appearance in the earlier version of the interim constitution. Thereafter, Ubuntu/Botho was mainly invoked by those who never believed in it, but only invoked it when they wanted to instrumentally use it to ask for forgiveness after which they would dispose it.

In all probability, Nelson Mandela was triggered by an observation that government had almost exclusively focused on the RDP of institutions, economy and infrastructure and neglected the cultural and social dimension of nation-building that he made a clarion call for "the RDP of the Soul" emphasizing the need for Ubuntu as a humanizing perspective of nation-building. It is worth noting that both the dominant white English-speaking neoliberal establishment and Afrikaner formations have developed advanced socio-cultural tools for their hegemonic projects which often find expression in their ideological articulations.

It is also in this context that Seretse Khama (1970) reminds us that:

"We should write our own history books to prove that we did have a past, and that it was just as worth writ-

ing and learning about as any other. We must do this for the simple reason that a nation without a past is a lost nation, and a people without a past is a people without a soul."

Efforts of government to implement some policy decisions on this sector are, as indicated earlier, crippled by lack of coordination among departments that have arts, culture and heritage components in their work. These include but are not limited to the departments of basic education, higher education and training, environmental affairs, social development, defence and military veterans, and cooperative governance and traditional affairs. Arts and Culture is likely to suffer even more marginalization as post-Covid19 SA slides to recession and possible depression as resources will be taken away from what is seen as non-essential "song and dance" portfolio as technocrats fail to appreciate the value of the sector in nation-building.

The ANC, as a governing party that also led the liberation struggle, is charged with two main historic tasks that seem to be contradictory and yet essential for realization of the promise of liberation: addressing the injustices of the past through some form of redress and uniting South Africa towards a common purpose and destiny. Currently, South Africa remains a divided society to some degree, because various communities have a different understanding of the past, the interpretation of the present and expectations of the future. In his Mandela Memorial Lecture, Chilean author Ariel Dorfman captures the essence of this when he observes that "*Enemies remember the past differently and until they agree in some way on the past, are unable to forge a memory common to both sides, their rivalry will refuse to vanish.*" It is in the realm of arts, culture and heritage that such memory is located though it may manifest itself in material conditions of our economy or political sociology. Nelson Mandela had

also articulated the importance of memory as a tool of domination and oppression when he stated that "*at the heart of every oppressive tool developed by the apartheid regime was determination to control, distort, weaken, and even erase people's memory.*"

Taking all of the above into account, the ANC's Battle of Ideas as a strategic lever for challenging dominant ideologies or hegemonic systems can never be complete if it does not take into consideration the centrality and potency of culture and heritage. It is for this reason, and also with the assistance of hindsight, that the ANC's failure to successfully challenge dominant ideologies and the precolonial establishment should, to a large extent, be understood.

WHY DID THE ANC OVERLOOK ARTS, CULTURE AND HERITAGE DURING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION?

There is a complex interplay of various factors that seem to have cumulatively led to marginalization and de-emphasis of arts, culture and heritage. The most prominent factors included the following:

1. Oppressive colonial and apartheid regimes had used culture to oppress and divide people according to their ethnicities and races, so some within the ANC were uncomfortable to raise culture and heritage with the fear that it would militate against unity and invoke primordial identity politics. It was the failure to conceptualize an alternative progressive view and model of cultural diversity that is not divisive.
2. A misconception that real power was in the political and economic realm and not in culture and heritage. In many ways this has been shown to have been a misdiagnosis of power as previous sections compellingly demonstrate the potent force that is culture in shaping

public consciousness and, therefore, national character.

3. The misconception that culture and heritage is about distant past issues which are traditional and conservative, which pose a hindrance to efforts to modernize and deal with unfolding future such as the 4th Industrial Revolution. And yet many advanced modernized and modernizing global powers such as Japan, China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and many others have demonstrated that enhancing and infusing their culture and heritage does not become an obstacle to their advancement instead it is used as a source of inspiration.
4. The complex and pervasive nature of this sector has made it difficult to assess and quantify its social and economic value or contribution to societal well-being. It is for this reason that lack of proper conceptualization and delineation of arts, culture and heritage has led to a caricatured view that this is merely an entertainment “song and dance” area of no strategic importance and value in nation-building and in pursuing a revolution or transformation in a transitional post-colonial society.

Ironically, the ANC’s avoidance of empowering previously marginalized culture and heritage as well as liberation heritage has led to a default embrace of culture of groups that were dominant during colonial and apartheid past as default South African cultures. Dominance of English and to a lesser degree, Afrikaans, of neoliberal ideologies and western cultures can be attributed to this neglect of arts, culture and heritage as strategic levers of the battle of ideas and counter-hegemonic struggles. As stated above, different political formations have made good use of culture and heritage to dominate discourse on transformation and decolonization. They are using these cultural and heritage tools to rally

the black majority and youth in particular, and to some degree they have succeeded to set an agenda for public discourse on areas such as indigenous languages, place names, statues and monuments in public spaces, honouring of heroes/heroines, indigenous knowledge systems, and pre-colonial history. Every indication is that mobilization of culture and heritage as a tool for public discourse and actual social transformation is cumulatively gaining momentum with or without ANC input or guidance. It would be prudent for ANC to be involved in directing this wave in a progressive direction or it could risk being marginalized and social transformation taking on unpredictable form in a global system which is witnessing resurgence and weaponization of culture and identity by populist nationalist movements.

If the ANC is to renew itself and reproduce its power and scope of influence, it has to deliver on improving the material conditions of the poor, mainly black people, on the one hand, and, on the other, it must also master the art of profiling the liberation heritage through sustainable high profile programmes and work towards the transformation of the sector through empowerment of the previously disadvantaged majority.

E. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS

Again, some notable government programmes that are meant to address the promotion of previously marginalized arts, culture and heritage are commendable even though they emanate from efforts of individual departmental and bureaucrats than from a clearly articulated ANC policy position. There are some notable exceptions as development of indigenous knowledge policy framework which was coordinated and led by ANC cadres.

The ANC is the oldest liberation movement in Africa and one of the oldest in the world. It presided over the most internationalized anti-apartheid liberation struggle in the world as well as a home-grown experiment in resolving political conflict and a world-acclaimed model of peace and reconciliation. South Africa has a rich tangible and intangible culture and heritage which is globally recognized. All these are heritage treasures which could ignite and rejuvenate arts, culture and heritage emanating from a unique South African experience that has a potential to capture national and global imagination. More important is a deliberate effort to involve the youth as key agents who will also transmit this to future generations and also utilize it as part of creative industry. Such mainstreaming of culture and heritage will also assist in decolonizing the public social spaces and education system. Flowing from the aforementioned narrative observations, there are proposed steps which are briefly outlined below even though it is crystallized into few key policy interventions and programmes that have catalytic impact hence it deserve prioritization.

- A. ANC **should establish a dedicated policy commission that focuses on arts, culture and heritage** as a focal point for policy development to guide government. If one takes the above compelling arguments on why culture and heritage matter and how it has been used for mobilizing collective consciousness across the world, then it would make sense to have a dedicated policy document on this sector. The coming ANC National General Council and subsequent national conferences should be the target spaces for launching this new policy focus.
- B. **Ubuntu/Botho is widely embraced as a worldview and way of life for indigenous African and yet it has a universal appeal** for its humanist and emphasis

on human solidarity and social justice as well as reconciliation. The central pillar of Ubuntu/Botho is the notion of mutual coexistence. This concept has been devalued, misused and grossly misunderstood, hence the need to elevate and amplify it as a societal and possibly a continental value system which could be infused into many spaces such as family values, industrial relations in workplaces, foreign policy and conflict resolution mechanism.

- C. **New funding methods** should be established to ensure sustainable resourcing of the sector even during the period of economic challenges. The last 26 years of our democratic transition have demonstrated that art, culture and heritage always receive small residual funds and struggle to attract non-governmental sponsorship as well. The aftermath of Covid19 economic hardships will further worsen the funding and resources for this sector, hence the need for innovative mechanisms to keep the sector and rejuvenated.
- D. The ANC **should lead and champion the creation of a liberation memory bank** that transcends partisan lines, thus bringing on board different strands of liberation movements such as the Pan-Africanists, black consciousness, communists and the Unity Movement. The size and scale of the ANC's liberation history will always guarantee its dominance of these collections and programmes. Such a liberation memory bank could be in a form of **a Liberation Heritage Resources Centre** as a hub of vibrant interactive space of not only storage of archives but of continuous education, tourism and continuous harvesting of new and emerging material on past and current struggles. It should craft a funding and operational model for self-sustenance of this resource center. Such a Centre should also help de-

- velop its own capacity to migrate the archival material into the 21st century format such as digitization. This intervention should also take note of the renewal of a memorandum of understanding with Fort Hare University and guide the process of enhancing and full utilization of the archives already at the university.
- E. A clearly articulated **position paper on how culture and heritage are dynamic to reflect the past, present** and position a people for the future as it has been the case in many other developed and developing nations. In the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution or mass digital platforms and the internet of things, it becomes essential to upscale archives and all resources to new digital and online platforms including the creation of virtual and augmented versions of resources for multi-dimensional experience and wider access across the world.
- F. One of the most sensitive and important elements of healing and closure has been the identification, **repatriation and reburial** of the people who died in exile or in prisons and places away from their homes or countries. Lack of coordination and commonly used protocols for such repatriation has a potential to achieve the opposite as it may generate conflict and misunderstanding of different interested parties or families affected by repatriation. There should be repatriation and centralization of liberation material with arrangement of shared custodianship in some specific circumstances. Currently this is an uncoordinated exercise undertaken by various departments and sometimes individual families. In some instances, national figures buried in places like Gauteng are exhumed and repatriated to their village homes and there is no common approach to guide such programmes and factor in family wishes and national interests. There also a need for the ANC to pronounce on **the concept of a place where struggle icons are buried or honoured in a form of a Heroes' Acre.**
- G. **Aggressively drive and advocate for authentic prescribed history in schools, culture and heritage emphasis in Life Orientation programmes**, more culture and heritage content in our broadcast media, rapid transformation of public spaces (names and statues) with emphasis on public education for such steps.
- H. **Development and adoption of the Southern African Liberation Heritage Route as an anchor flagship project of promoting and preserving liberation history.** Champion the project of declaration of Southern African Liberation Heritage Route as a World Heritage Site just like the Silk Road or other similar trails. The African Union has also expressed its support for this project. The embrace and adoption of this SADC-focused heritage project will go a long way to symbolically express gratitude to countries that hosted South African exiles and, in some form, address perceptions of South Africa as a xenophobic country that has no regard for the history of international and frontline state solidarity during the anti-apartheid struggle. It will be a significant manifestation of cultural diplomacy for the region and the rest of the continent. It is worth noting that some work towards realization of the liberation heritage.
- I. Ensure that the merger of Sport and Recreation Department with the Arts and Culture will not eclipse and unnecessarily disadvantage the arts, culture and heritage which do not have the same clout and pull for resources and sponsors as sports.

- J. Family is the basic foundation of any society and when family values and systems crumble then the community follows and ultimately this domino effect weak the social fabric of society. ***The erosion of the African family as a consequence of decline of our cultural and heritage fabric.*** ANC policy position on culture and heritage should put a spotlight on this crisis and provide dedicated innovative solutions.
- K. ***Infusion of indigenous knowledge systems and craft including medicines into the mainstream life.*** Oriental alternative health and medicine is a prominent example of dual systems of health and wellness.
- L. Development of a framework for Greater coordination of departments that have a bearing on arts, culture and heritage. These include but are not limited to Arts, Culture and Technology, Environmental Affairs, Basic and Higher Education and Training, Defence and Military Veterans, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and social development.
- M. ***Development of a concept of how to realize economic value of culture and heritage from tourism to development of creative industries.*** This include development of tools to assess and quantify performance and economic contribution of arts, culture and heritage as an industry as well as reflections on intangible benefits of the sector in the well-being of a nation.

PRIORITY POLICY INTERVENTIONS AND FLAGSHIP PROGRAMMES

All of the above-mentioned areas are important and worthy of intervention. But it is argued that at this historical moment it is important to single out and identify only a few flagship programmes and policies that have a catalytic impact on others as well as a huge symbolic importance for the liberation struggle. In terms of policy intervention, the following areas are in need of urgent attention:

1. **Repatriation policy for mortal remains of South Africans abroad and those in the country away from their places of birth:**
Development of a clear policy guidelines for repatriation that will take into account the both the national interests and family requirements as well as symbolic link to the country or community where the person was buried. This policy will also assist with the development of a well-coordinated approach among different government departments, different levels of government and political formations. So far, repatriation of liberation fighters and leaders from outside the country or from one location to their birthplace within the country has not been guided with any clear policy hence the current fragmented approach which sometimes militate against effort to have a standardized manner of honouring liberation heroes.
2. **Archives policy:**
ANC archives and liberation struggle archives in general are scattered all over the world and the country. Even where they are currently located, there seem to be no clear strategy to promote, preserve and protect them and even up-scale them for better utilization and access in the digital era of the internet of things. This policy will outline terms for re-

patriation of archival material as well as intellectual property rights issues as well as access and utilization. It is not conceivable how liberation memory and public consciousness or memory about the epic anti-apartheid and anti colonial liberation struggle without a well-articulated policy position and strategy on both external and internal liberation archives especially at the time when there is a policy pronouncement on making history compulsory.

3. **Indigenous Knowledge Systems and language policy:**

There is a whole body of indigenous knowledge systems that range from health, agriculture, craft, and home consumer industries being recognized and upscaled for the current epoch of social development. Development and promotion of indigenous languages is one area which is proclaimed in our constitution but does not find expression in its practical application. This will help revisit both the IKS and language policy which mainly exist on paper but have struggled with implementation. The work on indigenous knowledge system spear-headed by Dr Wally Serote is a firm basis to build on especially for the purpose of implementation.

4. **Promotion and mainstreaming of Ubuntu**

Ubuntu has a universal appeal to diverse cultural and religious communities and it already has resonance to the majority of the population as a value system that has been passed on from generation to generation. It holds the greatest potential for new national consciousness which could be at the core of social cohesion and national unity. It may also be part of South Africa's cultural diplomacy in its foreign policy. When Mandela spoke of the RDP of the soul he was mainly referring to Ubuntu which had been eroded. Such a policy

intervention would assist research and policy elaboration of Ubuntu as a world-view that has application in various parts of society from labour relations, foreign relations, citizens' duty and service culture of human solidarity, public service orientation towards customers or people, conflict resolution in form of restorative instead of punitive justice.

There are specific flagship projects which are underway but can be formally adopted and endorsed because of their potentially profound impact on the liberation struggle in public memory and national consciousness. There projects are:

1. **Southern African Liberation Heritage Route.**

AU and Unesco's World Heritage Committee have already endorsed development of this liberation heritage route as a unique multi-national historical experience of global significance for current and future generations to treasure. This would also create an avenue of expressing everlasting symbolic appreciation of the SADC/Frontline States support rendered to the anti-apartheid struggle and also provide story of solidarity among various liberation movements in their various anti-colonial struggles.

2. **Liberation Memorial Multi-purpose Centre**

Such a centre would accommodate all liberation material and become a learning and research centre to utilize all archival material. It could also be a point of collecting and coordinating all repatriated liberation archives.

3. **Establishment of a National Heroes Acre**

Establishment of a national heroes acre as an iconic piece of land to memorialize all those who fought against colonialism and apartheid. This could become a national liberation shrine.

8

THROUGH THE EYE OF A NEEDLE: CHOOSING THE BEST CADRES TO LEAD TRANSFORMATION

Identifying contextual issues to inform a review

Introduction

1. It has been 30 years since the unbanning of the ANC. It has been 26 years since the democratic breakthrough. It has been more than 19 years since the **“Through the Eye of a Needle? Choosing the best cadres to lead transformation”** document was produced. In these years, the ANC has grown in membership and yet the quality of its cadres is fast diminishing.
2. It remains a key political force in South Africa's democratic dispensation and yet its electoral fortunes are waning.
3. Much as there have been advances in the socio-economic and political arena, much still needs to be done.
4. The early period of our democracy was characterized by sustenance of the political stature of the movement and its leadership – deriving from its leadership of the liberation struggle and its management of the political transition.
5. Parallel to this process was a waning counter-revolutionary trend, which constituted a victory for the broad democratic forces.
6. Over time, a new set of challenges began to negatively impact on the ANC's revolutionary morality and ethics. Most members began to have a sense of entitlement to leadership. It had become easy to be a leader of the ANC. Experience, talent and longevity in the movement began to count for little. The ANC was captured by political careerists.
7. This new era saw a clear shift from adherence to the values and norms of the ANC to personality politics akin to cults and loyalties to factions than movement.
8. Members were no longer driven by the desire and commitment to serve. There was no track record appreciated by the ANC and communities alike.

9. In responding to this developing situation, the ANC adopted the document, ***Through the Eye of a Needle***. The aim of the document was to guide members in choosing the best cadres to lead transformation. Through this, the movement sought to strengthen its electoral processes and empower ordinary members – to play their role as articulated in the ANC constitution.
10. The document looked at the challenges we faced then, discussed what kind of ANC is required to meet these challenges, addressed the principles of ANC organizational democracy, and suggested constitutional guidelines for elections and the broad requirements for leadership. It looked at how the base of leadership had widened in the immediate period after unbanning.
11. This included cadres from prison, exile, underground formations and the mass movement who had occupied different leadership positions and also had varied experiences of organizational cultures.
12. The leagues of the ANC were to be important source of leadership for the movement. From the underground, the ANC had to adopt a culture of open mass participation that had helped, during the transition and early years of constitutional democracy, to root the ANC in all areas of the country.
13. The document called on the membership to take charge of the affairs of the organization. It outlined leadership selection processes. In this regard, it asserted the right and primacy of members and branches in deciding the leadership of the ANC.
14. It is now acknowledged that something deeper has gone wrong in the movement. Deviant behavior is finding protection and is thriving inside the ANC led liberation alliance. Is it perhaps the fact that the document is dealing with a needle and not the needle? Is it the size of a needle? Sizes of needles determine the kind of focus and attention you will have in pushing an object through the eye of any particular needle. A needle is sharp pointed but is of no use in sewing if it is not threaded. But the thread must go through a narrow eye which require clear vision or it will keep missing the eye and delay sewing of revolutionary garment. The assumption is that the smaller the needle, the more focused the attention and efforts of finding the path, crafting character and directing an object through the eye. A huge needle allows for lesser focus and attention, so anyone can pass through as a leader at any point.
15. At the core of the need for a review of the *Through the Eye of a needle* document is the manifest lack of revolutionary morality and disrespect of the movement's values and particularly its character. This has led to the loosening of the glue that binds its members and consequently compromising unity and cohesion of the movement.
16. The aim of this review process is to re-establish and position the movement back to its revolutionary soul, values, culture, character and its identity. It is to place the ANC as a revolutionary vehicle for our people to realize the broad objectives of our national democratic revolution – a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa.
17. In developing a new document, the National General Council (NGC) must take into account the totality of factors internal and external to the ANC. These

include new objective and subjective conditions without compromising the mission and values of the movement. The new guidelines must be rigorous as to stand the test of time.

Terms of Reference

18. For almost two decades now the document **Through the Eye of a Needle: Choosing the Best Cadres to lead Transformation** has played an important role in guiding the internal processes through which the ANC elects leaders and deploys as public representatives. The National Executive Committee decided at its meeting on 26-29 July 2019 that, given the changes in the subjective and objective conditions under which the ANC is operating, and in particular the role that money is playing in internal ANC processes, the document needs to be reviewed and updated to assist the movement in dealing with these challenges.

The context

19. The review of this document is taking place under a historical conjuncture where humanity globally is faced with a scourge of Corona virus pandemic (Covid-19).

20. It is an epoch which is dictating to human kind to focus and reflect on the possibility of the new demands or dynamics in the aftermath of Covid-19. It is expected that the global system will undergo major changes, as the extent of which is not yet fully known except to say the VUCA world of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity is upon us.

21. In order to deal with these unfolding complexities, the ANC will need astute cadres who will be agile, responsive, tactical and strategic.

22. The movement still has a considerable number of quality and dedicated cadres who might have been displaced and marginalized by political opportunists. A deliberate effort to open up the ANC to these cadres will demonstrate our commitment to the unity and renewal of the movement.

23. Taking cue from the terms of reference it is clear that money politics has put the ANC in a precarious position of risking being auctioned at all levels. It will lead or it is already happening that the state and private resources are being used thus making corruption to be an essential modus operandi of these transactional politics.

A brief analysis of key clauses of *Through the Eye of a Needle*

24. *Through the eye of a needle* covers all aspects of the revolutionary movement which include the following amongst others:

- what the ANC stands for;
- what it seeks to achieve;
- how it seeks to achieve it;
- the motive forces of the liberation struggle;
- who can join the ANC;
- the conditions of joining the ANC;
- the character and moral standing of a member of the ANC;
- who can be elected into a leadership position;
- the criteria for suitability of being elected into leadership;
- and the culture of the organization regarding campaigning for leadership.

25. Below are extracts obtained from the documents – that are relevant to the matter of the quality of the membership and the selection of leaders within the organization. They are by no means exhaustive; but they highlight the key issues relevant for the purposes of this exercise.
26. **Section 14:** “A mass movement: The ANC seeks to bring into its ranks as many South Africans as possible who accept its principles and policies. As a legal organization, it does not target only particular advanced political activists for recruitment. As long as one accepts its policies and takes its oath, anyone can become a member”.
27. **Section 22:** “Criticism and self-criticism: It is expected that in leading social activity, leaders and members will from time to time make mistakes. The most important thing is that these individuals and collectives should have the capacity and humility to honestly review their work critically and correct the weaknesses”.
28. **Section 34:** “An ANC leader should understand ANC policy and be able to apply it under all conditions in which she finds herself. This includes an appreciation, from the NDR stand-point, of the country and the world we live in, of the balance of forces, and of how continually to change this balance in favor of the motive forces of change”.
29. **Section 43:** “As it developed from being a movement of cadres thoroughly processed and systematically educated in its policies, it attracted huge numbers of people many of whom developed its ranks. Many of them were prepared to face the might of state-sponsored violence for “the last push”. However, some individuals may have joined for the prestige associated with the changes happening at the beginning of the decade; as well as the personal opportunities that would arise when the ANC came into government”.
30. **Section 64:** “How then does selection of candidates happen? Is it a “natural “process where leaders emerge out of some mysterious selection, or is it a conscious act on the part of members? Should members canvass for those they support and /or should individuals promote themselves/ is there a place for lobbying in the ANC?”
31. **Section 65:** “To answer these questions, let us go back to the basics. In the first instance, the ANC constitution asserts the right for individuals to stand for and be elected into formal positions of responsibility. But waving a constitution does not excuse unbecoming conduct. Thus, we need to understand and follow the constitution; but also learn from the movement’s culture while adapting that culture to current realities”.
32. **Section 66:** “Members are not discouraged from canvassing for those they support. And, technically, an individual is not prohibited from canvassing for him/herself. But it is a matter of profound cultural practice within the ANC that individuals do not promote or canvass for themselves. Historically, this has justifiably been frowned upon as being in bad revolutionary taste. One of the main reasons for this is that when cadres of the movement do their work, this is not meant to be an eye on leadership positions or some other personal reward; but to serve the people. When cadres are not in formal leadership positions, they should not will others to fail, but assist everyone in the interest of fundamental change”.

33. Though *Through the Eye of a Needle* was developed as a framework to guide the selection of leaders within the organization, the ANC has continued to experience deterioration in the quality of cadres that emerge as leaders, accompanied by conduct in internal campaigns that leaves much to be desired.
34. Were it an entrenched practice to apply the criteria outlined, among others, in the foregoing extracts in maintaining the quality of the membership and the selection of leaders, the ANC would have been able to mitigate against a number of negative features within its structures and the broad democratic movement that have emerged since the 1990s. It is clear that the guideline provided in the document has been ignored.
35. With political activism having become a career for the overwhelming majority of the movement's middle-level and senior cadres, there has emerged a strong tendency for the emergence of leaders whose sole objective is to use the membership of the ANC as a means to advance their personal ambitions to attain positions of power and access to resources for their own individual gratification.
36. The many challenges concerning the deterioration of the quality of the membership have been identified by successive conferences. In this regard, the political report to the 50th National Conference observed that:
"During the last three years, this has created such problems as division within the movement, conflicts based on differences among individuals, the encouragement of rank indiscipline leading to the undermining of our organizational integrity, conflict within communities and the demoralization of some of the best cadres of our organization.
"In reality, during the last three years, we have found it difficult to deal with such careerists in a decisive manner. We, ourselves, have therefore allowed the space to emerge for these opportunists to pursue their counter-revolutionary goals, to the detriment of our movement and struggle..."
37. The organizational report to the same conference (1997) echoed similar sentiments, *"The competition within the organization for positions in government has added a new dimension to the contestation for ANC leadership positions. Election to an ANC leadership position is viewed by some as a stepping stone to positions of power and material reward within government."*
38. This problem persisted even after the development of the *Through the eye of a needle* which was drafted precisely to deal with these challenges.
39. The organizational report to the 2005 National General Council observed that:
"The picture of our branches is very uneven. In general, across all provinces, the best-organized branches are in the minority, with the vast majority functioning according to the basic minimum of constitutional requirements. In many of our branches there are no sustainable political programs and community campaigns. They are conflict-ridden and unstable and, in many instances, fraught with fights over leadership positions, selection and deployment of councilors, tendering and control of projects and recruitment of membership in order to serve factional or selfish interests."

40. Similar sentiments were also carried in the Political report presented at the 2007 National Conference, which observed:

“All of us are aware of the poisonous phenomenon foreign to our movement, which many of us have characterized as the ownership of some members by other members. These are people who, while holding ANC membership cards, do not belong to the ANC but belong to those who paid their subscriptions.

41. *“This includes unqualified people who get appointed to such positions as Municipal Managers, placemen and women who serve as the pliable tools of their political masters, and who are used to advance the commercial and political interests of their handlers and patrons.*

42. *“We are aware of members of the ANC whom our Secretary General characterized as destructive elements which tarnish the image and effectiveness of our movement. These are people who abuse their positions in government consciously, purposefully and systematically to engage in corrupt practices aimed at self-enrichment.*

43. *“We have been horrified to hear reports of ANC members who occupy positions in government, who have murdered one another as they competed about who would emerge as the victor in the process of awarding government tenders to private sector companies in return for financial and material kickbacks paid by the winning bidders...”*

44. The question that arises is: Why is it that the ANC has not been able to deal with these challenges that have been clearly identified?

New Developments in the socio-economic and political landscape

45. *Through the Eye of a Needle* did not anticipate the massive developments that would negatively impact on the integrity, reputation, standing and leadership role of the ANC in society. This is characterized in the ANC Strategy and Tactics (2018) thus:

“The ANC faces declining fortunes. Internal squabbles, money politics, corruption and poor performance in government all conspire to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public. Some progressive formations and individuals who historically have been part of the broader front of forces for change are challenging the movement on important current issues, particularly corruption”.

46. The base from which the ANC has historically derived its leadership corps has massively narrowed. Key formations of the movement such as the youth league, women’s league and student organizations find themselves in a weaker position politically. The trade union movement is equally weak; and the SACP has itself played a diminishing role of providing ideological support to the rest of the congress movement. All these developments have combined to cripple the ANC, organizationally, politically and ideologically thus denuding it of its leadership role.

47. An update of *Through the Eye of a needle* document should take note of the developments inside and outside the ANC since 2001 when the document was drafted. These developments have been carefully noted in various documents and resolutions of the ANC.

48. It can also be argued that the 2001 document addressed itself in the main

to the role of members and branches without sufficiently emphasizing the role of the leadership and its obligations. It did not look at the issue of accountability by members and leaders. As a result, little emphasis has been placed on consequence management for dereliction of duty and the undermining of the value system of the movement.

49. Besides the fact that people have parroted the content of *Through the Eye of a Needle*, without much commitment to its essence, an air of impunity has reigned across the organization – with some leaders and cadres openly and defiantly violating the organizational precepts that define the movement. Paralysis has seeped into the organization. Members and leaders openly act against the interests of the ANC without any fear of repercussions.

What is the problem?

The Objective Factor

50. The problems that the movement is confronted with are both objective and subjective. The ANC's **Strategy and Tactics (2002)** document asserted that we live "*in a world in which the system of capitalism enjoys dominant sway over virtually the entire globe*". South Africa is very much part of that world. The strategic task of our movement remains that of eradicating a system of colonialism of a special type (CST), whose fundamental basis is an exploitative system of capitalism.

51. In 2007, in a pamphlet titled, '**Revolutionary Morality: The ANC and Business**', the ANC observed that "*The challenge of deepening the National Democratic Revolution(NDR) and its*

transformation agenda in the context of a capitalist economy has been recognized and debated within the ANC and Alliance for more than a decade now. The impact of aberrations such as careerism, personal enrichment and corruption on the revolutionary morality of the ANC has also been observed and debated". The value system of capitalism and its local manifestation is antithetical to the end point we seek to achieve: a just, humane and equitable world order. The task of our movement is to help its members, supporters and society to transcend selfish capitalist values.

52. These values are characterized by greed, crass materialism and conspicuous consumption. This has resulted in many in our society as well as some in our organizations seeking shortcuts to wealth. In order to effectively review the document, we need to acknowledge the negative societal influences on the ANC and its membership. Accordingly, the process of reviewing the *Through the eye of a needle* document puts the obligation to challenge the value system of CST on the shoulders of the ANC and its allies. The critical challenge for the ANC is to continuously work for higher civilizational values of human solidarity, social justice, revolutionary morality and ethics within a system that is exploitative and corrupt.

53. Added to the value system of capitalism, are the accumulated negative tendencies acquired in the process of building a new society. This refers to the bureaucratization or what has come to be known as the 'sins' of incumbency. In this regard, rent-seeking activities by some among us have contributed to the decline in the movement's prestige amongst our people and society as a whole.

54. The ANC's, **2007 Revolutionary Morality** document: **The ANC and Business'** document says that, *"The section on 'Character of the ANC' in the Draft Strategy and Tactics produced in July 1997, raised questions about the ethical principles that should underpin our conduct as a political party in power: "The fact of being in government has also thrown up challenges which were either not pronounced in, or foreign to, the previous epoch. For instance, the approach to deployment in the current phase cannot ignore mapping out career-paths for, and with, ANC cadres; to enable them to play the most effective role, and to advance in a systematic way, in the varied terrain of transformation. Such cadre policy has nothing to do with careerism of the opportunistic variety, which a governing party should always guard against"*.
55. This is not just an exercise of reviewing the document, but is at the same time a soul searching endeavor against negative tendencies like the use of money in internal organizational processes. The irony of it is that we engage in such negative actions while simultaneously referring to ourselves as a revolutionary movement prosecuting a revolutionary struggle. Comrade Fidel Castro clarifies this point in this way, *"In a revolution there are moral factors which are decisive. Our countries are too poor to give men great material wealth but they can give them a sense of equality, of human dignity"*.
- The Subjective Factor**
56. The *Through the Eye of a Needle* and other subsequent documents and conference resolutions have given us a conceptual framework of an ideal revolutionary movement, the ANC. Yet, in practice, the reality on the ground is different. Political opportunists have infiltrated and seized certain parts of the organization. In some cases, even the leadership organs of the organization have been affected by these developments.
57. In this review, we also take stock of our current subjective weaknesses against the core values of our movement which have been tested in the crucible of struggle over more than a century of its existence. The power is within us to rise to the occasion or stall to a halt. Coupled with this is the ever increasing need to further develop and strengthen the capacity of the motive forces for change to grasp the essence of our epoch.
58. The key challenge is the subjective factor – that is, the absence and or the erosion of the necessary political consciousness in our ranks. While ideological training and political education have, to some extent, put the ANC in good stead, it is also true that ill-disciplined behavior and the undermining of the value system of the ANC have also come from individuals who have undergone such training and who occupy leadership positions.
59. And so, bad and corrosive conduct manifests itself from the leadership level, to the cadres and then to ordinary members of the movement. We have, in fact, reached a stage where a toxic leadership has poisoned the rest of the ANC; and it has set the tone of what is meant to be acceptable conduct within the organization, including deviant practices.
60. Experience has shown that, selecting the best amongst us cannot be seen outside intensive political, ideological and organizational work. The recruitment and development of cadres in the organization is a product of a con-

scious and deliberate action. Without a plan, accidents will happen and consequently, the ANC will present the people of South Africa with public representatives who are not steeped in the ideas, culture, the value system, vision and mission of the ANC.

61. The failure of the ANC to fully implement the guidelines in *Through the Eye of a Needle* and other documents arises from, amongst others, the inability to exercise political and organizational leadership functions. It is the inability to act when members deviate from established policy positions and ill-discipline. The tone is not being set from the top. The ANC is engulfed with paralysis in decision-making. The notion of democratic centralism suggests that while there is a need to allow for democratic expressions at different levels of the organization, the exercise of leadership is an important variable in the mix. The preponderance of factional activities has resulted in the emergence of what can be characterized as **organization-al populism**: that is, the inclination to shy away from taking difficult decisions and to cave in to the conduct and demands of rogue elements.
62. Related to the above, there is a lack of accountability for our actions as leaders and members, in terms of owning up when we deviate from the values/culture of the ANC and our struggle for the attainment of a new society. And arising out of this is the inability to effect consequence management. The organization is ceasing to act as an integral whole, but a collection of individuals pursuing their own self-interest.
63. Accountability also means holding our leaders, cadres and general member's feet to fire. It is to ensure that they do what they were elected to do – serving

the people of South Africa. It is also to ensure that everybody is accountable for his or her actions.

64. Related to this is the need to clarify the fundamental concept of unity in the context of the programme of **organizational renewal** we seek to undertake. Renewal seeks to reassert the principles that inform the ANC's organizational principles as captured in *Through the Eye of a Needle*. To recapitulate, these cover the following spectrum of issues: what the ANC stands for; what it seeks to achieve; how it seeks to achieve it; the motive forces of the liberation struggle; who can join the ANC; the conditions of joining the ANC; the character and moral standing of a member of the ANC; who can be elected into a leadership position; the criteria for suitability of being elected into leadership; and the culture of the organization regarding campaigning for leadership. This is the framework within which unity should be pursued – not as an amorphous and unprincipled closing of ranks; but unity informed by revolutionary principles that define the ANC.
65. The real question is what sanctions we could impose as a movement if regulations or even guidelines that we bring into effect are violated by our members. Such sanctions will need to be punitive, be applied timeously and firmly, and thus become a deterrent to deviant behavior. The measures that are put in place should also respond to a worsening situation in the movement. In the NEC Statement (30 July 2019), *"the NEC further noted and strongly condemned the use of intimidation, violence and even killings, to access positions in the ANC and government, resources and patronage"*. The ANC seems to be engulfed by inaction and paralysis in the face of activities of the

forces of reaction and rogue elements within its ranks. We are unable to act to save the movement from self-destruction. There are many cases of ill-discipline that are not acted on in the provinces, municipalities and branches. This leaves the ANC weak. The tone is that of impunity across all levels of the organization.

66. Related to this are the questions: is the profound cultural practice within the ANC that individuals do not promote or canvass for themselves, still a sustainable mechanism for selecting leaders?
67. Is the reliance on the assumed culture of the organization, as outlined in the document, still a reliable mechanism for sustaining cohesion within the organization?

The role of money in the internal election processes of the ANC

68. The political economy of capitalism is premised on the culture and values of individualism for its sustenance and survival. Consequently, its political culture is informed by such logic. The American system is a case in point. Whilst our political economy is that of capitalism, our political culture as a movement is manifestly contrary to that of capitalism. As a movement, we have strived to inscribe this political culture into our constitutional dispensation. The question is whether we as a movement can transcend the inner logic of a capitalist political economy?
69. Faced with today's challenges where money has become the prime determinant on who becomes the leader of the ANC, the document does not prescribe a mechanism for regulating

or eliminating this tendency within the organization. With regard to the use of money in the campaigns for leadership, the movement is faced with two options. The first option is to insist that, the ANC is a revolutionary movement whose creed is based on progressive value system, revolutionary morality, selflessness, comradeship amongst its members and its general orientation to uplift the poor and the working people. Informed by the preceding statement, the notion of money changing hands for personal election purposes is an anathema to the movement. It is at the heart of ANC's moral crisis. It has begun to slowly change the nature and character of the movement as we know it. Accordingly, we have to revert to the core values of the movement, where money has no role to play in determining leadership outcomes. This very much depends on a membership that has high levels of political consciousness and is capable of holding leadership to account. **Is it realistic to insist in this direction?**

70. The second option is to create an institutional framework within which campaigning for election into elective positions should be regulated with the associated resources that this comes with. The ANC will thus be led by those who have money/resources and cease to be biased towards the working class and the poor. The reality is that, there is no free lunch in any human endeavor. Those who paid for the candidate to secure a leadership position will very soon determine policy positions and expect to be first in the queue for tenders in government. In some instance, it becomes a **Faustian Pact**. There is still the responsibility to deliver/pay your end of the bargain.
71. If we follow, the American system of inner party campaigning, the whole po-

litical institutional fabric/arrangements and culture of the ANC led revolutionary movement will have to change. The key question is whether the ANC is ready for this change. Presently, there is a tension between the objective developments within the movement (implications of working with a capitalist system with its attended value system) and the social, ideological and governance clothing of the ANC. This tension may result in rapture in the organization (remember the notion of the relationship between the forces of production and the relations of production – if they come into conflict, a revolution sets in).

72. Yet, there is a view that the ANC has to be realistic and accept that we live in conditions that are not of our making. That to ignore, the presence of money in our internal election processes is to live in a fool's paradise. That to ban this phenomenon altogether, will result in driving these activities underground. The option is therefore to regulate the issue of individual campaigning and the use of money in the process. The ANC has to be clear on the basis that should form the platform for campaigning, is it based on policy/platform purposes. In recent times, the campaigning inside the ANC has nothing to do with policy positions. So, the reality is that, we should confront the usage of money in our processes.

Lessons from the Communist Party of China

73. One of many ANC delegations on the exchange programme with the Communist Party of China (CPC) unearthed many lessons which we should learn from. The experiences of the CPC throw the light on how we should confront our organizational challenges. Relying on the level of political consciousness

of its members, the CPC places great importance in education and training of its cadres. Key principles that guide the Party in these areas are:

- Putting people first and teaching according to realistic demands.
- Training the whole party and ensuring quality.
- Development of all round competence and stressing practical activities.
- Keeping up with time and continuity reform and innovation.

The party school permeate all levels of the party including the one specifically for senior leaders. There is a National Party School at a national level and several colleges at provincial levels. The party school nationally focusses on researching philosophical and social sciences for the party and it is the main agency for the training of leading cadres and party members.

74. Combating corruption in the CPC is directly linked with upholding the integrity of the party. For the CPC the struggle against corruption is not just a moral question but also a major political task that acquired a systematic and programmatic approach within the Party (from highest to lower levels of the structures), the state and society as a whole. It has laid out the principles of combating corruption and upholding integrity. It seeks to fight corruption in a comprehensive way – that is both its symptoms and the causes. Many leading cadres have been caught up in corruptive behavior (since the introduction of market forces and 'opening up' policy) occurring at the intersection between the state officials and the private sector, especially at the procurement of government services and investment actions

75. The CPC made it very clear that up-rooting corruption is part and parcel of maintaining and enhancing public support for the prestige of the Party. It has done without fear or favor and its actions included punishing senior cadres of the party including members of the Central Committee and Political Bureau. The CPC has also invested a lot of research into the scourge of corruption – e.g. the process of appointing of cadres in the state, in this case the CPC found that some senior bureaucrats have actually bribed their way to get such positions. One innovation by the CPC was to establish a special agency to monitor mega investment/ construction, such as the Beijing 2002 to ensure a corruption free environment.

Aligning to the values of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

76. Is it not opportune to realign the document with country's constitution and its values, so that its implementation does not lead to the violation of the constitution resulting in litigation?
77. Does the document provide an adequate mechanism for getting rid of rogue members and counter-revolutionaries that have infested the organization as observed by various leaders of the ANC? If not, how can the document be updated to meet this challenge?
78. Further, inserted in the document should be the requirement for lifestyle audits at least for leaders; and clear guidelines on how leaders and members in conflict with the law should conduct themselves in relation to organizational structures.

79. Arising from all these observations is the assumption that revision of Through the Eye of a Needle should deal not only with the desire to encourage positive and appropriate conduct (the do's); but also, the firm assertion of sanctions that need to be imposed when principles are violated (the don'ts).

Where to from here?

80. The ANC **Strategy and Tactics (2018)** has identified key areas of strategic interventions in order to raise the overall efficacy of the movement and ensure that it reasserts its status as a leading and respected political and ideological force in South Africa and the rest of the African continent. These interventions include amongst others the following:
- Revitalizing and shoring up the visionary and policy integrity of the movement
 - Implementing an intensive programme to restore the integrity of systems of managing membership and leadership
 - Building up leadership integrity (this refers to the criteria to qualify as well as processes of selecting leaders
 - Strengthening the integrity of technical systems including modernization of the membership system and interactions among members.
81. The implementation of these four interventions together with other measures such as political education and ideological training could help in enhancing the quality of ANC members and cadres and make them effective community leaders and public representatives.

82. When *Through the Eye of a Needle* was first formulated, the current challenges were in their initial stages. An updated document must respond comprehensively to this fast-developing situation which is threatening the future of the ANC. In order to send reassuring signals and positive messages to South Africans, we need to show through the leadership selection processes that the ANC can act decisively to stem the tide of anarchy. We have to act without fear or favor!

83. As both a liberation movement and a governing party, we need to find and nurture cadres who possess a combination of attributes and skills that relate to political acumen and experience, ethical conduct and academic training. As asserted in conference resolutions since Mangaung (2012), these attributes and skills will have to be in keeping with the challenges of our times.

84. Addressing the issues of the selection of candidates must be seen in the context of a general milieu that exist in the movement today. This is set out in the 54th National Conference resolutions which call for renewal of the ANC and the democratic movement as a whole. Selecting candidates should be seen as part of the renewal process. In embarking on this process, society and communities must get a sense that the ANC is breaking with a toxic past. The tone in this undertaking must be set from the top. We must enforce accountability by leaders and members. We must implement consequence management.

85. As part of the renewal process and actualizing new ways of working, conditions must be created to allow the exercise of free will by ANC members in deciding their candidates for the

coming conferences and municipal elections. Factional lobbying and the use money have not abated. The ANC must consciously endorse effective, experienced and professional candidates from within its ranks and that of the broad liberation movement. Our candidates must be **popular** and not **populist**.

To be popular means that our members are rooted in communities, have earned their stripes by working honestly with people and by taking up people's concerns and advancing their aspirations. Such leaders do not take shortcuts by hiding the truth from the people – they provide leadership; however difficult that may be. Taking from Amilcar, Cabral's teachings, they hide nothing from the masses of our people. They tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. They mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. They claim no easy victory. Yet they work with people to solve complex problems confronting communities. In this way, they derive their popular standing amongst the people. Unlike populist, they don't inflame people's emotions and problems but work with them to find solutions.

Are these measures adequate to put a stop to organizational implosion?

86. In the words attributed to Albert Einstein, *"we cannot solve our problems with the same level of thinking that created them"*.

The ANC needs to be turned around and repositioned to its core purpose. National Conference has adopted resolutions on the renewal of the party. Conditions need to be created to make renewal possible. The ANC leadership must be willing to take drastic decisions to stem the tide of a rapidly deteriorating situation in the organization.

87. At its July 2019 meeting, the NEC “... noted and strongly condemned the use of intimidation, violence and even killings, to access positions in the ANC and government, resources and patronage”. If this assessment of the NEC is accurate, reflecting the most barbaric and counter-revolutionary conduct infusing various levels of the movement, firm and decisive action is urgently required.

88. In this regard, some form of ‘organizational state of emergency’ needs to be imposed on the ANC. We cannot start the process of renewal under conditions of anarchy.

What measures?

89. In the implementation of the new digital membership system, initiate a campaign to get every ANC member to re-apply for membership (over a period of, say 2 years)

- Introduce a vetting mechanism for all members of the ANC, which – in addition to principles contained in the ANC constitution – should include a police clearance certificate and an acceptance that any false declarations on any criteria would lead to declining or termination of membership
- Strengthen the role and place of the Integrity Commission in line with the resolutions of the 2017 Conference, and ensure that its recommendations are respected: going forward, this should include pre-conference ‘integrity checks’ for all those availing themselves for leadership positions
- Through a mechanism that enjoys universal confidence, conduct Lifestyle Audits and ‘integrity checks’ starting with national and

provincial leaders, and later regional and branch leaders

- Strengthen, in any other ways, the frameworks for heightened accountability by all deployees
- Ensure swift and decisive action against wrongdoers.
- The movement must openly discuss the issue of campaigning for leadership positions in the organization and the use of money that accompanies this phenomenon. How do we regulate campaigning? Very often the campaigns are not based on the difference in policy positions or the how we look we take the ANC forward but it’s always personality based. The reality is that, campaigning and the use of money cannot be ignored. Otherwise it will be driven underground and allow the organization to be captured by unsavory characters. So, what is the process that has to be established by the ANC. This phenomenon needs to be regulated, or does it?
- No member of the ANC should assume the position of leadership at all levels without having undergone a structured political and ideological education process.
- This means that the Through the Eye of a Needle document must be brought to speed with other documents (such as the constitution) where it is lagging behind.

On the matter of tone, style and format

90. Very often, ANC documents are seen to be made for a cadre-based party. This is a function of operating in exile, prison and underground. The reality is that the ANC is now a legal mass-based organization, whose membership is open to all South Africans who

agree with its aims and objectives. These members and supporters have varying level of political consciousness. The ANC consist of ordinary members, activists, organizers, cadres and different levels of leadership. Most of our members have not been tempered and steeled in struggle and have in most time operated in open mass political conditions. The challenge for the ANC is how, while retaining its central revolutionary concepts and ideas is able to communicate its view of the world to its multiple layers of membership. Therefore, the tone, style and format of the new document should take this into account. It must be easy to read and grasp. This is in no way suggesting that the ANC abandons its own language or nomenclature but a call to be conscious of the fact that its base has widened over years.

Conclusion

91. It is common cause that the organization is in crisis and has difficult choices to make: either let the downward spiral continue or work towards a new beginning. The review of *Through the Eye of a Needle* must be conducted with the view to amongst other:
- Reassert the ANC's historic values and principles at all levels of the organization
 - Implementation of decisive mechanisms to root out the rot within the

organization including getting rid of rogue and counter-revolutionary elements

- Adopt a clear and practical framework to renew and regenerate the ANC.
- Develop modernized mechanisms for developing and identifying leadership and for selecting leaders across the organization

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS

- **Is the current *Through the Eye of a Needle* document sufficient to guide ANC members in the current period?**
- **Which areas of the document need to be strengthened?**
- **What measures should the ANC put in place to address the issues of the usage of money in the internal ANC candidate selection processes and that of choosing cadres for leadership in the movement?**
- **Are the current disciplinary processes swift enough?**
- **Do you agree with a raft of recommendations contained in this document?**

ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

NGC 2020 Discussion Paper

“In a crisis, what was once unthinkable can suddenly become inevitable.” Rutger Bregman

Introduction

1. The 1994 transition meant a fundamental shift in how the ANC carried forward its mission, as it emerged as governing party after the first non-racial democratic elections. For the first time in its history, it had the responsibility and opportunity to put into practice its policies of a different South Africa, envisaged in the **African Claims of 1943**, the **Women’s Charter of 1954**, the **Freedom Charter in 1955**, the **Harare Declaration (1988)**, **Ready to Govern (1992)**, the **Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994**; and a host of other policies it developed over the decades. This was captured in its **1994 elections slogan of A Better Life for All. Sekunjalo**.
2. Twenty five years later, our movement face an existential crisis, which countless national gatherings since the 1997 National Conference in Mahikeng warned against. The 54th National Conference, and the Policy conference that preceded it, spent much of deliberations on this existential crisis.

At the end of Conference, the Declaration called for a “*deliberate and sustained programme of unity and renewal*”, based on what **Strategy and Tactics (2017)** calls ‘strategic interventions of re-engineering, renewal and regeneration’.

3. 54th Conference identified the problems which renewal must address, in order to carry forward its mission as a liberation movement and as governing party:

Problem statement 1: A distant inward-looking ANC unable to be agents of change and connect with communities, the motive forces, and sectors of society, out of touch with our constituency, and not schooled in the values and goals of the ANC. Leaders and members who lack basic leadership, organising and communication skills, and are unable to motivate and mobilise activists, civil society, supporters and voters. This is reflected in the ANCs declining electoral support, including the loss of a majority in five out of eight metros.

Problem statement 2: An ANC that is increasingly losing credibility and trust from the people because of our performance in delivering a better life for all, corruption and state capture, and because we are not seen to be “*managing state resources for the benefit of our people, effectively, efficiently and economically*”. We undertook to build a developmental state as a major instrument of transformation, and yet our people no longer believe that we have ‘*good plans to create jobs and change the economy.*’

4. Many of these issues are not new, but the general agreement is that it has reached such a stage, that it has led to an existential crisis for the ANC. Existential, not so much that the ANC may cease to exist, but that its historic role in the South African polity, its unity of purpose, values and standing amongst the people have been battered to such an extent due to the sins of incumbency, that its very character as a people's movement and agent for change is under mortal threat.

A Movement of Renewal

5. The ANC since its inception has been a movement of renewal, that adapts to external and internal challenges and changes. Few political organisations and parties survive for more than a century, weathering local, continental and global changes. Born at the turn of the last century, the ANC was formed against the backdrop and in response to the Union of South Africa of 1910 and the 1913 Land Act, the growth of the mining-energy industrial complex, the consolidation of colonialism of a special type and patriarchy, the growth of volkskapitalisme in tandem with grand apartheid, becoming a mass movement in the 50's, banning

and exile, and the transition of 1994. It lived through two World Wars, the consolidation, struggles against and dismantling of colonialism, through the 1917 Russian Revolution and the 1918 Spanish Flu, the Great Depression of the 1930's, the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the war on terror, unilateralism, multilateralism, structural adjustment programmes, globalization, rising neoliberalism and the growth of regional blocks.

6. Organisationally, these 108 years were challenging, with ebbs and flows, and sometimes with its very existence in question. And yet, the ANC continued to renew itself, even after a range of factors placed its survival as an organisation and leader of progressive forces into serious doubt during the late 1920s and 1930s. It survived the severe repression, mass detentions, banning of its allies and leaders, treason trials and the steady advance of grand apartheid and consolidation of apartheid colonialism and patriarchy in the 40s to 60s. The ANC adapted to and emerged intact after illegality and thirty years of exile – from its banning in 1960, with large numbers of its leadership and activists in prison or banned – to its unbanning in 1990.
7. The various elements which made it possible for the movement to renew itself over the decades include: a commitment to its progressive ideals and mission; selfless and courageous leadership and cadreship; putting the interest of the people and the country first; understanding of the balance of forces, and strategy and tactics; and continually building the capabilities of cadres and the organisation to implement and account for the tasks at hand.

8. As we face this existential crisis, we must ask therefor ask the question whether we have what it takes to pull the movement from the brink, and drive a successful programme of renewal and unity, as urged by Conference.
11. The NDR seeks to build the best in human civilisations, in terms of political and human freedoms, the realization of socio-economic rights, value systems and identity. Such human civilization should firstly be based on our ability to continually improve the use of our natural endowments, to turn it to collective human advantage, and ensure its regeneration and sustainable use for future generations. It is secondly based on the management of human relations on the basis of political equality and social inclusion.

A Revolutionary movement, with a Revolutionary mission and tasks

9. Despite these existential challenges, there is ironically agreement about the mission, character and tasks of the ANC in the current period.
10. **Strategy and Tactics (1997/2017)** articulates the central mission of the ANC as the liberation of Africans in general and Blacks in particular from socio-economic bondage, by resolving the fault lines created by apartheid colonialism and patriarchy and the creation of a National Democratic Society. In this regard, the ANC has national and democratic tasks, listed as:
 - A united, democratic and non-sexist state based on the will of all people.
 - A dignified and rising quality of life among all people by providing for equal rights and opportunities for all citizens.
 - The restoration of the birthrights of all South Africans with regards to access to land and other resources.
 - A thriving mixed economy, which reflects the natural endowments of the country and the creativity that a skilled population can offer, and that address the political economy of the distribution of income and assets, and the reality of white and patriarchal dominance in the economy.
12. It is indeed the continuity of this mission of a National Democratic Revolution, social and economic emancipation and the building of a National Democratic Society, that still defines the ANC as a *'disciplined force of the left.'*
13. Arising from this mission, there is also agreement on the ANC tasks during this phase of the NDR:
 - (a) To represent, organise and mobilise communities and the motive forces and win their support and elections.
 - (b) To win and use state power, by building a capable, developmental state, to better the lives of the people and advance towards a National Democratic Society.
 - (c) To make policies, win broad support for them, implement them through the state and monitor implementation and the impact on our people and transformation.
 - (d) To transform society through our programmes, values, our integrity, exemplary leadership in society and by winning the battle of ideas in a convincing manner.
 - (e) To select and deploy capable leaders and public representatives, with integrity, capacity, the

correct orientation and expertise to drive and implement our programmes.

- (f) To develop cadres, schooled in our values and policies, with the capacities to be agents of change wherever they are deployed.

14. We shall again argue that these tasks in the current phase are indeed revolutionary. As an NGC, we will review

the progress, we've made in each of these tasks. It will have to honestly reflect on whether we are tackling the organisational challenges identified in the problem statements (para 3), which consistently undermined our capacity to effectively implement these tasks, continues to endanger the building of a National Democratic Society and therefore our character as a revolutionary movement.

SINS OF INCUMBENCY AND MANIFESTATIONS (54th National Conference)

- (a) A loss of confidence in the ANC because of social distance, corruption, nepotism, arrogance, elitism, factionalism, manipulating organisational processes, abusing state power, putting self-interest above the people... and loss of support amongst sectors such as the middle class, civil society and social movements, and sections of the intelligentsia.*
- (b) Leadership weaknesses and loss of integrity, characterised by competition to control state resources, factionalism, conflict, ill-discipline and disunity, and the use of state institutions to settle differences. Slates and vote buying have delivered leaders who have difficulty driving our programmes or commanding respect from society and our supporters.*
- (c) A lack of planning, coordination, implementation and accountability for our work in government and the achievement of our policy goals to create a National Democratic Society. We have serious weaknesses in achieving economic growth (and transformation), overcoming education challenges, and in the effective combatting, prevention, investigation and prosecution of crime and corruption.*
- (d) Organisational work, outside of elections campaigns, focused more on mobilising members to support specific factions or individuals with increasing negative practices like gate-keeping and buying of membership.*
- (e) Loss of trust in organisational integrity because of practices like membership and vote buying, factions, using state institutions against each other, and factional violence and killings, and members resorting to courts to settle internal organisational disputes.*

IMPLEMENTATION OF 54TH CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

16. The National General Council is a forum for review of implementation of the resolutions adopted at National Conference to date. 54th National Conference resolutions on Organisational addresses two core issues: (a) Strengthening the Organisational capacity and structures of the ANC, and (b) Strengthening the Integrity of the ANC and its role in society. The main actions and how far we have implemented these are summarised in this table below:

ACTION IN RESOLUTIONS AND STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION
<p>A. Resolutions on Strengthening Organisational Capacity and Structures</p> <p>A1. Work of the Branch in the Community</p> <p>The resolution spells out the tasks of rebuilding branches, their role in communities, and the annual plan of the BEC. The process of rebuilding branches, over the last 30 months, have focused on the introduction of the new Membership system, Induction of BECs and ensuring that BBGMs take place. The Mass Political Education programme saw the training of trainers on the Branch Manual, but the training for BECs were held back by their mandates expiring and delays with the Membership system implementation.</p> <p>Despite these challenges, most branches during 2018-2019 participated actively in the 2019 Elections campaign, although once again we only managed to reach 20% of voters through our outreach, using the voting district system.</p> <p>During the Covid-19 pandemic ANC branches were initially demobilized, but a Covid-19 Action plan was developed and distributed to structures, and on 15 April 2020 we started a ward base Covid 19 reporting system on the ANC Cloud. Within three months, we managed to have 64% of branches reporting on the system, working with ward councilors.</p> <p>Branches also participated in the various national programmes, including political seminars, and commemoration days.</p> <p>The technical details of the Branch Functionality Audit have been developed, but this is delayed by the focus on getting branches to be in good standing, delayed by the Covid 19 pandemic.</p> <p>Aspects of the resolution still to be implemented:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Develop training on the ANC Branch manual as an online course;• Branch Functionality Audit and reporting• Establishment of ANC international structures in countries with sizeable SA diaspora <p>A2. Member Recruitment and Induction</p> <p>The resolution calls for a “modernised, technologically enabled, membership system, speed up membership cards, online renewal and discourage gatekeeping and encourage transparency.” Further calls for a branch recruitment strategy, allocation of the membership fee to branches, probation period, branch audits involving BECs.</p>

The ANC procured a new service provider, and development of the system started, with Phase 1 completed. The system is live, and has the essential elements: allowing members to manage their own membership system, transparency in state of membership at all levels, key role for branch secretaries, and audit trail throughout the system. It also makes the physical counting of forms, which made gatekeeping and other fraudulent activities such as membership buying more difficult. The initial development phase had its difficulties, including the need for the Ziveze campaign in 2019, but the system eventually went live in February 2020. Training on the membership system started in December 2019, and we were starting with training branches. The pandemic halted this, but Organising has since June 2020 started to train Branch secretaries and others virtually.

The delays with the launch of the system, though necessary, had an impact on BBGMs due over the last two years, with a knock-on effect on regions and some provinces.

The next steps for 2020 is to complete the Branch training on the system, resolving teething issues, review Phase 1 and to move towards phase 2 and 3 development of the system.

Aspects still to be implemented/strengthened:

- Resolve issue of allocation of membership fee to branches: recommendation from Finance Committee.
- Recruitment strategy for branches part of the ANC Branch manual
- Complete Phase 1 evaluation and roll-out of the MMS.
- Ensure production of regular Membership reports to NWC, PECs, RECs and BGMs.

A3. Clear ANC POA at all levels

As per the injunction of the Resolution, the NEC since 2018 each year adopted and Annual POA, based on Conference resolutions, which provinces and regions then use to develop their own POAs. Annual budgets have also been presented to the Finance Committee each year, however, there remains a serious problem in our capacity to fund our programmes and structures. The POA are discussed at Makgotla at the beginning of each year, and we also had a special Lekgotla in May 2020, after the NPE to plan around the Manifesto.

POA implementation has been inconsistent, as has been the reporting on the implementation of the POA. We have produced Annual reports for 2018 and 2019, but this has not been discussed by the NWC or NEC. For 2020, we also have to revise our POA in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Areas of resolution to be improved or implemented

- Capacity in SGO to monitor and coordinate POA, and to ensure discussed by structures.
- Programme funding.

A4. Cadre Development

The resolution calls for Induction of membership; RECs, BECs and PECs; and Councilors. Expansion of the Political school online courses to assist ANC study groups and individuals to complete the courses. Encourage leaders and deployed cadres at all level to develop their skills, qualifications and enhance capacities and ANC to run compulsory schools for leadership collectives and deployed cadres. Develop virtual and real discussion forums on current debates; use radio and podcasts.

The NEC adopted the Mass Political Education programme, aimed at training 1000 cadres capable to help with political education in branches, especially supporting branch study group and Induction. To date, less than half of this number have been reached, due to resource constraints, with similar restrictions on more general Induction.

The OR Tambo School of Leadership was finally launched at the beginning of 2019, and is now up and running with its board and staff. To date over ... have enrolled and passed the current Online ANC courses, and funding has been sourced for the remaining 5 modules.

During 2018-19 we celebrated the Centenaries of cdes OR Tambo, Mandela and Ma Sisulu, through memorial lectures and other events. Ironically, the 2020 pandemic forced us to do more virtual Umrabulo session, and we have seen especially ANC Youth League structures being very active in this regard, followed by the ANC and the WL. We have, however, not been able to use this to influence national debates nor engage sufficiently in the battle of ideas.

Areas still to be implemented/strengthened

- Mobilising sufficient and sustainable resources for Cadre development and the OR Tambo School
- Online Membership induction course
- Complete remaining 5 Modules of the Online political school.

A5. Elections

The resolution notes the declining electoral fortunes of the ANC as a serious concern, and we need to build permanent and professional elections capacity; building the ANC Cloud to track campaign and organisational work; strengthened communications capacity at all levels; engage the demarcation processes; culture of respect for fair and free electoral processes; monitoring capacity; involve communities in councilor selection processes.

The 2018/2019 Elections campaign was well coordinated, although our fortunes went below 60% for the first time, but we did win back some of the ground lost in 2016. Resources remained a key problem, as well as continuity in elections management. The 2019NPE also saw little distinction made between national, provincial and local government issues, unlike in previous elections, and with many hotspot issues. The Thuma mina campaign in 2018 helped to orientate our structures towards service delivery, although we need a better mechanism for consistent monitoring and follow-through.

We have continued with Elections house, albeit under difficult resource restraint with a small staff complement. By-elections have been mixed, with a blow in Maluti a Phofong, and doing much better in other by-elections, notably Mamusa. The election strategy process for the 2021 local government elections (LGE) has been done, we are involved in the demarcation processes, although the pandemic has set back deadlines.

During 2020, the following issues with regards to our electoral system came sharply to the fore, including some the issues which we should have dealt with much earlier:

- Synchronised elections – for national, provincial and local government elections to happen at same time.
- Constitutional ruling on individual candidates standing for national and provincial government;
- Issues of a mixed electoral system at national and provincial levels.

A6. Alliance

The Resolution calls for building a strong on a minimum programme of action, and to ensure that Alliance structures so meet, so that we avoid pubic spats. It further calls for the strengthening of COSATU in the context of one industry, one union; one country one federation, and engage with the broader trade union movement towards working class unity.

The Alliance over the last 30 months have met more frequently at the level of the Secretariat, as well as the APC. During the Covid 19 pandemic early days, regular APC meetings took place to discuss this national crisis, resulting in the development of an Alliance Framework document on Covid-19. Amongst the other issues which the Alliance structures have been dealing with include the 2019 National and Provincial Elections Campaign, SOEs (especially Eskom and SAA), Energy strategy, and a range of other national issues. Alliance structures at provincial level have also been engaging, although in some provinces the relationship have been fractious based on specific issues, e.g. VBS in Limpopo, Letsemahole, Maluti a Phofong in Freestate. The issue of the Reconfigured Alliance, a paper by the SACP is still on the agenda and being discussed with provincial structures.

There have been intermittent engagements with unions outside of the COSATU; the dream of one union one industry, one federation one country, remains elusive, given the political and other issues giving rise to the split from COSATU.

A7. On Sectoral Work

The resolution emphasized the following: the role of the Youth and Women's Leagues as mass formation of youth and women, their role in their respective sectors and society. Specifically on the Youth League, the resolution called for the YL to consider its cut-off age, and for the YL and SASCO to work together when contesting SRC elections on campuses, to unite behind SASCO in contests, supported by the PYA. The

resolution also urged organisational work amongst national group and focused programme to build non-racialism; engaging with civil society and for ANC members to be active in community and sectoral organisations in the country; to engage motive forces in their organized formations, including those not part of the Alliance; affirmed the role of traditional leaders in advancing development and transformation, gender equality, social cohesion, deepening democracy, and the participation of rural motive forces.

The Women's League structures over the last 30 months have active programmes around the Molo Mkhawane campaign, mobilizing in the NPE campaign, the fight against gender based violence, and more recently during the Covid-19 period, its weekly Umanyano programme to reach out to women virtually, on a range of issues.

The NEC disbanded the NEC of the YL following its legal liquidation, and appointed a National Youth Task Team to assist to take the ANCYL to Congress, but the process has been very slow. The YL structures have risen to the occasion during the Covid-19 organising virtual political lectures and seminars on issues of the day, and have also been more active during Youth month in 2020.

Most sectoral work have centred around elections, with outreach to various sectors. NEC Committee who also have responsibilities to reach out to sectoral formations in their area of work have not been as pro-active as they should be. Outreach to business and professional organisations also continues through the Progressive Business Forum. A national task team was established to coordinate activities on the mobilization Coloured and Indian communities.

A8. Policy Development and Implementation

The resolution calls for the establishment of a Policy Institute and to explore public funding for political party policy institutions. In the later resolution on Provinces, it calls for provinces to also develop policy monitoring capacity. Extend the policy cycle to a decade, rather than the hitherto five-year cycle. Emphasised the need for macro policy planning and coordinated implementation in government, with the Presidency as the central driver of the developmental state.

This is still work in progress.

A9. Selection Process for Public Representatives

The resolution called for strengthening our guidelines, to ensure we select candidates with good standing in communities, screening and other processes, in the context of having a permanent ANC Electoral Commission.

Work in progress:

- NGC to discuss the issue of a permanent Elections Commission;
- Review of Through the Eye of the Needle and Guidelines for Selection of ANC Councilors at NGC

A10. Process for Elections of ANC Leaders and Managing Succession

The resolution calls for the establishment of a permanent ANC Electoral commission, with its roles, that will oversee the elections of leadership. It also highlighted areas to strengthen electoral rules, including outlawing slate voting, candidates to contest elections to declare interests, including campaign money and sources, conflict of interests and lifestyle audits, a youth quota (25-40%), consider gender equity in elections of Officials. The resolution also required the NEC to manage the two centres of power.

The Electoral Commission has not been formed, because it was not adopted as a constitutional amendment; the ANC Constitution (2017) still makes provision for the NEC, PECs and RECs to appoint elections commissions for conferences. The NGC therefore needs to discuss this matter.

A11. Regions, Sub-Region/Zone

The resolutions deals with the role of ANC governance committees, at these levels, as a space for accountability between the councilors and the ANC structures, involving the Troika and MP/Ls.

A12. Veterans League and Council of Elders

The resolution mandated the NEC to engage with the Veterans League with regards to options on its role, and to investigate the possibilities of a Council of Elders.

A13. Champion an Education, Skills and Creative Revolution

All ANC members and leaders are called upon to take practical steps to improve their literacy rate, skills, levels of education, support and participation in the arts and creative sectors, and general knowledge on matters relating to global and domestic socio-economic and political issues. Every ANC, Youth and Women's League branch shall strive, through the education and skills revolution, to improve the literacy rate, the work of cultural and creative sector and general level of education and skills among the people in the ward. Every ANC member should be involved in a project or programme to improve the quality of learning and teaching in all schools, promote the culture of reading, and raise the level of education, skills, entrepreneurship and literacy rate in a specific community.

A14. Create an ANC Accountability Framework, which outlines the roles and responsibilities and performance management of cadres.

A15. Finance and Fundraising

Legislation on funding of political parties to be amended to provide for increment and transparency in party funding, and apply to all three spheres of government, with separate funding for political foundations. Strengthening ANC fundraising and building its resource and sustainability base; maintain professional management and accountability and financial systems; and settle longstanding debts and liabilities.

B. STRENGTHEN THE INTEGRITY OF THE ANC AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY**B1. Social distance**

The resolution calls for a change in how the ANC relates to the people, especially the gap between ourselves and the people, leaders and cadres doing grassroots work, and encouraging the values of humility, discipline, hard work, ubuntu, empathy and respect for people. This resolution is closely linked to the role of the branch in communities and the role of leadership, and restoration of the values of the ANC.

B2. ANC Credibility and Integrity: Dealing with Corruption; Integrity Commission and Discipline

Strengthening understanding of values, ethics and morality; cadres accused and Integrity committee to present themselves; publicly disassociating ourselves from any person accused of corruption or criminal activities; cooperate with law enforcement; strengthen state capacity to investigate investigation; strengthen capacities of state law enforcement; ban all slates and enforce code of conduct; implement NEC resolution on special commission on state capture.

On the Integrity commission resolve that the NEC to conclude the terms of reference, its powers and that it reports directly to NEC and NGC, National Conference. On Discipline, to introduce dispute resolution capacity, discourage and defend organisational court cases; and investigate and act on gate keeping.

The Officials and NWC have been consistent in their message of unity, starting with the pilgrimage to different provinces; during the 2018/2019 conferences encouraging PECs to bring in comrades excluded using the cooption clause. At the same time, NEC members have been guilty of breaches of the Communications Protocol, and the coherence of the NEC took time to build. The appointment of the National and Provincial Dispute Resolution Committee has also helped during the run-up to the elections to resolve mainly internal disputes; on the whole it has reduced the number of court cases, although there have been still quite a few.

The NEC after lengthy deliberations adopted the Terms of Reference of the Integrity Commission, and consistently look at how to strengthen its work and make it more effective and fair. However, as expected, the matters which the Integrity Commission has pronounced on to date, with recommendations to the NEC has been difficult, most notably the review of the Lists for National and Provincial public representatives in 2019 and the VBS matter. Provincial Integrity Commission have also been estab-

lished, and we need to get a report from the provinces on how these have performed their tasks.

The President established the Zondo Commission in 2018, and it has been a grueling period for the ANC and its image. The consistency on the principled position which the ANC has taken, that it supports the commission, encouraging its members to cooperate with the commission; will not give a blow by blow response, but instead intervene for the record when matters affect the ANC have been adhered to on the whole.

On the overall issue of the image of the ANC with regards to corruption, there are worrying signs that this is not improving, especially with regards to public expenditure.

B3. Dispute resolution and Discipline

Establishing the National Dispute Resolution Committee and mechanism, respond to complaints timeously and give feedback to structures and individuals, so as to discourage organisational matters taken to and settled in courts. This should include training on conflict resolution methods as part of our mass political education and induction.

B4. Communications and the Battle of Ideas

Social transformation requires the production and dissemination of progressive ideas for a National Democratic Society. This struggle for hegemony takes place in a heavily contested terrain, with increasing interconnectivity, use of social media; growing civic and social activism, sometimes anti-establishment, but more often combining tactics of protest and cooperation. It is recognizing that ideas in society are disseminated through media in all its forms, the education system, the political apparatus of the state, and a range of faith based, cultural and other institutions and practices. Within this, the women's movement plays an important role in contesting the ideas and dominance of patriarchy, and its intersections with poverty, inequality and unemployment, as well as race and class. We must therefore strengthen the ANC's engagements in and with all facets of ideas, values and culture, in contributing towards social cohesion as well as its own internal capacity for the battle of ideas

B5. Non-racialism and Non-sexism

These are two key organizing principles of a National Democratic Society, the ANC must be at the forefront of progressive ideas to advance a non-sexist and non-racial South Africa, and itself become the political school for non-racialism and non-sexism, setting an example for our society, and active in the fight against the scourge of racism, sexism and gender-based violence.

PART 2: A SUSTAINED PROGRAMME OF UNITY AND RENEWAL

The COVID-19 Moment: Challenges and Opportunities

17. The global Coronavirus pandemic has been a black swan event warned about, but very few in the world were prepared for how quickly it would engulf and affect every country in the world. It has challenged many “established truths”, about the superiority of western systems, or that any institution but the nation state can act when nations are under threat. And indeed, that societies with capable developmental states, with universal health coverage and social safety nets, are in better positions to deal with this global disaster and its aftermath, than countries without these systems. At the same time, like with other seismic global events such as the Spanish Flu, the Great Depression or World Wars, it provides a window or windows of opportunities for progressive ‘turning of the tides.’
18. In South Africa Covid-19 showed us the ugly face of the structural fault lines of poverty, inequality and unemployment, and the festering sores of hunger and food insecurity, the precarity of livelihoods of the majority and how little it takes to tip them below the poverty and hunger line. The ANC government must continue to lead the fight against the Covid 19 pandemic, and to deal with the social and economic crisis, exacerbated by the pandemic, supported by ANC structures at all levels.
19. The pandemic has an impact on all forms of human activities, including our organisational activities, and we therefore have to adapt. We had .

A DECISIVE MOMENT FOR RENEWAL

20. In the 2000 NGC document, “**ANC Revolutionary movement and Agent for Change**” we identified one of the unique characteristics that sustained the ANC over the decades, as its ability to “*identify and seize decisive moments...when the combined elements (for) qualitative movement forward (are) evident.*”
21. Decisive moments for organisational renewal can be driven by a number of factors, or one lead factor that provide opportunities for others. These include a burning platform such as losing elections; pressure from below or within like was done by the ANC Youth League in 1944; re-engineering of organisational culture or structures, like becoming a governing party and the impact of the close alignment of ANC structures and governance structures on leadership in the ANC; leadership changes, although we commit to collective leadership, the vision, quality, experience/capabilities, and style of leadership matters; and lastly, an external event or situation, like the Nationalist Party coming to power in 1948, which prompted the 1949 ANCYL Programme of Action or having adoption of armed struggle when the regime closed all peaceful avenues in 1960.
22. Indeed, the social and economic impact of Covid-19, its impact on human interaction, on work, governments and business, on national and global fault lines, on generations, and on how societies interact, is such an external decisive moment.
23. The moment also coincides with other ‘*cumulative quantitative conditions and factors*’ – the leadership outcomes of

NASREC, finally moving forward on the OR Tambo Political School as well as the new online Membership Management System, the potential and push for renewing our other organisational systems, including the system of leadership selection and election; and the strong Conference mandates on issues such as restoring integrity and fighting corruption, and on radical socio-economic transformation.

24. The Covid-19 crisis forced us to be outwardly looking, to practice community activism and solidarity, to read, to analyze and to engage, to act local and think global. The crisis also mobilised and raised the profile of key government departments, of course Health and COGTA, but also Water and Sanitation, Human Settlements and Housing, Education, and Social Development and economic departments such as Trade and Industry, Employment and Labour, and Small Businesses. Local government and ward councilors are also more visible, there is potential to generalize the District Development Model beyond the initial pilots, and a critical institution like NED-LAC re-engaged.
25. Of course, we must expect some internal resistance to change, and external interference to keep us in the perpetual state of internal conflicts. The reports of abuse of Covid 19 funds and of racketeering, the recent Auditor General report on municipalities, are worrying indicators. But now is the time to build the momentum and implement a sustained programme for organisational renewal!

A Decade of Renewal

26. The 53rd National Conference (2012) raised the issue of a **Decade of Renewal**, in order to strengthen the following

capabilities, capacities and urgent tasks of the ANC:

- a) Capabilities to act as a strategic centre of power and influence, organised along, and effective, in the five pillars of social transformation.
- b) Capacity as a vanguard movement for social transformation, to organize and mobilise the motive forces and lead grassroots and sectors in a programme of participatory and mass-based community and sectoral transformation, empowerment and development.
- c) Fast-track a coherent and targeted Cadre policy: recruitment, cadre development, deployment, accountability and cadre preservation. Through the political school and other programmes, prioritise the political education, general education, academic skills and capabilities of ANC leadership and membership, with special focus on the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, with a view to build and cultivate the New Cadre..
- d) Speed up Economic Transformation by fast tracking the development of entrepreneurs, small-medium entities, including large-scale infrastructure development and enhancing the capacity of the state to intervene in key sectors of the economy in pursuit of inclusive economic growth and development, employment creation and broad-based empowerment.
- e) Build a democratic and capable developmental state, with the agility and resolve to drive and implement the programme of social transformation and the creation of a National Democratic Society.
- f) Restoration of the core values of the ANC, ethical conduct and integrity in society, rooting out factionalism and corruption in its ranks.

- g) Education, skills and the development of human capabilities, creativity, dignity and well-being of all at the centre of social transformation.
- h) Our participation in the African renaissance and agenda, and as part of the global progressive forces, towards a peaceful, more just and equitable social, political and economic world, and that is environmentally sustainable.
- i) Urgent and practical steps to professionalise and modernise the operations of the ANC, its membership system, introducing technology and progressive management sciences to improve its operations.
- j) Political and ideological work amongst the new generations of young people, in all of different sectors and social strata, to reproduce a cadre of responsible citizens and active participants for social transformation.
27. *“At the core of the ANC’s tasks in the current period is the renewal of the organisation for it to exercise societal leadership in a changing environment, the consolidation of democracy and the speeding up of programmes of fundamental transformation to attain shared prosperity, social justice and human solidarity...”*
28. *A strategic centre of power should command both legitimacy and authority, deriving from the quality of its collective ideas and the discipline of its members. It should ensure that its mandate is carried out by its members, wherever they are located. It should be able to monitor and evaluate the implementation of its policies. When and where there are weaknesses – whether these are a result of poor policies, weak implementation or poor leadership – it should be able to act decisively.”* (Strategy and Tactics, 2017)
29. The NGC must review the detailed Conference resolutions set out above, and deliberate on how we strengthen their implementation. In addition, the following issues require emphasis and attention of the NGC, as we develop this **Decade-long Programme of Renewal**:
- a) **Agreeing on a vision of a Renewed ANC:** what would a “renewed ANC” in the current period look like, in relation to the current tasks of the moment and having rid ourselves of the negative tendencies?
- b) **The role of leadership in renewal:** the impression is oft created, that because leadership are affected when we deal with renewal, unity and integrity issues; and they are responsible for deciding on action as per Conference resolutions. Is this ascertain correct, and if yes, how do we then address this, so that the organisation are able to act decisively to restore integrity and discipline in the movement? How do we build a critical mass in all structures, that are committed and working towards renewal?
- c) **Dealing with Corruption:** Corrupt practices across government, and the perceptions of widespread corruption have become a serious blight, undermining transformation and the trust of the people. How do we draw a line on this matter, so that we can turn the tide?
- d) **An Accountability and Performance Framework:** what should be the main elements of such as Accountability framework, towards building a developmental and effective state, and how do we ensure it works and is adhered to?

- e) **Role of Leadership Collectives:** The ANC Constitution sets out the tasks of the NEC, PEC, REC and BEC – are these structures living up to these tasks, and what roles should be given to each member of these collectives, for example each BEC members assigned a block of streets and to report on issues, etc?
- f) **Membership system and Recruitment:** how do we ensure conscious recruitment and development of members from amongst the motive forces?
- g) **Strengthen system of leadership selection:** Is it not time to review the system of proportionality branch representatives to conferences, which leads to branch processes being subverted and delegates being wooed, simply to add voting numbers? How do we deal with money in our leadership elections processes? Should we give membership a more direct role in electing leadership, beyond just nominating and electing delegates to represent the branch at elective conferences?

Conclusion

- 30. The paper deliberately avoided adding to an already comprehensive and relevant set of areas and actions around which renewal must take place. This does not mean that within each of the proposed areas, there are not further innovations that should be proposed.
- 31. As we prepare for the next twenty five years of democracy, we want to see a South Africa celebrating its Golden Jubilee by 2044 as an example of the African renaissance we so deeply desire: a country that is thriving and prosperous, where the land and other resources and assets are shared, which is free from hunger, poverty, racism and sexism and want, that is creative, innovative and entrepreneurial, has a capable, legitimate developmental state and that represents the best of human civilizations.
- 32. The starting point is the renewal of our revolutionary movement. We do know the tasks at hand. Let us get to work.

ANNEXURE A

Growing concern about Organisational Culture and Values of ANC, since 1994

Extract from paper on “Organisational Renewal, Unity and a Common Programme of Work” (2018, B Hofmyer)

“In **1994 Conference in Bloemfontein** we recognised the centrality of political education and cadre development especially as we lost many leading cadres to positions in government and had recruited hundreds of thousands of new members unschooled in the values of the ANC. In 1995 we set up a political education unit and an organising department to focus on building the organisation. The last time mass national BEC training was done in the ANC was in 1998/9. Since then resources have been restricted and used mostly for election or pre-conference training. From being the foot soldiers of building branches driving implementation of ANC programmes, organisers have evolved to bureaucrats and auditors who check compliance of nominations, membership and other ANC processes, rather than driving programme implementation.

As a governing party in most of SA our focus shifted to the many challenges we faced in government. We were still negotiating the final constitution, setting up new local municipalities, managing an apartheid debt close to the size of the annual budget, and dealing with the untransformed apartheid public service. In spite of these challenges

and our inexperience, we made quick progress and managed to deliver massive improvements within the first 100 days. Free health care was extended to pregnant women and all children under 7. School feeding was introduced in the poorest schools. 26 000 community land claims were settled. A massive infrastructure improvement plan was developed and started. Eskom started the electrification programme in townships and informal settlements as well as rural areas. The RDP housing programme was conceived. Every government department was focussed on delivering efficiently and economically. A combination of political will, clear goals (RDP), a united ANC and capable and committed leaders and managers in government enabled these successes

In our **50th Conference in 1997, Mafikeng** we came to terms with the remaining challenges we faced in government and recognised our weaknesses in building a dynamic and responsive government in touch with the people. It had become clear that expectations were very high and that government alone could not address all problems fast enough. We passed resolutions to build people’s participation, ward committees, community police forums, school governing bodies, government communication and stronger coherence and oversight between ANC structures and government deployees in local government. Twenty-two years later all of these remain on our wish list without much evidence of widespread

successful implementation. We recognised the “*reality of the scourge of rape, the battering of women and the abuse of children*” and resolved to address these evils within society, in our communities and in our own ranks. While we have improved polices and laws we have failed to effect fundamental social change and eliminate either patriarchy or violence in our communities and in our organisation.

In **2000** at the **Port Elizabeth NGC** we confronted the changing face of the ANC and the development of a political elite with growing access to personal wealth and government resources. We discussed revolutionary morality and the dangers of political careerism and resolved to use political education to develop cadres who are agents of change wherever they are active, clear about our values, the NDR and programme of the ANC, and accountable to the ANC. The same 2000 NGC highlighted the roles of the Youth and Women’s League as leading agents for change with regards to the two sectors they organise.

In **Stellenbosch, 2002** we noted the need to sustain and strengthen the mass character of the ANC and ensuring the implementation of our cadre development policy as a means of sustaining the revolutionary culture and traditions of the movement among new generations of cadres and members. We also noted the need to enhance organisational democracy and discipline as well as strengthening the Leagues of the ANC, giving leadership to the struggle for women’s emancipation and assisting the Youth League in increasing its mobilization of youth in all sectors of our

society. Maintaining and enhancing the unity of the Alliance and ensuring that the historic relationship continues in the implementation of the important tasks of the National Democratic Revolution as well as building a broad movement for national transformation that draws together democratic forces in a range of sectors and unites them in this important task that is led by the ANC, supporting the ANC’s efforts to remain the largest mass political movement in South Africa.

In **2007, Polokwane** the **Organisational Report** was brutally frank about our continued failure to build the kind of ANC we needed to lead transformation and development in our society. The 2007 Strategy and Tactics sharpened our focus the internal challenges we faced and we resolved to set up a political school and a policy institute to address some of our ongoing weaknesses in the organisation and the state. We agreed to increase public participation and strengthen relations and accountability between our structures and public representatives, as well as deployment strategies, and monitoring evaluation of public representatives and deployees.

In **2012, Mangaung** we developed a comprehensive **Organisational Renewal** discussion document that recognised increasing social distance between the ANC and the people, a breakdown of relations with civil society, increased factionalism and corruption, and weakness in leadership and structures. We resolved to rebuild our relationship with key sectors of society and to strengthen the Alliance, declared a decade of the cadres that would focus on developing

the cadres we need to implement our programmes and achieve our goals in government and in the organisation. We also resolved to set up an integrity committee to deal swiftly and decisively with lapses in integrity and morality.

In the **2015 NGC**, we took a hard look at **leadership election** and **candidate selection** and strongly condemned practices of slates and factions, membership bulk-buying and ghost members, money politics in securing votes within the ANC, and the impact of all these negative practices on the lives of branches and the quality of leadership and public representatives. We resolved to ban slates and take strong action against vote buying.

We decided to strengthen the Integrity Committee and act more decisively on allegations of corruption. We also

resolved to set up an internal election committee and to review our candidate and leadership selection processes.

In **2017 at Nasrec** we focussed on many of our weaknesses, passed the strongest resolution yet on corruption, clarified the role of the branch, outlined the community and sectoral work expected from every branch, made political education and induction compulsory for leadership at all levels, and set up the framework for an Electoral Committee to guide and run candidate and leadership election processes. In every Conference, we have resolved to improve coordination in government, especially at the local level, monitoring of implementation, the ANC's own policy and monitoring capacity, and our capacity to hold deployees to account and recall them if needed."

TOWARDS A RECONFIGURED ALLIANCE

A joint Alliance reconfiguration platform

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. This common Alliance reconfiguration paper is anchored in four initial discussion documents and responses by the Alliance formations. The first discussion document on the reconfiguration of the Alliance was produced by the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the second by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The third discussion document was produced by the African National Congress (ANC) in response to the SACP and COSATU papers, while the fourth was produced by the SACP, replying to the ANC's response. The South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) made an oral representation at an Alliance Political Council that considered the papers, as did the other Alliance formations in addition to their discussion documents.
2. What the above indicates is that this has been an extensive process of engagement within the Alliance towards its reconfiguration. At the heart of this process lies the unity and organisational renewal project, thus the necessity to move with the times. The process involves a conscious effort to guide the evolution of the Alliance and maintain and deepen its strategic relevance towards the fulfilment of its historical mission.
3. The main historical and theoretical basis for the Alliance is noted in the four initial Alliance formations papers and the subsequent engagements that took place. This paper is therefore a synthesis towards a common reconfiguration platform. The paper is arranged into four chapters, including this brief introductory chapter.
4. **Chapter 2**, entitled the '**Revolutionary Alliance**', presents summaries on the nature and character of Alliance formations and their historical missions, and thus those of the Alliance.
5. Entitled the '**Shared strategy of struggle and basic programme**', **Chapter 3** covers the subject of its title.
6. **Chapter 4**, which has already been presented to, and considered by the Alliance Political Council, is entitled the '**Success Model and Organs of Consensus-Seeking Consultation**'. The chapter looks at the success model and organs of consensus-seeking consultation as essential components of improving the functioning of the Alliance, as part of its reconfiguration.

7. The reconfiguration is a deep-going process, rather than an event. It is guided both by the continuously changing conditions and, within this context, the necessity to continuously build, strengthen and reposition the Alliance towards realising its ultimate objectives.
8. In addition to the initial documents, this paper briefly highlights the rationale for building a united, well-functioning, strong and cohesive Alliance. The old established premise that revolutionary organisations are necessary to resolve fundamental societal contradictions and social antagonisms rings true to the effort to reconfigure the Alliance as part of our collective unity and organisational renewal project.
9. The Alliance is involved in the national democratic revolution (NDR), our shared strategy of struggle, transformation and democratic transition. The NDR is aimed at destroying the legacy of colonialism, inclusive of colonialism of a special type and apartheid, and replacing it with a society based on democracy and the principles of redress, equality, non-racialism, non-sexism and collective prosperity. The NDR is an anti-imperialist strategy in terms of its content, worldview and goals. The minimum programme of the Alliance is aptly captured in the policy lodestar of the movement, the Freedom Charter, as discussed in the next sections. The Alliance is a practical expression of unity of purpose by its formations, of which all are formations of the Left. Thus the Alliance constitutes a Left pole or an axis of the Left in our national spectrum and its position in the international arena.

CHAPTER 2: OUR REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE

1. The Alliance is a national democratic revolutionary front. The shared characteristics and principles of the formations of our strategic Alliance are unity, non-racialism, non-sexism, democracy, collective leadership and accountability to the movement as well as the people as a whole, and all other principles enshrined in the Freedom Charter, our shared programme.
2. The roots of the Alliance date back to 1928 following the adoption of a resolution on the South African Question by the Communist International (Comintern). The resolution was ratified in South Africa by the Communist Party in 1929, a few months after its first adoption, leading to the establishment and development of our liberation Alliance. As the resolution states, the development in South Africa of capitalist relations of production, imposed from Europe through colonial expansion, 'led to British imperialism carrying out the economic exploitation of the country with the participation of the White bourgeoisie of South Africa (British and Boer)'. The general colonial character of South Africa was not altered when the Union of South Africa was established, in 1910, since British-controlled capital continued to occupy the principal economic positions in the country (banks, mining and industry), and since the South African bourgeoisie was equally interested in the merciless exploitation of the oppressed majority. In its Strategy and Tactics the ANC refers to this merciless form of exploitation as super-exploitation.

3. Based on the history of South Africa and its internationalism, our liberation Alliance is anti-colonial and anti-imperialist in its nature and character. In our region and continent, the Alliance stands for the African Revolution, towards wider continental independence and progressive integration. Globally, the Alliance stands for a peaceful world order and international justice, economic, political and broadly social. The history, nature and character, aims and objectives, and therefore goals and historical missions of our Alliance formations are detailed in their respective founding documents, constitutions, programmes, strategies and tactics. By way of brief summaries, the Alliance comprises the following independent formations but which need the dependability and therefore support of each other through the Alliance.
6. The ANC is also the leader of our society. It has earned its leadership role through decades of struggle, as well as electoral contests as the leading force of the Alliance's common electoral platform. This leadership position is not leadership by decree. Hence the ANC as well as the Alliance should continuously build and earn its leadership role.

The Communist Party

7. The oldest Marxist-Leninist formation on the African continent and second oldest political organisation in South Africa after the ANC was founded in 1921 as the Communist Party of South Africa. The roots of the Party in South Africa date back to the founding in 1914 of the War on War League in opposition to the imperialist First World War and participation in it of South Africa. The War on War League was succeeded by the larger International Socialist League (ISL) in 1915.
8. The Communist Party was subsequently formed by the union of the ISL, the largest component, and other, mostly regional or city-based, Communist and Socialist organisations that existed in South Africa and sought affiliation to the Comintern. The unification was one of the conditions of affiliation to the Comintern, which accepted only one Communist Party per country. The Party gained its current name in 1953 as part of its underground reconstitution in response to its banning in 1950. It was formed with the historical mission of achieving liberation and social emancipation, systematically ending the system of economic exploitation of one person or group by another and ultimately replacing the exploitative system with a socialist revolution.

African National Congress

4. The ANC, the oldest national liberation organisation on the African continent is the formation leading the Alliance, which is at the head of our national liberation movement. The process of consultation that led to the founding of the ANC dates back to between 1908 and 1909 in protest against the Whites-only dialogue that was held towards the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, a decade after the end of the Anglo-Boer War.
5. The ANC was established in 1912 as the South African Native National Congress, with the historical mission of unifying the African people against their exclusion, and for equality before the law, thus liberation of the oppressed. It gained its current name in 1923 and evolved to include Black people in general as well as White democrats.

Congress of South African Trade Unions

9. COSATU is a progressive movement that brings together prime mass organisations of the workers in the form of trade unions. To fulfil its purpose, it is as broad as possible and seeks to unite, on an industrial basis as well as in the public sector according to its organisational structure, all workers, at whatever level of their political consciousness, who appreciate the elementary need to come together and defend and advance their conditions of employment. The federation was formed in 1985 in the context of widespread township uprisings and intense repression unleashed by the apartheid regime.
10. COSATU's roots date back to the formation of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), its predecessor, in 1955, and before then to the preceding progressive trade union formation processes. SACTU became part of our Alliance and the struggle for liberation and social emancipation. As a class-conscious trade union centre, and taking into account its origins and history, COSATU appreciates that the state as well as its apparatus and therefore state power has serious implications for workers.
11. The federation therefore embraces the necessity to be involved in the broader political struggle. COSATU was accordingly formed with the historical mission to achieve freedom from oppression and economic exploitation. Its objectives include organising unorganised workers and building effective trade unions on a democratic basis, as well as fostering democratic worker leadership in all spheres of society working together with other progressive forces, hence its engagement in the Alliance.

South African National Civics Organisation

12. The development of our Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) in the 1980s became one of the important innovations in the history of Alliance reconfiguration, evolution and adaptation to changing operating conditions. The United Democratic Front (UDF) was added to the equation and played an important role towards the final dislodgement of the apartheid regime from power.
13. SANCO was formed in 1992 as part of the MDM. The progressive civic organisation took the form of a unitary formation replacing pre-existing local and regional civics. Some of the civics SANCO replaced emerged in the previous decade of the 1980s as characterised organisationally by the development of the MDM and the consolidation of the progressive trade union movement. While the UDF was later dissolved, SANCO continued organising and was later recognised as an Alliance formation.

Progressive formations

14. The Alliance earned the support of an array of progressive formations in our society.
15. Internally, the leagues of the ANC, namely the ANC Women's League, ANC Youth League, ANC Veterans' League, form part of this wider progressive movement. The movement includes the Young Communist League of South Africa, youth wing of the SACP, and COSATU affiliates. The associations of the veterans of the joint ANC and SACP military formation, uMkhonto we-Sizwe, are also part of the wider progressive movement.

16. The Alliance also earned the support of the progressive student movement, which comprises the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the South African Student Congress (SASCO). These together with the ANC Youth League and the Young Communist League of South Africa form the core of the organisations constituting the Progressive Youth Alliance (PYA).

17. The last chapter refers to the Alliance as 'the sum (total) of its formations'. What the emphasis in this section is placed on is the fact that, as the Alliance Political Council concluded at its plenary session held from 10 to 11 November 2019, the total strength of the support earned by the Alliance as well as its formations in the course of our struggle plus the sum its formations is much greater. This analysis is crucial to an appreciation of our organisational and political tasks both with regard to the reconfiguration of the Alliance, our collective organisational renewal and unity project, and the necessity to continuously build, strengthen and grow its wider support base as inextricably inseparable objectives.

CHAPTER 3:

SHARED STRATEGY OF STRUGGLE AND BASIC PROGRAMME

1. The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is our strategy to complete the liberation of the formerly oppressed, Africans in particular and Black people in general, and to overcome persisting racialised, gendered and class articulated inequality, as well as uneven development, unemployment, poverty and the associated social consequences. Thus the strategic objective

of the NDR is to transform South Africa into a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society. A major achievement of the NDR as a process of struggle for liberation and social emancipation was the dislodgement of the apartheid regime through the 1994 democratic breakthrough. This shared milestone laid the foundation for the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and non-sexist democratic society in pursuit of collective prosperity based on the Freedom Charter, the basic programme of the NDR adopted by all Alliance formations and other progressive organisations.

2. In the 1950s, with the SACP existing as an underground formation following its banning by the apartheid regime in 1950, the configuration of the Alliance publicly assumed the form of the Congress Alliance, comprising the ANC, SACTU, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Organisation, later re-named the Coloured People's Congress, and the Congress of Democrats. Members of the underground SACP were active in all the Congress Alliance formations. The banning of the Party had the effect of deepening the dual membership principle of the Alliance. In terms of the principle, the Party required communist cadres to be active in mass democratic formations, and the ANC as a national liberation organisation that accepts members into its ranks from different ideological persuasions provided they accept its historical mission, aims and objectives. It is the Alliance that co-ordinated the convening of the Congress of the People and preceding processes of consultation, leading to the drafting and adoption of the Freedom Charter by the historic gathering in 1955.

3. The achievement of the goals of the Freedom Charter, which is our minimum programme, lies at the core of the intersection of our historical missions, NDR, and our aspirations.
4. Since the 1994 democratic breakthrough, we have achieved commendable social progress benefitting millions of our people. In this regard a major contribution also came from our enshrinement of human, including workers and socio-economic rights, in our country's post-1994 Constitution. It is within this framework that, through the ANC-led government involving other formations of the Alliance, we were able to massively extend access to housing, clean drinking water, electricity, social grants and education at all levels, among other programmes. The Alliance formations remain categorical in their unwavering historic support, defence and advancement of the human rights we enshrined in our Constitution following decades of our liberation struggle.
5. Notwithstanding the social progress we have achieved since our 1994 democratic breakthrough, we are still in the midst of many challenges to overcome. Others are old, systemic and reinforcing, while others are new and compounding the old ones. The intercourse between the two categories of challenges and their multiplication increases their enormity on, and negative implications for the Alliance and the NDR. In this regard, state capture and other forms of corruption, bad governance and incompetence are, among others, a serious threat to our movement as whole and the NDR. Combating these deviant tendencies is crucial in defence of the revolution, our democratic transition, and the integrity of our movement as a whole, that is, its legitimacy to lead our national democratic revolutionary programme and democratically earn growing and high support.
6. In essence, it is a key organisational, political and ideological task of the Alliance to foster democratic revolutionary values centred on serving the people selflessly, and to build universal strategic discipline, unity and cohesion based on the shared values. This includes attaching great importance to building and deepening revolutionary moral high ground, binding on our members both within our Alliance as a movement and the state, as well as in society in general. The latter presupposes that, also in their personal conduct, our cadres should carry themselves in a manner that will bring credit and attract support to the movement, rather than repel support or either expose the movement to unfair criticism or attacks.
7. There remains a lot of work to be done towards fulfilling the historical mission of our shared struggle, including securing our national independence and thus safeguarding our policy space, a key instrument of effecting change to achieve the objective aspirations of our people. To this end there are at least three key strategic national tasks arising from the '**National**'(N) in the **National Democratic Revolution (NDR)** that merit underlining: **(i) NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION:** resolutely safeguarding our democratic national sovereignty; **(ii) NATION BUILDING:** building the united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society that we seek to achieve, including by fostering social cohesion; **(iii) and strengthening our REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM,** while at the same time deepening our internationalism, our international solidarity and anti-imperialism.

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8. In its pursuit of revolutionary nationalism, and of course the NDR, the Alliance stands in contrast to ultra-leftism, chauvinism and narrow nationalism. As eloquently captured in the body of our shared theory of struggle, for instance, in the Strategy and Tactics adopted by the ANC in Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969:
- '...our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass.'*
9. The Alliance seeks to build a capable national democratic developmental state that serves the people wholeheartedly. The attainment of the goals of the Freedom Charter and completion of the NDR remains firmly rooted in the heart of the shared strategy of the Alliance, in the Alliance as an active expression of our unity of purpose. This is the guiding lodestar of our common policy direction in relation to, but not exclusively, the role of the state in our society and therefore the primary mandate of our public representatives.
10. The NDR is a revolutionary process of transformation to rid our economy and society of colonial and apartheid features, as well as imperialist domination, and to implement democratic economic transformation as well as broader social development towards its full potential. In the present period, the Alliance is striving to move the NDR into a second radical phase and further advance, deepen and defend the revolution towards resolving the primary contradictions of the South African society, as captured in the strategic objectives of the NDR.
11. To that end, the NDR in the here and now has to be a process to transform the dependent-development path of our economy and the chronic underdevelopment that this unresolved colonially created path still reproduces. This process of change is for the right of everyone to work and contribute to nation building, and for the wealth of our country to be shared, as the Freedom Charter declares.
12. Thus meeting the material and social needs of the people is an essential component of the NDR and central to our efforts of fundamental change. This means uplifting the quality of life of all our people, especially the poor, the majority of whom are Africans in particular and Black people in general, female and the youth, and in class terms the working class. In this regard rural areas, townships and peri-urban areas require greater development policy attention.
13. The Alliance will strive to ensure that the above find theoretical and practical expression in the role of the state within the framework of our constitutional democracy. This is based on collective recognition that post-1994 the state has become one of the key pillars of our struggle and transformation to complete the liberation of the formerly oppressed and achieve social emancipation for all South Africans regardless of race, gender and other arbitrary grounds.
14. However, ascendancy to the key levers of state power, especially legislative and executive organs, and therefore the exercise of their powers and functions (which has wider implications in relation to other key levers of state power), is subject to the outcomes of the constantly unfolding democratic
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contestation and regular elections. In this regard the declining support of our ANC-led common Alliance electoral platform between 1994 and 2019 indicates that electoral victories are not necessarily guaranteed. The unity of the Alliance and independently its formations is crucial, and is also the basic condition of electoral victories, but which in turn require the Alliance to forge broader unity of all the motive forces of the NDR and widest possible unity across the length and breadth of our society.

15. Therefore the importance of winning the decisive-to-overwhelming majority of our society to our side and continuously earning their support by democratic means cannot be overemphasised. This requires active involvement of the Alliance in the day to day struggles of the people. The Alliance has to reach out with its positions to wider sections of our society and their respective forms of organisation through consistent processes of democratic engagement. This should be destined for laying the basis and building and expanding conditions for a wider partnership towards national unity, in line with our country's Constitution.
16. The exercise of state power, where ascendancy to the respective organs of state has been achieved, is alone not enough. In many respects it still requires to be supported by ongoing and deepening popular mobilisation of all the constituencies of Alliance formations and the motive forces of the NDR. This is crucial towards giving the Freedom Charter's first clause, 'The people shall govern', full play. Moreover, as the Alliance Political Council stated in its post-meeting statement of 13 November 2019, it is essential for the national democratic developmental state that we seek to build, and indeed for the Alliance itself, to mobilise our people in their communities and other areas of transformation and development to act as their own architects of change. This requires an articulation of the structures, programmes and strategies through which the state plays its democratic developmental role to involve direct democratic participation of the people.
17. In addition, post-1994 a new reality of engagement in politics through court processes and particular non-governmental organisations also emerged and grew, for better or for worse. A part of this is foreign driven or funded, or both, and is not always underpinned by good faith, while the other part is driven genuinely by real concerns and democratic interests of the people. What is clear is that the Alliance has to organise its presence in all key sites and forms of struggle and significant centres of power.
18. Democratic mobilisation of all sections of our people, with greater attention placed on the overwhelming majority, the working-class, and therefore working-class and popular struggles, are an important determinant in the advance and defence of the NDR. This must, in order to succeed, be guided by clear strategies and tactics, as well as effective organisation, targeted and mass political education and capacity building. NDRy hegemony within the state, the economy, our communities, the battle of ideas and, of course, within our organisations, is the critical factor for developing a purposeful, strategically clear, and practically effective NDR.
19. In pursuit of non-sexism, the NDR seeks to overcome the vicious impact of patriarchy, not just in some generalised

way, but a patriarchy that was sharpened and integrated into the economic base of our country and its social relations of production in general over centuries of colonialism, inclusive of colonialism of a special type (CST) and apartheid. This deep-seated, systemic patriarchy has generated varied forms of social reproduction problems, including the scourge of violence in general and gender-based violence in particular. The Alliance is resolutely determined to bringing an end to the problems, altogether with their root cause, entrenched economic and broader social system patriarchy.

20. In our pursuit of non-racialism and a national democratic revolution we will continue to combat racism and the ideology and attitudes of white supremacy. The NDR has the effect of, and is therefore also about emancipating those among White people who harbour, and therefore from the false ideology of racial superiority and the insecurity attached to oppressing others or benefitting from the oppression.
21. The process of change requires investment resources. At present not all the investment capital, technologies and technical capacity required are in the hands of the people as whole or the state on their behalf. Neither are they all controlled by South Africans. At the same time, the resources that are in the hands of the state are not sufficient to meet all the goals of our shared project of broader social transformation and economic emancipation.
22. What the above necessarily dictates is the strategic mobilisation of the resources that are neither in the hands of the people as a whole nor in the hands of the state on their behalf for investment, particularly but not exclusively in the productive sector of our economy. This should however be guided by clear objectives, concrete tasks and targets, and meaningful consultation. The objectives, tasks and targets should include a priority on decent work and employment-creating investment; skills transfer; appropriate and sustainable development of the forces of production; the elimination of compradorist, parasitic, corporate-capture of the state and the movement and other corrupt tendencies; and an active contribution to a strategic, high impact industrial policy that overcomes CST sectoral and spatial imbalances.
23. Quite how various strata of capital, Black and White, or, rather, the immense resources controlled by them, get to be mobilised into such an agenda will vary according to circumstances. The measures available in this regard range from enforcing effective strategic discipline, increasing worker democracy on the shop-floor and systematically building worker-control, state-led strategic planning, and state-provided incentives and economic and social infrastructure development, effective state and also popular regulation. Where appropriate public-private participation arrangements based on mutually beneficial outcomes and fair agreements for workers, to straightforward compulsion and even expropriation, to the extent it is necessary, should be considered. All of these require consensus-seeking, meaningful consultation based on the principles of collective leadership and accountability, as it is equally fundamental with regard the overall pursuit of the NDR through state power.
24. The tasks outlined above further require sound strategic and tactical calculations and the pursuit of a de-

velopmentally oriented and strategically driven professional cadre in the state, in boards of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as other public entities, and in industry. In this regard at least one thing is certain. We will never achieve broad national democratic mobilisation, including of capital that is neither in the hands of the state nor the people as a whole on a mutually-beneficial-outcomes-basis, if, as the liberation movement, we are unclear ourselves as to what the R in the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is all about. One thing it is certainly not about is veering into a path of reformism. What it stands for, as we pronounce it in the full text of the NDR, is REVOLUTION. It therefore remains crucial to maintain the distinction between strategy and tactics; strategic consistency without veering into tactical rigidity; tactical flexibility without losing connection from strategy; and analytical alertness. To this end the goals of the Freedom Charter remain emphatically fundamental!

CHAPTER 4: SUCCESS MODEL AND ORGANS OF CONSENSUS-SEEKING CONSULTATION

1. Central to reconfiguration of the Alliance is the necessity to strengthen and deepen its purposeful organisational unity, adapt to the continuously changing conditions and thus move with the times, towards fulfilling the Alliance's historical mission. This requires consistent evaluation of the changing nature of the operating environment, both domestic and global, and its implications for the organisation and co-ordination of the Alliance as well as its strategy – the national democratic revolution, basic programme – the Free-

dom Charter, and the model, levels of operational efficiency and political discipline it needs to successfully carry out its strategic objectives.

2. For that cause, the Alliance recognises that consensus-seeking consultation (premised in the Alliance's minimum programme) as a standing process, and its associated collective organs have a central role to play. At the heart of this recognition lie the democratic revolutionary principles of unity of purpose – unity not just in words but also in perspective and action, thus principled and programmatic unity, cohesion, collective leadership and accountability. The Alliance will continuously develop, seeking to perfect, and exercise these and other shared revolutionary principles and values, in theory and practices, necessary for the successful implementation and completion of the national democratic revolution. This includes improving the co-ordination, functioning, capacity and impact of its collective leadership organs.

3. In its evolution the Alliance has created a number of consultative organs, and even defined the frequency of their sessions. It was in this process that, at its National Summit held in May 2008, having summed up the experiences of the past period, both positive and negative, the Alliance Political Council was created. This was based on recognition of the continuing strategic relevance of the Alliance and its centrality to the national democratic revolution, thus its primary position, as stated in the declaration of adopted, as the strategic political centre of the revolution. In this regard the Alliance represents the organisational unity of the independent components that constitute it and the intersection of their historical missions in terms of strategic perspec-

five, thus the strategic political centre of their shared strategy in the form of the national democratic revolution and its basic programme, the Freedom Charter.

4. The Alliance is therefore the sum (total) of the unity and strengths of its constituents, which, as independent formations, remain strategic political centres in their own right, based on the underpinnings of their independent existence, in relation to their respective members or affiliates, aims, objectives and goals. The Alliance recognises, however, that there are other key centres of power existing in our society, including the community, the economy (inclusive of the workplace and sectors), and the state, to mention but a few.
5. Common Alliance mechanisms, approaches and platforms in relation to the state, for example, in the post-1994 period as a key centre of power in the context of multi-party democracy and related contestation, are necessary in view of principled and programmatic unity as a weapon of victory. The electoral victories since the first in 1994 have added the key levers of the state ascendable through winning elections, and the others associated with subsequent decisions, as the pillars of the implementation of the national democratic revolution.
6. Accordingly, the state has become a pillar of our struggle, to complete the liberation of the formerly oppressed and advance social emancipation of all, and therefore for the implementation of the national democratic revolution. Conversely, electoral losses do have the effect of subtracting from the pillars of the struggle those levers of state power that we lose in electoral battles. While independent, in this and other regards Alliance formations are also interdependent, in a variety of ways. To this end the importance of common Alliance mechanisms, approaches and platforms, as well as joint programmes and campaigns, cannot be overemphasised.
7. The Alliance comprises the following organs at its disposal to function more effectively as the strategic political centre of the national democratic revolution.
 - **Alliance Political Council** at the national level as the central leadership of the Alliance, and **Alliance Office Bearers Councils** at each sub-national level.
 - **Alliance Secretariat** at the national level, and at each sub-national level.
 - **Alliance Summit** at the national level, and respective summits at each sub-national level.
 - **Alliance Bilateral Sessions** between Alliance components and the leaders of their respective decision-making organs at all levels.
 - **Alliance Deployment and Accountability Commission**
 - ***The class leadership of the working-class as the main, and thus not the sole, motive force of the national democratic revolution, and the organisational leadership of the ANC.***
8. Existing Alliance declarations, such as the Ekurhuleni I and II Alliance National Summit declarations and the May 2008 National Alliance Summit declaration delved into details in relation to operational aspirations of the Alliance during the corresponding periods. In many ways these declarations re-

main a key source of reference. A few broad principles regarding minimum standards of operation merit underlining in relation to the way a reconfigured Alliance should function. To that end, the following minimum standards of consensus-seeking consultative processes take into account the fact that each Alliance component has its own key meetings, as part of democratic consultation. To this end practicability is crucial, as big ambitions without regard to it may result in disillusionment about the functioning of the Alliance while the problem their practicability.

Alliance Political Council

9. The Alliance Political Council was established by the May 2008 National Alliance Summit to give practical effect to the recognition of the Alliance as the strategic political centre of the national democratic revolution. This was the first of the steps that were identified as needed, as the declaration states, 'to be taken to strengthen the capacity of the ANC and the alliance to play this role'.
10. The Alliance Political Council was assigned to ensure that the Alliance engages 'actively and dynamically with its deployees in government', both with regard to the implementation of its programmes and ensuring medium-term strategic guidance. The convening of the Alliance Political Council to manage potential or real crises as *the main modus operandi* is not a characteristic of revolutionary organisation or a reconfigured Alliance.
11. As the standing leadership core of the Alliance, and thus the chief representative of its centrality to the national democratic revolution, the Alliance Political Council needs to meet regularly but according to proper planning, comprising a clearly defined purpose, objectives and expected outcomes. This should include a review of the progress in implementing the national democratic revolution since the last meeting according to its outcomes.
12. The Alliance Political Council should therefore at least hold Quarterly Sessions to guide the implementation of the national democratic revolution and serve as the standing platform for consultation on all major policy questions and considerations. The Alliance Political Council may directly, or indirectly through the Alliance Secretariat, establish any Alliance Working Group on a specific matter or specific aspects and determine its tenure, mode of operation or any necessary conditions for successful work.
13. Established practice has seen the Alliance Political Council play the role of the deployment organ of the Alliance. This is epitomised by the consultative process that was followed before the Cabinet was appointed following the 2019 May general election. This role has to be strengthened. The preceding provisions refer to quarterly evaluation of progress on the implementation of the national democratic revolution. These functions effectively make the Alliance Political Council the Alliance's custodian of deployment and accountability, including recall.
14. Each Alliance component has internal deployment and accountability mechanisms and/or organs. These should be strengthened and convergence should be built in the form of an **Alliance Deployment and Accountability Commission** which will perform its work in consultation with the Alliance Secretariat while, as an advisory

body, reporting also to the Alliance Political Council. The Deployment and Accountability Commission requires Policy Monitoring and Evaluation capacity, technically and professionally, and therefore training and other necessary equipment to perform its functions. The Alliance Political Council, directly or through the Alliance Secretariat, should ensure that these and other necessary measures required for successful Deployment and Accountability Commission work are put in place.

Alliance Secretariat

15. The Alliance Secretariat is responsible for the co-ordinating functions of the Alliance Political Council and its strategic guidance as well as leadership role, including in relation to the convening of the Alliance Summit.
16. The Alliance Secretariat is, however, also a consensus-seeking consultative organ of the Alliance on day-to-day matters and has the duty to implement all such tasks assigned to it by the Alliance Political Council.
17. The Alliance Secretariat should therefore meet frequently, at least once per month.

Alliance Summit

18. The Alliance Summit has a key role to play as the 'parliamentary-wing' of the motive forces of the national democratic revolution and therefore responsible for its overall direction, including legislative direction and associated policy development.
19. At the national level, at least one Alliance Summit per annum, preceded

by thorough preparations, research and performance evaluation under the direction of the Alliance Political Council and co-ordinating functions of the Alliance Secretariat suffices, provided it is convened based on the basis of proper planning. The Alliance Political Council may convene joint consultative conferences or other Alliance Summits, such as the Alliance Economic Policy Summit and Alliance Governance Summit, if the Alliance deems it necessary, and may similarly also establish any working group and technical task team.

20. The Alliance Political Council may extend the Alliance Summit to other progressive formations within the ambit of our broader movement and the necessity to unite the key motive forces of the national democratic revolution.
21. As a matter of principle, and to give play to the widest possible democratic consultation within the Alliance, election manifestos and guidelines should pass through the mechanisms of the Alliance Political Council and Alliance Summit, each in accordance with its role vis-à-vis the centrality of the Alliance to the national democratic revolution.

Alliance Bilateral Sessions

22. Alliance components do convene bilateral sessions from time to time on an as and when necessary basis or as agreed upon in joint planning session. The Alliance encourages this as part and parcel of its consensus-seeking consultative processes. The terms and agenda of the bilateral sessions are agreed upon by the respective Alliance components.

Class leadership of the working-class as the main motive force of the national democratic revolution and organisational leadership of the ANC

23. The Alliance is headed by the ANC organisationally, while the working-class has a class leadership role to play with regard to our project of broader social transformation, an indispensable part of the national democratic revolution. Alliance components¹ are at one with regard to this dialectical articulation of the Alliance and its leadership as well as that of its shared strategy, the national democratic revolution.
24. A conscious effort is required for the ANC and the working-class to play their organisational and class leadership roles, respectively. However, all Alliance components share the responsibility to ensure that the organisational leadership role of the ANC and the class leadership role of the working-class are played to the best of the required standards and objectives of our shared strategy of struggle.
25. Co-ordination of the Alliance is particularly important with regard to the organisational leadership of the ANC. This includes ensuring that electoral processes are Alliance electoral processes, both in form and content, theoretically and practically, led by the ANC, rather than exclusive ANC organisational processes. This requires adherence to both the letter and spirit of consensus-seeking consultation with other Alliance components, and in a proper manner within the framework of the Alliance's collective leadership organs.
26. Thus the architecture of our electoral processes, with elections as a common platform organisationally led by
- ANC, should be a collective outcome. The makeup of electoral lists should reflect the composition of the Alliance, and this necessarily requires all Alliance components to engage in internal democratic processes and present their determinations for finalisation by the Alliance as led organisationally by the ANC. The manifestos and subsequent policy direction should reflect the content and strategic tasks of the national democratic revolution and also be an outcome of consensus-seeking consultation as well as wider mobilisation of, and therefore consultation with the motive forces of the national democratic revolution.
27. Similarly, leadership to parliamentary, legislative and council representatives should be exercised by the Alliance as led organisationally by the ANC. This collective leadership process requires engagement and consensus-seeking consultation before all major decisions, including voting on major questions within these parliamentary, legislative and council bodies.
28. In a similar manner, the Alliance should foster joint programmes and campaigns, including but not limited to cadre development, community development and policy development campaigns.

Mutatis mutandis

29. The minimum principles of effective functioning at the national level of the Alliance shall apply mutatis mutandis at all sub-national levels, with improvements, as a matter of principle, the only variations allowed.

1 On the part of the ANC see, for example, its Strategy and Tactics adopted in December 2017 at its 54th National Conference.

Improving the Quality of Life of Citizens and leaving no-one behind in human capability development (HCD)

Discussion Paper on Human Capabilities Development

(Inputs from: Education, Health, Science and Technology, Labour, PSA, Social and Economic)

1. Introduction

This discussion paper is written in terms of Rule 10.6 and 10.8 of the ANC Constitution and in preparation for the 5th National General Council (NGC) whose aim is to assess the implementation of conference resolutions, policies and key programs adopted by the organization. The paper mainly focusses on the aspect of human capabilities development (HCD) necessary to affirm a people centred and a people driven national development agenda towards the National Development Plan (NDP) Vision 2030.

Whilst the NDP also identified Education, Health and Science & Technology as key inputs for HCD, other sectors are equally critical as HCD straddles the sectors of social transformation, economic transformation, Governance and the Environmental sectors. It is acknowledged that the Policy and Drafting SubCommittees will facilitate a process to harmonise the various discussion papers for coherence, towards the NEC prior to circulation to branches.

The 54th Conference recognized that the course of social transformation in SA is taking place in a global environment characterised by contradictory tendencies in terms of human development and the crisis of neo-liberal capitalism. Concern was noted of declining legitimacy of political and business elites globally consequential to their inability to address the fundamental questions of social inequality and declining social ethics amongst others.

It must be recalled that the National Democratic Revolution seeks to abolish a combination of sources of social conflict emanating from antagonistic and interrelated social contradictions of race, class and patriarchy which characterised Apartheid as Colonialism of a Special Type. The NDR thus have both national and democratic tasks and must continually strive to realise shared prosperity, social justice and human solidarity.

The human capability approach is a theoretical framework that entails two core normative claims:

- first that the freedom of citizens to attain socio-economic well-being is of primary moral importance, and
- second, that freedom of citizens to attain this well-being is to be understood in terms of people's capabilities.

This theory is a revolutionary contribution by a Nobel Prize winner, Amartya Sen and others to development economics and social indicators in his article *Equality of What*. He argues that political freedom, education, conducive environment, equality and standard of living must also be key considerations, in addition to economic growth when considering development. It is now acceptable to argue that the performance of governments should be measured against the concrete capabilities of their citizens and that poverty thus be viewed as deprivation of their basic capability. This argument underpins the notion of a developmental state.

In its 2019 Human Development Report entitled ***'Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today – Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century'***, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) cites the developmental cost of not investing equitably in human capabilities by stating that *'inequalities in human development hurt societies and weaken social cohesion and people's trust in government, institutions and each other'*. Further that *'inequalities hurt economies, wastefully preventing people from reaching their full potential at work and in life thus making it harder for political decisions to reflect the aspirations of the whole society and to protect our planet, as the few pulling ahead flex their power to shape decisions primarily in their interests.'*

The Human Development Index (HDI), which *"was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone"* stems from the capability approach to development, which is defined by its focus on *"the moral significance of individuals' capability of achieving the kind of lives they have reason to value"* (Wells, 2020). This distinguishes it from more established approaches that tend to be defined by their utilitarianism, which tends to focus almost exclusively on the subjective well-being or the availability of *"means to the good life"* (Wells, 2020). A person's capability to live a good life is defined in terms of the set of valuable *'beings and doings'* like being in good health. In this regard, as indicated above, *'poverty'* is taken as *"deprivation in the capability to live a good life,"* whilst *'development'* is meant to bring about a *"capability expansion"* (Wells, 2020).

Like-minded policy thinking has informed multilateral developmental initiatives, most prominently the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). An underlying and driving assumption in this regard is the notion of agency transcending exclusively economic measures. Subsequent scholars, for example, have highlighted the distinction between agency and well-being. Claassen (2009: 422) notes that *"it is one thing for a person to have a high level of well-being (however determined), it is quite another to be an agent, which means, roughly, to lead a life in which one decides for oneself what to do."* This chimes with Thandika Mkandawire's

insistence on a democratic developmental state in the African context and against theories which “suppress freedom in the name of development” (2011: 12). The UNDP points that “inequalities in human development are a defining bottleneck in achieving the 2030 UN Goals for Sustainable Development.”

On the other hand, scholars such as Evans note that “in the coming century, state capacity will have an even greater role to play in societal success than it did in the last century” and that the “‘state–society synergy’ that was crucial to 20th-century industrial transformation – dense networks of ties connecting the state to industrial elites – will have to be replaced by a much broader, much more “bottom-up” set of state-society ties to secure developmental success” (2014: 84). In this regard, the ANC’s 2017 **‘Strategy and Tactics’** document sees democracy coinciding with state capacity; whilst noting that the ANC “seeks to build democracy with social content, underpinned by a capable developmental state” (p. 7), the document also observes that: “For [the state] to exercise leadership, the state should be networked among all sectors of society. This embeddedness should be combined with autonomy in policy development and decision-making. While the democratic state in principle seeks to facilitate societal consensus, it should be able to take a firm stand in the national interest, where such agreement cannot be reached” (p. 22). Recent developments presented by the Corona virus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have demonstrated the centrality of the State globally in creating social cohesion and human solidarity in the balancing act of saving the lives and livelihoods of citizens globally.

In the South African context, though the ANC is agile and pragmatic in the use of theory, the focus has been on addressing the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment, which correlates with SDGs 1 (poverty elimination), 8 (unemployment), and 10 (addressing social inequality), driven by uniquely South African imperatives and modalities. The NDP Vision 2030 also has largely considered social security net, skills development and quality health inputs by the government as contributing to the development of the capabilities of citizens. Similarly, the ANC emphasises that **“in addition to issues related to income and cost of living, social policy is fundamental to ensuring that all South Africans enjoy a decent standard of living. The core approach in this regard is to improve human capabilities and ensure equal opportunities for all”** (ANC ‘Strategy and Tactics’, 2017: 23).

The South Africa National Development Plan Vision (NDP) 2030 has largely considered the social security net and skills development inputs by the government as contributing to the human capability of citizens, their resilience and the envisioned sustainable people-centred development that advances the motive force, whom we intend on alleviating, and who are the ones left behind, and increasingly so and continue living hand to mouth and not able to provide and are thus not capable. The African Union (AU) Development Agenda 2063 and United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 to which South Africa is signatory to, do encompass the objectives of human capability development being central.

As part recognition of the need for renewal, the Strategy and Tactics adopted at the 54th National Conference states that: the main goal of state transformation is “building a

developmental state that provides effective basic services and with capabilities to take forward a far-reaching agenda of national economic development, whilst at the same time placing people and their involvement at the centre of this process” (p. 42), whilst also observing that: “The ANC needs to demonstrate in actual practice its commitment to speeding up fundamental transformation.” In addition to strategically strengthening the Alliance and mobilizing the progressive forces in society, the ANC has “*to shore up its own capacity, honestly identify and correct its weaknesses and revitalise its public image. Bland reassurances that are then negated by the very conduct of leaders and members will worsen the decline; and, among the people, they will merely generate irreverent humour”* (‘Strategy and Tactics’, 2017: p. 16). The posture, actions and impact of the state that the ANC leads are to be measured by the extent to which the inherent capacity is directed to eliminate inequality, eradicate poverty and ensure the well-being of all citizens. The ANC must demonstrate its capability in this regard and lead the way for ordinary citizens, who are the electorate, to assess the capability of the state and to hold it accountable.

This paper reviews the current socio-economic conjuncture, the outputs and impact of work done over the 25 years of democracy and in particular since the 54th ANC Conference held in NASREC 2017. The paper acknowledges the significant effort and resources deployed in these the past twenty-five years, that presented in various initiatives including investment of large portions of its budget in Education, Health and Innovation as well as providing a Social Security net in social grants and housing amongst others in support of the vulnerable in society. These investments, however, do not measure at all against the growing poverty, unemployment and inequality that results in the dependency on the State even for those that have undergone state-funded skills and training programs. The NEC Subcommittee was emphatic that this phenomenon of divergence between investments in human capabilities development and continues increase of poverty and inequality, requires more study involving also social scientists, in addition to what many believe that we should attribute it mainly to the structural economic constraints that remain as unfinished business in dismantling of the deep-rooted stranglehold of the Colonial-Apartheid system that protects a white minority male citizens , whilst leaving the majority blacks and women behind in poverty and desperation.

2. Background

As the saying goes – ‘*If you can’t measure it, you can’t achieve it*’ . The analysis presented herein is extracted from various studies and reports but primarily from the UNDP Development Report of 2019 and the SA 25 Year Review Report of 2020 both of which documented trends mainly up to 2018. Whilst the UNDP report ranked the country at 7th (out of 54) on the continent in terms of the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) and 113th globally (out of 189 countries). SA is thus ranked within the category average of countries with High Human Development (HHD) but below the category average. Other categories include Very High Human Development (VHHD), Medium Human Development (MHD) and Low Human Development(LHD). Of note however is that the Inequality Adjusted for Life expectancy, Education and Income is 0.463 compared to the average for HHD which is 0,615. The Coefficient for Human inequality is 31,4 which is much higher than the VHHD, HHD, MHD and LHD averages of 10.5, 17.5, 30.9 and 20 respectively. This makes SA not only the most unequal society but an extremely, grossly and

scandalously an unequal society. What concerns most is that the overall loss in HDI due to inequality in South Africa is very high at 34.4% depicting the severe negative impact of the infamous triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality on the lives of ordinary citizens.

The South African population growth figure stands at an average of 1.38% per year in the last decade. At the same time, however, the country's unemployment rate has increased; from about 7% in the mid-1970s to 13% in the mid-1990s and 25% in the late 2000s and to more than 29% in 2019, making South Africa's unemployment rate one of the highest in the world. This takes place against the backdrop of the population of Africa increasing rapidly from an estimated 140 million in 1900 to a billion by 2010. According to the United Nations "medium scenario" projections, this figure will rise to 2.5 billion in 2050 and more than 4 billion in 2100. The population of Africa is increasing because the fertility rate outnumbers the mortality rate by a ratio of four to one, creating a possibility of a demographic dividend from its youthfulness with estimates that its urban population may exceed the European in a few decades. Especially in urban areas, housing projects in South Africa are not reducing the percentage of households living in informal dwellings with 81,1% formal dwellings recorded in 2018 households that have received some kind of government subsidy to access housing has increased from 5,6% in 2002 to 13,6% by 2018, 13,1% of households were still living in informal dwellings. While the population has increased by 1,3% per annum over the period 2002-2018, the number of households increased by 2,4% per annum over the same period, a growth of 48,9% over the period. Since households are the basic units for service delivery, rapid unplanned household growth will constrain the delivery of basic services. More than one-quarter (25,7%) of households consisted of a single person, while 62% of households contained three or fewer members. Of serious concern is that the persistent structural economic constraints continue impoverishing blacks who are the majority of the population at a household income level. If primarily the majority blacks, women, youth and the working class in general are not put in states of capability, SA is unlikely to recover for a long time from the current impact of COVID-19 pandemic and the economic recession, realise the demographic dividend nor significantly benefit its population from the regionalisation of the economy.




Figure 2: Annual Household Income

Source: **Statistics South Africa.** 2017. **Living Conditions Survey 2014–15.**

Social grants remain a vital safety net with % who benefitted from a social grant increased with 31% of persons benefitted from a grant in 2018, 44,3% of the household received one or more grants. Grants were the second most important source of income (45,2%) for households after salaries (64,8%), and the main source of income for almost one-fifth (19,9%) of households nationally.

Life expectancy at birth whilst on the increase in SA with what is referred to as an epidemiological miracle, it is at similar levels of 1990 at 63,9 which is below the HHD average, this is mainly as the result of poor management of the HIV pandemic in earlier years. The Health Expenditure is at 8,1% of GDP, higher than the HHD average of 5,8%, however, the impact remains poor mainly due to HIV, a fragmented health system, the capability of the state, corruption and social determinants of health. Child malnutrition rate is 27,4 which is also worse than the HHD average of 15 even worse than countries such as Ghana at 18,8, Chile at 1,8 and China at 8,1. HIV prevalence is higher only than Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland at 18,8 % and much higher than the HHD average of 1,2%. Child mortality rate whilst on the decline is at 37,1% (60,9 in 1990, 84 in 2005 and 59,3 in 2010) is still higher than the HHD average of 16,1%. Linked to this are considerations on health and wellness as being unhealthy disadvantages the ability to work productively; there is a high disease burden with an estimated 5.7% of the GDP of the country is lost due to depression and South Africa is ranked 106/156 globally on the Happiness Index. Access to health care significantly improved with universal access to Primary Health Care provided and with regulations on tobacco related health problems are on the decline, including related cancer and chronic obstructive respiratory diseases.

The Gender Development Index is 0,984 which is between the VHHD of 0.979 and HHD of 0.960 averages. However, the estimated Gross National Income (GNI) per capita for females is lower than the HHD at 9036 (2018) a decline from 9328 (2014). The males estimated GNI per capita is however higher than females, even though still lower than the HHD average of 18272(2018) at 14554 (2018) also a decline from 14975 (2015). The male suicide rate is 21.7 (higher than all country averages) whilst Female suicide rate 5.1 (lower than the VHHD and HHD). This depicts a very gloomy picture of gender inequality with also the estimated GNI per capita of both males and females in South Africa on the decline.

Education expenditure is at 6,1% of GDP, which is even higher than the average of countries with VHH. Gross enrolment ratios at tertiary level are at 20 (primary 102 and secondary 100). This is much lower than Chile at 91, China at 51 and the HHD average of 46. The primary school drop-out rate is 20,3 which is even higher than the MHD at 18,1. The survival rate to the last grade of the lower secondary general education is however high at 93% even higher than the average of countries with VHHD of 91. Of note, South Africa is not reporting on the important indicators of pupil-teacher ratios, primary school teachers trained to teach and percentage of primary schools with access to the internet. Internet users as a total of the population, however, is 56,2% and amongst the highest in the continent and lower than both Russia at 80,9% and 67,5% amongst the BRICS countries. Of significance in respect of connectivity, access communication and the digital economy, South Africa mobile phone subscription rate is at 153,3%.




Figure 1: Proportion of population aged between 25 and 64 years with tertiary education in 2015.

Source: **OECD. 2016.** <https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/population-with-tertiary-education.htm>

Two-thirds of learners attend **no-fee schools** but still lack of money still contributes to dropping out. The percentage of learners that attended no-fee schools increased from 21,4% in 2007 to 67,2% by 2018. Almost one-quarter (24,2%) of learners who have dropped out from school before the age of 18 years, however, offered a lack of money ('no money for fees') as the main reason. According to the report more than three-quarters (77,1%) of learners who attended public schools benefited from school feeding schemes in 2018, compared to 63,1% in 2009. Learners in Limpopo (91,2%), Eastern Cape (89,7%), Mpumalanga (87,8%) and Northern Cape (82,6%) were the most likely to benefit from this program.

Educational attainment continues to improve. The percentage of individuals aged 20 years and older who did not have any education decreased from 11,4% in 2002 to 4,5% in 2018, while those with at least a grade 12 qualification increased from 30,5% to 45,2% over the same period.

The report shows an increase in the percentage of households that was **connected to the electricity supply** from the mains from 76,7% in 2002 to 84,7% in 2018, was accompanied by a decrease in the use of wood (20,0% to 7,7%) and paraffin (16,1% to 3,6%) over the same period

Despite early gains in the provision of **water, provision slowed down notably after 2014.** Although the percentage of households with access to an improved source of water only increased by less than five percentage points between 2002 and 2018 (growing from 84,4% to 89,0%), the increases were much more notable in Eastern Cape (+19,0 percentage points) and KwaZulu-Natal (+11,2 percentage points). The GHS report further shows that a percentage of households with access to **improved sanitation** increased by an 21,3 percentage points between 2002 and 2018, growing from 61,7% to 83,0%.

The South African government adopted the NDP vision 2030 perspective of a developmental state whose centrality is an active citizenry with a capable state that enables their effective participation in the socio-economic development of the country and in nation-building. Beyond the protection of the constitutional human rights of all citizens,

various initiatives have been undertaken in areas of early childhood, education, health and youth development. These initiatives include, but not limited to, the Prioritization of the First 1000 Days of every Child's Life; Improving the quality of Education, Connectivity of schools, Broadening access to higher education with a priority focus on TVETs, Skills Revolution targeting the youth NEETs, Re-skilling of the workforce in the context of the 4th Industrial Revolution and the Changing World of Work; Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and National Health Insurance, Reducing the Burden of Disease as well as investing in Research and Innovation.

Whilst even Treasury noted nearly a decade ago that **“high youth unemployment means young people are not acquiring the skills or experience needed to drive the economy forward”**, this is a demonstration that the South African government in its stance as a developmental state has understood the centrality of skills development and productivity considering the country's history, its present realities, and its aim of achieving the National Democratic Society. Various initiatives aimed at transformation have been undertaken, including the skills levy, establishment TVETs, scarce skills funding, NSFAS, the NYDA, Skills Development Summit among others. At the same time, it has been observed that we stand on the cusp of the fourth industrial revolution which will transform the needed skill-set of the populace.

There is an urgent need to resolve this conundrum of high unemployment rate on one hand and a critical skills gap on the other is given urgency by the 8 million “NEETS” in the country; young people aged 15 to 35 years who are not in education, nor employment nor training who have gone up from 2.8 million people (41.6%) in 2010. Furthermore, only about 30% of youth go on to seek education after basic schooling. The ANC having noted in the NASREC Conference in 2017 that *“the challenges of new technology and the 4th industrial revolution require a revolutionary approach to training and skills development,”* and therefore *“initiatives that accelerate the placement of youth in employment opportunities that generate skills and experience should be intensified”* (p. 33).




Figure 3: Unemployment remains the largest contributor to poverty.

Source: Stats SA.2015. Millennium Development Goals Country Close Out Report for South Africa.

Further, initiatives to create an enabling environment for optimal development and productivity of citizens include Free Primary Health Care, Programs to combat communicable and non-communicable diseases as well as the enhancement of the social security net such as child support grants, free housing etc.

Despite the policy framework, plans, programs and investments much of these efforts aimed at improving human capabilities and shared growth in South Africa have not yet yielded the desired impact. One of the underlying reasons hampering progress has been cited as the **lack of coordination** within government, across public-private – civil society sectors. The recently adopted policy on a District Development Model aims to rectify this coordination flaws. Lessons must, however, be taken on why the capability of citizens was not enhanced in past similar initiatives such as Reconstruction and Development, Millennium Development Goals, Urban and Rural Development Programs, Targeted Development Nodes and Corridors as well as the recent Presidential Infrastructure Program and Phakisa interventions. There are however success stories that need to be leveraged including at sub-national levels such as the Sukuma-Sakhe and other provincial and local initiatives

There is currently a colliding of three storms that will possibly result in an unprecedented economic depression and enormous social distress on the lives of South Africans, if a business as usual attitude continues. These storms relate to:

- firstly, the protracted poor economic performance that resulted in the downgrading of the sovereign credit rating of South Africa to sub-investment
- secondly, the severe impact on the economy resultant from the COVID-19 pandemic
- thirdly, the emergent new world of the 4th Industrial Revolution which will likely shed more jobs.

The country is at a crossroads of either sinking in the looming storm of economic depression or rising like a proverbial sphinx from the ashes of the triple challenges (poverty, unemployment and inequality) compounded by COVID-19 pandemic and the recession. The COVID-19 pandemic disaster response of South Africa has demonstrated that with political will, the **state does** have the capacity to foster unity and singularly focus the nation on surviving together, leaving no-one behind. The President's capability to ensure collective leadership across political parties and sectors for a common national interest, all-of-government response and human solidarity should be commended. The initiatives of the President on the various Compacts (Jobs, Investment, Health, Gender etc) and on the District Development Model require that the country continues to build on this capability and harness the totality of the State and Societal capacity towards **localised impact** for the wellbeing of citizens – where they live, work and do business. COVID-19 should not be allowed to erode instead it should consolidate this National Solidarity to survive the impending economic recession. Borrowing from the UNDP Human Resources Report of 2019, this moment beckons leadership to mount a bold response to protect the rights of citizens to quality lives beyond policies, beyond institutions and across all communities.

Frankly speaking, South Africa's lack of substantive progress and lag behind major developing countries with regard to the development of her human capabilities cannot be justifiable. The Colonial-Apartheid legacy, albeit it devastated the lives of the majority of citizens over three centuries, can no longer alone be an acceptable reason why there is a deterioration and not in some of the aspects of the quality of life of citizens in the 25 years of democracy. South Africans are not adequately capacitated and empowered to drive the necessary radical socio-economic transformation for shared growth, inclusive society and to begin enjoying equitably in the prosperity of their relatively mineral-rich country. The various identified objective and subjective factors need to be tackled within the wonderful policies, programs and interventions. The moment is now to tackle decisively the undesirable tendencies of incompetency, mediocrity, greed, corruption and lack of accountability within the ANC and in throughout the State institutions and Society. As engagements with other subcommittees in May 2020 have showcased, there is a growing trust deficit in the population's perception of the ANC by critical stakeholders and emotive forces such as the poor, marginalised, and the youth.

Let us be inspired by one of the dynamic courageous and developmental activist women of our times who is a Nobel Peace Laureate Wangari Maathai when she said *"In the course of history, there comes a time when humanity is called to shift to a new level of consciousness, to reach higher moral ground. A time when we have to shed our fear and give hope to each other. **That time is now.**"*

The mandate of the 54th National Conference was founded on the premise that as the ANC and the Nation a choice was made not to fear and fight amongst ourselves but to unite with hope and create together a new dawn – that the moment of Unity and Renewal for Socio-economic transformation had arrived and must not be wasted. COVID-19 pandemic and the looming economic depression calls for a greater sense of urgency and national unity lest the decline that has been witnessed over the past years since the global recession of 2008 continues to a point of irreversibility in the lifetime of this generation.

3. Assessment of the Implementation of Resolutions

An effective organisation is characterised by its ability to track and monitor the implementation of its own decisions, especially by leadership mandated by their own members who form the consciousness of their communities. One of the constraining factors is that whereas Departments had provided reports on their extensive work, it is not always clear how inputs and activities will eventually result in the desired outputs, outcomes and least on impact. The NEC would have to review and strengthen the Monitoring Systems and Accountability Tools. The 25 Years of Democracy in SA Review Report has assisted in as far as performance trends as outlined above up to 2018 complemented by the 2019 UNDP Report on Human Development Report. This report acknowledges that there is work in progress and further that the COVID-19 pandemic has presented a disaster of global proportion which was imported to South Africa due to global movement of citizens. The report provides both a high-level summary and a detailed assessment in the annexure reflecting performance on resolutions since the 54th Conference.

The Scientific Research, Technology and Innovation sector has since 2017, realised a slight increase in expenditure to 0,85% of GDP against the 1,5% resolution of the 54th Conference. It must also be borne in mind that for South Africa the ideal for global competitiveness is a 5% investment. The Presidential 4th Industrial Revolution Commission has been established and made recommendations on how the country can move much more decisively and speedily to remain competitive as well as to build capacity for the new skills required. Whilst it is fact that both public and private Sectors continue to underfund research in the country, there is also concern that significant investments are not aligned to policy and socio-economic imperatives, especially with government programs. The other big challenge is that government procurement regulations and practices do not enable the preferential use of locally developed innovations and thus resulting in paralysis in transforming critical sectors of government consumption such as Pharmaceutical and Technological innovations.

The failure of the government to connect all schools means many students are locked out from using technology to learn or from being equipped to take part in the 4IR. The curriculum changes to prepare learners for the 4IR will have limited impact if the country does not ensure all schools are connected and data costs are reduced. The introduction of coding and robotics in public schools need to be welcome and the progress in government funding of research aligned to the socio-economic transformation and developmental agenda remains critical. The Basic Education sector continues to inspire the nation on the matric pass rate that has not only reached the highest at above 80% last year in for the 2019 Matriculates, but has also lifted the historically poor performing rural and township schools to excel including in the STEM subjects. Two key challenges remain poor performance at primary school level as well as concerning delays due to funding in incorporating ECD into the formal education system.

The link between the basic education, higher education and the world of work/business remain the strangle in the education system that continues to produce young people who have gone through at least 15 years of training only to be unemployed and desti-




Figure 4: Whilst access to higher education has been impressive, the enrolment ratios are skill skewed and lag behind the 20:80 University: TVET/CET split.

tute from poverty. We need to acknowledge the improvements registered in the reduced drop-out rates for NSFAS funded students and the increased funding for TVET Colleges. The quality of training still requires focussed and urgent attention especially to ensure that the graduates of TVET and CET colleges complete both theory and practical work supervised by the very training institutions. There is a need however, to ensure improvements in the quality of training especially in the TVETs and Colleges.

The funding of higher education is still skewed towards Universities. The higher education institutions are faced with the need to respond to the transformation demands especially in their relevance in creating knowledge that assist in resolving real problems that society faces and using instruments such as student funding policy targeted at producing skills for the current and future needs of the economy.

The life expectancy of South Africans continues to rise since the bold and decisive action was taken to control the HIV and AIDS pandemic. Of significance is that the District of UMkhanyakude in KZN is the first in the country to achieve the HIV 90-90-90 target set by UNAIDS in the Global effort to reach herd immunity. Despite concerns over stunting indicating child malnutrition, Child and Maternal mortality rates continue to decline.

More still needs to be done to reduce the high disease burden of diseases of lifestyle, trauma, children and mothers as well as of TB. Faced by yet another pandemic the South African response to the COVID-19 pandemic has tested the capacity of the Health System that was still trying to cope with sustaining the lives of South Africans amidst a high disease burden, shortages of staff, fragmented health system and underfunded public services. The District Health System has proven to be a necessary investment as the COVID-19 pandemic response utilize its vast numbers of Ward Based Primary Health Care Teams in the mass screening and testing intervention.




Figure 5: Life expectancy at birth for South Africans, 2002-2019.

Source: Adapted from StatsSA, Mid-year population estimates, 2019.




Figure 6: U5MR and IMR from VR/RMS and neonatal mortality rate (NMR) from VR/DHIS, 2000-2017.

Source: Dorrington RE Bradshaw D, Laubscher R, Nannan N (2019). Rapid mortality surveillance report 2017. Cape Town: South African Medical Research Council.

Prior to this, Cabinet in advancing Universal Health Coverage and Quality Health for All policies, approved the NHI Bill which now Parliamentary Public Hearings have been concluded on in all nine provinces. Preparations for the hearing were led by an NEC Task Team which ran workshops for the organization from the ANC NEC, PECs, RECs and for BECs to Alliance, Business, Workers, Civil Society, Professionals and Communities. This extensive Joint Alliance led campaign created excitement and hope amongst ordinary citizens who went all out to attend public hearings and making written submissions. This campaign helped dispel misinformation and fake news intended to mislead ordinary for narrow interests of the few, especially those whose profit margins have been excessive as they amass wealth by extracting the much needed medical care resources from the unsuspecting citizens. The ANC led Alliance listened to many accounts of citizens whose medical insurance get depleted in the middle of a therapeutic intervention, regardless of whether acute or chronic, and how the majority of South Africans decried the delays in introducing the NHI that must be based on the principles of solidarity, quality and equity for all citizens. A comprehensive report on the NHI campaign awaits availability of resources but the process has begun.

Given the results yielded by the ANC Subcommittee on Education, Health, Science and Technology (with 50% of resolutions still not complete), Science, Technology and Innovation (62.5% complete; 31.25% in progress; 6.25% completed), Basic Education (68.96% incomplete; 20.68% in progress; 10.34% completed), Higher Education and Training: 61.29% incomplete; 25.8% in progress; 12.9% completed) and Health (81.81% incomplete; 9.09% in progress; 9.09% completed), it is evident that the implementation of resolutions is lagging. One of the constant challenges identified was the lack of uniform reporting and the consistent subjective interpretation of resolutions. Indeed, some reports cited resolutions from a conference ago, whilst others appeared to be introducing resolutions of their own. Reportage is a critical issue, with many reports being verbose and, in some instances, irrelevant and tangential. Whilst showing the need for a non-dogmatic approach and agility in implementation, it also demonstrates the need for a capable state and organisation, with measures for accountability. As the governing party, the ANC, in cooperation with the Alliance, the MDM and other progressive stakeholders has an indispensable role in building a people-centred, developmental South Africa with a focus on improving human capabilities for radical socio-economic renewal, inclusive growth and nation-building amidst a changing industrial landscape and economy with trends nationally and globally.

There is no doubt that as the COVID-19 infections peak, the capacity of the Human Resources and Hospital Services will be accordingly tested and thus with the added beds in stadia amongst other sites, the call has been made for doctors, nurses and other health workers to volunteer in saving the lives of our people. The collaborative efforts of across the Public and Private Sectors does give hope for the NHI as envisaged by the NDP and the SGD UHC, to succeed in our country. SA scientists have joined the global effort of a vaccine and research in combatting COVID-19 and more efforts are also required to implement the resolution on vaccine-preventable diseases. This is the time to reaffirm Primary Health Care, fully unlock the value of the Cuban Medical Training System and welcome the support for preventative medicine approach.

Concerns remain over the capability of the State to unlock the huge investments in the Health, Education and Training as well as in Research and Innovation to catalyse radical socio-economic interventions towards inclusive and shared growth in the country. Whilst Health and Basic Education operate largely on a District Based approach, better coordination, meritocracy, accountability and decisive action against incompetent, corrupt and non-evidence based actions require continued attention. The review of the public service administration that has begun should be fast-tracked do tackle the inherent structural weaknesses in the public service performance management system and, working with the dedicated anti-corruption multi-agency team (focussed in the health sector initially), efforts to uproot the culture of corruption must be seen to be done. The DDM will also consolidate the national societal partnerships on education to a local level and assist communities to defend the right of their children to education and thus the protection of the schooling program and the relevant infrastructure in keeping with the old adage that ***'it takes a village to raise a child'***.

In concluding this section, there is need to address the legacy of organizational lethargy and lack of tenacity in seeing through the implementation of broadly consulted policies that are taken at conference by delegates from branches. Often, these policies are lauded by fraternal liberation organizations and others globally. Since the 54th Conference, resolutions were translated into government policy, the election manifesto and the MTEF priorities. The impact of COVID19 Disaster need to be urgently assessed and any interventions guided by the principles of protecting all citizens from hunger and destitute circumstances as well as ensuring that the opportunity to tackle poverty, unemployment and inequality is not lost. To date the trust deficit is being closed by the leadership of government in fighting COVID19 and this leadership is expected by the majority of citizens who were trapped, even before the pandemic, by circumstance that continue to erode their quality of life, capabilities and dignity.

4. Organizational and State Capacity

This paragraph reflects on possible missed opportunities, from hindsight, to advance the quality of life of citizens either from the organizational or government platforms. A missed opportunity is a chance that presented and was, for one reason or another, not taken full advantage of. This science of hindsight is extracted from benchmarking and seeking inputs of others. In short, be prepared to learn and act on the lessons learnt. In the case of the ANC as a governing party, these lessons are always viewed from the lens of a revolutionary quest to succeed in improving the lives of people for the better and the prosperity of our nation.

In as much as there is a necessary call for the capability and reliability of the state, the role and responsibilities of the ANC as the governing party that is democratically elected is even much more critical in the needs to be rigorously relooked at even at this stage. There is urgency in sparing no effort and doing all that is ethical, impactful and inspiring to close the trust deficit through having a reliable and capable governing party and the state to implement the resolutions mandated by members and their communities.

Areas of weakness, chronic underperformance and failure to manage the implementation of resolutions that are potentially equalising forces with a high impact but are multi-dimensional and dictates a dynamic multi-sectoral multi-stakeholder approach for success, require a deep examination to be mitigated as the capacity of the state is discussed. Some examples include:

- 4.1 The ANC may need to establish a much more scientifically rigorous system to monitor the translation of the various resolutions (which are informed by an extensive consultation process of policy review involving experts, branches and the public into the Policy Conferences) into government policies and programs and that the ANC must pay more attention to its own subjective weaknesses in this regard and need to be accountable for the impact of its own policies. The continued lack of ANC capacity, including the Sub-Committee system to effectively monitor those deployed to the government due to lack of adequate full-time support system and resources – if indeed this is the moment not to waste, the institutionalization of a monitoring and evaluation system on the lauded policies and plans of the ANC, based on resolutions of Conferences, must be prioritised.
- 4.2 Dynamic use of the capacity in municipal councils, legislatures and parliament to strengthen constituency work and oversight to augment the organizational capacity of the committee system can be improved. The cost benefit of the Parliamentary Constituency Offices and Standard Operating Procedures in identifying areas of need amongst communities and sectors (including in ward committees, clinic committees, hospital boards, school governing bodies, policing forums) was done and there is a need to review why the PCO system is failing the poor and most vulnerable in key areas of human capability development. The most likely is that the elite in the organization become gatekeepers and dispense patronage to their own cronies leaving the majority of citizens trapped in a whirlwind of corruption, incompetence and continued suffering. A more rigorous system must be considered and a zero tolerance for corruption, patronage and abuse of the poor and vulnerable must be seen and not only heard.
- 4.3 The implementation of the resolutions on capacitating the deployed cadres through the Political School system is even more relevant in the implementation of resolutions intended to unleashing the human capabilities so that they thrive and participate in the country's developmental agenda optimally. The persistent failure of the ANC to prioritise funding political education relevant to capacitate deployed cadres to be effective and accountable – whilst there was a huge fanfare on the launch of the OR Tambo Political School, there was no prioritization of funding and now the Head of the School is back in government with an additional team to run the school professionally as envisage, not realised.
- 4.4 The continued silo approach in the implementation of the first-1000 days program of a child program and other ECD programs, including the delays in transferring ECD to Basic Education Department – the culture of a minimalistic silo approach might have resulted in the eradication of severe malnutrition but has left a generation to wrestle with the consequence of stunting. The recent squabbles between national, provincial and local governments on enabling communities to access the potable water already in tankers in their communities as part of the COVID-19 response should be made a case study and used to resolve structural failures of the state model and rectify such, now and after the disaster.

- 4.5 The poor performance, governance and outputs of TVET and Colleges despite this being a key priority for artisan training – the increased funding of the multitudes of young people who graduate from technical and vocational training institutions with nothing only but theory is actually bastardising the sector. Whilst it is agreed that the TVET / College sector needs to ensure that it becomes the option of choice for skills development by guaranteeing demand for its graduates and position itself to provide skills needed for the 4IR, the throughput of the sector could not even be assessed due to unavailability of reliable data, during the 25 year review.
- 4.6 The continued non-alignment of Higher Education to real Socio-Economic Needs and further the separation of government-funded/subsidized primary skills development from industry-funded skills development agenda – if judged by the escalating number of unemployed graduated the funding of Higher Education Institutions is like throwing NSFAS resources in a leaking bucket and using SETA/YES/Job Fund resources to pluck the bucket holes thereafter. The Skills Revolution process has as yet to align the various fragmented inefficient efforts of both public and private sector funded interventions.
- 4.7 The persistent failure to significantly increase investments for Science and Innovation in key areas of the developmental agenda and utilisation of the minimal available resources in a non-targeted manner such as the government funding of research in the higher education sector – there is a significant body of research that should have long enlightened on the direct correlation of investment in research and economic growth as well as methods of improving relevance such as the triple/quadruple helix approach – though Asian countries such as China initially attracted manufacturing due to cheap labour, investments in both education and innovation is what sustained their economic growth and global competitiveness.
- 4.8 The huge number of EPWP and internship beneficiaries who have been side-lined the mainstream economy presents a tragedy waiting to happen as many feel like social outcasts and although healthy physically are not able to fend for themselves and their families – the proposed cooperatives model was aimed at this cohort which is not organically entrepreneurial but willing work and be economically active. The failure of government to bring in experts to build on early successes in this cooperative sector is one of the missed opportunities.
- 4.9 The persistent irrational government procurement that discourages local innovation, boosting consumption of foreign intellectual property and imports at the expense of locally manufacturing has both deepened the trade deficit and discouraged a lot of local innovations – the most glaring missed opportunities are the procurement of pharmaceutical products, the motor industry despite being incentivised by government is not building the capacity of the country to produce such , there is still yet to be a 'Made in SA' mobile systems. Even when Free Africa Trading Zone become a reality South Africans are likely to be conduits of products whose intellectual property is elsewhere.
- 4.10. There is no culture of meritocracy and consequence management, as a result, other than the frontline workers, there is no evidence that the public service (all spheres and state owned enterprises) is providing value for money, including that the performance management system is weak and not aligned to organizational and service performance - organizational values systems are yet to be aligned to policies of the new dawn era of zero tolerance to mediocrity and corruption.

- 4.11 The lethally toxic silo mentality whilst been defeated by the coherence of leadership across the spheres in the DDM approach that calls for a joint-up government with involvement of all of society and transparency is slowed down by capacity in the public service – during elections government is almost always able to resolve many services and developmental needs of communities, whilst the launched DDM has been conceptualized to have Executives on the ground the process was overtaken by the COVID19 pandemic and the institutionalization of the DDM as a new norm of governance is yet to be realised.
- 4.12 Weak business continuity systems bedevil progress and sustenance of good programs even by the same political party, resulting in governance in limbo for periods about a year before and after elections, leaving the public sector paralysed and programs/business/investors held at bay – with the staggered national and local government elections, there is effectively only one full year (in a five year period) or two full years (in a ten year period) to focus on government and the nation on service delivery and development and not on narrow intra- and inter-party political contestation.

5. Key success factors

- 5.1. **Policymaking and Governance is laden with risks:** The lifecycle of any policy measure is so open to circumstantial challenges. The paper notes that in addition to silo modes of operation, which is indicative also of poor stakeholder management, the lack of resource availability persists as a key undermining factor in the fulfilment of the ANC's resolutions. On the other hand, key success factors identified include the potential demographic dividend based on the overall size of youth as a proportion in the population, which differentiates South Africa and the African continent in light of the aged population in developed countries in much of the rest of the world. Secondly, South Africa remains richly endowed with mineral resources which could be better utilised to benefit the majority of the country. Thirdly, the country has a variety of institutions actively working and yielding results in scientific research.
- 5.2 **Cushioning children and youth against poverty:** Nutrition is essential for a healthy population. There are currently serious issues around malnutrition and stunting in South Africa, with women and children particularly disadvantaged. Health and nutrition-related problems are generally caused by economic (low income, unemployment etc.) and environmental (climate change) factors. Technologies should be used to create opportunities for advancing farming in South Africa and making efficient use of arable land by reducing pressures resulting from climate change, waste and pollution. The nutrition security domain focuses on zero-impact agriculture and the application of biotechnologies, precision agriculture and big data. In this regard, the government will need to cushion children and youth against poverty through various measures such as continuation and improvement of school childhood nutrition schemes, improving parent involvement, making use of the labour unions in the alliance, and bringing the state closer to schools through the DDM.

- 5.3 **Instruments to redress inequality:** Real wages of the bottom 10% earners in the country have radically decreased, shrinking by about 25% between 2011 and 2015. In contrast, the same period saw the earnings of the top 2% grow by 15%, while those in the top 1% had their earnings grow by 48% (Webster, 2019). Furthermore, research by the University of Stellenbosch demonstrates that the wealthiest 1% owns 67% of all the country's wealth, and the top 10% owns 93% -- meaning that some 90% of South African own only 7% of the country's wealth (Orthofer, 2016: 1). Inequality is both symptomatic and predictive of socio-economic risk and unsustainability, especially when it is increasing. This means less revenue for the state, whilst also coinciding with increasing demand for social expenditure due to health shortfalls, dropouts, and unemployment. The onset of recession and the unforeseen rapidity of the COVID-19 means can only exacerbate this fiscal stress. The policymaking process will similarly require instruments to redress inequality in the presence of the state between wealthy and poor, and urban and rural. Indeed, as it has been observed that the state is unevenly present in the lives of South Africans, this means not only redress in economic terms but also the distribution of services, by taking advantage of the 4IR, as well as integrating land reform in the creation of an enabling environment characterised by access to basic social services.
- 5.4 Overall, the **healthcare system needs to be optimised** in order to deliver better diagnostic and treatment services. Drug development is part of this. Prevention is cheaper than cure, and it is therefore important to educate society so that, where possible, people take control of their own health. It is also necessary to improve current health infrastructure and administration, which are inadequate, particularly in rural areas. As in other domains, mobile technologies, artificial intelligence and big data will bring enormous opportunities for the development of healthcare service delivery for all.
- 5.5 Mindful that the **full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic disaster** will unfold over the next few years and that there it was already preceded by an almost freefall economic decline for a number of years resulting in the economic recession and sub-investment sovereign credit rating, the risk-mitigated resumption of necessary social and economic activities can either save or further sink the country from/into an economic depression that can last for decades. The optimal enablement of the majority of citizens to be fully involvement in the economic recovery can help redress the decline in human capabilities and ensure SA turns the tide against dependency culture of grants to a truly people centred sustainable development. A business as usual approach in the management of the Disaster and Recovery therefrom is likely to place SA in the economic recession state it was prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. All-of-government, including the role of parastatals, need to succeed in truly enabling maximum participation leaving-no-one behind.

6. Game Changers

Multi-dimensional assessment of human development is increasingly recognized as playing an important role in assessing the well-being of citizens in addition to the countries' economic performance. Human capability is also used as an indicator to assess the legitimacy of governments based on the three dimensions of the Human Development Index – the standard of living, education and health, and their relationship with public social spending towards achieving the 2030 NDP Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Guided by the Strategies and Tactics, the ANC policies, plans and resolutions of the ANC are aligned with the notion of a people-centred development and, whilst encouraged by the progress made over the past 25 years, there is a need for a greater sense of urgency to respond to the looming economic depression that is threatening to deepen the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Whilst not new decisions, the following are catalytic interventions that are proposed as game changers to ensure effective implementation and high impact on the lives of people to break the logjam of poverty, unemployment and inequality. This document identifies as game changers:

- **preparedness and institutionalization of the 4IR imperatives** including connectivity, smart industries and big data across sectors;
- **a skills revolution** with a seamless alignment from Early Childhood Development to Higher Education to the Transformation, Innovation and Development Agenda. A new revolutionary curriculum that fixed the nexus between ECD, Basic Education and Higher Education by investing in early differentiation focusing on technical skills, like in China and Germany;
- **a capable state with capacity to create an enabling environment for unlocking capabilities of citizen** through activist ministers and a knowledge driven professional public service focussed on and accountable on resolving the needs of citizens and the implementation of the district development model which is premised on the objective of ensuring a higher impact of seamless government interventions with people where they live, work and do business;
- **a capable organization** with systems to engage society, effectively monitor its policy decisions and ability to support as well as to hold its capacitated deployed cadres accountable for results.

6.1 A future South Africa is required, therefore, in which the state equips itself and those who are socio-economically excluded through a set of policies and regulatory frameworks which encourage long-term oriented and context-driven adoption of the various nodes of the 4IR, necessitating, among others, seamless integration of the digital economy, the basic and higher education sectors, as well as the state to anticipate and shape trends in the structure of the economy. This will also require the localisation of the digital economy, which has thus far been dominated by multinational corporations and has been poorly regulated and taxed, and thus shrinking jobs and the tax base.

- This will also require a renewed understanding of universities and their role in socio-economic development and the nurturing of the digital economy, which should incorporate among its priorities not only publication (which have been growing in recent years), but also translation research and commercialisation of intellectual property.
- Access to broadband, connectivity and reducing the cost of data must be at the centre of revamping the SA economy from schools to higher education centres and from home to work environments. The COVID-19 pandemic experience should be used to unlock e-governance, e-health, e-learning and other capabilities such as telemedicine to bridge the urban-rural digital divide. Local innovation and broadening of participation in the digital economy are also vital.

6.2 Revisiting the separation of basic, higher education and continued skills development departments may be necessary in implementing a new revolutionary curriculum that fixed the nexus between ECD, Basic Education and Higher Education by investing in early differentiation focusing on technical skills, like in China and Germany, this may need revisiting the separation of basic and higher education Ministries as well as the separation between formal education and continued skills development programs.

- Establish a Presidential Compact on **Early Childhood Development** that must review the Policies, Legislation and Strategies in the sector to put SA Children first. A priority focus must be in three areas of the first 1000 days of the Child, Mother Tongue development and the fast-tracking of the formalization of ECD with Basic Education. Government coordinates countrywide district-based surveillance with quarterly reports on the state of children and develop a responsive system of interventions. This is given impetus by the fact that some 21% of all children in South Africa have lost both parents according to the 25 year review report.
- Prioritise **funding of TVETs and Colleges** as sites for Ready-To-Work training and innovation in the areas of infrastructure development, manufacturing, mining beneficiation and other key priority economic recovery and human development areas within the context of the Skills Revolution and the 4th Industrial Revolution utilizing the quadruple helix model (Government, Corporate, Research and Society). The policy and legislative framework of ensuring that all higher education curriculum must include apprenticeship must be enforced. TVETs and Colleges must be the centres of development for current and future economic innovation in addition to training.
- Universities of Technology be assigned to support a cluster of TVETs and Colleges. The relevant funds must be consolidated and rationalised: NRF, NSFAS, SETAs and the Jobs Fund.
- the opportunity to integrate the interventions on **NEETs** including the multitudes trained (some of whom may now be just above 35years) in programs such as the EPWP, Working for Water, Community Works Program in the various programs of the Stimulus Packages given the leading role of the state in cushioning society from the double-edged recession resultant from both the pandemic and sluggish economic growth. A massive countrywide labour-intensive and labour absorbing program be instituted for road construction, Hospital and Clinic, Schools, BPOs, Social Worker Assistants, Pharmacy Assistants, Teacher Assistants.

It is hoped that if 5.1 and 5.2 succeed, the NEETs pool will gradually decrease. Infrastructure, Manufacturing, Beneficiation and Agriculture investments must be measured by ability to absorb, skill and empower these young people in order to unlock the demographic dividend.

- Strengthen the National Innovation System and introduce a tax-based incentive for local innovation in key priority social and economic development areas of and amend procurement legislation to prioritise local innovations with a priority in areas of greatest government consumption like Health, Communication, Motor, etc. Government must develop a policy for off-take agreements and preferential procurement with state owned innovation and manufacturing companies over a specific period of time.



Figure 7: Education must be relevant for 4IR and Ready-To-Work.

Source: **Towards 25-year review of the South African Democracy.**

6.3 The fast-tracking of the **District Development Model** to enhance coordinated collaborative efforts, responsiveness, transparency and high impact in communities through localization and spatial referencing of national and provincial programs and integration such with the IDPs. Human Development Index must be one of the indicators of the success of the model which must be monitored per district, sub-district and ward-based. The HDI can be adapted for the SA conditions however remain globally benchmarked. These can find expression in the DDM, whose aim is to “accelerate, align and integrate service delivery under a single development plan per district or metro that is developed jointly by the national, provincial and local government as well as business, labour and community in each district” (The Presidency, 2019; 16 October). This should also be aimed at addressing the public service’s individualistic performance and incentive mechanism and encourage cooperation and coordination, with potential applications for e-governance to assist government functionality. The establishment of the Nedlac equivalent at District level to participate in the Khawuleza District Forums will be a critical factor.

Re-institute the **Professionalization of the Public Service Policy and Program** and establish relevant professional bodies in line with the Lawyers, Health, Engineers etc. Introduce Organizational Performance system that is aligned to the Personal Performance System that is responsive especially in areas of key Human Capital and Capability Development – Social Development, Health, Education and related. Jointly with the Department of Labour and Higher Educations, a Skills need for the Country be developed covering the public, private and community-based sectors.

As a developmental state that is people driven focussed on the capabilities and quality of life of citizens, fast-track the strengthening of the health care system through the **NHI bill** process based on the integration, digitalization and modernization of the national health system. The Ward Based Health Outreach Program be strengthened as an important Primary Health Care component in reducing the burden of disease and making health care more efficient, they need to be provided with mobile technology and connectivity. Mitigate the risk of disease and ill-health on the society and the economy through a Health Promotion Commission taking lessons from the tobacco, alcohol, HIV and AIDS as well as COVID-19 social determinants and impact on the economy.

Stabilise governance by creating a **Single national and local elections system**. With the possible impact of the COVID19 disaster, the looming economic depression and the court ruling on constitutionality of parts of the electoral system, these present an opportunity to begin the discussions.

Enter into agreement with one of the Universities to establish a rigorous **policy monitoring system** in support of the work of the NEC Policy SubCommittees.

7. Other Key Recommendations

There is a need to systematically respond and translate the recommendations in the 25 year and the NDP 2030 reviews as the ANC . Based on some of the identified shortfalls that can be effectively responded to with specific programmes , the following recommendations are offered with such outcomes in mind:

- 7.1 Encourage national, provincial and local governments to domesticate and modulate as well as share best practices in skills dissemination through SALGA, COGTA, PCC etc. platforms and initiatives such as the district development model (DDM) in terms of its human capabilities relevance. This requires the development of a framework for structurally effecting the all-of-government and leaving-no-one-behind district-based reporting on resolutions.
- 7.2 Capacitate entrants into the labour force with soft skills to improve interpersonal communication since production will be increasingly and more efficiently managed by automation.
- 7.3 Cooperate with institutions of higher learning to understand causes of dropouts among students, especially those from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds. Furthermore, the 25 Year Review makes the case for differentiated gendered strategies to keep youth engaged in schooling and training. It similarly notes the need for participation by all stakeholders, including teachers, teachers' labour representatives, school governing bodies, parents and guardians.
- 7.4 Increase higher education subsidies to various educational institutions to increase specialised training and agility to changing industry demands. Additionally, identify the skills that ought to develop and explore the prospects of exporting those skills in the continent and the rest of the world.

- 7.5 Showcase TVETs as institutions of first choice by shaping their curriculum to be readily relevant to the skills demanded. Moreover, the 25 Year Review notes that these can be used to encourage more young people into the agricultural colleges and sciences and make available land to those interested in farming and agro-processing, with requisite support programmes such as twinning and mentorships.
- 7.6 Increase research and development expenditure to encourage commercialisation of patents and research and development capacity of the country focussed on global competitiveness, building sovereign wealth and resilience.
- 7.7 Prioritise early childhood education through interventions that link education to optimum health and nutrition to computational thinking in public schools.
- 7.8 Capacitate schools with facilities such as libraries, quality infrastructure, administrators, and universal implementation of technology dissemination to correct for the currently uneven distribution of computational devices.
- 7.9 Review employer selection processes to ensure alignment of employment of graduates from TVETs, universities, entrepreneurship, and apprenticeships.
- 7.10 Maintain and improve health with appropriate measures to tackle both resurgent childhood malnutrition and vaccine-preventable diseases.
- 7.11 Establish a Health Promotion Council to take lessons from the HIV and AIDS as well as currently from the COVID-19 experience in reducing the risks of ill-health and building socio-economic resilience against social determinants of diseases which also threaten the present workforce such as Hypertension, Diabetes, Mental ill-health, Cancer and other non-communicable diseases. This will require an urgent finalization of the national strategy on NCD's.
- 7.12 Develop a policy for the State on off-take agreements with locally service providers, especially in manufacturing, that are state owned as this will pave the way to resolve the challenges on the implementation of the ANC resolution on the establishment of a state pharmaceutical company.
- 7.13 Finalise the Human Resources for Health Plan.
- 7.14 Capacitate ANC branches to be sites of advocacy for ECD, Health, Education, Skills Revolution and Programs to eradicate poverty and inequality.
- 7.15 Encourage and incentivise life-long educational paradigms through multiple platforms, including ANC branches, national media, institutions of basic and higher learning, employers, and the private sector.
- 7.16 Develop a comprehensive program for the first 1000 days, which includes routine health checks, psycho-social support to pregnant women, education component (early stimulation) and early detection of disability.
- 7.17 Create safe learning environments and address the current situation by appointing youth-care workers, psychologists and social workers as part of schools' human resources.

- 7.18 Build inclusive and special schools that accommodate learners with a wide range of disabilities.
- 7.19 Increase industry participation, the number of adequately qualified staff, on the job training curriculum as well as funding for infrastructure at TVET colleges.
- 7.20 Explore interventions further to reduce maternal deaths and increase investment as well as better management of resources such as Community Health Care professionals in South Africa's public hospitals and clinics.
- 7.21 Improve the management and training of Community Health Workers to improve preventative care in communities. It should increase the rate of conversion and construction of Ideal Clinics to enhance primary care services, especially in underserved areas throughout the country.
- 7.22 Investigate the sufficiency of the Child Support Grant amount and address the policy question on the Foster Care Grant. Undertake corrective measures to address exclusion errors for 0-2-year-olds in the MTSF to achieve the NDP targets by working with the Departments of Health and Home Affairs. The 25 Year Review notes the required urgency for the existing social floor to be consolidated with the current social assistance programs.
- 7.23 Implement the comprehensive social security and retirement reform system to ensure that it is affordable, sustainable and appropriate for South Africans by 2021 including the Establish the National Social Security Fund.
- 7.24 Nedlac and all social partners should explore the mechanisms for social insurance, which extends coverage to workers in the informal sector.
- 7.25 The National Treasury should introduce pension reform, in particular, the high cost and fees structures of pension funds should be reduced.
- 7.26 Establish effective partnerships, systems, regulatory environment and oversight for the private and not-for-profit sectors.
- 7.27 Identify linkages between cash and in-kind transfers by integrating issues of disability and ensure equitable service provision for people with disabilities.

8. Specifically on the fourth industrial revolution

In light of the preceding review, the following recommendations, which stem from the Presidential Commission the Fourth Industrial Revolution, are presented:

- 8.1 Investment in human capacity development that will facilitate multidisciplinary and computational thinking in early childhood, primary, intermediate and higher education. Furthermore, the reskilling of the existing workforce with the latest tools of analysis and implementation in the 4IR is a necessity.
- 8.2 Develop a national artificial intelligence (AI) institute that will mobilize all productive forces in our society. This institute should leverage the comparative strengths of

each sector, as well as external partnerships such as the BRICS association, to better respond to challenges and present innovations in tackling the triple challenges. A primary initial task is a consolidation of advanced learnings from the various science councils which make up the National System of Innovation.

- 8.3 Build data capabilities within the state by strengthening data-gathering, storage and processing through the office of a Chief Data Scientist within the state. The state should also pursue the formulation of a regulatory framework for data-gathering, including taxation of its commercialisation by international and domestic enterprises operating in the commercialisation of data.
- 8.4 Invest in an institute for advanced manufacturing. As South Africa has been de-industrialising, the state needs to invest in advanced productive forces, including the integration of elements of the 4IR in its small and medium enterprises (SMME) strategy.
- 8.5 The state should devise incentives for the adoption of advanced means and modes of production to accelerate attainment of the National Democratic Society through the existing special economic zones (SEZs) by tapping the benefits of AI, IoT and special tax regimes.
- 8.6 Review all legislation to ensure compliance with advances in the 4IR to accelerate towards the National Democratic Society through appropriate taxation of South African and non-South African technology companies who are insufficiently taxed. This will also require a review and implementation accordingly the findings of the competition commission on the overpricing of data bundles by the service providers in South Africa.
- 8.7 Build 4IR infrastructure through a capable energy regime, streamlining of fibre installations, and 5G. This will naturally include the release of the spectrum in such a way that the national communication space is decentralised and broadened by having multiple service providers.
- 8.8 Evaluate the prospect of an Office for Fourth Industrial Revolution Implementation and Coordination in the Presidency and at Luthuli House. This will naturally mean that both the state and the ANC will be capacitated with technologically advanced cadres able to link the NDR to inclusive development as well as review the essentials of service delivery in the wake of the 4IR.
- 8.9 Implement various forms of machine learning, robotics and big data in ensuring a safe and secure South Africa for all whilst also controlling for excesses of relying on machine-run or automated mechanisms. This may also require putting in place mechanisms to effectively respond to the manufacture of counterfeit and banned products in the wake of 3D printing.
- 8.10 Put in place legislation that prevents discriminative practices along with gender, race and class in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, particularly through big data and machine learning by adopting measures that regulate the design, early testing and implementation of big data- and machine learning-based technologies to ensure databases accurately reflect South Africa's demographic and socio-economic realities.

9. Conclusion

Mindful that the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic disaster will unfold over the next few years and that the pandemic was already preceded by an economic declining for a number of years resulting in the economic recession and sub-investment sovereign credit rating, the risk-mitigated resumption of necessary social and economic activities can reposition the country to successfully tackling the structural constraints for an inclusive growth that benefit all citizens equitably.

The optimal mobilization and enablement of the majority of citizens to be fully involvement in the economic recovery can help redress the decline in human capabilities and ensure SA turns the tide against the dependency culture of social security to a truly people centred sustainable development. The introduction of the mooted basic income grant must be underpinned by a capable state able to manage a single national the social security data base aligned to an exit strategy linked to investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.

A business as usual approach in the management of the COVID-19 Pandemic Disaster and Recovery therefrom is likely to place SA in the economic recession state it was prior to the COVID19 pandemic. All-of-government, including the role of SOEs, need to refocus on impactful interventions where people live, work and do business, enabling maximum participation and leaving-no-one behind.

The end state of achieving human capabilities in our country underpins the constitutional human rights based perspective in South Africa and build on the freedom charter vision that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, that the wealth of the country shall be shared, that the land belongs to all who work it and that all have equal rights. The constitution further established a developmental state that is accountable to work cooperatively to ensure that citizens progressively attain their full rights. Learning from less endowed countries that have succeeded in developing the quality of life of their citizens, there is a need to think out of the box of current constraints, to institutionalise interventions at the apex avoiding structural failure in the state as well as to ensure an ethical high disciplined cadre organizationally and within the state resolute to uproot the vestigial remains of a racial, sexist and inhumane Colonial-Apartheid past. Experience globally is that abuse of power and corruption are inherent in human societies and consistent zero tolerance with an effective swift justice system remains crucial in this regard.

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National General Council discussion paper on

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE BUILDING OF A NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

1. ELECTIONS AND THE BUILDING OF A NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Preamble to the **Freedom Charter** declares that: *"We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people."*

The Charter goes on to declare that The People Shall Govern, and that: *"Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws."*

The **Constitution of the ANC** describes the character of the ANC as follows: *"The ANC is a non-racial and non-sexist and democratic liberation movement";* and, *"The ANC also contests elections as a registered political party drawing its electoral support from all sections of South African society."*

The **Strategy & Tactics of the ANC** emphasises that: *"One of the most critical acts of the National Democratic Revolution is the creation of a legitimate state which derives its authority from the people, through regular elections and continuing popular*

participation in the processes of governance."

The founding provisions of the **South African Constitution** provide that: *"The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on [amongst others] the following values: Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness."*

The **National Development Plan** argues that an unintended outcome of the manner in which government has "delivered" services has been to reduce the incentive for citizens to be direct participants in their own development.

Active citizens and social activism are necessary for democracy and development. The state cannot merely act on behalf of the people – it has to act with the people.

A number of forums have been created for citizens to participate in governance beyond elections - school governing bodies, ward committees, community policing forums and clinic committees.

Mechanisms have been established for citizens to shape the institutions closest to

them. These mechanisms must ensure that the fruits of development accrue to the poorest and most marginalised, offsetting possible attempts by elites to protect their own interests at the expense of less-powerful communities.

Despite these avenues, there appears to be a growing distance between citizens and the government.

Outbreaks of violence in some community protests reflect frustration not only over the pace of service delivery, but also concerns that communities are not being listened to.

These trends have been analysed in a number of studies, including: **The Smoke that Calls** by Karl von Holdt, Malose Langa, Sepetla Molapo, Nomfundo Mogapi, Kindiza Ngubeni, Jacob Dlamini, and Adele Kirsten.

The Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) advances a sobering analysis in its report: **"Election 2019 and the quality of multiparty democracy in South Africa – notes on the first 25 years."**

Participation trends in elections over the past 25 years raise questions regarding the legitimacy of politics and elections in our country. MISTRA points out that some argue that, *"There are cumulative signals that multiparty democracy and elections in South Africa are past their heyday – and substitutes or supplementations that fall into place are potentially taking the country to disruption at worst, or new spaces of creative additions to multiparty democracy at best."*

MISTRA argues that for many, non-participation was in response to disillusionment with the politics of parties and government, or due to a decline in trust in political parties.

They cite an Ipsos poll that indicated that 37 percent of registered voters felt that is 'no political party that represents my views' and a Citizen Surveys' poll, which found

that 70 percent of South African citizens do not believe political parties can solve the problems of South Africa.

MISTRA concludes by arguing that, *"The levels of participation in 2019 (registration and turnout) bear witness to a process where the questioning of multiparty democracy has become intense, as evidenced in electoral actions on the ground, and attitudes surveys concerning elections. However, for many voters, elections are an instrument to get leaders to account to them on mandates received; and there is also an emotional attachment to elections as reminder of political liberation. The combination of, and balance among, these factors will set the tones and directions for South Africa's multiparty democracy in the coming 25 years."*

The ANC Strategy & Tactics argues that, *"disquiet within society grows by the day. Be it among the poor with little prospect of improving their lot, or women and young professionals butting their heads against glass ceilings, or ordinary workers living through socio-economic marginalisation, the restlessness has become palpable. While elements of these realities may derive from objective conditions, subjective factors pertaining to the quality of leadership have not been edifying either. Addressing the root causes of these social challenges is in the national interest. It requires leadership in a broad front of all social sectors, to give hope through practical action, and to galvanise society into active citizenship. The twin impulses of legitimate societal leadership and an active citizenry will feed on each other to propel society to greater heights."*

Therefore, *"at the core of the ANC's tasks in the current period is the renewal of the organisation for it to exercise societal leadership in a changing environment, the consolidation of democracy and the speeding up of programmes of fundamental transformation to attain shared prosperity, social justice and human solidarity."*

Whilst declining participation and confidence in elections and the political system and have their national specificities, we must also understand them in an international context.

Strategy & Tactics argues that the global economic crisis starting in 2007 has underlined the flaws of neo-liberal ideology and praxis and has resulted in a "poly-crisis" which, in turn, has led to the declining legitimacy of the political and business elites. One of the consequences of this has been the rise of narrow nationalism and chauvinism.

In his analysis of the rise of populism Simon Tormey, points to the hollowing out of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s due to the consolidation of neo-liberalism and "new public management." These were characterised by widescale privatisation of public services and the use of market-based criteria to assess the work or value of public goods.

This, he argues, has resulted in the transformation of politics into a form of technocratic governance, rather than the contest of different visions, ideologies and world-views. Consequently, "[i]f it didn't quite kill off politics, neo-liberalism subordinated it to an agenda dictated from outside and beyond the nation state and thus the political community, leading to the impression that politics didn't matter."

The legitimacy and credibility of elections is also affected by the increasing use of fake news and the manipulation of big data and social media as evinced by the Cambridge Analytica scandal.

The role of money in the selection of candidates and the conduct of election campaigns has further undermined the legitimacy of electoral politics.

The Covid-19 pandemic will also have a substantial impact on the manner in which elections and election campaigns are conducted.

The debate on electoral systems has also been made more urgent by the recent judgment of the Constitutional Court ordering Parliament to make provision for independent candidates to stand for election to Parliament and provincial legislatures.

There are many dimensions to the strengthening and deepening of democracy in a National Democratic Society. The electoral system is one amongst many. This discussion document focusses narrowly on two aspects of our electoral system:

- 1) Whether we should introduce elements of a constituency-based electoral system at national and provincial level;
- 2) Whether national, provincial and local government elections should be synchronised and take place at the same time.

The document does not attempt to give a definitive answer to either of these two questions. Rather, it seeks to spell out the existing legal and constitutional framework and to identify relevant factors to ensure a robust and rigorous discussion within our ranks and in broader society.

Many of the challenges outlined above cannot be solved making changes to the electoral system alone, if at all. They require concerted interventions at the level of our developmental trajectory, the balance of forces in our society, capacity of the developmental state, governance, service provision, the selection and conduct of public representatives, and the role of ANC structures.

Therefore, this document must be read in conjunction with other NGC discussion documents, in particular: **Balance of Forces, Building the Capacity of the Developmental State and Local Government**, the revised **Through the Eye of a Needle, Organisational Renewal**, as well as proposals for **Local Government Candidate Selection**.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDGMENT – INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

On 11 June 2020 the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in *The New Nation Movement NPC and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others*.

The Court ordered that the Electoral (Act 73 of 1998) is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires that adult citizens may be elected to the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures only through their membership of political parties. Parliament was given two years within which to amend the Electoral Act to provide for the independent candidates to stand for public office nationally and provincially.

The majority of the Court based their judgment on an interpretation of section 19(3) of the Constitution. They argue that section 19(3)(b) confers upon every adult South African the right “*to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office*”. Parliament has the power to pass legislation that regulates the exercise of the right but it cannot enact legislation that prevents the exercise of the right. In its present form, the Electoral Act does not allow every adult South African to exercise the right to contest elections on their own. Accordingly, it is unconstitutional.

In a separate concurring judgment more attention was focused on the right to association (and disassociation), concluding that forcing citizens to belong to political parties in order to hold office is a violation of the right not to associate.

In a dissenting minority judgment it was argued that it is a tenuous proposition that the Constitution mandates an electoral system that enables independent candidates to stand for and hold political office at national and provincial level. Sections 46 (national) and 105 (provincial) of the Constitution do not expressly permit

a mixed system of proportional and ward representation as provided for in section 157 (2) for local government. The fact that a mixed system is not even mentioned as a constitutionally permissible electoral arrangement at national and provincial level means that it certainly cannot be read in as a constitutionally prescribed requirement. At worst, this silence means that non-political party representation is prohibited. At best, it means that the accommodation of independent candidates is permissible so long as it still yields, in general, proportional representation.

Parliament has two years within which to amend the Electoral Act to provide for the independent candidates to stand for public office nationally and provincially. The next national and provincial elections are scheduled for 2024. A substantially different electoral system will require considerable preparation.

The judgment does not imply direct elections for President. However, it opens the door for someone to stand as an independent candidate for Parliament and then be elected as President by Parliament.

The introduction of independent members of Parliament will also impact on the internal functioning of Parliament and provincial legislatures in respect of the composition of committees, allocation of speaking time, allocation of resources, participation in bodies like JSC, selection of delegates to the NCOP, etc.

The Court does not prescribe what electoral system must be used to give independent candidates the right to stand for public office.

Parliament must decide. However, whatever system Parliament adopts must still comply with the constitutional requirement that the electoral system must result, in general, in proportional representation.

There are three possible approaches to the New Nation Movement judgment:

- 1) Try to keep changes to existing proportional representation system as small as possible while providing for independent candidates.
- 2) Redesign the electoral system fundamentally. For example, introduce elements of constituency-based representation while ensuring that electoral outcomes are proportional.
- 3) Amend Constitution to make it clear that electoral system can exclude independent candidates. Example: Provide for two options at national and provincial spheres similar to local government: **Option 1:** Proportional representation based only on party lists. **Option 2:** Mixture of proportional representation based on party lists and constituency-based representation. Parliament can provide for independent candidates but makes it clear that this is not required.

These approaches are not mutually exclusive and a combination of approaches might be required.

Consideration should be given to approaching the Constitutional Court for clarity on the implications of its judgment, and extending the deadline.

3. INTRODUCTION OF CONSTITUENCY-BASED ELECTORAL SYSTEM

3.1 Introduction

Declining voter registration and turnout has raised questions regarding the accountability of public representatives and their connection to the electorate. A number of proposals have been made regarding the introduction of elements of a constituency based electoral system at national and

provincial level. This debate has been also been encouraged by the introduction of the district development model.

It is often argued that democracy would be strengthened significantly if there were greater pressures for accountability of public representatives to voters. Many regard the choice of electoral system as a key factor in determining the level of accountability of public representatives. An electoral system based on proportional representation lists is seen as promoting representativity and inclusivity but not accountability. Public representatives in this system, it is argued, are more accountable to 'party bosses' rather than voters. This line of argument concludes that a constituency based electoral system would ensure greater accountability.

Steven Friedman argues in **The System's Not To Blame? Electoral Systems, Power, and Accountability** that the link between electoral systems and accountability is not as straightforward as these arguments suggest.

Direct election of representatives does not automatically ensure accountability, which depends on many factors, including a country's context. He notes that the US, UK, India, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Kenya, all use a constituency system but with very different outcomes in each case. He remarks wryly that, "*changes in electoral system can simply offer politicians new ways of doing the same things.*"

He identifies three factors important in shaping the South African context: First, the persistence of poverty and inequality mean that the difference between serving as a local councillor and losing a seat is the difference between being middle class or living in poverty. Second, identities are important – South Africans (like voters in many other countries) vote for parties who they believe speak for their particular (racial, language, regional or cultural) group, far

more than on perceptions of possible economic benefit. Third, and flowing from this, parties are far more powerful organisations and wield more influence over their members and supporters than they do in many other democracies.

Friedman argues that these factors suggest that switching to a more constituency-based system might hold few benefits and many costs. First, it might reduce the number and diversity of parties in parliament, thereby exacerbating divisions in society by denying some identities a voice. Second, the strength of party loyalties also suggests that it would not prevent parties ensuring that representatives account to them rather than voters. Third, the financial dependency of many public representatives will keep them under the control of their parties.

Friedman suggests two measures more likely to promote accountability than a constituency based electoral system: First, recall provisions, allowing voters to remove representatives in mid-term. This will allow voters loyal to their parties but unhappy with their representatives to act. Second, introducing party primaries, allowing voters rather than party activists to choose candidates.

Furthermore, he argues that improving accountability must take into account, and respond to, two crucial realities. First, unequal power relations in society result in unequal levels of accountability. Wealthy and organised minorities command more influence with decision makers, despite the fact that they are less likely to vote for the governing party. Second, in order to ensure accountability, voting needs to be reinforced by organisation and organisation needs to be supported by linkages with power holders inside and outside government as well as greater access to information.

Friedman concludes by arguing that the ability to demand accountability from

public representatives depends more on access to power than on the form of the electoral system. Consequently, transforming power relations in society will result in more fundamental change than an over-emphasis on the electoral system.

3.2 Report of the Electoral Task Team (2003)

In 2002 Cabinet appointed an Electoral Task Team chaired by the late Dr F van Zyl Slabbert to draft new electoral legislation. The Task Team reported in 2003.

The Task Team identified the following basic principles that should characterise an electoral system: (a) fairness; (b) accountability; (c) inclusiveness; and simplicity.

The problem statement that the Task Team sought to answer was how to improve accountability of public representatives and their connection to the electorate while maintaining constitution imperative of proportional representation.

The majority of the Task Team recommended that the National Assembly should consist of 400 members. Of the 400 members, 300 should be elected in multi-member constituencies consisting of 3 to 7 members each. The other 100 members should be elected on a proportional list. The Task Team proposed 69 multi-member constituencies. The boundaries of these constituencies should coincide with the boundaries of district and metro municipalities, or subdivisions thereof. The Task Team proposed that the same system should apply to provinces with the necessary modifications.

The Task Team argued that South Africa already has the embryo of the proposed system with 9 provincial multi-member constituencies ("*provincial to national lists*") and a national PR list.

The Task Team also argued that the proposed system would not require any constitutional amendment and that it complies with the requirement that any electoral system results, in general, in proportional representation.

The Task Team argued that this system can, but is not guaranteed to, improve the accountability of representatives and their connection with the electorate.

The minority of the Task Team, supported by the ANC, recommended that the status quo be retained. A strong view in the ANC's submission was that proportionality served the country best. The ANC countered the opposition views on constituency-based accountability, and argued that the multi-member nature of rural and small districts would be meaningless in terms of MPs representing a particular constituency that could hold the MP accountable. In reality, at that time it would have resulted in Cape Town having about 20 representatives and the whole of the Northern Cape having 4. All votes had to have equal value. The ANC felt it would not make a meaningful improvement to accountability.

The Northern Cape, at the time, would have one or two MPs for the whole of Kimberley and two for the rest of the province, with its mix of political, class and race interests. The MPs would most likely come from one or two parties and still would be accountable mainly to the party. We also had by then introduced a much more meaningful constituency-based system in local government with ward councillors representing small areas, and had not found it to make a massive difference to accountability as the party policies and caucus, rather than the constituency, still determined party positions in council.

3.3 National Conference Resolutions

The 52nd National Conference (2007) noted that the factors that led us to opt for a proportional representation system for national and provincial elections remain relevant. We are still a nation in transition and must ensure that we facilitate representativity across the various sectors of our communities through a credible, generally accepted and understood electoral system. Our current system can best help us reach the true objectives of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) within the framework of our founding Constitutional principles.

It expressed the belief that the imperatives to retain the current electoral system remain and call upon us to improve our responsiveness to the electorate.

Accordingly, it was resolved that the current electoral system should be maintained and be strengthened, further to enhance the links between the people and their public representatives.

The formula used to calculate the allocation of seats in local government elections should be reviewed to ensure that it does not disadvantage parties that get more ward votes.

Appropriate requirements should be set for persons wishing to contest elections as independent candidates.

3.4 Factors to Consider

As indicated below, the Constitution does not prescribe a specific electoral system as long as it complies with the following requirements: (a) is prescribed by national legislation; (b) is based on the national common voters roll; (c) provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years; and (d) results, in general, in proportional representation.

A system along the lines proposed by the Electoral Task Team could contribute to strengthening the link between voters and public representatives and promote greater accountability.

If the multi-member constituencies proposed by the Task Team are based on the demarcation of metro and district municipalities it could strengthen the district development model. By having public representatives across the three spheres being linked, by virtue of their electoral mandate, to the basic geographic demarcation in which national, provincial, and local planning and implementation takes place can promote a more integrated approach.

Of course, as the Task Team recognised, no electoral system will in and of itself guarantee improved accountability of elected representatives to the electorate. The mixed experience of local government councillors, who are directly elected by voters in their wards, underscores this point.

Some argue, that a constituency based electoral system is as prone to manipulation and control by party machines as proportional lists, and that voters are often equally alienated and dissatisfied, especially since the constituencies would be large and would all represent multiple communities with different interests.

In considering whether to attach a geographic base to the electoral mandates of public representatives at national and provincial level we must consider the legacies of Colonialism of a Special Type manifested in the persistence of apartheid spatial patterns, the racial and ethnic content of many political boundaries, and the consequent spatial dimension of the national question.

We would also need to pay careful attention to the impact that geographic constituencies might have on the unitary character of the ANC. Organisational reports to

National Conferences as well as the report of the commission of enquiry led by Cde Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma after the 2011 local government elections have highlighted the increasing tendency for the formation of provincial, regional and local powerbases and interlocking networks of patronage.

4. SYNCHRONISED ELECTIONS AT NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL LEVELS

4.1 Mandate from the People

Since 1994 South Africa has held six national and provincial elections and five local government elections in 25 years of democracy. On average, South Africa holds elections every 2.5 years. Added to this we have experienced a marked increase in the number, frequency, and scale of local government by-elections.

Election campaigns start 18 months before election day and peak three months before election day. This has led to the country, and political parties, being in a state of semi-permanent elections mode, with the attendant costs, financial, governance, and service provision.

This has led to the proposal that consideration be given to holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time. This proposal has received added impetus with the introduction of the district development model seeking to integrate the work of all three spheres of government within the demarcations of metro and district municipalities.

Some refer to these as "*unified elections*" and others to "*harmonized elections*." We have used the term "*synchronised elections*" to emphasise the point made below that, even where elections take place on

the same day, they remain constitutionally and legal distinct and separate processes.

4.2 Governance and Service Provision

The frequent holding of elections impacts on governance. Parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils adjourn months before elections. Cabinet, provincial executive councils and mayoral committees also wind down in the runup to elections. Major decisions are put on hold. Periods leading to up to and after elections are often characterized by uncertainty and instability as well as transition periods causing delays in service provision.

4.3 Financial Challenges

Elections are very expensive both for the national fiscus (at around R1.7bn per election) as well as political parties. Frequent elections drain party resources and keep parties in perpetual debt. At the same time fundraising is becoming more difficult due to impending entry into force of the Political Party Funding Act and the amendment of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), requiring political parties to disclose the source and extent of contributions. This is compounded by the revelations made before a number of commissions of enquiry, further increasing the reluctance of many funders to contribute to political parties.

Certain forms of fundraising risk undermining good governance, promoting state capture, and delegitimizing politics in general. Related to this is the question of the increasing role of money in the ANC processes.

Synchronised elections would not be two for the price of one, as many of the processes and local focuses would still need clear actions, and it but would probably cost around 65% of what two separate election campaigns would cost. For ex-

ample, the IEC would require more ballots, more logistics, more ballot boxes and more staff. The ANC would need two candidate selection processes, local manifestos, local campaigns combined with national and provincial campaigns.

4.4 Impact of ANC Processes

Parallel, and sometimes related to elections, are a multitude of ANC organizational processes. National Conference (every 5 years), National Policy Conference (every 5 years), National General Council (every 5 years, midway between conferences), Provincial Conferences (every 4 years), Regional Conferences (every 3 years), Biennial Branch General Meetings (every 2 years), List conferences (every 2.5 years).

In addition, the conferences of the Leagues and Alliance partners have become increasingly intertwined with internal processes of the ANC mother body: ANCYL National Conference (every 3 years), ANCWL National Conference (every 3 years), ANCVL National Conference (every 3 years).

The lack of synchronisation between ANC organizational processes and elections has resulted in a number of organizational challenges arising from what is often characterized as “two centres of power”.

The two-year period between the holding of ANC National Conference and national and provincial elections have led to the recall and resignation of Presidents in 2008 and 2019. Similar patterns have manifested themselves at provincial and regional levels in relation to Premiers and Mayors and their respective leadership collectives.

Furthermore, the holding of national, provincial and local elections at different times has limited the ability to the ANC to select and deploy candidates between different spheres of government. Local government councillors who are nominated to be MPs and MPLs are often requested to decline

nomination and to finish their terms. Similarly, it is very rare for sitting MPs and MPLs to interrupt their terms of office to stand as councillors.

4.5 National Conference Resolution: 2012

The question of single elections was discussed at the 53rd National Conference in 2012.

The Commission noted that election campaigns give the ANC an opportunity to connect with the masses and renew our mandates – so we shouldn't reduce them. Without separate local government elections, which open spaces in the state, it will cost the ANC more financially to reach our constituencies. Elections help to build the organization and capacity of our cadres. Provincial ANC leaders currently oversee the finalization of our local government candidates, and they will not be able to do so if they themselves are candidates to be public representatives.

It was resolved that the current system of separate elections be retained. However, in future, should conditions warrant it, consideration should be given to reviewing the issue of elections.

4.6 Synchronised Elections: Factors to Consider

There are a number of arguments and considerations that must be taken into account in discussing the form and content of South Africa's electoral system. This is a very complex matter that should be viewed holistically. We should resist the temptation to elevate and give undue weight to one amongst many relevant and interconnected considerations.

We must engage critically with issues around constituency engagement and mandates, financial and fiscal considerations, party funding, service delivery,

governance, planning, administrative, election management, constitutional and legal factors.

4.6.1 Governance & Service Provision Factors

Holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time could contribute to building a developmental state and improving governance and service provision.

- 1) It could promote stability in governance by reducing instability caused by pre- and post-election disruptions, delays and uncertainties.
- 2) Interruption of service provision could be reduced.
- 3) It could contribute to strengthening intergovernmental relations by aligning national, provincial and local government planning and coordination.
- 4) It could contribute to building the district development model.

However, holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time could also have the following negative consequences:

- 1) It could lead to less contact between citizens and public representatives.
- 2) It could breed complacency and a lack of accountability amongst public representatives and the public servants.
- 3) It might result in increased protests and non-democratic forms of expressing grievances.
- 4) Less frequent elections could result in the lack of a pressure valve and lead to a build-up of frustrations and the lack of mid-term correction.
- 5) Local issues could be subsumed under national and provincial issues.
- 6) National and provincial planning may be less able to set agendas and influence local plans and budgets.

4.6.2 Planning / Budgeting Factors

Holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time can contribute positively to the building of a developmental state by streamlining planning, budgeting and implementation.

Combining these elections and aligning electoral terms can contribute to the strengthening of the district development model. Parties would be able to contest elections on the basis of manifestoes that set out policies and programmes for integrated development across the three spheres of government converging in districts.

On the other hand, holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time could have the following unintended negative consequences that might hamper inter-governmental planning and co-ordination:

- 1) Planning processes that require both “top down” and “bottom up” inputs might require some degree of separation of electoral mandates.
- 2) It might limit national and provincial participation in integrated development planning processes because all spheres of government are starting planning processes at the same time and it would limit the ability of national government to set a strategic framework and agenda for government at all levels.
- 3) Local issues might run the risk of being subsumed under national and provincial issues.
- 4) National and local budget years have different starting and ending months to facilitate national and provincial planning and oversight, reporting and support of local government. There may not be a strong argument for synchronising all these as it could undermine one of the few measures we introduced

to prevent a fully federalised and autonomous municipal system.

- 5) The major advantage of separate are the fact that it forces us to connect with the people and renew our mandate as well as listen to and focus on people's problems and explain what we have done. It also allows us to focus on local issues and local government. We also establish national and provincial government, programmes and budgets and have stable government and stable leadership in place to support local government and selection etc.

4.6.3 Political and Organisational Factors

Politically and organizationally having national, provincial and local elections at the same time has a number of advantages:

- 1) It will contribute to reducing election fatigue, which is compounded by the overlap of elections and internal ANC processes.
- 2) It can free ANC structures to take up programmes of action and campaigns based on community issues. ANC structures are generally weak and inward looking outside of election.
- 3) It can increase voter turnout, especially for the local component of elections. This is positive for the strengthening and deepening of our democracy. The ANC benefits from increased voter turnout.
- 4) A strong positive national election campaign can lift support at a local level and mitigate local challenges.
- 5) Holding elections at the same time can also address the increasing tendency for national, provincial and local issues to become intertwined.
- 6) It makes greater flexibility in candidate selection and cadre deployment possible.

On the other hand, there are a number of political and organizational disadvantages:

- 1) We run the risk that intense, systematic voter contact will only take place once in five years. The argument that this will be made up for by freeing our structures to engage in community orientated campaigns is a hypothesis that remains to be tested. Election campaigns force our structures to engage with voters, and in recent elections we seldom reached more than 20% of ANC voters. Our communication campaigns during elections have a far greater reach and would also have to be replaced with more dynamic ongoing communication and engagement if we move towards elections once every five years.
- 2) The reality is that the ANC does very little outreach and community engagement. Notwithstanding the fact that our annual programmes of action always include outreach and community engagement, these programmes are never carried out on the scale and intensity as during election campaigns. If voters really only see us once in five years. Notwithstanding repeated resolutions to train cadres and engage more effectively, the reality is that this generally happens in the run-up to elections and conferences. Election campaigns provide the opportunity to focus on our policies and politics. They act as mass civic and cadre education moments. We must ask ourselves it would be wise to move to synchronised elections before we have demonstrated the ability to engage in a sustainable way.
- 3) Local government elections have tended to act as political weather vanes, or miner's canaries, sending warning signals of voter discontent in time for the organization to take corrective action. The 2016 local government elections are a case in point.
- 4) Combined elections will involve up to five ballots in those local municipalities that fall under district municipalities. This might lead to voter confusion and exacerbate the "AIC syndrome."
- 5) Related to the above, a proliferation of candidates (and ballots) might contribute to the growing tendency for independent candidates and smaller parties to contest elections. It might also increase the propensity of voters to "split" their vote amongst parties across different spheres of government.
- 6) It might add to the complexity of framing a manifesto and defining core messages. The 2016 local government election was a local government election that was contested on essentially national issues. On the other hand, the 2019 national and provincial elections were characterized by a very high level of local issues.
- 7) Much as a strong, dynamic national campaign can lift support and voter turnout at a local level, a high degree of discontent over local issues can pull down national support, or lead to a protest vote or boycott of all voting.
- 8) Historically protests have tended to decline during local government election years. This has been explained by increased voter contact during which concerns raised by voters are listened and attended to. However, increasingly, protests are become linked to the electoral process itself. Protestors are not threatening to withhold or change their votes but to stop the voting process from taking place altogether.
- 9) Whilst holding national, provincial and local elections at the same will enable the organization to take a more holistic approach to candidate selection and deployment of cadres across the three spheres of government, it will also add to the complexity and difficult dynamics inherent in the candidate se-

lection process. Furthermore, having the organization as a whole engaged in the selection of candidates at the same time will mean that all levels of leadership become interested parties, limiting their ability to exercise oversight over processes at other levels. The 2011 and 2016 local government candidate selections processes have highlighted many of these challenges. This could be mitigated by the establishment of an empowered Electoral Commission to run all candidate selection processes and to make rules that are less open to manipulation.

- 10) We also run the risk of introducing the complex and difficult dynamics of local government demarcation and ward delimitation, that often lead to boycotts in certain areas, into national and provincial elections.
- 11) Holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time might impact negatively on participatory democracy and accountability at local level.

4.6.4 Election Management Factors

The following factors related to the management of elections should be considered:

- 1) Holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time will add to the complexity of the electoral process. A national and provincial election entails the preparation of one national ballot and nine provincial ballots. Voters are able to cast a national ballot anywhere in the country and a provincial ballot anywhere in the province where they are registered.
- 2) If elections were to be held on the same day voters in metro municipalities will have to cast four ballots: national PR, provincial PR, metro PR, and metro ward ballots. In local municipalities this will increase to 5 ballots: national-PR, provincial-PR, district-PR, local-PR, and local-ward ballots.
- 3) The greater number of ballots involved in an election will contribute to prolonging the duration of voting process. Already, the ANC is disadvantaged by long queues in ANC strongholds. This might require voting to take place over more than one day. This will entail significant costs and might well reduce the savings gained by holding national, provincial and local elections on the same day. It will also be necessary to secure and store electoral material overnight. This might open the space for doubts to be cast on the integrity of the electoral process.
- 4) These concerns might be mitigated by the introduction of electronic voting systems. However, these systems remain untested and the experience with them has been uneven, with some countries reporting great success and others reverting to paper-based systems after constitutional challenges or cyber-attacks.
- 5) The increased number of ballots might lead to a higher proportion of spoilt ballots. Some of the areas with the lowest levels of education and literacy will have the highest number of ballots. Intensive voter education will be required.
- 6) The counting of votes will also take longer. It might not be possible for the same team of election officials and party agents to complete the counting of votes at a station within a single session, again raising concerns regarding the security and integrity of the electoral process.
- 7) The logistics involved in the design, printing, distribution and safeguarding of large numbers of ballots will be considerable.
- 8) Another consideration is maintaining the capacity of the IEC to conduct

elections if it is idle for five years in between elections. It would necessitate retraining of most presiding officers and key staff.

4.6.5 Fiscal Savings

Our starting point must be that the quality and depth of democracy does not come cheap. Democracy is the foundation upon which a National Democratic Society is built. The costs saved by holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time will have to be quantified empirically.

The 2016 local government elections cost approximately R1.5 billion for two voter registration weekends and election day. The 2019 national and provincial elections cost R1.7 billion for one voter registration weekend and election day. The complexity of a unified election, while not doubling costs, would probably still cost about 65% of the cost of separate elections.

4.6.6 Party Funding Factors

Holding national, provincial and local elections at the same time will reduce the frequency of costly elections campaigns that threaten to bankrupt political parties or keep them locked in perpetual cycles of crippling debt that increase their exposure to the risk integrity compromising fundraising activities.

On the other hand, the costs involved in the increased complexity of running national, provincial and local election campaigns at the same time might off-set some of the savings. Parties would also have to fund substitute ways of communicating and engaging with constituencies.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

5.1 National Government

The Constitution sets out the principles and the broad framework for an electoral system. The detail is left to Parliament to determine in national legislation.

The National Assembly must consist of no fewer than 350 and no more than 400 women and men elected as members [Section 46(1)].

These members must be elected in terms of an electoral system that complies with the following requirements: (a) is prescribed by national legislation; (b) is based on the national common voters roll; (c) provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years; and (d) results, in general, in proportional representation.

The Constitution does not prescribe election dates, only terms of office. The National Assembly is elected for a term of five years [Section 49(1)(a)]. It is the President who proclaims the date for an election. This date must be within 90 days after the expiry of the National Assembly's five-year term.

The President must dissolve the National Assembly after it has adopted a resolution to dissolve by a majority of its members. This can only happen after three years have passed since it was elected [Section 50(1)].

5.2 Provincial Government

Similar provisions apply to provincial legislatures. A provincial legislature consists of women and men elected as members in terms of an electoral system that: (a) is prescribed by national legislation; (b) is based on that province's segment of the national common voters roll; (c) provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years; and (d) re-

sults, in general, in proportional representation." [Section 105].

A provincial legislature is elected for a term of five years [Section 108(1)(a)]. It is the Premier who proclaims the date for an election. This date must be within 90 days after the expiry of the provincial legislature's five-year term.

The Premier must dissolve a provincial legislature if the members of the legislature pass a resolution to dissolve. This can only happen after three years have passed since it was elected. [Section 109(1)].

It is important to remember that while we refer "*the national and provincial elections*", these are actually 10 different elections. Constitutionally, provinces can hold elections on dates different from national elections and from other provinces.

5.3 Local Government

Similarly, the Constitution does not prescribe the detail of the local government electoral system. It provides that the election of members to a municipal council must be in accordance with national legislation.

The Constitution goes on to provide that national legislation must prescribe a system of proportional representation based on a municipality's segment of the national common voters roll.

The Constitution then provides for two options:

Option 1 provides for the election of members from lists of party candidates drawn up in a party's order of preference.

Option 2 provides for proportional representation, combined with a system of ward representation based on that municipality's segment of the national common voters roll.

The system provided for in the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act corresponds with Option 2: a system that combines proportional lists and wards.

Importantly, the Constitution provides that whatever electoral system is chosen for local government, it must result, in general, in proportional representation. [Section 157(2)]. Overall proportionality is interpreted as adding all ward and PR votes to determine the number of councillors each party receives in terms of the proportion of votes cast for that party.

The Constitution provides that the term of a Municipal Council may be no more than five years, as determined by national legislation. [Section 159]. The Minister responsible for local government proclaims the election date.

The Constitution provides that the objects of local government are, amongst others: (a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities, (b) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. [Section 152(1)].

5.4 Cooperative Governance

The Constitution provides that in the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial, local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. [Section 40(1)].

The distinctive, yet interdependent and interrelated nature of the three spheres and their specific mandates are important to consider in discussing the electoral system and the scheduling of elections.

5.5 Summary

In summary then, we can highlight the following Constitutional provisions:

- 1) The Constitution does not prescribe election dates - only the terms of the National Assembly, provincial legislatures and municipal councils.
- 2) Elections are constitutionally distinct events that can, but do not have to be held at the same time.
- 3) Regular elections must be held to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
- 4) The three spheres of government are distinctive, interdependent, interrelated.
- 5) There is an emphasis on democracy and community involvement in local government

Elections are central to democracy and the strategic objective of building a National Democratic Society - not a necessary inconvenience or compliance issue that must be discharged in the most efficient way possible before getting on with "real work."

The dynamic relationship between form and content, process and outcome, must be kept in mind when we discuss what electoral system best gives expression to the ideal of a National Democratic Society.



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